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PREFACE
PREFACE BY THE  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
In the past quarter century (namely, since the end of 
the Cold War), global governance has failed to keep 
pace with economic globalization. Therefore, as 
unprecedented openness in trade, finance, travel 
and communication has created economic growth 
and well-being, it has also given rise to massive 
opportunities for criminals to make their business 
prosper.
Organized crime has diversified, gone global and 
reached macro-economic proportions: illicit goods 
are sourced from one continent, trafficked across 
another, and marketed in a third. Mafias are today 
truly a transnational problem: a threat to security, 
especially in poor and conflict-ridden countries. 
Crime is fuelling corruption, infiltrating business 
and politics, and hindering development. And it is 
undermining governance by empowering those who 
operate outside the law:  
drug cartelss   are spreading violence in Central 
America, the Caribbean and West Africa;  
collusion between s  insurgents and criminal 
groups (in Central Africa, the Sahel and South-
East Asia) fuels terrorism and plunders natural 
resources; 
smuggling of migrants and s  modern slavery have 
spread in Eastern Europe as much as South-East 
Asia and Latin America;
in so many s  urban centres authorities have lost 
control to organized gangs; 
cybercrimes   threatens vital infrastructure and 
state security, steals identities and commits 
fraud;
piratess   from the world’s poorest countries (the 
Horn of Africa) hold to ransom ships from the 
richest nations;  
counterfeit goodss   undermine licit trade and en-
danger lives; 
money-launderings   in rogue jurisdictions and 
uncontrolled economic sectors corrupts the 
banking sector, worldwide.
So serious is the organized crime threat that the UN 
Security Council has on several occasions consid-
ered its implications in Afghanistan, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Central America, Somalia, 
West Africa, and in relation to several themes (traf-
ficking of arms, drugs, people, and natural resources). 
Around the world, organized crime has changed 
strategic doctrines and threat assessments. Armies 
have been mobilized to fight drug cartels, navies 
have been sent to capture pirates. Yet the threat 
persists. 
Despite the gravity of the threat, organized crime is 
insufficiently understood. There is a lack of infor-
mation on transnational criminal markets and 
trends. The few studies that exist have looked at 
sections of the problem, by sector or country, rather 
than the big picture. Without a global perspective 
there cannot be evidence-based policy. 
UNODC has produced this first-ever Transnational 
Organized Crime Threat Assessment to fill a know-
ledge gap and pave the way for future world crime 
reports. This Threat Assessment focuses on traffick-
ing flows, connects the dots between regions, and 
gives a global overview of illicit markets:  it reports 
about the ways and means international mafias have 
grown into an international problem. 
What is striking about the global map of trafficking 
routes is that most illicit flows go to, and/or ema-
nate from major economic powers (that is, the G8, 
but also informal groups like the BRIC). In other 
words, the world’s biggest trading partners are also 
the world’s biggest markets for illicit goods and 
services. On the one hand, this is a logical conse-
quence of the huge increase in the volume of trade. 
On the other, it reflects the extent to which the 
underworld has become inextricably linked to the 
global economy, and vice versa, through the illicit 
trade of legal products (like natural resources), or 
the use of established banking, trade and communi-
cations networks (financial centres, shipping con-
tainers, the Internet) that are moving growing 
amounts of illicit goods and thus profiting crime. 
It is also shocking how far many smuggled products, 
and people, travel before they reach their destina-
tion. Corruption, coercion and white collar collabo-
rators (in the private and public sectors) lower risk 
to international mafias while the effective logistics 
they provide increases mafia profits. This model has 
made transnational crime one of the world’s most 
sophisticated and profitable businesses. 
The perspective afforded by this global study should 
provoke some new thinking on combating transna-
tional organized crime. 
First, since crime has gone global, purely national 
responses are inadequate: they displace the problem 
from one country to another. Regional and interna-
tional responses are enabled by the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNTOC) adopted in 2000. Its tenth anniversary 
is a good occasion to agree on a mechanism to 
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review its implementation, not least to make infor-
mation-sharing compulsory which would enable 
UNODC to represent more effectively the global 
crime scene.   
Second, states have to look beyond borders to pro-
tect their sovereignty. In the past, they have jeal-
ously guarded their territory. In the contemporary 
globalized world, this approach makes states more, 
rather than less vulnerable. If police stop at borders 
while criminals cross them freely, sovereignty is 
already breached – actually, it is surrendered to 
those who break the law. Therefore, trans-border 
intelligence-sharing and law enforcement coopera-
tion are essential. 
Third, since transnational organized crime is driven 
by market forces, countermeasures must disrupt 
those markets, and not just the criminal groups that 
exploit them. Otherwise, new criminals will simply 
fill the void, and new routes will be found. 
Fourth, since traffickers follow the paths of least 
resistance – characterized by corruption, instability 
and underdevelopment – it is essential to strengthen 
security and the rule of law. The Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs) are the most effective anti-
dote to crime, while crime prevention helps to reach 
the MDGs. Peacebuilding and peacekeeping make 
fragile regions less prone to the conflict that affects 
crime, while fighting crime neutralizes spoilers who 
profit from instability.
Fifth, since criminals are motivated by profit, the 
key is to go after their money. That means strength-
ening integrity by implementing the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption. It also means stop-
ping informal money transfers (hawala), offshore 
banking and the recycling through real estates that 
make it possible to launder money. In particular, 
governments and financial institutions should 
implement Article 52 of the anti-corruption Con-
vention that requires Parties to know their custom-
ers, determine the beneficial owners of funds and 
prevent banking secrecy from protecting proceeds 
from crime.     
Sixth, since the wide-open window of trade is let-
ting criminals in, it is essential to install filters. In 
the past two decades, insufficient regulation and 
unchecked growth, together with the Internet and 
free trade zones, have enabled abuse of the eco-
nomic and financial systems. Today, greater vigi-
lance is needed to keep illicit goods out of the supply 
chain; prevent the diversion of licit products into 
the black market; strengthen anti-corruption meas-
ures; profile suspicious container and air traffic; 
crack down on cybercrime; and exercise due dili-
gence (for example, in banking and real estate).
In terms of global reach, penetration and impact, 
organized crime has become a threat affecting all 
Member States: they have a shared responsibility to 
respond. I hope this report will ring alarm bells, and 
contribute to new ways of looking at – and fighting 
– transnational organized crime.
 
Antonio Maria Costa 
Executive Director 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
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KEY FINDINGS
There are two ways of looking at transnational 
organized crime (TOC): some focus on multi-crime 
groups of professional criminals, while others focus 
on illicit markets.
To date, most of the attention has been given to the 
first approach, addressing TOC groups, using the 
tools of arrest and seizure, and this approach has 
seen some success at the national level.
National successes have often pushed trafficking 
flows into other countries, however, with the flow 
often settling along the path of least resistance, fre-
quently in countries with little capacity to bear the 
burden of TOC.
Most organized crime problems today seem to be 
less a matter of a group of individuals who are 
involved in a range of illicit activities, and more a 
matter of a group of illicit activities in which some 
individuals and groups are presently involved: strat-
egies aimed at the groups will not stop the illicit 
activities if the dynamics of the market remain 
unaddressed.
Most TOC flows begin on one continent and end 
on another, often by means of a third, so only inter-
ventions at the scale of the problem – global – are 
likely to have a sustained effect.
To address these markets, there is a need to better 
understand them. This is no easy task: data on clan-
destine markets are limited. The information that 
does exist is often out-of-date and frequently con-
flicting. This report represents the best reading of 
the available data, but is only as strong as the infor-
mation on which it is based. Quantitative estimates, 
in particular, are necessarily imprecise, offered only 
to give a sense of the relative order of magnitude of 
these problems. It is hoped that this publication will 
precipitate the collection and sharing of better data 
on organized crime topics.
                                                                         
With regard to human trafficking, a greater variety 
of nationalities of victims have been detected in 
Europe than in any other region.
After a strong increase at the end of the Cold War, 
human trafficking to Europe for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation appears to have stabilized, with 
women from a wide variety of countries displacing 
the Eastern European victims that formerly domi-
nated this market.
With regard to migrant smuggling, the two most 
prominent flows are the movement of workers from 
Latin America to North America and from Africa to 
Europe.
Most irregular migrants to the United States of 
America enter clandestinely across the south-west 
border of the country and over 90% are assisted by 
a large number of small scale professional smug-
glers, but this flow appears to be declining in 
response to the global financial crisis.
The routes for migration from sub-Saharan Africa 
to Europe have shifted dramatically in response to 
enforcement efforts, so the smugglers are often 
opportunistic entrepreneurs. While the number of 
detected migrants has recently declined dramati-
cally, it is too early to draw conclusions about the 
long-term trend.
With regard to heroin trafficking, around 90% of 
the global heroin supply comes from opium poppy 
cultivated in Afghanistan, and the majority of this 
is consumed in Europe, the Russian Federation and 
countries en route to these destinations.
The route to the Russian Federation takes advan-
tage of cross-border social and ethnic linkages in the 
new states of Central Asia, mostly moving the 
heroin in small amounts on board commercial and 
private vehicles.
In contrast, the flow to Europe appears to be more 
organized, with much larger shipments crossing a 
greater number of borders involving states with 
much higher interdiction capacity.
With regard to cocaine trafficking, the vast bulk of 
the flow proceeds from the Andean region to North 
America (often via Central America) and Europe 
(often via West Africa) though an increasing share 
is directed to the Southern Cone of South Amer-
ica.
Consumption of cocaine in the United States has 
been in long-term decline since the 1980s and has 
dramatically dropped off since 2006. This is likely 
due to enforcement efforts in Latin America, but 
these efforts have increased competition and vio-
lence between trafficking groups.
International attention and intervention, as well as 
political changes, appear to have substantially 
reduced trafficking through West Africa after 2007. 
Demand in Europe appears to be stabilizing after 
rapid growth in the last decade.
With regard to firearms trafficking, traffickers 
service two primary markets for illicit arms – those 
who need weapons for criminal purposes (such as 
KEY  
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the flow from the United States to Mexico), and 
those who need them for political ones (such as the 
flow from Eastern Europe to Africa). Different types 
of arms and techniques are implicated in each case.
Most of the firearms trafficked from the United 
States to Mexico appear to be acquired from licensed 
dealers by straw purchasers and then trafficked 
across the border in very small batches by a large 
number of couriers taking advantage of the high 
levels of cross-border traffic. This long-standing 
flow appears to be stable.
With massive stocks of arms from the Soviet era, 
some countries in Eastern Europe remain vulnera-
ble to trafficking, though control efforts and the 
global decline in civil conflicts have been reducing 
the risks. 
With regard to environmental resource traffick-
ing, the trafficking of wildlife from Africa and 
South-East Asia to other parts of Asia and the traf-
ficking of timber to China and Europe represent 
two of the best documented flows.
While the poaching of large species in Africa cap-
tures most of the attention and the demand for 
rhinos appears to have recently increased dramati-
cally, the growing consumption of a wide variety of 
smaller species from South-East Asia could have 
greater long-term environmental consequences and 
almost certainly brings more money to organized 
crime.
Measures have been taken to prevent the import of 
illegally harvested wood, but corruption and “timber 
laundering” in third countries are undermining 
these efforts, even as demand grows.
With regard to product counterfeiting, the out-
sourcing of production to Asia has fuelled global 
economic growth, but it has also created opportuni-
ties for counterfeiting. This can be seen in the flow 
of counterfeit consumer goods to Europe and the 
flow of counterfeit medicines to South-East Asia 
and Africa.
The flow of counterfeit goods into Europe, while 
small in comparison to licit goods, appears to have 
increased dramatically in recent years, and the lack 
of accountability for these items renders some 
classes of goods a serious public safety concern.
Trafficking of medicine is an opportunistic crime, 
emerging where regulatory capacity is low, not 
where profits would be highest. Because many of 
these products are dilute versions of genuine prod-
ucts, they may foster the evolution of drug-resistant 
strains of deadly pathogens.
With regard to maritime piracy, the traditional 
robbery on the high seas has been transformed into 
a form of kidnapping for ransom, as Somali pirates, 
sometimes directed by shipping industry insiders, 
seek a growing number of targets further and fur-
ther from their national waters.
With regard to cybercrime, the Internet has allowed 
traditional acquisitive crime, such as identity theft, 
and transnational trafficking, such as the trade in 
child pornography, to vastly increase in scope.
Online identity theft is still far less common than 
other forms of the crime, but the potential is much 
greater, and appears to be most advanced in the 
United States in terms of both victims and perpetra-
tors.
The production and distribution of child pornogra-
phy used to be both dangerous and inefficient, and 
there was a risk that the rise of the Internet would 
increase demand to the point that multi-crime 
groups began victimizing children for profit. To 
date, this risk does not appear to have been realized, 
though, as an increasing share of child pornography 
distributed is exchanged between peers on a non-
commercial basis.
Transnational organized crime can have an impact 
on political stability in vulnerable countries, includ-
ing both in countries where insurgencies and illegal 
armed groups are funded through trafficking (in the 
Andean region, South and Central Asia and Central 
Africa), and in countries where violence and cor-
ruption pose a serious challenge to the rule of law 
(West Africa and Mesoamerica).
                                                                         
The report concludes that while organized crime 
groups can become problems in themselves, elimi-
nating these groups is unlikely to stop the contra-
band flow. National efforts have successfully diverted 
production or trafficking to other countries, but so 
long as there is demand, national law enforcement 
alone cannot solve the problem. Rather, global 
strategies, involving a wide range of both public and 
private actors, are required to address global traf-
ficking. In many instances, this means regulating 
international commercial flows that have grown 
faster than our collective ability to manage them.
1EXECUTIVE 
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Transnational organized crime only found its way 
onto the international agenda recently, but has 
gathered considerable attention in recent years. The 
United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime entered into force in 2003. The 
next year, the United Nations High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges, and Change, identified trans-
national organized crime as one of “six clusters of 
threats with which the world must be concerned 
now and in the decades ahead.”1 In February 2010, 
the UN Security Council noted “with concern the 
serious threat posed in some cases by drug traffick-
ing and transnational organized crime to interna-
tional security in different regions of the world” and 
invited the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
“to consider these threats as a factor in conflict pre-
vention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated mis-
sions’ assessment and planning.”2 
Stopping the operations of transnational organized 
crime has thus become a matter of international 
priority. Translating political will into concrete 
results will mean achieving two difficult goals: 
understanding transnational organized crime and 
integrating national responses into international 
strategies. This report is a contribution to the first 
effort.
A non-exhaustive list of the transnational organized 
crime problems confronting us would surely include 
human trafficking, migrant smuggling, heroin traf-
ficking, cocaine trafficking, firearms trafficking, 
environmental resources trafficking, counterfeit 
goods trafficking, maritime piracy and cybercrime. 
Because most of these problems involve the traffick-
ing of people or goods internationally, this report 
focuses on documenting distinct “flows” as exam-
ples of each organized crime problem. This allows 
discussion of concrete details on how the trafficking 
is being conducted and who is involved. It also 
allows more accurate estimation of the size of the 
flow than is generally possible when speaking in 
global terms. Finally, this report looks at certain 
regions that are particularly vulnerable to the desta-
bilizing impact of organized crime. This is not 
always an easy task, as data are not usually readily 
available. Estimates should thus be interpreted with 
caution and may change as more and new informa-
tion becomes available. 
What is “transnational organized 
crime”?
Under the Organized Crime Convention, transna-
tional organized crime (TOC) is any serious trans-
national offence undertaken by three or more people 
with the aim of material gain. This understanding 
is broader than that popularly used, which tends to 
focus on multi-crime groups of career criminals.
This focus on the groups rather than the offences 
has deep implications for the way TOC is under-
stood and addressed. Law enforcement officials 
tend to conceive of TOC as groups of people, 
because the tools they possess – the powers of arrest 
and seizure – can only be levelled against individu-
als. But TOC problems are often caused by factors 
other than the people presently implicated. To solve 
these problems, tools are needed beyond those given 
to law enforcement officials.
Law enforcement officials are also limited to action 
within their national jurisdiction. Facilitated by the 
Convention and similar mechanisms, bilateral and 
regional cooperation are possible, but the TOC 
problems examined in this report are often global in 
scale. To resolve global issues, global strategic think-
ing is required.
Gathering reliable information on which to base 
this strategy is no easy task. Unlike the “conven-
tional” crimes (murder, rape, robbery et cetera), 
citizens rarely approach the police with complaints 
about organized crime. Many of the offences are 
“victimless”, in the sense that none of the parties 
participating has any interest in bringing the matter 
to the attention of the police. Consequently, most 
organized criminal activity is only registered when 
the police take the pains to proactively investigate 
it. Some enforcement agencies lack the capacity, or 
the mandate, to do this.
Of all the areas under consideration, the most is 
known about drug trafficking. UNODC and con-
cerned governments have conducted surveys of the 
major cultivation areas for coca bush and opium 
poppy for many years, and so estimates can be made 
with some precision as to how much cocaine and 
heroin are being produced. Many countries submit 
their drug seizure data to UNODC, and many of 
the main destination countries have survey data on 
the size of the drug-using population. Supply, 
demand and seizures can be triangulated to give a 
more reliable picture than any single data source 
could generate. But there are still serious deficien-
cies in our knowledge about the way drug markets 
operate. Even less is known about other areas of 
transnational organized crime, and there are few 
global databases on these topics.
The matter is made all the more confusing because 
the nature of transnational organized crime is 
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changing all the time. Drug epidemics have come 
and gone and resurfaced in new environs. Human 
trafficking and firearms flows have rapidly expanded 
in areas of conflict and subsided just as rapidly. The 
end of the Cold War, the decline in the number and 
severity of civil wars, and the advance of globaliza-
tion – all have impacted on organized crime in 
unpredicted ways. Future trends are likely to be 
affected by global shifts in demographics, migra-
tion, urbanization, conflict and economics. To avoid 
being blindsided, the international community 
needs to better understand the way that TOC pat-
terns relate to broader social changes.
Aside from what little is known about specific mar-
kets, can anything sensible be said about trends in 
transnational organized crime generally? There 
appears to be general consensus that both highly 
structured and loosely structured organizations are 
involved in transnational organized crime, and a 
number of authorities have argued that the former 
are losing out to the latter. Under enforcement pres-
sure, the narrative goes, the traditional, hierarchical 
organized crime groups have developed a “cell struc-
ture” similar to that seen in terrorist groups, with 
small networks doing the work formerly performed 
by more rigid structures.
Rather than being an adaptive response of tradi-
tional groups, it appears that these networks of 
market-driven individuals have always existed in 
transnational trafficking, but were less visible to law 
enforcement authorities focused on local crime 
problems. Perhaps it is safest to say that the groups 
themselves have become less important than the 
markets with which they engage. Today, organized 
crime seems to be less a matter of a group of indi-
viduals who are involved in a range of illicit activi-
ties, and more a matter of a group of illicit activities 
in which some individuals and groups are presently 
involved. If these individuals are arrested and incar-
cerated, the activities continue, because the illicit 
market, and the incentives it generates, remain. To 
solve TOC problems, it is necessary to come to 
terms with these markets on the scale at which they 
operate. The following case studies are an attempt 
at assessing some of these flows.
Trafﬁcking in persons
Trafficking in persons is a truly global phenome-
non: in data recently reported to UNODC, victims 
from at least 127 countries were detected, and 137 
countries reported having detected victims. While 
this sample may not be representative of the entire 
victim pool, two thirds of the victims reported were 
women, and 79% of the victims were subjected to 
sexual exploitation. The European Union has one of 
the best documented pools of victims of trafficking 
for the purposes of sexual exploitation, with a 
greater variety of nationalities (at least 95) than any 
other part of the world. This market is the subject 
of a flow study. 
Trafﬁcking of women to Europe
With the end of the Cold War, a large number of 
labourers of all sorts moved from Eastern to West-
ern Europe. Some of these labourers were or became 
sex workers, and not all came voluntarily. In 
2005/2006, 51% of human trafficking victims 
detected in Europe were from the Balkans or the 
former Soviet Union, in particular Romania, Bul-
garia, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Moldova. But this appears to be chang-
ing, as women trafficked from other parts of the 
world are becoming more prominent.
In many instances, women, some of whom may 
have once been victims themselves, play an impor-
tant role in exploiting the victims. The traffickers 
are often of the same nationality as the victim, 
although there are important exceptions. The tech-
niques used to recruit victims seem to vary by source 
country: in Eastern Europe, for example, victims 
may be collected through employment agencies, 
while in West Africa, family and social networks are 
utilized. As a general rule, groups engaging in traf-
ficking for sexual exploitation are small, although 
there have been exceptions.
ORIGINS OF TRAFFICKING  FIG. 2: 
VICTIMS DETECTED IN WEST AND  
CENTRAL EUROPE, 2005-2006
Balkans
32%
Central 
Europe
7%
Others
21%
East Asia
3%
South 
America
13%
Africa
5%
Former Soviet 
Union
19%
Source: Elaboration of UNODC-UN.GIFT data
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The chapter estimates that there are 140,000 traf-
ficking victims in Europe, generating a gross annual 
income of US$3 billion for their exploiters. With 
an average period of exploitation of two years, this 
would suggest over 70,000 new entries every year. 
The trend appears to be stable.
Smuggling of migrants
Due to global inequalities and restrictive immigra-
tion policies, many workers from developing regions 
are willing to borrow heavily from their communi-
ties and risk their lives to access opportunities in the 
more affluent countries. Since they cannot do this 
legally, they often employ organized criminals to 
assist them, and become more likely to do so as 
immigration controls tighten. Because these serv-
ices are illegal, those who provide them have tre-
mendous power over their charges, and abuses are 
commonplace, particularly when the movement is 
clandestine. This report examines two northward 
smuggling flows: from Latin America to North 
America and from Africa to Europe. 
Latin America to North America
The USA hosts the second-largest Spanish speaking 
population in the world, including more than 9 
million people born in Mexico. Over a third of the 
population speaks Spanish in the border states of 
California, Texas and New Mexico. Combined with 
the fact that some 150 million Latin Americans live 
on less than two dollars per day, this expatriate 
population exerts a powerful pull on the poorer 
states to the south. Mexican immigrants can expect 
to greatly improve their standard of living without 
having to master a new language or leave behind 
their cultural group. As a result, an estimated 80% 
of the illegal immigrant population in the United 
States is from Latin America. Most clandestine 
entrants to the USA come across the Mexican land 
border, most of these entrants are Mexican, and 
over 90% of illegal Mexican migrants are assisted by 
professional smugglers. Some 88% of the total 
792,000 migrants apprehended in 2008 were Mex-
ican nationals, and the remainder were mostly other 
Latin Americans. 
Although migrants have been detected travelling by 
rail, on foot and even using dedicated tunnels, most 
of the migrants are smuggled in trucks. The smug-
gling generally takes the migrants some distance 
from the border. Smuggled migrants may be col-
lected in “stash houses”, either before the crossing 
or once inside the USA. The smugglers group the 
migrants in these houses in order to receive the rest 
of the smuggling fee. This is normally paid by 
migrants’ relatives in the country of origin or in the 
USA. While delaying payment until the crossing is 
complete provides some security that migrants will 
not simply be dumped in the desert, it also trans-
forms the migrants into hostages, the collateral on 
which the transaction is secured. In Mexico, non-
Mexican migrants have been held for ransom as 
well. While some sophisticated operations have 
been detected, it appears that a large number of 
small groups handle the bulk of the trade.
Overall, it appears that about 3 million Latin Amer-
icans are smuggled illegally across the southern 
border of the USA every year. Since 90% of them are 
assisted by smugglers, the income for the smugglers 
is likely to be around 7 billion dollars per year. This 
market appears to have been in sharp decline since 
2005. Between 2005 and 2008, the number of Mex-
ican apprehensions decreased by 35% and appre-
hensions of other nationals decreased by 62%.
Africa to Europe
The dynamics behind African migration to Europe 
are similar to those behind Latin American migra-
tion to the USA, except the push and pull factors are 
even stronger. The fact that illegal immigration from 
Africa to Europe is a fraction the size of that from 
Latin America to the USA is probably partly due to 
the relative difficulty of making the crossing, and 
partly due to the relatively small size of the African 
expatriate population in Europe. Nonetheless, 
Europe does host the largest African-born popula-
tion outside Africa, and remittances form a signifi-
cant share of GDP in many African countries.
Most migrant smuggling routes involve long land 
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passages and short maritime hops to European 
islands. Both parts of this voyage are hazardous, and 
the migrants are subject to exploitation throughout 
their journey. The routes taken have changed dra-
matically in response to enforcement action. For 
example, the Canary Islands grew rapidly until 
2006, at which point enforcement pushed the flow 
toward Lampedusa, until a cooperation agreement 
between Italy and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 
May 2009 abruptly shut this route down. Since 
these islands are not the final destination of the 
migrants, they rely on the authorities to transport 
them to the mainland. Many European countries 
do not have repatriation agreements with African 
countries, and migrants without identification 
papers are generally released with an order to depart. 
Counting on this outcome, most African migrants 
actively seek to be detected by the authorities.
This makes assessing the flow relatively simple. 
Some 55,000 migrants were smuggled into Europe 
in 2008, worth about US$150 million to the small 
groups of smugglers who found themselves posi-
tioned along the route at that time. The overall flow 
appeared to be slowly growing until 2009, but it 
remains to be seen whether the financial crisis will 
reverse this trend in Europe as it has in the United 
States.
Cocaine
Cocaine comes from three countries in the Andean 
region. Until recently, almost all cocaine production 
was directed north, to the US market, but US 
demand has been declining since the 1980s, and 
recently fell precipitously. At the same time, cocaine 
demand in Europe began to grow, and has increased 
rapidly in the twenty-first century. 
From South America to North America
The ways cocaine is moved from South America to 
North America have varied over time, partly in 
response to enforcement efforts and partly due to 
changes in the groups doing the trafficking. Today, 
cocaine is typically transported from Colombia to 
Mexico or Central America by sea (usually by 
Colombians) and then onwards by land to the 
United States and Canada (usually by Mexicans). 
The US authorities estimate that close to 90% of 
the cocaine entering the country crosses the US/
Mexico land border, and some 70% of the cocaine 
leaves Colombia via the Pacific, 20% via the Atlan-
tic, and 10% via the Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela and the Caribbean.
Following the dismantling of the Medellin and Cali 
cartels in the early 1990s, the Colombian organized 
crime groups got smaller and violence declined. At 
the same time, Mexican groups grew in size and 
strength, and today are responsible for most of the 
violence in Mexico. 
Some 196 tons of cocaine are needed to satisfy US 
demand, a flow valued at US$38 billion in 2008, 
but this money is not evenly distributed. The coca 
farmers in the three Andean countries earned about 
US$1.1 billion that year. The amounts generated 
from processing and trafficking activities within the 
Andean countries for cocaine destined to be shipped 
towards North America amounted to around 
US$400 million. The total gross profits accruing to 
those importing cocaine to Mexico can be estimated 
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at around US$2.4 billion (excluding costs of ship-
ping), and the Mexican cartels reaped US$2.9 bil-
lion that year moving the cocaine across the border 
into the USA. The largest profits, however, are gen-
erated within the USA: US$29.5 billion between 
the US wholesale level and US consumers. Out of 
these gross profits, the bulk is made between the 
mid-level dealers and the consumers, accounting for 
more than US$24 billion or 70% of the total size of 
the US cocaine market.
From the Andean region to Europe
The number of cocaine users in Europe has doubled 
over the last decade, from 2 million in 1998 to 4.1 
million in 2007/2008. The overall level of cocaine 
use is still lower than in North America, but indi-
vidual European countries, notably Spain and the 
United Kingdom, now have higher annual preva-
lence rates than the USA. The European cocaine 
market grew in value from US$14 billion in 1998 
to US$34 billion in 2008, about the same size as the 
US market. Preliminary data suggest the rapid 
growth of the European cocaine market is begin-
ning to level off, however.
Most of the trafficking of cocaine to Europe is by 
sea. Most cocaine shipments to Europe are destined 
for one of two regional hubs: Spain and Portugal in 
the south and the Netherlands and Belgium in the 
north. Colombia remains the main source of the 
cocaine found in Europe, but direct shipments from 
Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia are far 
more common than in the US market. The routes 
taken to arrive in Europe have changed in recent 
years. Between 2004 and 2007, at least two distinct 
trans-shipment hubs emerged in West Africa: one 
centred on Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, and one 
centred in the Bight of Benin which spans from 
Ghana to Nigeria. Political turmoil in the northern 
hub and successful interdiction elsewhere appear to 
have dampened this transit route for the time being, 
although it could quickly re-emerge. The Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela has also emerged as a key 
transit country for shipments to Europe, particu-
larly for large maritime shipments.
In the end, about 124 tons of cocaine are distributed 
in Europe, worth some US$34 billion. It appears 
that less than 1% of the value of cocaine sales in 
Europe goes to the Andean coca farmers, and 
another 1% goes to traffickers within the Andean 
region. The international traffickers who ship the 
cocaine from the Andean region to the main entry 
points (notably Spain) obtain 25% of the final sales 
value. A further 17% is generated in shipping the 
cocaine from the entry points to the wholesalers in 
the final destination countries across Europe. The 
largest income is generated in the destination coun-
tries, between the wholesaler and the consumer, 
generating more than 56% of the total. As there are 
far more dealers at the national level, however, the 
per capita income of the dealers at the national level 
in Europe is lower than among the smaller group of 
internationally operating cocaine dealers.
Heroin
The origin of most of the world’s heroin is concen-
trated in a handful of provinces in embattled 
Afghanistan. Afghan heroin feeds a global market 
worth about US$55 billion annually. The Balkan 
DISTRIBUTION OF COCAINE SEIZURES MADE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, FIG. 6: 
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and Northern routes are the main heroin trafficking 
corridors linking Afghanistan to the huge markets 
of the Russian Federation (US$13 billion) and 
Western Europe (US$20 billion). Most of the prof-
its go to the organized crime groups along the route, 
but some goes to fund insurgents in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan to the Russian Federation
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the use of heroin 
appears to have rapidly grown in the Russian Fed-
eration, but began to stabilize around 2001. Today, 
there are an estimated 1.5 million heroin users in 
the Russian Federation, making it the single largest 
national heroin consumer in the world. To get to 
Russian markets from Afghanistan, land transport 
appears to be the most popular route. Twenty years 
ago, all the countries north of Afghanistan were part 
of the USSR, so cross-border linkages are common. 
These new states are mostly poor and some have 
had problems with political insurgencies. Under-
resourced and struggling to find their feet, stopping 
trans-shipment of heroin was not an early priority. 
Today, efforts are being made, and several tons of 
heroin are seized each year, but some 70 tons 
manage to make their way through to satisfy 
demand in the Russian Federation.
To get 70 tons to the Russian consumers, some 95 
tons, or 25% of all Afghan heroin exports, must 
pass from Afghanistan into Central Asia, with 
Tajikistan handling most of this volume. Both large, 
well-organized groups and small entrepreneurs 
appear to be engaged in trafficking, with the drug 
typically changing hands multiple times before 
reaching the consumers. Cross-border familial and 
ethnic linkages appear to be important in facilitat-
ing the flow.
These 70 tons are sold for US$13 billion in Russian 
markets, and this flow appears to have been increas-
ing since 1999.
Afghanistan to Europe
The “Balkan route” proceeds by land from the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (or Pakistan into the 
Islamic Republic of Iran) via Turkey and through 
South-East Europe. To satisfy European demand for 
87 tons of heroin, about 140 tons must depart 
Afghanistan along this route, largely due to high 
levels of seizures in the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Turkey. Most of this heroin is consumed in just four 
countries: the United Kingdom, Italy, France and 
Germany.
Organized crime groups involved in international 
trafficking on the Balkan route are often composed 
of nationals from the source or transit countries. But, 
at various stages, many of the traffickers may be 
transportation professionals contracted to do the job, 
not necessarily members of the group that owns the 
drugs. Opiates destined for Western Europe are traf-
ficked out of Afghanistan by Baluchi and Pashtun 
networks operating in the border regions of Afghan-
istan, Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Baluchi groups are believed to offload their ship-
ments in the Islamic Republic of Iran to groups with 
greater regional and international ties, such as Azeri, 
Arab, Persian and Kurdish groups. Once opiates have 
changed hands, these groups are then mainly respon-
sible for shipping the drugs from the eastern to the 
western borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Once in Turkey, large shipments are broken down 
into smaller parcels for distribution in Europe.
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In the Balkans, relatively little heroin is seized, sug-
gesting the route is exceedingly well organized and 
lubricated with corruption. Balkan groups are 
important through the Balkans, but do not appear 
to control the drugs in destination markets. In most 
European countries, nationals control the local drug 
markets. The Netherlands acts as another redistri-
bution center, after Turkey. 
Firearms
The trafficking of firearms is unlike many of the 
other forms of trafficking discussed in this report 
because firearms are durable goods. In addition, the 
modern pistol or assault rifle represents a “mature 
technology”, so current weapons holders do not 
need to regularly update their stock to remain com-
petitive. Consequently, the number of new small 
arms purchased each year is only about 1% of those 
already in circulation, and this likely applies to both 
licit and illicit markets. There are two primary mar-
kets for illicit arms – those who need weapons for 
criminal purposes, and those who need them for 
political ones. The movement of firearms from the 
United States to Mexico represents an example of 
the first, while the outflow of guns from Eastern 
Europe serves as an example of the second.
From the United States to Mexico
The United States of America is an obvious source 
of weapons for criminals in Mexico. The United 
States has the most heavily armed civilian popula-
tion in the world, with about one quarter of all 
adults having at least one firearm. The gun trade in 
the United States is subject to competitive pres-
sures, so weapons are also inexpensive in compari-
son to countries where firearms sales are highly 
regulated, such as Mexico.
It appears that most of the firearms trafficked into 
Mexico are purchased from one of the 6,700 gun 
dealers along the border with Mexico using “straw 
purchasers” and driven across the border by a large 
number of cross-border smugglers. Very small 
batches of weapons are moved across at the regular 
crossing points, concealed in private vehicles. About 
88 million passenger cars cross the border each year, 
and most of those crossing the border do so every 
day; a single smuggler following this ebb and flow 
can transport more than 500 weapons per year in 
loads too small to be suspected as organized traf-
ficking. In the end, the cross-border trade in arms 
is best seen as a market, rather than a group-driven 
activity.
Mexico already has a lot of illicit arms, however: an 
estimated 10 million unregistered weapons, or 
enough to arm one in three of the adult males in the 
country. In this context, trafficking serves mainly to 
top up the market. Based on what is known about 
the size of the groups that provide the bulk of 
demand – the drug cartels – an estimated 20,000 
weapons are trafficked each year, worth at most 
US$20 million.
From Eastern Europe to the world
The dissolution of the former Soviet Union left 
many of the new countries, particularly on strategic 
borders, with an unwanted legacy: large stockpiles of 
aging, but still functional, arms and ammunition. 
Ukraine is a case in point. After dissolution, Ukraine 
essentially inherited 30% of the Soviet military-in-
dustrial complex. The country currently holds an 
estimated 7 million small arms. In absolute terms, 
this is the third largest stockpile in the world, after 
China and the Russian Federation, but Ukraine 
emerges as the country with the most spare firearms 
per active duty soldier. This large stockpile presents 
a risk as shown by numerous reports of attempted or 
completed transfers to states subject to sanctions or 
involved in regional conflicts, particularly in Africa.
To arm a revolution or embargoed military, a large 
number of weapons is required. It is generally dif-
ficult to steal and clandestinely traffic sufficient 
quantities to make the venture worthwhile, so most 
military arms “trafficking” takes place under a 
veneer of legality. Like other commodities where 
the legality of a shipment is entirely dependent on 
paperwork, most large-scale arms trafficking hinges 
on corruption. Most transactions involve a combi-
nation of officials and international arms brokers. 
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These brokers sell their connections, their access to 
fraudulent paperwork, and their transportation 
services to both insurgent groups and embargoed 
states. They operate chains of shell companies and 
often own small fleets of surplus planes and other 
vehicles. Because warring parties may lack an inter-
national currency, brokers may take payment in the 
form of natural resource concessions, making money 
on both the sale of the arms and the sale of exported 
commodities. As a result, they may have a back-
ground in dealing in natural resources.
In terms of valuation, arms trafficking to political 
combatants is episodic, and so it is difficult to speak 
of a consistent flow. During a crisis, demand may 
be high, only to subside as peace is restored. Look-
ing just at shipments connected to a specific case of 
trafficking to South Sudan, some 40,000 Kalash-
nikovs were sold in 2007/2008, valued at some 
US$33 million. 
Environmental resources
There are many forms of transnational organized 
environmental crime, and as global regulations 
grow, new forms will emerge. Classically, there are 
two major subheadings under which these offences 
fall. One is crime related to pollution, in particular 
hazardous waste dumping and the trade in ozone-
depleting substances. The second is crimes related 
to illicit harvesting of natural resources, in particu-
lar threatened animal species, timber and fish. This 
discussion focuses on two important instances of 
environmental resource theft and trafficking: the 
trafficking of endangered species from Africa and 
South-East Asia to Asia as a whole, and the traffick-
ing of timber from South-East Asia to Europe and 
Asia.
Wildlife from Africa and South-East Asia 
to Asia
Between them, sub-Saharan Africa and South-East 
Asia are home to a large share of the world’s endan-
gered large mammal species. Both regions face seri-
ous challenges to environmental protection, 
including a lack of effectively managed resources for 
law enforcement, few alternative livelihoods for 
rural people, long hunting traditions, periodic insur-
gencies and conflicts, weak border enforcement, and 
some enforcement officials who may find the eco-
nomic potential of this market more attractive than 
their salary. These problems are not unique to these 
regions, but, unfortunately, the wildlife species are.
The first step in the trafficking chain is poaching. 
Well-organized groups have been documented, and 
it is clear that some have turned environmental 
exploitation into a business. Not all players in the 
market are full-time professionals, and some of 
those sourcing wildlife products may be informal 
participants. 
In Africa, every state with a wildlife population is 
affected by poaching, but it appears that Central 
Africa is the main source of elephant ivory, and 
Southern Africa the main source of rhino horn. 
Some of these products are retailed to tourists 
locally, but very large consignments of ivory have 
been detected en route to Asia, representing larger 
organizations. There is evidence of militants being 
involved in the trade, including Somali and Suda-
nese groups.
In South-East Asia, a much wider variety of smaller 
wildlife is harvested, but the volumes are staggering, 
and the environmental implications less well under-
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stood. One large species, the tiger, is on the verge of 
being poached into extinction in the wild. Border 
crossings are frequently made at points controlled 
by insurgent groups.
Between 5,000 and 12,000 African elephants are 
killed every year to supply the market with between 
50 and 120 tons of ivory annually. The East Asian 
ivory market appears to be worth about US$62 mil-
lion per year. While seizures are smaller, rhino horn 
is worth far more than elephant ivory per kilogram. 
About 800 kilograms has entered the market in 
recent years, worth just over US$8 million per year. 
Tiger parts continue to fetch high prices, but have 
become so scarce that if as much as 5% of the remain-
ing tiger population were poached, this market 
would be worth less than US$5 million per year.
Timber from South-East Asia to the  
European Union and Asia
The transportation of wild animal parts, when 
detected, tends to raise questions. In contrast, the 
transport of large volumes of timber and wood 
products is a staple of international commerce. As 
with other ostensibly licit goods, the legality of any 
particular shipment of timber is based on paper-
work. Fraudulent paperwork can be used for a 
number of purposes. It can transmute a protected 
hardwood into a more mundane variety. It can 
render a product originating in a protected area into 
one from an authorized source. In Asia, much of 
this paperwork is not forged – it is bought from 
corrupt officials in timber source countries. 
Illegal logging gangs operate throughout the source 
countries, with varying degrees of assistance from 
corrupt officials, particularly in the military. Bro-
kers are often based in third countries in the region. 
Due to the bulk of the product, timber is generally 
transported by sea or by road, entering through 
official border crossings. Timber of questionable 
origin may be “laundered” by being re-exported or 
processed within the region. 
Imports of illicitly sourced wood-based products to 
the EU from China and South-East Asia in 2009 are 
estimated at some US$2.6 billion, and from South-
East Asia to China at about US$870 million. Much 
of this commerce is based on fraudulently acquired 
paperwork sourced from corrupt officials in South-
East Asia, and consequently it has become very 
difficult to disentangle licit and illicit in this area.
Counterfeit goods 
Product counterfeiting is a form of consumer fraud: 
a product is sold, purporting to be something that 
it is not. The practice is widespread – products des-
tined for 140 countries were detected in 2008 – and 
poses a serious global challenge. The branding of a 
product provides implicit quality assurance and a 
legal line of accountability that consumers have 
come to take for granted. Unaccountable products 
are often dangerous products, and the damage is not 
just felt in the receiving countries: the producing 
countries also suffer. Even as the major brands work 
to improve labour standards and workplace safety at 
their outsourced manufacturing sites, counterfeit 
goods producers take advantage of global sweat-
shops. As licensed manufacturers try to improve 
their environmental impact standards, counterfeit-
ers enjoy the cost savings of dirty production. In 
short, anywhere that the international community 
attempts to establish good practice standards for 
industry, counterfeiters undercut them.
Counterfeit goods from Asia to Europe
Much of global economic growth in recent years has 
derived from outsourcing. Counterfeiters have taken 
advantage of this practice – in which the designers 
and manufacturers of a product often live on diffe-
rent continents. China, in particular, has grown 
rapidly as the world’s workshop, and according to 
World Customs Organization statistics, some two 
thirds of counterfeits detected globally in recent 
years were shipped from China. This production is 
typically decentralized. A large number of firms can 
produce virtually any product desired, and since 
many products are not branded until they are closer 
to their destination markets, the lines between licit 
and illicit production can become blurred.
The number of counterfeits detected at the Euro-
pean border has increased dramatically in recent 
years, and most of these products originate in China 
(including Hong Kong, China and Taiwan, Pro-
vince of China). It remains unclear how much of 
this flow is due to push factors and how much to 
pull. As many are licit products on their face, most 
of these goods are shipped out by the same means 
as other manufactured goods, although they may be 
falsely declared to avoid inspections and evade taxes. 
The bulk proceeds by sea. Some are further pro-
cessed, including mislabelling, in free trade zones in 
transit or once in Europe.
Once in Europe, the goods are distributed in a vari-
ety of ways. Some are sold through ostensibly licit 
discount retailers, but a large share appears to be 
distributed through informal markets, including flea 
markets. Street retailing is also important, usually 
making use of the labour of illegal immigrants. 
There have been documented instances in which 
11
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
migrants, indentured to those who smuggled them 
into the country, have been compelled to work in 
the counterfeit vending trade. Based on European 
seizures and consumer surveys, the value of this 
market can be estimated at US$8.2 billion per year.
Counterfeit medicines from Asia to  
South-East Asia and Africa
Asia has also emerged as a key source of medicine, 
especially for developing countries, and some share 
of this trade involves counterfeit pharmaceuticals. 
The debate around what constitutes a “counterfeit” 
drug has become highly politicized. From a crime 
perspective, any mislabelled product, whether 
intended to deceive as to the maker or the content, 
constitutes consumer fraud. When drugs are not of 
the potency or even of the type they are labelled to 
be, the results can be catastrophic, and not only for 
the buyer. Dilute medication can fuel the breeding 
of drug-resistant strains of pathogens with global 
implications.
A large share of certain key medicines tested in both 
South-East Asia and Africa have failed potency tests 
and many are clear forgeries. It is clear that orga-
nized criminal groups are deliberately defrauding 
consumers in some of the poorest parts of the world, 
often with lethal results. The consensus, increas-
ingly backed by forensic research, is that these drugs 
are originating primarily in India and China.
This crime is perpetrated for relatively meagre prof-
its, considering the volumes involved and likely 
outlay. Consumers in these regions spend less than 
US$10 per capita per annum on medicines. If one 
tenth of their expenditure was wasted on counter-
feits, this would represent a market of some US$1.6 
billion per year.
Maritime piracy
Unlike most of the other organized crime problems 
discussed in this report, maritime piracy is not a 
trafficking issue. No contraband is moved, no illicit 
market serviced. Rather, it is a violent, acquisitive 
crime that exploits a dense international flow of 
commercial vessels. The term “piracy” encompasses 
two distinct sorts of offences: The first is robbery or 
hijacking, where the target of the attack is a mari-
time vessel or its cargo; the second is kidnapping for 
ransom, where the object of the attack is the crew. 
The Somali situation is unique in that almost all of 
the piracy involves kidnapping for ransom. 
Modern piracy off the coast of Somalia is said to 
have arisen from efforts of local fishermen who 
formed vigilante groups to protect their territorial 
waters. Today, in a situation similar to what has 
happened in the Niger Delta, the political aims of 
the pirates have all but been forgotten. While the 
rhetoric remains, the true end of these attacks is the 
enrichment of the pirates. Drifting further and fur-
ther from the Somali coasts, the pirates are attack-
ing commercial freighters, pleasure craft and other 
vessels that have nothing to do with Somalia. Rather 
than championing the cause of the Somali people, 
pirates today attack vessels bearing the food aid on 
which so many Somalis depend.
At present, most of the piracy appears to be con-
ducted by a small number of dedicated groups, with 
limited ties to militants and insurgents on the main-
land. This could easily change, however, as wealth 
generated through this activity becomes attractive to 
those who control the landing sites. In relative terms, 
piracy generates fortunes. In absolute terms, the true 
figure is unlikely to exceed US$100 million.
10,709
26,704
37,334
43,671
49,381
22,311
7,553
5,056
6,253
4,694
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
 Source: European Commission
ATTEMPTS TO IMPORT COUNTERFEIT GOODS FIG. 12: 
DETECTED AT THE EUROPEAN CUSTOMS 
UNION BORDER, 1999-2008
Source: World Health Organization
PERCENTAGE OF CHLOROQUINE TABLETS FAILING FIG. 13: 
POTENCY TESTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2003
5
20
29
43
47
57
67
0 20 40 60 80 100
Sudan
Mozambique
Gabon
Kenya
Mali
Zimbabwe
Ghana
%
12
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cybercrime
Cybercrime also differs from the product trafficking 
markets considered in the earlier chapters. “Cyber-
crime” has been used to describe a wide range of 
offences, including offences against computer data 
and systems (such as “hacking”), computer-related 
forgery and fraud (such as “phishing”), content 
offences (such as disseminating child pornography) 
and copyright offences (such as the dissemination 
of pirated content). This discussion focuses on two 
of the most problematic: the well-established fraud 
of identity theft and the previously unprofitable 
trade in child pornography. The former is an acquis-
itive crime, an updated version of check kiting. The 
PIRACY INCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO SOMALI PIRATES, FIG. 14: 2006-2009 
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latter is a kind of electronic trafficking, transmitting 
contraband across borders through the Internet.
Identity theft
Today, identity-related offences are both the most 
common form of consumer fraud, and the fastest 
growing. The misuse of credit card information is 
often identified as the most common form of iden-
tity-related crime, but most of this activity occurs 
offline. Electronic banking has offered opportuni-
ties for acquiring the cash more directly. The most 
recent techniques used to acquire identity informa-
tion by Internet-related methods can be broken 
into three large headings: “phishing”, or deceiving 
Internet users into divulging their personal infor-
mation; “malware”, or the use of unintentionally-
installed software which collects and transmits 
personal information; and “hacking”, or illegally 
accessing computer systems remotely.
Identity theft is not necessarily a crime that needs 
to be committed with the help of others. Both the 
seller and the buyer of identity-related information 
are involved in the offence, but they do not form a 
“group” any more than do the buyers or sellers of 
any other commodity. One of the great advantages 
of the Internet for criminals is that it allows the 
formation of exactly these ad-hoc associations 
between otherwise unrelated individuals. 
The USA has been reported as the leading source of 
credit card numbers advertised on underground 
economy servers. Figures from the USA show that 
most computer crime against US citizens is com-
mitted by other US citizens. Based on US data, the 
value of Internet-related identity crime globally can 
be estimated at some 1 billion dollars annually.
Child pornography
Until recently, the production and acquisition of 
child pornography were highly risky activities. Only 
a limited number of paedophiles had access to the 
facilities to produce hard copy materials, most 
materials were produced by amateurs, and their dis-
semination was limited to social networks that were 
both difficult to establish and fragile. One of the 
risks associated with the growth of the Internet is 
that the greater accessibility of child pornography 
could lead to greater demand, and thus greater 
profitability in the production and sale of these 
materials. If child pornography were to approach 
the profitability of adult pornography, this could 
attract the attention of organized crime groups, 
transforming what had been a furtive paper exchange 
into a professional operation and leading to greater 
levels of victimization. The risk could be particu-
larly acute in developing countries.
To date, this threat does not appear to have been 
realized. Although some large-scale commercial 
websites have been detected, most of the traffic in 
these materials appears to occur on a voluntary basis 
between amateur collectors, increasingly through 
peer-to-peer networks. The share of websites that 
are commercial seems to vary dramatically by juris-
diction. This may be related to the likelihood of 
being prosecuted in any given country.
This is not to minimize the importance of the prob-
lem. Amateur producers may victimize children 
opportunistically (including their own offspring) 
and publicize the results. Because the victims and 
the offenders are so often related in some way, and 
because most of the exchange appears to take place 
between fellow offenders, most of the production 
seems to take place in the consumer countries. 
Research on the ethnicity of the victims suggests 
few are from Africa, Asia or Latin America.
Although there have been multibillion dollar esti-
mates of the size of the child pornography industry, 
the existing data do not support an estimate of 
more than 1 billion dollars globally, with US$250 
million likely a better approximation. Clearly, child 
pornography is not a crime that can be reduced to 
a dollar figure.
Transnational organized crime and 
instability
TOC can present a major challenge even where the 
state is strong, but when, for a variety of reasons, 
the rule of law is already weakened, it can pose a 
Credit card 
information
32%
Others
25%
Bank account 
credentials
19%Email 
accounts
5%
Email 
addresses
5%
Proxies
4%
Full identities
4%
Mailers
3%
Cash out 
services
3%
Source: Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report 2008
BREAKDOWN OF GOODS AND SERVICES  FIG. 15: 
AVAILABLE FOR SALE ON SAMPLED UNDER-
GROUND ECONOMY SERVERS, BY TYPE, 2008

15
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
abuse, as diamond-fuelled wars in Angola and Sierra 
Leone demonstrate. The oil-driven conflict in the 
Niger Delta provides a current example.
Organized crime can become even more important 
when rebels gain exclusive control of a portion of a 
country. The pseudo-states thus created have no 
international accountability and, particularly when 
strategically placed, often become trafficking hubs 
and retail centres for all manner of illicit goods and 
services. They also continue to pose a threat to 
national and international security, providing a safe 
haven for international fugitives, including 
terrorists.
But conflict zones are not the only places where 
transnational organized crime can pose a threat to 
the state. There are a number of areas around the 
world where criminals have become so powerful 
that, rather than seeking to evade the government, 
they begin to directly confront it. In these cases, a 
pattern of symptoms is typically manifest. Investi-
gators, prosecutors and judges who pursue orga-
nized criminals are threatened and killed. Journalists 
and activists may also be targeted. Corruption is 
detected at the highest levels of government, and 
law enforcement can become paralysed by mistrust. 
Portions of the country may effectively drift beyond 
state control. This is the situation presently con-
fronted in some parts of Central America and West 
Africa, both of which have suffered from a long his-
tory of violence and instability.
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TOC PROBLEM ESTIMATEDEXTENT
ESTIMATED 
ANNUAL VALUE 
(US$)
ESTIMATED 
TREND POTENTIAL EFFECTS
TRAFFICKING  
IN PERSONS
TO EUROPE  
FOR SEXUAL 
EXPLOITATION
70,000 victims 
(annual)
140,000 victims 
(stock)
3 billion (stock) Stable Human rights violations
SMUGGLING 
OF 
MIGRANTS
FROM LATIN 
AMERICA TO 
NORTH  
AMERICA
3 million entries 
(annual)
6.6 billion  
(income for  
smugglers)
Declining
Irregular migration,  
vulnerability of migrants
FROM AFRICA 
TO EUROPE
55,000 migrants 
(annual)
150 million  
(income for  
smugglers)
Declining
Irregular migration,  
death of migrants
COCAINE  
  
FROM THE 
ANDEAN 
REGION TO 
NORTH  
AMERICA
309 tons (depart)
196 tons  
(at destination)
38 billion  
(at destination)
Declining
Addiction; drug related crime, 
corruption and violence in  
the Andean region; links with  
illegal armed groups in the 
Andean region; destabilization 
and corruption in neighbour-
ing states, Central America 
and Mexico
FROM THE 
ANDEAN 
REGION TO 
EUROPE
212 tons (depart)
124 tons  
(at destination)
34 billion  
(at destination)
Stable
Addiction, drug related crime 
and violence, destabilization 
and corruption in Andean 
countries, the Caribbean and 
West Africa
HEROIN  
FROM  
AFGHANISTAN 
TO THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION
95 tons (depart)
70 tons 
(at destination)
13 billion  
(at destination)
Increasing
Addiction, spread of HIV/
AIDS; increase in organized 
crime, funding for criminals 
and insurgents, corruption
FROM  
AFGHANISTAN 
TO EUROPE 
(EXCL. RUSSIA)
140 tons (depart)
87 tons  
(at destination)
20 billion  
(at destination)
Stable
Addiction, increase in  
organized crime; funding  
for criminals and insurgents, 
corruption
TRAFFICKING  
OF FIREARMS
FROM THE 
UNITED STATES 
TO MEXICO
20,000 weapons, 
mostly handguns
20 million Stable
Rising deaths in Mexico’s drug 
cartel wars
FROM EASTERN 
EUROPE TO THE 
WORLD
At least 
40,000 Kalashnikovs 
in 2007/2008
At least 33 million  
(in 2007/2008 at 
destination)
Declining Death and instability
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TOC PROBLEM ESTIMATEDEXTENT
ESTIMATED 
ANNUAL VALUE 
(US$)
ESTIMATED 
TREND POTENTIAL EFFECTS
TRAFFICKING  
OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES
WILDLIFE FROM 
AFRICA AND 
SOUTH-EAST 
ASIA TO ASIA
Elephant ivory:  
75 tons
Rhino horn: 800 kg
Tiger parts: Perhaps 
150 tiger skins and 
about 1,500 kg of 
tiger bones
Elephant ivory:  
62 million
Rhino horn: 8 million
Tiger parts: 5 million
Increasing
Tigers and black rhinos may 
become extinct in the wild; 
impact on South-East Asia 
wildlife unclear; promotion  
of corruption and organized 
crime
TIMBER FROM 
SOUTH-EAST 
ASIA TO THE 
EUROPEAN 
UNION AND 
ASIA
Perhaps 10 million 
cubic meters
3.5 billion  
(at destination)
Declining:  
Indonesia, 
Myanmar;  
Possibly  
increasing in  
Lao PDR, Papua 
New Guinea
Deforestation, loss of  
habitat, loss of species,  
climate change, increased 
rural poverty especially 
amongst indigenous people, 
irregular migration, flooding, 
soil erosion
PRODUCT  
COUNTER-
FEITING
CONSUMER 
GOODS FROM 
ASIA TO EUROPE
Some two billion  
articles per year
8.2 billion  
(at destination)
Increasing
Loss of product safety and 
accountability, loss of revenue
MEDICINE FROM 
ASIA TO SOUTH-
EAST ASIA AND 
AFRICA
Billions of dose units
1.6 billion  
(at destination)
Unclear
Death, drug-resistant  
pathogens
MARITIME  
PIRACY
OFF THE COAST 
OF SOMALIA
217 attacks in 2009 100 million Increasing
Difficulties in establishing  
Government authority,  
negative impact on local  
and international commerce
CYBERCRIME
IDENTITY THEFT
Around 1.5 million 
victims
1 billion Unclear
Increase in the costs of  
credit, depressive effects on 
the economy, loss of trust  
in e-commerce
CHILD  
PORNOGRAPHY
Perhaps 50,000 new 
images generated 
annually
250 million Unclear Child victimization
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CONCLUSION
Most of the trafficking flows examined in this report 
are the product of market forces, rather than the 
plotting of dedicated criminal groups. Demand 
exists for drugs, prostitution, cheap labour, fire-
arms, wild animal parts, knock-off goods, hard-
woods and child pornography. The consumption of 
these goods apparently carries little moral stigma, 
and little chance of apprehension, in the circles 
where the consumers operate; the demand endures, 
despite dramatic adaptive shifts in the production 
and trafficking of the contraband. To deal with 
these markets, creative solutions are needed, draw-
ing on techniques not necessarily found in the law 
enforcement toolkit.
Groups of professional, multi-crime offenders are 
significant in some areas, however. For example, 
within the cocaine flow to the United States, which 
has run strongly for decades, the Mexican cartels 
have emerged, showing a willingness to engage in 
other forms of acquisitive crime, such as kidnap-
ping and extortion. In these cases, there is no choice 
but to break up these groups, and the most direct 
way of doing this is through arrest and incarcera-
tion.
Whether driven by markets or groups, in almost 
every instance, these problems are transcontinental. 
Drugs link South America and Asia to North Amer-
ica and Europe. People are trafficked and smuggled 
from one end of the earth to the other. Commercial 
flows in raw materials and manufactured goods are 
truly globalized, the illicit along with the licit. As a 
result, what happens in the Andean countries, for 
example, has an impact on South America, Central 
America, North America, West Africa and Europe. 
And what happens in any of these regions has an 
impact on the Andean region.
International cooperative action is developing and 
progress is necessary and inevitable. The control of 
crime must be seen as part of the larger project of 
global governance. Globalization has progressed 
faster than our collective ability to regulate it, and 
it is in the unregulated areas created by this disjunc-
ture that organized crime opportunities have grown. 
Bringing the rule of law to the international flow of 
goods and services is essential if the problems of 
organized crime are to be uprooted. 
There is no choice to tackle these problems at the 
scale they have emerged: globally. Local efforts are 
key, but will only serve to displace the flow until a 
coordinated approach is adopted. A global approach 
will allow each flow to be scrutinized for vulnerabili-
ties, the weak link in the chain to be identified. In 
every instance, there are likely points of insertion 
that have been overlooked simply because no one 
was examining all aspects of the problem and the 
way they interact to create transnational criminal 
markets. 
INTRO-
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INTRODUCTION
“With transnational threats, States have no choice but 
to work together. We are all affected – whether as 
countries of supply, trafficking or demand. Therefore, 
we have a shared responsibility to act”. 
United Nations Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon
The number of human beings living together on the 
planet grows every year, and so does the volume of 
exchanges among them. The vast majority of these 
exchanges are legitimate and beneficial, but a sig-
nificant share is not. The growth of global crime is a 
threat to the rule of law, without which there can be 
no sustainable world development. Transnational 
criminal markets crisscross the planet, conveying 
drugs, arms, trafficked women, toxic waste, stolen 
natural resources or protected animals’ parts. Hun-
dreds of billions of dollars of dirty money flow 
through the world every year, distorting local econo-
mies, corrupting institutions and fuelling conflict. 
What people all over the world wish each other at 
the beginning of a new year, health, peace and pros-
perity, is what transnational organized crime markets 
destroy, bringing instead disease, violence and misery 
to exposed regions and vulnerable populations. 
Governments have realized the danger and decided 
to react. International conventions have been 
adopted to step up the collective response to these 
common threats. In 2003, the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
entered into force. The next year, the United 
Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, 
and Change, identified transnational organized 
crime as one of “six clusters of threats with which 
the world must be concerned now and in the dec-
ades ahead”. In February 2010, the UN Security 
Council noted “with concern the serious threat 
posed in some cases by drug trafficking and 
transnational organized crime to international secu-
rity in different regions of the world.”
Stopping the operations of transnational organized 
crime has thus become a matter of international 
priority. Translating political will into concrete 
results will mean achieving two difficult goals: 
understanding transnational organized crime and 
integrating national responses into international 
strategies. This report is a contribution to the first 
effort.
What is “organized crime”? There are at least two 
competing definitions: one that focuses on particu-
lar groups of people, and one that focuses on par-
ticular types of crime. Both definitions have some 
validity, and neither is sufficient to completely 
describe the global reality. Understanding the way 
that real-life organized crime situations fit these two 
definitions makes a big difference in the ways we 
might go about solving these problems.
When most people say “organized crime”, it is often 
a shorthand way of referring to groups of people, 
usually “the mafia” and similar groups. Understood 
in this way, organized criminal activity is simply 
whatever these organized crime groups do. The 
people are consistent across time, although what 
they do may change: today maybe extortion, tomor-
row maybe heroin trafficking, or check kiting, or 
procurement fraud, or all of the above. The empha-
sis is on the group, not the nature of the crime. This 
is an important distinction, because it implies a 
number of assumptions about the way that organ-
ized crime works.
Law enforcement agencies use this definition almost 
as a matter of course, because the criminal justice 
system is designed to deal with specific offences 
committed by specific people. Police arrest suspects 
and seize their property, prosecutors secure convic-
tions one-by-one, and only individual people can be 
sent to prison. When actors in such a system plan 
proactively, they are limited by the tools at hand, 
and this affects the way they conceptualize the 
problem. They can chart and pursue organized 
crime groups, which are made up of people they can 
arrest and prosecute. They cannot deal with the 
transnational markets in which these individuals are 
active, because they lack the jurisdiction and equip-
ment to do so. 
But there is another way of looking at organized 
crime, a vision reflected in the United Nations Con-
vention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
Essentially, “organized crime” is any serious offence 
committed by a group of three or more people with 
the aim of making money. This definition is broad 
enough to encompass a range of activities, not just 
those committed by career criminals. For many of 
these activities, the organizing principle is the invis-
ible hand of the market, not the master designs of 
criminal organizations. Looking at the world 
through this broader definition, it is often the 
groups that come and go, while the market remains 
constant.
From this point of view, disrupting any particular 
criminal organization will not solve the problem, 
because the incentives remain in place, and other 
people will rise to service the market. Law enforce-
ment agencies, acting alone, cannot address these 
problems, because their toolkits are limited to inter-
ventions against specific wrongdoers. To take on 
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organized crime in the broader sense, the interven-
tion of other agencies is required, those with the 
power to change the regulations and structures that 
give form to a criminal market. 
Failure to identify the market-driven dimension of 
organized crime, and particularly of transnational 
organized crime, is one of the reasons these prob-
lems can prove so intractable. There is often a fun-
damental mismatch between the nature of the issue 
and the body assigned to deal with it. Police and 
prosecutors can do a splendid job of jailing offend-
ers, and still make little headway in reducing the 
supply of drugs, or the number of human traffick-
ing victims, or any of a number of the flows dis-
cussed in the chapters that follow. Making progress 
on global organized crime will require policymakers 
to have a broader understanding of the subject 
matter.
Another factor confounding progress is that organ-
ized crime today is truly global. Illicit commerce has 
globalized as quickly, if not quicker, than its legal 
counterpart. As will be illustrated in the examples 
that follow, most forms of transnational trafficking 
start on one continent and wind up on another, 
often by means of a third. In this context, purely 
national or even regional approaches are unlikely to 
solve the problem. At best, they may displace it, as 
traffickers find new sources, transit zones, or desti-
nations for their contraband.
In particular, law enforcement, like all national 
actors, is not geared to deal with international 
issues. Regional organizations and INTERPOL 
have done much to facilitate information sharing 
and joint operations, but, in the end, each criminal 
must be prosecuted in a national criminal justice 
system. And after years of struggling with transna-
tional organized crime, the world still does not have 
global strategies for solving perennial problems like 
the trade in heroin or cocaine. In fact, from an 
operational point of view, these issues are rarely 
addressed on a world-wide basis. 
The task is daunting because information on organ-
ized crime is often limited to anecdotes and case 
studies. There are few global data sets on organized 
crime topics, and none are comprehensive. The 
topic is sensitive and international data sharing has 
been slow to develop. Particularly when it comes to 
estimating the size of the problem and trends in its 
development, any assessment is likely to be contro-
versial. This report endeavors to make the best read-
ing of the available information, acknowledging 
that these estimates must remain tentative until the 
data are improved.
The situation is also difficult to track because global 
organized crime markets are so dynamic. As with 
other global geopolitical events, a complex web of 
interacting factors can cause sudden shifts in the 
nature of illicit commerce. Issues of inequality, 
migration, and the informal economy all play a role 
in the way organized crime develops. 
All this illustrates that organized crime is not a 
niche subject, of interest only to professional inves-
tigators and Hollywood directors. It has become 
central issue in international affairs, an important 
factor in the global economy, and an immediate 
reality for people around the world. Aside from the 
direct effects – drug addiction, sexual exploitation, 
environmental damage and a host of other scourges 
– organized crime has the capacity to undermine 
the rule of law and good governance, especially in 
developing countries. It is time the topic be placed 
where it belongs: at the center of our understanding 
of a globalized world. This report is offered as a 
small step in that direction.
The first chapter discusses our current understand-
ing of transnational organized crime as a whole and 
what may influence its evolution. There is hardly 
any region in the world that is not affected by 
transnational illicit flows and activities, but some 
regions pay a particularly heavy price when these 
cross their territory. The last chapter examines a 
number of cases where transnational organized 
crime and instability amplify each other to create 
vicious circles in which countries may become 
locked. Chapters 2 to 10 review a number of trans-
national organized crime threats, ranging from traf-
ficking in persons (ch. 2), to smuggling of migrants 
(ch. 3), to cocaine and heroin trafficking (ch. 4 and 
5), trafficking in firearms (ch. 6), smuggling of 
natural resources (ch. 7), to the illicit trade in coun-
terfeit goods (ch.8), to maritime piracy (ch. 9) and 
to cybercrime (ch.10). Maritime piracy and some 
forms of cybercrime are predatory offences rather 
than forms of illicit enterprise, as is typical in traf-
ficking – this important distinction will be dis-
cussed in the relevant chapters. In each case, a brief 
overview is followed by a closer examination of 
some of the most acute cases. The list is not exhaus-
tive, and important aspects of the problem such as 
money-laundering, criminal networks and groups, 
or a systematic review of the regional impact of 
transnational organized crime, could not be included 
in this report. Nevertheless, the cases put together 
in the following pages offer not only one of the 
most comprehensive presentations of current trans-
national crime threats, but also a striking view of 
the global dimensions of organized crime today.

A global threat assessment
THE THREAT OF 
TRANSNATIONAL 
ORGANIZED CRIME 
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THE THREAT OF  
TRANSNATIONAL  
ORGANIZED CRIME
What do we mean by “transnational 
organized crime”?
The term “organized crime” appears to have emerged 
in Chicago in 1919,1 and the term retains under-
tones of the bootlegging gangs prevalent during 
that era. But the phenomenon of organized crimi-
nal activity far pre-dates this coinage and its mani-
festations have developed considerably since that 
time. Depending on the definition, offences that 
could be classed as organized crime have always 
been with us, but it was only recently that the 
nations of the world began to compare notes and 
collaborate on a collective response.
Although the development of multilateral agree-
ments to control the transnational drug trade began 
a century ago, and a number of international instru-
ments to address certain offences have been in exist-
ence for some time, there was not, until recently, an 
agreement on how transnational organized crime 
should be addressed. The rapid growth in the scale 
and scope of the problem in the post-Cold War 
world led to the passage of the United Nations Con-
vention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
which came into effect in late 2003. 
Remarkably, the Convention contains no precise 
definition of “transnational organized crime,” nor 
does it contain a list of the kinds of crimes that 
might fall under this heading. This is not a problem 
unique to the Convention – as noted above, there 
is no consensus definition of organized crime among 
either practitioners or theoreticians. A very wide 
range of criminal activities can be conducted trans-
nationally in an organized fashion, and new forms 
of crime emerge constantly as global and local con-
ditions change over time. In order to accommodate 
this complexity, a precise definition was omitted.
Instead, the Convention defines “organized crimi-
nal group.” This is needed because the Convention 
requires parties to criminalize participation in an 
organized criminal group.2 But the purpose of the 
Convention is to “prevent and combat transna-
tional organized crime”, not organized crime groups. 
Attacking the groups is just one tactic toward this 
end. Under the Convention, an “organized criminal 
group” is:
a group of three or more persons that was not s 
randomly formed;
existing for a period of time;s 
acting in concert with the aim of committing at s 
least one crime punishable by at least four years 
incarceration;
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a ﬁ-s 
nancial or other material beneﬁt.
Since most “groups” of any sort contain three or 
more people working in concert and most exist for 
a period of time, the true defining characteristics of 
organized crime groups under the Convention are 
their profit-driven nature and the seriousness of the 
offences they commit. 
The Convention covers only transnational crimes, 
but “transnational” is similarly cast broadly. It covers 
not only offences committed in more than one 
state, but also those that take place in one state but 
are planned or controlled in another. Also included 
are crimes in one state committed by groups that 
operate in more than one state, and crimes commit-
ted in one state that impact on other states. 
The implied definition of “transnational organized 
crime” encompasses virtually all profit-motivated 
criminal activities with international implications. 
This broad definition takes account of the global 
complexity of the issue and allows cooperation on 
the widest possible range of common concerns, but 
leaves the exact subject matter rather vague. A better 
idea of the offences intended is provided in the 
attached Protocols, which relate to specific crimes: 
trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants and 
firearms trafficking. These issues – which typically 
involve countries of origin, transit and destination 
– are areas where international cooperation is essen-
tial, since it is beyond the capacity of any single 
state to take comprehensive action to tackle the 
problem.
What do we know about it?
Unlike the “conventional” crimes (murder, rape, 
robbery et cetera), citizens rarely approach the 
police with complaints about organized crime. 
Many of the offences are “victimless”, in the sense 
that none of the parties participating has any inter-
est in bringing the matter to the attention of the 
police. Even when there is a clear victim, this person 
may be reluctant to report for fear of reprisals. Fur-
ther, to sell contraband or illicit services, criminal 
markets have to be open enough to attract custom-
ers, and to operate in this way suggests some degree 
of tolerance on behalf of the authorities. Corrup-
tion is often implicit, and members of the public 
may be left with the impression that complaints 
would be useless. Why inform the police about 
businesses operating in plain sight?
26
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Consequently, most organized criminal activity 
comes to the attention of the police only when they 
take the pains to proactively investigate it. The abil-
ity to detect organized crime is contingent on a 
police force with the resources to take on this addi-
tional work, beyond the considerable case load 
involved in responding to citizen complaints. It also 
requires a police force with the skills to conduct 
long-term, often clandestine, investigations. And it 
requires a police force able to resist the corrupting 
influence of organized crime groups, whose resources 
may far exceed those of law enforcement. In many 
parts of the world, one or more of these elements is 
missing, so very little organized crime activity is 
registered.
Even in countries with plenty of capacity, the atten-
tion given to any given area of organized crime 
differs. The definitions of crime can also vary based 
on local values. As a result, the criminal justice sta-
tistics may reflect political priorities more than the 
state of the underlying problem. 
Of all the areas under consideration, the most is 
known about drug trafficking. UNODC and con-
cerned governments have conducted surveys of the 
major cultivation areas for coca bush and opium 
poppy for many years, and so estimates can be made 
with some precision as to how much cocaine and 
heroin are being produced. Many countries submit 
their seizure data to UNODC, and most of the main 
destination countries have survey data on the size of 
the drug-using population. Supply, demand and 
seizures can be triangulated to give a more reliable 
picture than any single data source could generate.
As a result, some trends can be tracked with consid-
erable confidence. It is clear, for example, that long-
term declining demand for cocaine in the United 
States and rapidly growing demand for it in Europe 
have reconfigured global drug markets. Between 
2004 and 2008, West Africa suddenly became an 
important transit area for the drug in a way never 
seen before. Also novel is the growing trafficking of 
cocaine base products from the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia to neighbouring developing countries in the 
Southern Cone. These phenomena can be tracked 
through supply, demand and seizure statistics.
But there remain many gaps in our knowledge of 
the drug markets. Aggregated national seizure fig-
ures say very little about the nature of the traffick-
ing: the who, what, where and how of smuggling 
drugs. For this, more research and detailed reports 
of individual seizures and arrests are needed. Under 
the drug Conventions, States parties are obligated 
to send to UNODC details of specific seizures 
which are deemed important because they throw 
light on the sources from which drugs are obtained, 
the quantities involved, the methods employed by 
illicit traffickers or because they illustrate new 
trends.3 These details are consolidated in the 
UNODC Individual Seizures Database. Some 
countries go beyond the requirements of the Con-
ventions and send complete details of all drug sei-
zures above a threshold amount,4 but too few 
regularly comply with this obligation for these data 
to provide a comprehensive global picture.
Less is known about the scale and nature of human 
trafficking. UNODC recently spearheaded the 
UN.GIFT project, which, among other things, 
gathered data from 155 countries and territories on 
human trafficking victims and perpetrators.5 The 
amount and reliability of this information varied 
greatly between countries, however, and some 
important countries did not participate. Most 
importantly, it is difficult to say what share of the 
victims are detected and whether these people are 
representative of the market as a whole. It remains 
likely that law enforcement is just skimming the 
surface in many parts of the world. And, unfortu-
nately, the UN.GIFT report was a one-off assess-
ment; a mechanism for collecting these data on a 
regular basis is not yet available.
Transnational firearms trafficking presents even 
greater obstacles, since the Convention does not 
provide for international seizure data pooling.6 Even 
groups that have been involved in monitoring the 
small arms situation for years have trouble quantify-
ing the extent of transnational trafficking. When 
large seizures are made, it is difficult to distinguish 
firearms that have been trafficked from those that 
have been legally imported and then diverted to the 
illicit market domestically. 
For the emerging issues, the process of gathering 
information is at its earliest stages. Most informa-
tion remains anecdotal. Some of these areas, how-
ever, touch on well-documented aspects of the licit 
economy, such as the smuggling of counterfeit 
goods and environmental resources. For example, 
groups like the European Customs Union publish 
statistics on their seizures of counterfeit products 
each year. Similarly, the International Chamber of 
Commerce keeps detailed records of piracy inci-
dents, and the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna 
(CITES) secretariat maintains a longstanding data-
base on elephant ivory seizures.
Case studies of transnational threats 27
1
How is the global situation  
changing?
Data from these sources can tell us something about 
developments in specific markets, but can anything 
sensible be said about trends in transnational organ-
ized crime generally? Much of the discussion to date 
has been conducted by law enforcement authorities, 
and, for reasons described above, law enforcement 
authorities have been deeply concerned about the 
nature of the groups involved in organized crime. 
There appears to be general consensus that both 
highly structured and loosely structured organiza-
tions are involved in transnational organized crime, 
and a number of authorities have argued that the 
former are losing out to the latter.
For example, in 2001, the European Commission 
claimed:
 … traditional hierarchical structures  
are being replaced by loose networks of 
criminals...7
In 2004, a United Nations High-Level Panel found 
that:
Organized crime is increasingly operating 
through fluid networks rather than more 
formal hierarchies. This form of organization 
provides criminals with diversity, flexibility, 
low visibility, and longevity.8 
In its 2006 Organized Crime Threat Assessment, 
Europol notes:
OC groups are also becoming increasingly 
heterogeneous and dynamically organised in 
structural terms, moving towards loose net-
works rather than pyramidal monoliths.9 
According to the 2008 United States Department 
of Justice’s Strategy to Combat International Organ-
ized Crime:
International organized criminals have 
evolved toward loose network structures  
and away from traditional hierarchical  
structures.10
If true, this represents a remarkable development 
across a range of highly disparate activities, from 
elephant poaching in Central Africa to child por-
nography rings in Eastern Europe. To understand 
this point better, it is necessary to look in some 
depth as to what are meant by “hierarchical struc-
tures” and “loose networks”. “Hierarchical struc-
tures” seems to refer to the kind of groups that 
emerge in low-governance areas around the world, 
which have an institutional identity of their own 
and typically engage in a wide range of criminal 
activities in the territories they control (i.e. “the 
mafia” and similar structures ). The “loose net-
works” may be a reference to the mutable commer-
cial ties between buyers and sellers of contraband in 
illicit markets around the world. Human beings 
seem to have a natural tendency to self-organize, 
and do so spontaneously when no higher authority 
provides order. People and activities that the state 
fails to regulate tend to fall under the control of 
local actors, who then vigorously defend this power 
from reacquisition by the state. Without the formal 
apparatus of government and access to the courts, 
local strong men are compelled to settle disputes 
with violence, or at least the credible threat of vio-
lence. These strong men, and the organizations they 
build, constitute the hierarchical groups most com-
monly associated with “organized crime” in the 
public imagination. Concrete examples include the 
various mafia organizations in Italy; the American 
ethnic mafias (Italian, Irish, Jewish, Polish and 
others); the Yakuza of Japan; the Triads of Hong 
Kong and the Tongs of Chinatowns worldwide; the 
favela gangs of Brazil; some street gangs in the 
United States, Central America and the Cape Flats 
of South Africa; and many others.
This form of organized crime grows in geographic 
areas and communities that the state has neglected, 
such as slums and new immigrant neighbourhoods. 
Socially excluded communities frequently respond 
to the lack of opportunity by creating their own 
sources of credit, job access and security. Unregu-
lated, these schemes can devolve into loan sharking, 
labour racketeering and protection rackets. What 
began as the efforts of a marginalized community to 
protect and provide for itself can transform over 
time into a source of predation, threatening their 
own community and the society at large.
Similarly, where the state forbids goods and services 
for which there is nonetheless strong demand (for 
example, drugs, gambling and prostitution), self-
appointed authorities can assume a regulatory role. 
Distribution centres are often located in marginal 
areas, and organized crime groups have strong 
incentives to keep these areas marginal. In order to 
secure the loyalty of the local population, they may 
offer a range of community services, providing sup-
port for people not sufficiently served by the state. 
But however beneficent they may appear locally, 
they remain violent criminals, enriching themselves 
through antisocial activities, and ultimately account-
able only to themselves.
These territorial organized crime groups have been 
known by different names around the world, and 
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some of the currently active groups have existed for 
generations. As longstanding organizations, they 
have been essentially conservative, usually hierarchi-
cal, and often clannish. Their concerns have been 
chiefly local, providing for and exploiting their 
parent communities, while combating rival groups 
and the state. They tend to be engaged in multiple 
criminal activities in their territories, rather than 
specializing in a particular commodity or service.
The latest wave of globalization has proven to be 
both an opportunity and a challenge for these tra-
ditional organized crime groups. Although many 
have been involved in transnational trafficking for 
years, their rigid structure and focus on maintaining 
local authority has caused some to miss emerging 
global opportunities. This has led a number of 
authorities to argue that they are being “replaced” 
by smaller, more flexible groups, or “networks”. 
One popular notion is that networks are an adap-
tive response to law enforcement pressure on the 
more visible traditional hierarchies, essentially the 
“next generation” in organized crime. As traditional 
groups are weakened through repeated arrests and 
seizures, the narrative goes, market gaps are quickly 
filled by low-profile, agile groups. This alleged evo-
lution in organized crime would be parallel to the 
development of “cell structure” in terrorism.
In fact, these networks are hardly groups at all, any 
more so than a widget manufacturer, a shipping 
company and a local widget retailer are a “group.” 
With no independent institutional identity, they are 
nothing more than commercial connections of var-
ying durability between individuals, all responding 
to a common interest in making money. And rather 
than being an adaptive response of traditional 
groups, networks of market-driven individuals have 
probably always existed in transnational trafficking, 
but were less visible to law enforcement authorities 
focused on local crime problems. 
When organized crime first rose in prominence, law 
enforcement authorities may have focused on an 
opponent that was organized similarly to them-
selves. This impression was bolstered by the discov-
ery of the mob meeting at Apalachin, New York, in 
1957, where some 70 senior gang members from 
around the country were present. This incident was 
taken as confirmation that the enemy was a kind of 
anti-government or criminal corporation, secretly 
coordinating the illicit activities of the nation. 
When the European authorities began looking for 
similar structures at about that time, they may have 
imported a perceptual bias from the United States.11 
Some commentators have even suggested that the 
leadership of the traditional hierarchical groups 
were coordinating their activities in a vast global 
conspiracy.12
This portrayal of organized crime provided a kind 
of local rival army with which to war, and glossed 
over any structures that did not fit the model. The 
media fascination with the image of an under-
ground empire continued to grow, and the fear this 
generated may have become a source of funding for 
further law enforcement against these groups. Only 
with growing scrutiny over time has this image 
begun to crumble, and what had appeared to be 
concerted action was, in many instances, deter-
mined to be the activity of a range of actors respond-
ing to market forces.
It is also possible that while transnational trafficking 
markets have grown, traditional turf-based activities 
may have declined in value, leading to a decline in 
the prominence of territorial groups. Turf-based 
groups have always profited from transnational traf-
ficking, either by trafficking on their own behalf or 
by taxing sale of contraband in their areas. But a 
number of social changes and policy developments 
may have made conditions less favourable for old-
school racketeering in the wealthier countries, 
including: the growth in easy access to credit; the 
decline in the influence of labour unions; policies 
favouring the integration of new immigrants and 
the decline in ethnically homogeneous neighbour-
hoods; the outsourcing of manufacturing to devel-
oping countries; containerized shipping; greater 
transparency in hiring practices and government 
contracting; controls on patronage politics in devel-
oped counties; the growth of private security com-
panies; and liberalized policies on gambling and 
prostitution in many areas. With growing regula-
tion at a national level, it may be that the criminal 
opportunities today are rather found in the 
unguarded interstices of the transnational arena.
Perhaps it is safest to say that the groups themselves 
have become less important than the markets with 
which they engage. For example, many types of 
groups have engaged in cocaine trafficking since the 
current boom began in the 1970s, with routes and 
conveyances shifting in response to enforcement 
efforts, internecine wars, trends in demand and the 
intricacies of geopolitics. Some of these groups were 
involved in a range of criminal activities, but far 
more were specialized in cocaine. Many of these 
groups came and went, but the cocaine continued 
to flow. The nature of these groups was, in the end, 
less significant than the issues of supply and 
demand. 
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Today, organized crime seems to be less a matter of 
a group of individuals who are involved in a range 
of illicit activities, and more a matter of a group of 
illicit activities in which some individuals and 
groups are presently involved. If these individuals 
are arrested and incarcerated, the activities con-
tinue, because the illicit market, and the incentives 
it generates, remain. Strategies aimed at the groups 
will not stop the illicit activities if the dynamics of 
the market remain unaddressed.
Law enforcement seems to have had trouble making 
the leap from focusing on groups to focusing on 
markets. Police officers, investigators and prosecu-
tors are employed to make cases against individuals 
and groups of individuals in a particular jurisdiction. 
They lack the authority and the tools to take on an 
entire trafficking flow. As hammers, they seek nails, 
and tend to conceptualize organized crime as the 
activities of a collection of particular people, rather 
than a market with a dynamism of its own.13 
This focus on building cases has been a real barrier 
to making progress against criminal markets because, 
in most countries, the combating of organized crime 
has been seen as almost exclusively a matter of law 
enforcement. The situation is further complicated 
because the problem is international while the tools 
are inherently national. Penal law is a matter of 
national legislation, which itself is the codification 
of long-standing cultural norms. Further, the crim-
inal justice system is an essential mechanism for the 
maintenance of internal stability. As each breach of 
the criminal law represents a kind of governance 
failure, particularly when executed by an organized 
group, this activity is often regarded as a matter of 
national security. High-level corruption is often 
involved, which can be embarrassing for affected 
states. There are also legal issues involved in discuss-
ing the facts of pending cases and strategic reasons 
for silence on ongoing investigations. 
In short, the subject matter is sensitive, making 
international information-sharing and multilateral 
interventions difficult. And, historically, crime has 
been primarily a local issue, so there has been little 
motivation to collaborate across borders on the 
topic. As the following section argues, this attitude 
is bound to change due to our growing appreciation 
of the threat posed by organized crime.
What factors inﬂuence the evolution 
of organized crime threats?
Transnational organized crime has evolved over 
time. Drug epidemics have come and gone and 
resurfaced in new environs. Human trafficking and 
firearms flows have rapidly expanded in areas of 
conflict and subsided just as rapidly. The end of the 
Cold War, the decline in the number and severity of 
civil wars and the advance of globalization have all 
impacted on organized crime in unpredicted ways. 
In many instances, the inability of the global com-
munity to predict these trends has resulted in 
damage that could have been avoided with a little 
foresight.
Of course, predicting storms in the complex weather 
of global affairs is a matter of considerable complex-
ity and uncertainty. But much can be learned by 
looking retrospectively at dynamics that have 
affected organized crime problems in the past. This 
report does not hazard much prognostication, but 
it does explore some of the risk factors that affect 
the way transnational organized crime evolves over 
time. 
The enhanced movement of everything
A term with nearly as many meanings as users, 
“globalization” generally refers to the growing inter-
connectedness of the nations of the world following 
the global liberalization of trade at the end of the 
Cold War. Enhanced flow of goods was accompa-
nied by enhanced flow of capital and services and 
outsourcing of manufacturing. Global tourism has 
expanded, facilitated by less restrictive visa regimes 
and cheaper airfares. The simultaneous expansion 
of the Internet and telecommunications has also led 
to globalization in a cultural sense. Today, a wide 
range of products and services can be accessed virtu-
ally anywhere in the world.
But the process of globalization has outpaced the 
growth of mechanisms for global governance, and 
this deficiency has produced just the sort of regula-
tion vacuum in which transnational organized crime 
can thrive. People and goods can move more cheaply 
than ever before, and criminals and contraband can 
only be interdicted by national governments. 
Human and commercial flows are too intense to 
easily distinguish the licit from the illicit. Silos of 
sovereignty provide sanctuary to those who, how-
ever harmful their activities, are of use to the 
authorities in one country or another. The open 
seas, which constitute three quarters of the earth’s 
surface, remain essentially ungoverned.14 And the 
rapid pace of change itself provides opportunities 
for organized crime.
The ease with which people and goods travel 
between nations today confounds the regulatory 
attempts of any individual nation. The number of 
air passengers has grown at approximately 5% per 
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year over the past 30 years, enabled by the introduc-
tion of wide-body jumbo jets in the 1970s, as well 
as airline deregulation.15 In 2007, the world’s air-
lines flew more than 29 million scheduled flights, 
transporting over 2.2 billion passengers between 
some 3,750 airports in cities across the world.16 
As capacity has increased, prices have declined. In 
one US study to measure the effects of airline dereg-
ulation in the late 1970s, median fares were found 
to have declined by almost 40% between 1980 and 
2005.17 It is now easy and affordable to travel to 
cities previously considered remote and inaccessi-
ble. The expansion of civil aviation provides mobil-
ity needed for both licit and illicit international 
activity. 
Air transport prevails in the movement of people, 
but the bulk of goods are moved by sea. More than 
90% of global trade is transported by sea, and these 
flows are rapidly expanding: in 1996, 332 million 
tons of goods were transported worldwide, and by 
2007, this had increased to 828 million tons.18 
Containerization has greatly accelerated the flow of 
goods through ports, and international commerce 
has become dependent on this new pace. As with air 
travel, for the first time, it has become economically 
feasible to move goods between countries formerly 
divided by insuperable space. More and more man-
ufacturing is outsourced, increasing the importance 
of rapid mass movement of goods. Between 2002 
and 2007, the amount of cargo moving through the 
top seven Chinese ports tripled.19 Very little of this 
cargo can be inspected.
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Even more rapid has been the expansion in the 
growth of global communications. The number of 
mobile phone subscribers increased from some 200 
million in 1997 to 3.3 billion in 2007. The Inter-
national Telecommunications Union estimates the 
2008 number at 4.1 billion; a yearly increase of 
almost 25%. While telecommunication used to be 
tied to a location, it has now become as mobile as 
its users. Moreover, in December 1991, the internet 
was comprised of 10 websites; in July 2009, the 
number was close to 240 million.20 It is impossible 
to police these information flows. Old forms of 
crime are supported by information technology, 
and new forms are emerging, unique to the virtual 
world.
An example of a traditional crime that has been 
revolutionized by global communications is child 
pornography. Far from being a new phenomenon, 
the internet has enabled cheap and instant global 
distribution to millions of customers from con-
cealed origins, usually situated in countries where 
prosecution is unlikely. In the past, the images 
would have had to be processed, printed and the 
hard copies distributed via mail or retail outlets. 
As with many other technology-related crimes, leg-
islation (and by extension enforcement) is strug-
gling to keep up. In a recent study of 187 countries 
worldwide, 93 countries were found to lack legisla-
tion that specifically addresses child pornography, 
and of the countries that do have such legislation, 
24 do not provide for offences facilitated by com-
puter technology.21 This means that the majority of 
the world’s countries has not kept pace with devel-
opments in the world of crime.
Similarly, internet fraudsters and identity thieves 
can find victims in the wealthy countries while 
safely ensconced in nations with little power or will 
to stop them. The money they skim can easily be 
moved through dozens of national banking systems 
in a matter of minutes, making their transactions 
nearly impossible to trace. The high volume of legal 
funds circulating around the globe makes the move-
ment of dirty money less conspicuous. Criminal 
cash is often moved to a different jurisdiction for 
placement in the legitimate financial system, invest-
ment in property or to pay for illicit commodities 
or services.22 
Grey and black markets
Most definitions of organized crime specify its prof-
it-driven nature, and, like licit business, criminal 
enterprise is subject to the vagaries of the interna-
tional economic climate. Certain economic circum-
stances seem to favour the rapid development of 
organized crime, and the single most important 
global economic event of recent times – the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union – continues to resound in the underworld. 
Aside from opening the way to globalization as 
discussed above, the rapid social changes it brought 
in a large number of countries generated precisely 
the sort of gaps in governance that typically spawn 
organized crime.
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The rapid shift from being highly managed societies 
to free-market democracies created deep challenges 
for all the Warsaw Pact countries. As the massive 
edifice of communism collapsed, much was dam-
aged by the rubble, and the dust obscured a great 
many crimes. The old rules of social and economic 
behaviour were suddenly suspended, while new 
norms had yet to take hold. Countries that had 
been dependent on the Soviet Union for direction 
and guidance were suddenly left to their own 
devices. Whole social sectors were thrown open, 
essentially unregulated. 
Of course, organized crime had existed under com-
munism, particularly in the form of consumer 
goods smuggling, which generally took place with 
the corrupt complicity of the security services. The 
groups involved were well positioned to take advan-
tage of the confusion, and the lines between capital-
ism and looting could be hard to discern. Security 
in this period was essential, both to protect estab-
lished interests and to repel petty interlopers. 
Aside from creating new players, economic shifts 
can affect established ones, and organized crime can 
deeply impact the formal economy. For example, 
Japan’s construction “bubble” in the 1980s brought 
new power to the Yakuza. Long employed by legiti-
mate interests to resolve disputes outside Japan’s 
legal system, the Yakuza were used in “land shark-
ing” – forcing reluctant tenants and property hold-
ers to make room for the new developments. They 
also invested heavily in the boom, so that when the 
bubble burst, their interference with the collection 
process has been said to be a key cause of the reces-
sion that followed.23
Organized criminals are subject not just to shifts in 
the licit economy, but to shifts in the illicit one as 
well. For example, Jamaica suffered for decades 
under organized violence linked to patronage poli-
tics, culminating in the 1980 elections. During the 
1980s, large amounts of cocaine transited Jamaica 
en route to the crack markets of the north-eastern 
United States, where Jamaican nationals also domi-
nated key markets. In the 1990s, the cocaine flows 
began to shift from the Caribbean to Central Amer-
ica, as radar surveillance prevented trafficking by air 
and as Mexican groups increasingly dominated 
cocaine importation and distribution in the US. As 
Jamaican groups lost this key source of income, it 
appears that many compensated by engaging in 
predatory crimes in their own communities, includ-
ing extortion and robbery. Violence levels increased 
commensurably, giving the country one of the high-
est murder rates on earth in recent years.
It is still too early to discern the impact of the cur-
rent economic crisis. It stands to reason that grow-
ing unemployment and declining licit opportunities 
would cause some to become less picky about their 
source of income or the origins of the products they 
consume. On the other hand, many of the items 
traded by organized crime are essentially luxury 
goods and services, not the staples of life, and tight-
ening economic conditions would affect illicit mar-
kets as well. 
For example, in order for human trafficking to be 
feasible, forced labour must be cheaper than volun-
tary labour, even after the additional costs of secur-
ing and retaining victims are factored in. Women 
trafficked for sexual exploitation have to compete 
with voluntary sex workers, whose numbers can be 
expected to swell if economic conditions worsen. 
The growth in supply is likely to cause a drop in 
price, chasing what is likely to be a declining 
demand from a cash-strapped male population. The 
net result would be smaller incentives for traffick-
ing. Similarly, sweatshop labour would have to be 
cheaper to maintain than a voluntary workforce, in 
a market where demand for manufactured products 
is likely to decline.
Young, urban, foreign and poor
Crime and violence are strongly associated with the 
increasing number of young people, particularly in 
developing countries. Almost 85% of the world’s 
youth currently live in developing countries, and by 
2025, this figure will grow to 89.5%.24 And while 
0.9 people per 100,000 die each day in youth homi-
cides in high income countries, in Africa, the figure 
is 17.6 and in Latin America, 36.4. Moreover, for 
every fatality, there are from 20 to 40 victims of 
non-fatal youth violence. These marginalized young 
people provide foot soldiers to organized crime.
In addition, a growing share of these young people 
are being raised in cities, without the support and 
normative infrastructure of the traditional rural 
lifestyle. More than half of humanity is already 
living in cities; a share that is projected to reach 
60% within two decades, with most of the growth 
taking place in developing countries. Since most 
developing countries lack the capacity to accom-
modate this rapid inflow, many will be brought up 
in slums, where quality of life is low and competi-
tion for scarce resources is fierce. Urban lifestyles 
require cash; which is difficult to access legally in 
countries with high unemployment levels. As a 
result, crime rates are higher in cities, especially in 
slums, where drug addiction and gang activity pro-
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liferate.25 It is these areas that give rise and shelter 
to a variety of organized crime activities. Urban 
violence and crime are on the rise in developing 
countries; from 1980 to 2000, recorded crime rates 
increased by almost one third. In developing coun-
tries, an estimated 60% of all urban residents have 
been victims of crime over the past five years, rising 
to 70% in Latin America and Africa.26 
Difficult conditions at home can provide a substan-
tial “push” to emigration. But while global capital 
flows freely, labour still does not. Market demand 
for workers draws them in from around the globe, 
oblivious to the immigration code. This creates 
demand for a service to overcome the legal barriers, 
precisely the kind of service in which organized 
crime specializes. The result is migrant smuggling 
and the many abuses that accompany it.
There are more than 200 million international 
migrants in the world today, which is two and a half 
times the number in 1965, and a significant share 
of these migrants are undocumented. Human 
mobility has become a life choice driven by dispari-
ties in demography, income and employment 
opportunities across and within regions.27 And 
since this migration is essential to both developing 
and developed countries, it will be extremely diffi-
cult to stop through law enforcement. Demographic 
trends show that the working age population in 
developed countries is expected to decline by 23% 
by 2050 without immigration.28 The working age 
population of Africa, on the other hand, is expected 
to almost triple, from 408 million in 2005 to 1.12 
billion in 2050.29 
Most irregular migrants resort to the assistance of 
profit-seeking smugglers.30 For example, Dutch 
customs data on asylum seekers who arrived in the 
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Netherlands in 2000 showed that 97% had received 
assistance from smugglers. Migrant smuggling is 
already a major revenue-generating transnational 
criminal activity, and given that illegal immigration 
is likely to increase, so will the size of the illicit 
economy related to migrant smuggling and the 
number of criminals involved in the trade.
Migration, be it legal or illegal, may also broaden 
the reach of existing criminal networks. Although 
most migrants, including many of those who enter 
their destination country illegally, are generally law-
abiding citizens, among them, there are inevitably 
affiliates of a variety of criminal networks. These 
people bring with them their crime-related skills 
and knowledge as well as their criminal contacts. 
Chinese, Nigerian, Italian and Russian groups are 
well-known examples of network proliferation 
through migration.
Revolutionaries or criminals?
Another source of rapid change and governance 
gaps is conflict. Most wars today are civil wars, usu-
ally fought by dissident groups and regional seces-
sionists. In the post-Cold War world, these groups 
may be compelled to find funding through illicit 
activities. If they control territory, they can use this 
land to facilitate transnational trafficking. The 
money this brings in can become an end in itself. 
After some time, it may be difficult to differentiate 
political dissidents and criminal groups. This issue 
is discussed further in this report.
Why should we be concerned?
The threat posed by transnational organized crime 
is often misunderstood. There is a tendency to over-
simplify, and, in particular, to equate the damage 
done by organized crime with the amount of vio-
lence associated with the market. But the threat 
posed is much deeper than a body count, tragic 
though this loss of life may be.
Many forms of organized crime do involve violence 
or the threat of violence. For example, to subjugate 
human trafficking victims, violence or the credible 
threat of violence is almost always present. In other 
markets, violence is needed to ensure contract com-
pliance and to resolve disputes. Professional crimi-
nals may seek to minimize the extent of violence to 
ensure the smooth flow of profits and to avoid 
unwanted attention, but few would be able to con-
duct their business without recourse to the gun.
Relying on homicide figures as a proxy for the threat 
would be a big mistake, however, because some of 
the areas most afflicted by organized crime have 
very low violence levels, just as some authoritarian 
societies have very low crime rates. Typically, the 
better organized the crime, the less violence associ-
ated with it. The groups concerned have paid off 
MIGRANT STOCK EVOLUTION BY FIG. 24: 
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the appropriate officials, resolved intra- and inter-
group tensions, and terrified the public to the extent 
that very little additional violence is required. As 
noted above, crime groups sometimes provide social 
services and support that the state does not, win-
ning them popular support. If law enforcement is 
ever roused into action, the violence associated with 
this disruption of the criminal equilibrium can even 
fuel calls for enforcement to desist. 
So, the real threat of organized crime cannot be 
reduced to the violence associated with criminal 
markets. Rather, it is best described under two 
headings: 
Direct impacts, which are essentially the rea-s 
sons each criminal activity was prohibited in 
the ﬁrst place;
Indirect impacts, in particular the ways organ-s 
ized crime as a category undermines the state 
and legitimate commercial activity.
Direct impact
It is easy to lose sight of the reasons why organized 
criminal activities were prohibited in the first place. 
For some markets, like drug trafficking or migrant 
smuggling, most of the parties are willing partici-
pants. Many die as a result of their choices, but in 
a world increasingly governed by the principle of let 
the buyer beware, it is possible to absolve ourselves 
of responsibility for this loss. Unless we happen to 
know one of the victims, these personal costs are 
not tallied as social costs, and so the impact of crime 
becomes obscured.
In addition, the impact of organized crime is often 
realised in a different country than that where the 
profits accrue. Crimes may appear victimless when 
the victims are located on the other end of the 
world, and criminals who bring in money by export-
ing problems may receive popular support. For 
example, people residing in the under-governed 
areas of countries that produce drugs may see no 
problem with working for the trafficking groups, 
who may provide more security and support than 
the state. The drug addicts are located overseas, and 
so do not form part of the calculus of local actors. 
Similarly, those who use drugs in developed coun-
tries rarely consider the way that their consumption 
may be affecting violence and stability in producer 
and transit countries. Only when viewed globally 
are the net costs of trafficking apparent, and only 
national governments, not their organized crime 
substitutes, have any incentive to look globally.
Certain drugs are prohibited because they cause 
addiction and lead to serious physical and mental 
health problems. The impact inevitably extends 
beyond the users, affecting their families, commu-
nities and the society at large. The costs of drug- 
related accidents, lost productivity, child neglect 
and abuse, psychological damage and the like are 
tremendously difficult to tally. It is a challenge to 
simply estimate the number of drug addicts in the 
world. Addicts in developing countries often go 
uncounted, while some of those in richer nations 
handle the matter privately. 
Based on the available data, it is possible to estimate 
that between 172 million and 250 million adults 
used illicit drugs in 2007. On the upper end, this is 
more than the population of any but the three larg-
est nations in the world. Perhaps 18 to 38 million 
could be classed as “problem drug users”. On the 
upper end, this is more than the populations of 
Switzerland, Bulgaria, Honduras, Israel, and Hong 
Kong, China combined. We also know that some 
4.4 million people are currently in drug treatment 
worldwide, equivalent to the entire population of 
Ireland. Studies of people arrested for a range of 
crimes in the United States, Australia, and else-
where have found that most test positive for drug 
use. In a 2008 study in the United States, 87% of 
people arrested in 10 major cities tested positive for 
drugs.31
Few would dispute the seriousness of the crime 
of human trafficking, but far less is known about 
its extent. Based on data from 111 countries and 
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territories (not including China or India), 21,400 
victims were detected world-wide in 2006. These 
are just the victims detected, and it is estimated that 
only one in 20 or one in 30 victims are ever recog-
nised. If true, this represents and immense pool of 
human suffering. In addition, there are as many as 
a million images of child pornography currently 
circulating on the Internet, each of which represents 
an act of human trafficking and a crime against the 
most basic moral principles. The impact of these 
crimes is impossible to quantify.
Many mistakenly believe the primary impact of 
product counterfeiting is loss of revenues to rights 
holders, but the crime has far more serious implica-
tions. Manufacturers of counterfeits have little 
incentive to adhere to safety regulations, since they 
have no reputation to protect or liability to fear. 
Substandard or outright hazardous products, from 
toys to auto break pads, pose a serious public safety 
threat. Of greatest concern is counterfeit medica-
tion, which, in addition to hastening the death of 
the many who go untreated, can contribute to the 
generation of drug-resistant strains of the most 
deadly pathogens. 
The profits generated through natural resource 
smuggling are driving whole ecosystems to the brink 
of extinction. The true costs of this crime are impos-
sible to reduce to a dollar figure – a world less 
diverse, the end of whole life forms, a shortsighted 
error impossible to correct. 
Indirect impact
Aside from the damages directly caused by specific 
forms of crime, there is one that is common to all: 
the insidious erosion of state control. Traditional 
organized crime groups displace state authority, by 
filling the governance niches neglected by the offi-
cial structures and by co-opting whatever vestigial 
state agents remain. In other words, organized crime 
groups gradually undermine the authority and the 
health of the official government.
Why is this a problem? Insofar as the official state 
structures provide value, this value is threatened by 
the growth of parallel structures. Organized crime 
groups are inherently unaccountable, they are not 
subject to democratic controls, and their chief aim 
is the enrichment of their membership, not the 
advancement of society. Where they are predomi-
nant, development can become impossible, because 
any contract that is not to the advantage of the 
dominant groups will be nullified. In areas where 
the official state structures are particularly bad, 
organized crime groups may appear relatively attrac-
tive. But the solution in these cases is to improve 
governance, not to cede authority to those who 
enrich themselves through antisocial activities.
Since the network groups do not seek to wrest ter-
ritory from state control, their impact is even more 
insidious, but can be just as important. Most trans-
national trafficking requires smuggling, and the 
surest means of smuggling is through corruption. In 
poorer states, the corruption can go straight to the 
top, and the highest authorities can quickly become 
manipulated by traffickers. If opposed, these groups 
can engineer the removal of problematic officials, 
up to and including the chief executive. If the state 
is uncooperative, it can support opposition groups 
or insurgents. Under these circumstances, the 
rational choice may be to give in to the traffickers. 
This is a situation the international community 
cannot afford to permit. 
TRAFFICKING 
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TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
Trafficking in persons involves the use of violence, 
threats or deception to create a pliant and exploit-
able work force.1 It is a truly global phenomenon: 
victims from at least 127 countries have been 
reported, and victims have been reported in 137 
countries.2 Given this diffusion, it is difficult to 
estimate the size of the problem. Many countries 
have only recently passed, and some have yet to 
pass, legislation making human trafficking a dis-
tinct crime. Definitions of the offence vary, as does 
the capacity to detect victims. According to official 
figures, at least 22,000 victims were detected glo-
bally in 2006,3 but some countries where human 
trafficking is known to be a problem do not report 
detecting victims.4
The current best estimate on the global dimension 
of human trafficking comes from the International 
Labour Organization (ILO). According to this esti-
mate, at least 2,450,000 persons are currently being 
exploited as victims of human trafficking.5 Using a 
broad definition, ILO estimated the global eco-
nomic costs suffered by all victims of forced labour 
to be US$21 billion in 2009.6 The total illicit pro-
fits produced in one year by trafficked forced 
labourers was estimated at about US$32 billion in 
2005.7 The data remain patchy, however, and any 
global estimate must be regarded as tentative. 
The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially  Women 
and Children,8 which supplements the Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, is cast 
broadly enough to encompass a wide range of forms 
of exploitation, but in practice, two major catego-
ries of transnational activity can be identified:
traﬃcking for the purposes of sexual exploita-s 
tion, and
labour exploitation, including the use of child s 
labour.
In data recently collected by UNODC on the 
number of victims detected by state authorities 
around the world, two thirds of the detected victims 
were women, and 79% of the victims were subject 
to sexual exploitation. But these figures should not 
be mistaken for a description of the total victim 
pool. Some national laws only address trafficking in 
women or only recognize victims of trafficking for 
sexual exploitation as trafficking victims. Even 
where the law provides for other forms of traffick-
ing, sexually exploited women and children may be 
prioritized for enforcement and assistance, and so 
the profile of victims detected may be different 
from those that are not detected. 
Since victims are often recruited by means of decep-
tion, traffickers need to gain the trust of potential 
Countries covered by 
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victims. For this reason, recruitment is often carried 
out by nationals of the same country as the victims. 
The use of women to recruit other women has been 
documented by studies conducted in this field.9 For 
most forms of crime, women are much less likely to 
be perpetrators than men; human trafficking appears 
to be an exception. The victims’ trust is also needed 
at destination to reduce the risk of escape. An 
analysis of the nationality of the victims shows that 
in destination countries, traffickers are often either 
nationals of the destination country or of the same 
nationality as the victims. 
Trafﬁcking for sexual exploitation 
Whether the number of victims of sexual exploita-
tion is greater than the number of victims of labour 
exploitation is debatable, but it is clear that the 
countries of the world regard the former as the 
greater problem. This is in keeping with the general 
tenor of criminal law: in most countries, sexual 
violation is considered an aggravating factor in any 
form of assault. The crime of forced prostitution 
garners more outrage than other forms of forced 
labour, and so many countries have laws aimed 
specifically at this practice.
For most people, the world of commercial sex is 
unknown terrain. While as much as half the young 
people in some developed countries will experiment 
with illicit drugs, a much smaller percentage have 
any experience with commercial sex. This makes it 
difficult for policymakers to weigh the evidence and 
generate a reasonable assessment of the nature and 
scope of the problem.
To come up with an accurate estimate of the scale 
of human trafficking for sexual exploitation, it is 
helpful to get some sense of the size of the market 
for commercial sex (see Box later in this chapter), 
since trafficked women are but a subset of a larger 
body of commercial sex workers. The purveyors of 
trafficked women are in direct competition with 
both domestic and international sex workers who 
were not trafficked. Those who traffic women also 
have to consider costs. Trafficking in women can be 
an extremely labour-intensive process, and the 
prices victims reportedly command have conse-
quently been very high. All of these factors act as 
constraints on the demand for women trafficked for 
sexual exploitation. 
Sudden geopolitical or economic shifts, such as the 
end of the Cold War, the  integration of China into 
the world economy or violent conflicts like the 
Yugoslav Wars can create new opportunities for 
human traffickers. The end of the Cold War was key 
in precipitating one of the best documented human 
trafficking flows in the world: the movement of 
Eastern European women into West European sex 
markets. Today, women of more nationalities (at 
least 95) have been trafficked into Europe than to 
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any other known destination. In addition, new (pre-
viously undetected) nationalities have increasingly 
been detected among trafficking victims in Europe. 
This problem is the subject of the flow study 
below.
Trafﬁcking for labour exploitation 
Trafficking for the purpose of forced labour appears 
to be limited to labour-intensive enterprises with 
rigid supply curves: typically, the so called dirty, 
dangerous or demeaning jobs. As a country develops 
and public welfare protections are established, fewer 
citizens are willing or able to take on these jobs at 
an internationally competitive wage. In some cir-
cumstances, demand for trafficked labour, includ-
ing the labour of children, can be generated. 
Coerced labour is more profitable for short-run 
productions. The longer the exploitation, the lower 
the net productivity of the coerced labourer and the 
greater the risk to the offender. 
There are many factors that can render a source 
country vulnerable to human trafficking, the most 
commonly cited of which is poverty. But there are 
many  poor countries that do not seem to produce 
large numbers of trafficking victims, so poverty 
alone is not enough to explain the phenomenon. 
Diaspora populations in destination countries are 
surely one factor, as is the presence of organized 
crime in the source country.10 


44
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
What is the nature of the market?
A greater variety of nationalities has been found 
among human trafficking victims in West and Cen-
tral Europe than in any other part of the world, and 
most of these victims (84%) were trafficked for the 
purpose of sexual exploitation. Both the detection 
rate and the type of exploitation detected are 
affected by enforcement patterns, however. In 2006, 
the entire Western Hemisphere only recorded some 
150 convictions for human trafficking, which is 
about the same number as Germany alone. It is dif-
ficult to say to what extent this is indicative of a 
greater problem or whether it is simply a matter of 
greater vigilance.
In recent years, the majority of human trafficking 
victims detected in Europe have come from the 
Balkans and the former Soviet Union, in particular 
Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, the Russian Federa-
tion and the Republic of Moldova. Victims from at 
least some of these five countries have also been 
located in all parts of Europe. But the dominance of 
these groups appears to be changing as new source 
countries emerge on the European scene.
Although trafficking from South America occurs in 
a smaller number of countries, it is often severe in 
the places where it does occur. The main destina-
tions for South American victims are Spain, Italy, 
Portugal, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Aus-
tria and Switzerland.12 Almost all of this trafficking 
is for the purpose of sexual exploitation and it 
includes transgender victims.13 Among South 
Americans, Brazilian victims have been increasingly 
detected in Europe. Trafficking originating in this 
country mainly affects the poor communities of the 
north (such as Amazonas, Pará, Roraima and 
Amapá), rather than the richer regions of the 
south. 
Trafficking from Africa affects mainly West African 
communities, in particular Nigerian women and 
girls.14 Trafficking originating from North Africa 
(Morocco and Tunisia) is still very limited, but may 
be increasing. Trafficking from East Africa (Uganda 
and Kenya) is found mainly in the United King-
dom.15
Trafficking from East Asia has traditionally involved 
mainly Thai women. More recently, Chinese nation-
als are also affected, as are women from Viet Nam 
and Cambodia. These women are normally exploited 
in indoor prostitution, such as massage parlours, 
saunas or beauty centres. 
How is the trafﬁcking conducted?
Every trafficking group has its own modus operandi 
for the recruitment, transportation and exploitation 
of victims. The most common recruiting method 
Number
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used by Balkan-based groups consists of promises of 
employment.16 In Ukraine, traffickers entice 70% 
of their victims through promises of work, partici-
pation in beauty contests, modelling opportunities, 
affordable vacations, study abroad programmes or 
marriage services.17
Trafficking originating from the Balkans, the former 
Soviet Union and Central Europe is characterized 
by recruitment conducted by victims’ acquaint-
ances. According to studies conducted in the Czech 
Republic,18 Poland19 and Romania,20 the majority of 
victims are recruited through acquaintances, friends 
or relatives. Similar patterns have been reported in 
the South Caucasus.21 Studies from Ukraine indi-
cate that 11% of victims were trafficked with the 
active cooperation of their husbands.22 
While some of these victims are recruited know-
ingly into prostitution, they may nonetheless end 
up in exploitative situations through deception, 
coercion or violence.23 According to one Ukrainian 
study, nearly 20% of the victims are promised work 
as exotic dancers, masseuses and the like. While 
most of these women understand that they will 
have to render sexual services, they are unaware of 
the conditions under which they will work.24
Violence is frequently used to control victims. Traf-
ficking by Balkan-based groups is described as very 
violent.25 Similarly, Russian organized criminal 
gangs engaged in human trafficking are reported to 
adopt particularly harsh methods of control. Often, 
before being presented to clients, women are raped 
by the traffickers themselves, in order to initiate the 
cycle of abuse and degradation. Some women are 
drugged to prevent them from escaping.26 Studies 
conducted in Romania, the Czech Republic and 
Poland show that violence towards the victims nor-
mally occurs at the destination site.27
Because of the short distances, most women traf-
ficked from Central Europe and the Balkans are 
transported by bus or car.28 Victims originating 
from the former Soviet Union are trafficked by 
making use of counterfeit passports, false visas and/
or false marriages. In some cases, trafficking victims 
are highly visible and engage in street-level prostitu-
tion, but in many cases, sex trafficking takes place 
in underground venues, such as private homes or 
brothels. Often, public and legal locations such as 
massage parlours, spas and strip clubs act as fronts 
for illegal prostitution and trafficking.
In the context of the Latin American human traf-
ficking flow, cases were registered where victims 
were forced to ‘recruit’ friends and/or family mem-
bers.29 Traffickers in Latin America may also make 
use of entertainment networks, fashion agencies, 
employment agencies, marriage and tourism agen-
cies and newspaper advertisements to recruit vic-
tims.30 Because of the long distances involved, Latin 
American women trafficked to Europe are normally 
transported by air to major European airports. Reg-
ular three-month tourist visas may be used to cross 
the borders.31 Trafficking victims travelling from 
Brazil to Europe may pass through European-
administrated territories in the Caribbean or South 
America to reduce the risks of being intercepted in 
                     Source: Elaboration of UNODC/UN.GIFT data
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Europe. Suriname is also a transit country to 
Europe.32 Once in Europe, women and transgender 
individuals may be exploited in the streets or 
indoors, depending on the destination.
Studies of Nigerian victims report that acquaint-
ances, close friends or family members play a major 
role in the recruitment of victims. Recruitment 
frequently occurs in the victim’s own home.33 Nige-
rian trafficking is characterized by a debt bondage 
scheme. Victims trafficked into Europe (Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and others) are forced 
to pay back inflated smuggling fees.34 Victims 
mainly travel to Europe by plane from Lagos or 
other international airports from West Africa.35 
Victims may also have been transported by land and 
sea across the Mediterranean. The vast majority of 
West African women and girls are exploited in street 
prostitution.
Traditionally, Chinese brothels in Europe were 
accessible just to the Chinese communities, but this 
is changing and these new forms of Chinese prosti-
tution seem to be more amenable to trafficking in 
persons. Chinese trafficking occurs on the basis of a 
debt bondage scheme and in the context of assisted 
irregular migration. Most of the victims come from 
the impoverished north-eastern regions, and typi-
cally move to the country’s south-east. From there, 
they are trafficked across the former Soviet Union 
and Eastern Bloc countries before reaching 
Europe.37 
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Who are the trafﬁckers?
Most convicted traffickers are male, as are convicts 
of virtually every other crime. Female offending 
rates are higher for human trafficking than for other 
crimes, however. This may be due in part to the 
importance of trust between the victim and the 
perpetrator. Additionally, in some markets, victims 
may become exploiters over time, as this may be the 
only way to escape further exploitation.38 
In the countries that formerly comprised the Soviet 
Union in particular, the majority of recruiters are 
women, often persons previously engaged in prosti-
tution.39 A study by the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) on trafficking in the former 
Soviet Union reports cases where repatriated traf-
ficked women became recruiters, as this is one of 
the few employment options available to previously 
trafficked women.40 
A study by the United Nations Interregional Crime 
and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) on Roma-
nian trafficking to Germany reports that women are 
used not only as recruiters of other women but also 
as guardians in the destination country.41 In 2007, 
of the 121 people arrested for human trafficking in 
Greece, 38 were women. Of these, more than 40% 
were Russian, Ukrainian and Kazakh, whereas the 
same nationalities accounted for only 7% of the 
males arrested. 
The prevalence of female traffickers is also charac-
teristic of Nigerian trafficking,42 and women may 
Source: Dutch National Rapporteur
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“evolve” over time from victim to exploiter.43 The 
Nigerian networks have loose structures and oper-
ate mainly in and from Nigeria, although they have 
bases in Europe through which the women are 
transported before arriving at their final destina-
tion. The exploitation in Europe is handled by resi-
dent Nigerian women, referred to as ‘madams’.44 A 
large part of the West African trafficking into 
Europe originates from, or passes through, the 
Nigerian state of Edo and its capital Benin City. It 
is mainly conducted by Edo traffickers, known as 
“Binis.”45 
In Europe, the perpetrators are frequently not 
nationals of the country where they operate, in 
contrast to some other regions. Often, their nation-
ality corresponds to that of the victim. For example, 
only 39% of the traffickers prosecuted in Greece in 
2007 were Greek. More than half came from Bul-
garia, Romania, the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine, the largest source countries for trafficking 
victims. A similar situation is found in Italy. This 
suggests that diaspora communities are a vector for 
trafficking, but there are exceptions. In Germany, 
Turks are the most commonly encountered foreign 
traffickers, but few Turkish victims have been 
detected. The same is true with Moroccans in the 
Netherlands.
As a rule, groups engaging in trafficking for sexual 
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2
exploitation are small.46 The Russian Federation 
provides a case in point, where many of the groups 
comprise two or three people.47 But again, there are 
exceptions. Azerbaijani authorities detained over 40 
members of a trafficking group with cells in five 
countries. The network covered a huge area extend-
ing from Central Asia to Turkey and was engaged in 
human trafficking and the issuance of fake docu-
ments, which they used to import the victims.48
In Romania, based on a sample of 30 cases, UNICRI 
found 23 involved groups of three or more people, 
while seven cases were conducted by individuals 
operating alone. Most of the groups sampled in this 
study were very small, however; usually made up of 
a recruiter, a transporter and an exploiter. Within 
the larger networks there was usually a structured 
division of labor and often additional accomplices 
who performed support tasks on an irregular 
basis.49
European groups may be involved in recruiting in 
source countries in Latin America. This is the case 
for the Brazilian flow, which appears to be in the 
hands of European and Asian organizations. The 
involvement of Asian organized crime groups in 
Brazil has been documented.50 About one third of 
the recruiters in one research sample (52 of 161) 
were European or Asian.51 Other studies report that 
trafficking of Brazilian women to Spain and Portu-
gal is conducted through cooperation among differ-
ent groups, in which Russian groups are said to play 
a dominant role.52 
Chinese organized crime groups run the gamut 
from mafia-like secret societies to street gangs and 
informal networks. Triads are traditionally hierar-
chical, but not all human trafficking is triad-linked. 
In Europe, these groups are increasingly involved in 
the business of sexual exploitation. In 2008, the 
Italian authorities indicated that this business 
became the most prominent illegal activity of these 
groups  in Italy.53
How big is the ﬂow?
The ILO estimates that the minimum number of 
victims trafficked for all purposes in Europe and 
North America is 279,000 in 2005.54 Based on data 
gathered by UNODC, the total number of victims 
detected in West and Central Europe was 7,300 in 
2006.55 If about one victim in 20 were detected, the 
number of trafficking victims in Europe would be 
around 140,000.56 
To reconcile this with the estimate of the number of 
sex workers in Europe generally (see Box), about 
one sex worker in seven would be a trafficking 
victim. A high figure, but not beyond the realm of 
possibility.71 Research on the period of exploitation 
suggests a turnover period of two years on average.72 
This means some 70,000 women would need to be 
trafficked anually to replace those leaving the 
market.
If there were indeed 140,000 trafficking victims in 
Europe, they could produce perhaps 50 million 
sexual services annually.73 At €50 per client,74 this 
would constitute a market worth €2.5 billion 
(equivalent to some US$ 3 billion) annually. More 
research is required, however, on both the client 
load and the rate for services for both trafficked 
women and other sex workers.
How big is the commercial sex market in Europe?
Notwithstanding the existence of diﬀerent markets for sex, including sex tourism, 
transgender prostitution and male prostitution, commercial sexual services in Europe 
are consumed almost entirely by men and performed in great part by women. 
National survey data suggest the percentage of men who have purchased sexual serv-
ices in their lifetimes varies considerably between countries and over time. According 
to the Kinsey surveys in the 1940s, 70% of adult males reported having paid for sex at 
least once in their lives,57 but this was at a time when non-compensated extramarital 
sex was far less common than today. More recent surveys suggest the ﬁgure today is 
closer to 19%.58 Recent surveys in other countries suggest a similar ﬁgure in Sweden 
(13%),59 the Netherlands (14%),60 Australia (15%)61 and Switzerland (19%).62 Spain 
(39%) is an outlier in Europe,63 as is Puerto Rico (61%) in North America.64 The 
comparable ﬁgure is even higher in Thailand (73%).65 
Self-reported annual prevalence for buying sex has been estimated at 13-15% of the 
adult male population in the Central African region, 10-11% in Eastern and Southern 
Africa, and 5–7% in Asia and Latin America. The median for all regions was about 
9–10%.66 
A British study found that 4% of the men polled reported having paid for sex in the 
previous ﬁve years.67 Another British study found that 10% had paid for sex in their 
lifetimes, of which two thirds (7%) had paid for it in the last year and 27% (3%) were 
regular clients of prostitutes. Over half of these men reported having paid for sex while 
abroad, and less than 2% had paid for sex both domestically and abroad, suggesting 
that about half of these men were not clients for British sex workers.68 A Spanish study 
found that 25% of men had paid for heterosexual sex at some time in their lives, 
13.3% in the last 5 years and 5.7% in the last 12 months.69
How many women are required to meet this demand? An estimate of the number of 
women engaging in transactional sex in 25 European countries (comprising 74% of the 
total European population) suggests a sex worker population of some 700,000 women, 
or 0.63% of adult women (15-49) of these countries.70 Extrapolating to the entire Eu-
ropean population, this would indicate a total of about one million sex workers.  
If 0.6% of the women are selling sex and 6% of the men are buying it (the prevalence 
in the Spanish study cited above), this suggests a ratio of about one sex worker per 
10 annual clients, too few clients to be the sole source of income, even if they were 
all regular customers. Doubling or even tripling the share of men visiting sex workers 
would only double or triple this client load. Despite the estimates, either less than 
0.6% of European women sell sex professionally, or more than 6% of men purchase 
sex on annual basis, or both. More research is required on the nature, structure, eco-
nomics and scale of this industry.
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For this to be possible, there must be commensurate 
demand. Assuming 5% of the adult (15-49) male 
population of Europe sees a sex worker on a monthly 
basis (see Box), there would be demand for 600 
million sex services annually, meaning trafficking 
victims would meet about 8% of demand. 
Detecting trends in the number of trafficking vic-
tims is difficult, because awareness of the problem 
and legislation to deal with it is evolving. As a result, 
it is difficult to distinguish trends in enforcement 
from trends in prevalence. The number of victims 
of trafficking for sexual exploitation detected by the 
authorities in Europe increased about 20% between 
2005 and 2006.76 Some countries (for example, 
Germany and Romania) have registered a recent 
decrease in the number of criminal proceedings and 
a reduction in the absolute numbers of victims 
detected. At the same time, other countries in West 
and Central Europe registered an increase in 
detected cases.
Some trends can be seen in the profile of the vic-
tims, however. Today, it appears that about 60% of 
the victims detected originate from the Balkans, 
Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Per-
haps 13% come from Latin America, about 5% 
from Africa and about 3% from East Asia. A large 
share of the victims (about 20%) are either of 
unspecified origins or are local victims. This is a 
different profile than in the past.
In the late 1990s, for example, Albania was a ‘hot 
spot’ for human trafficking. In 1996, about 40% of 
the victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation in 
Italy were Albanians. This dropped to 20% in 2000-
2003 and 10% after 2003. A similar trend was 
recorded for Ukrainian and Moldovan victims.
The trafficking originating from the Russian Fed-
eration and Ukraine, although still prominent, 
appears to have decreased in the last ten years in all 
West and Central European countries. This decline 
coincided with an increase in detected victims from 
the Balkans, particularly Romania and Bulgaria, but 
this trafficking flow also appears to have decreased 
after 2005.77 
SHARE OF COUNTRIES  FIG. 36: 
REPORTING TRENDS IN  
RECORDED CONVICTIONS  
IN WEST AND CENTRAL   
EUROPE, 2003-200775
Stable or no 
clear trends, 
48%
Decreasing 
trends, 26%
Increasing 
trends, 26%
Source: UNODC/UN.GIFT
1996-1999 1996-1999
2000-2003
1996-1999
2000-2003
2000-2003
2003-20072003-2007
2003-2007
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Albanians Ukrainians Moldovans
                    Source: Anti-Mafia Bureau and Project WEST
SHARE OF SELECTED NATIONALITIES OF VICTIMS DETECTED IN ITALY,  FIG. 37: 
1996-2007 
%
 o
f 
vi
ct
im
s 
d
et
ec
te
d
51
2
New nationalities have appeared on the European 
scene in the last few years. While generally small, 
the share of Chinese, Paraguayan, Sierra Leonean, 
Uzbek and Turkmen victims has been increasing 
over time. This shows a diversification of the sources 
of women trafficked for sexual exploitation. In 
addition, an increase of domestic trafficking has 
been recorded in all of West and Central Europe. 
Chinese victims have been increasingly detected in 
many European countries. In 2008, Chinese were 
the largest foreign group involved in sexual exploi-
tation in Italy. In the Netherlands, Chinese massage 
centres were for the first time described as an ‘emerg-
ing form of prostitution’ in 2005, and today, Chi-
nese are the most prominent foreign group of 
victims in that country.78
In Turkey, Uzbek and Turkmen women seem to be 
replacing the Russians and Ukrainians. Similarly, in 
Spain the increase of Paraguayan and Brazilian traf-
ficking victims appears to have compensated for the 
decrease in trafficking from Colombia. 
This suggests that human trafficking rings may 
react to changes in traditional origin countries, such 
as increased awareness among potential victims, 
stringent law enforcement action or improved 
livelihoods.
SHARE OF SELECTED NATIONALITIES OF DETECTED VICTIMS IN SPAIN  FIG. 38: 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR RESPONSE
The international community acknowledges the 
need for a policy response articulated in five pillars, 
key to a comprehensive action against trafficking in 
persons: prosecution, protection, prevention, 
national coordination and cooperation, and inter-
national coordination and cooperation.
The United Nations Protocol on Trafficking in 
Persons entered into force on 25 December 2003. 
Since then, many countries have passed appropriate 
legislation, and this represents a significant step 
forward. Fewer have actually used this legislation to 
convict anyone, however. In fact, 40% of countries 
with dedicated laws did not record a single convic-
tion for trafficking in persons from 2003 to 2008, 
and most of those that have applied the law have 
registered relatively few convictions. 
Convicting human traffickers can be tricky, because 
victims are often so traumatized by the experience 
that they are unable to assist in the prosecution. But 
human traffickers have their own vulnerabilities. 
Victims tend to be employed in certain sectors, like 
textiles, manufacturing, catering and prostitution. 
The sex trade in particular is exposed because it 
must maintain some degree of publicity to attract 
customers. Often, trafficking victims are offered 
through front businesses, like massage parlours or 
escort services, with a very public face. Even where 
criminal prosecution is not possible, civil action can 
be taken against offending businesses, for violation 
of health or labour standards, or for employing 
illegal immigrants.
Part of the reason few convictions have been 
returned may be due to the fact that although the 
Protocol has been ratified, some countries have not 
provided for all the institutional arrangements it 
recommends. Victim support, for example, serves 
both to protect this highly vulnerable class of people 
and to bolster the criminal justice response, facili-
tating victim participation in the trial. But whether 
the victim wishes to testify or not, they must not be 
further victimized by law enforcement or immigra-
tion authorities, and care must be taken to ensure 
they are released into a situation where repeat vic-
timization is unlikely.
Of course, prevention is better than cure, and there 
are many ways that human trafficking can be pre-
vented in both source and destination countries. 
Public education efforts in Eastern Europe have 
apparently paid dividends: surveys of potential 
migrants in some vulnerable areas show high levels 
of awareness, and the flow of victims from this 
region appears to be in decline. Awareness cam-
paigns targeted at expatriate communities in desti-
nation countries, focusing on the problematic 
industries, can also be beneficial. These campaigns 
should be evidence-based and evaluated for impact. 
In areas where prostitution is legal or tolerated, 
careful monitoring is required to ensure that work-
ers, especially foreigners, are not being exploited. 
The scrutiny should be applied to all aspects of the 
sex trade, including cover enterprises like massage 
parlours and strip clubs.
While domestic trafficking occurs, human traffick-
ers commonly exploit the cultural dislocation of 
immigrants, and there are many well-established 
intercontinental flows. Putting a stop to human 
trafficking will require documenting these flows 
and creating strategic plans to address them. Since 
they do not suffer the ill-effects themselves, transit 
countries may be completely unaware of the key 
role they play. These countries must be informed 
and involved in finding solutions. Enforcement or 
prevention efforts in one geographic area may 
simply divert it to other regions. Plans must be 
global in scope, and based on strong international 
cooperative agreements concerning both law 
enforcement and victim assistance.
The problem of human trafficking is not only a 
criminal justice issue. It involves broader social 
issues, including labour, urban management, immi-
gration and foreign policies. National and interna-
tional strategies to stop human trafficking should 
reflect this complexity, ensuring input and assist-
ance from agencies with expertise in these matters.
A global threat assessment
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SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS
The United Nations defines smuggling of 
migrants as: 
the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indi-
rectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the 
illegal entry of a person into a State of which the 
person is not a national or a permanent resident.1 
The criminal, under this definition, is the smuggler, 
not the smuggled. The aim of the Migrant Smug-
gling Protocol is not to stop illegal immigration. It 
is to stop organized criminals from profiting off an 
inherently vulnerable population.
This population is vulnerable because of the great 
differences in opportunities experienced in different 
parts of the world. By accident of birth, many young 
people face a much bleaker future than their coun-
terparts abroad, if they accept the impermeability of 
national borders. A large number of people are will-
ing to take great risks in order to gain a chance at a 
better future away from their homeland, including 
violating immigration laws. In some communities, 
the practice is very common, and illegal immigra-
tion bears no social stigma.
Because they must enter their destination country 
illegally, undocumented migrants may feel com-
pelled to enlist the help of smugglers, either for the 
purposes of entering the country clandestinely or 
for assistance in acquiring fraudulent paperwork to 
secure a visa. Because these services are illegal, those 
who provide them have tremendous power over 
their charges, and abuses are commonplace, parti-
cularly when the movement is clandestine. Many 
die on their way to their destination, or are aban-
doned without resources en route. As with many 
other illegal transnational activities, efforts to stop 
illegal immigration can create opportunities for 
organized criminals.
The interdependency of the global economy today 
explains why migrant smuggling is a growing cri-
minal enterprise. Capital flows virtually unimpeded 
around the world; the same is not true for labour. 
The two are connected, however, as a growing share 
of national incomes are dependent on transnational 
remittance flows, particularly in the smaller econo-
mies. Remittance flows are largest for lower-middle 
income countries, not the poorest of the poor. These 
flows do not necessarily come from the richest 
countries – they need only be richer than the source 
countries to attract labour.
Both developing and developed countries need 
well-regulated migration. Many developed coun-
tries are facing low or even negative population 
growth, and populations are ageing. At the same 
time, many developing countries are still seeing 
population growth that exceeds economic growth, 
but restrictions on legal migration have arguably 
increased in the last thirty years. 
There are an estimated 50 million irregular interna-
tional migrants in the world today.2 A good share of 
these people paid for assistance in illegally crossing 
borders. The fees involved can be many times their 
Source: UNDP
0.98
0.9
0.8
0.5
0.33
No data
U
N
O
D
C
 / 
SC
IE
N
C
ES
 P
O
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX, FIG. 40: 2007
56
SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS
annual income before migrating. They may borrow 
heavily against the expectation of greater future 
earnings, and their debtors may be equally poor 
people who invest everything in the hope of forth-
coming remittances.
Of course, not every illegal migrant requires assist-
ance in getting to their destination, but a surprising 
share do, even when the path seems fairly direct. A 
number of factors can favour high levels of organi-
zation, including the distance to be travelled, the 
degree of cultural isolation of the migrants and the 
difficulties of evading law enforcement. In practice, 
migrants may pay for assistance in making some 
border crossings while tackling others independ-
ently. They may travel alone until they meet resist-
ance, and only then seek assistance.
The nature of that assistance is likewise varied. 
Many “smugglers” may also run legitimate busi-
nesses. For example, licensed travel agents may pro-
vide advice and assistance to people wishing to 
migrate illegally.3 Some are merely opportunistic 
carriers or hospitality providers who choose to look 
the other way. Demand for transport and sanctuary 
may suddenly emerge as migration routes shift, and 
in some parts of the world, small businesspeople 
cannot afford to be choosy about their clientele.4 
Many may fail to appreciate the moral downside of 
helping people find a better life. On the other hand, 
full-time professional criminals – some specialized 
in smuggling people, some not – are important in 
many flows around the world. Both formal and 
informal structures may operate without conflict, so 
long as business is plentiful.
Smugglers are often either of the national origin or 
ethnic background of the migrant group they serve, 
or of the country of transit, depending on the role 
played. One typology distinguishes “local smug-
glers” from “stage coordinators”. Stage coordinators 
help migrants navigate through a particular country 
or part of their journey, and, for reasons of com-
munication and trust, are generally of the same 
MIGRANTS’ REMITTANCES AS A SHARE OF NATIONAL GDP  FIG. 41: 
(TOP 25 COUNTRIES), 2007
Source: World Bank
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3
ethnic background/origin as the migrants. They 
subcontract services to smugglers who come from 
the area to be crossed and thus know the terrain 
best.5
Services may be purchased as a package from origin 
to destination, or piecemeal, with more compre-
hensive and safe approaches commanding higher 
prices. Air travel with visa fraud is the preferred 
route for most who can afford it, and those less 
well-resourced are compelled to take their chances 
with more arduous land and sea voyages.6 Many 
migrants optimize their value for money by com-
bining strategies.7
The following two flow studies exemplify many of 
these observations, and illustrate the pull the afflu-
ent north has upon its southern neighbors. The 
largest number of migrant apprehensions found 
anywhere in the world is along the southern border 
of the USA, a flow that, despite proximity, is largely 
handled by organized groups. A flow with similar 
dynamics and growing potential is that from Africa 
to Europe. These are not the only two major illegal 
migration flows in the world, of course. There are 
also a number of undocumented migrants from 
East Africa to Yemen, and a flow of people through 
Central Asia to the Russian Federation and beyond. 
But the flows to the USA and Europe are probably 
the most lucrative ones for smugglers, and so they 
are the topic of the flow studies below.
POPULATION GROWTH RATE, SELECTED COUNTRIES (MOST RECENT)FIG. 43: 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
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What is the nature of the market?
The USA is a nation of immigrants, and its recep-
tivity to immigration has long been one of the 
country’s strengths. It presently hosts – in absolute 
terms - by far the largest foreign-born population of 
any country in the world. This situation is a mani-
festation of deeply held American values, including 
a belief in social mobility and self-reliance. Com-
pared to the European Union, for example, the 
USA offers a relatively slender social safety net to 
new arrivals. From an economic perspective, it 
therefore risks less by allowing an immigrant into 
the country. 
People emigrate to the USA from all over the world, 
but Latin America provides the largest regional 
share, accounting for over a third of the foreign-
born population. Most of these migrants are autho-
rized, but it is estimated that just under a third of 
all immigrants to the USA are illegal, and about 
80% of the illegal emigrant population in the coun-
try is from Latin America.8 
Of all illegal immigrants in the USA, an estimated 
25-40% entered the country on a legal visa and 
then overstayed, with the remainder having entered 
the country clandestinely. The nationalities most 
likely to be denied a visa are also among those most 
likely to be detected entering clandestinely. Most 
clandestine entrants to the USA come across the 
Mexican border, and most of these entrants are 
Mexican. Given the proximity of the country, it is 
not surprising that most Mexican illegal immigrants 
enter the country by clandestinely crossing the 
border, rather than relying on a visa overstay or 
other overt means.10 As is explained below, over 
90% of illegal Mexican migrants are assisted by 
professional smugglers.
The USA hosts the second-largest Spanish-speaking 
population in the world. More than 9 million 
people born in Mexico alone were living in the USA 
at the time of the 2000 census, the single largest 
foreign national contributor to the population. 
Over a third of the population speaks Spanish in the 
border states of California, Texas and New Mexico. 
Combined with the fact that some 150 million 
Latin Americans live on less than two dollars per 
day, this expatriate population exerts a powerful 
pull on the poorer states to the south.11 Mexican 
immigrants can expect to greatly improve their 
standard of living without having to master a new 
language or leaving behind their cultural group.
Migrants make an important contribution to the 
economy of Latin American countries. Remittances 
from Mexican migrants to the USA increased from 
US$3.6 billion in 1995 to US$20 billion in 2005.12 
Central American countries figure prominently 
INTERNATIONAL  FIG. 45: 
MIGRATION STOCK, TOTAL 
BY COUNTRY, 2005
Source: World Development Indicators
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among those countries with the highest share of 
GDP attributable to remittances. 
But remittances do not come from nowhere – they 
represent value created in the US economy. As the 
US population becomes more skilled, there is a 
demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour, par-
ticularly in industries such as construction and agri-
culture.13 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan testified before Congress that illegal 
immigration significantly supported the US econ-
omy by providing a flexible workforce and creating 
a “safety value” to accommodate fluctuations in 
demand for labour.14 Unfortunately, it also creates 
opportunities for organized crime.
How is the smuggling conducted?
The 3,000 kilometre south-west border of the USA 
is relatively sparsely populated, much of it desert, 
with the thin Rio Grande river separating Mexico 
and the US state of Texas. It is among the most 
crossed international borders in the world, dotted 
with a series of twin cities, the most prominent of 
which are San Diego/Tijuana, El Paso/Juarez, 
Nogales/Nogales, Laredo/Nuevo Laredo, McAllen/
Reynosa and Brownsville/Matamoros. Many of 
these pairings allow day commuters to pass with 
limited controls, with security checks only some 
distance from the border. This necessary accommo-
dation of the hundreds of thousands of people who 
cross every day effectively broadens the area where 
illegal entry is possible.
APPREHENSIONS OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS AT FIG. 47: 
THE US BORDERS
Number of apprehensions 
at all borders, 2008
Source: US Department of Homeland Security
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ORIGIN OF ESTIMATED FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE USA FIG. 48: (LEFT) 
AND TOP COUNTRIES OF FOREIGN BIRTH (RIGHT), 2000 
Source: US Census Bureau, Census 2000
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Some 97% of the illegal migrants who enter the 
USA clandestinely do so over this border.15 Coastal 
apprehensions comprised less than 1% of the total 
unauthorized migrants intercepted in 2005.16 Cur-
rently, Arizona sees more illegal border crossers than 
any other state, which was not the case ten years 
ago, while California recently regained some lost 
“popularity”. 
Some 88% of the total 792,000 migrants appre-
hended in 2008 were Mexican nationals. The 
remainder were mostly other Latin Americans.17 
The number of apprehensions of irregular “other 
than Mexican” migrants increased rapidly in the 
beginning of this decade (up 220% from 2002 to 
2005)18 but decreased in the last few years (down 
60% from 2005 to 2008).19
Given the scale and scope of migration in this area, 
and cultural affinities between the USA and Mexico, 
the need for assistance in crossing the border might 
be unclear. But US border enforcement is appar-
ently quite effective at deterring independent border 
crossers, because a very large and growing share of 
detected migrants say they paid smugglers for assist-
ance.20 Enforcement has also pushed migrant flows 
into increasingly harsh terrains, such as eastern Cali-
fornia and the Sonoran desert of Arizona, which 
may be the reason behind a growing number of 
detected migrant deaths.21 
Although migrants have been detected travelling by 
rail, on foot, and even using dedicated tunnels, 
most migrants are smuggled in trucks.22 The smug-
gling generally takes the migrants some distance 
from the border. Smuggled migrants may be col-
lected in “stash houses”, either before the crossing 
or once inside the USA.23 The smugglers group the 
migrants in these houses in order to receive the rest 
of the smuggling fee. This is normally paid by 
migrants’ relatives in the country of origin or in the 
USA.24 
While delaying payment until the crossing is com-
plete provides some security that migrants will not 
simply be dumped in the desert, it also transforms 
the migrants into hostages, the collateral on which 
the transaction is secured. In 2004, among 275 
people arrested for migrant smuggling in the USA, 
36 (25%) were also charged with hostage taking, 
and 15% of the smuggled aliens concerned had 
been held against their will in attempts to extort 
additional payments.25 It appears that this practice 
is expanding within Mexico as well, as non-Mexican 
migrants are being held for ransom in Tabasco and 
other states.
Other sectors*
* Washington, New York, Michigan, North Dakota,
 Montana, Maine, Florida, Louisiana, Puerto Rico, 
Washington and Vermont
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MIGRANT FLOWS FROM LATIN AMERICA TO THE USA, FIG. 49: 1999-2008
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The smuggling of Mexicans is somewhat different 
from the irregular migration of other nationals. In 
contrast to Mexicans’ illegal border crossing, other 
Latin Americans cross the border mainly at the 
eastern sectors of Texas (80% of “other than Mexi-
can” apprehensions in 2005).26 This may be related 
to the repatriation agreements between the USA 
and origin countries. Once apprehended at the 
border, a Mexican migrant is repatriated immedi-
ately on the legal base of bilateral agreements. 
Because of a lack of such agreements with the Cen-
tral American countries, when irregular non-Mexi-
can migrants are apprehended, they are detained 
TRENDS IN APPREHEN-FIG. 50: 
SIONS AT THE US SOUTH-
WEST BORDER, 1992-2008
Source: US Department of Homeland Security
SHARE OF BORDER  FIG. 51: 
SECTORS IN TOTAL APPRE-
HENSIONS, FY 2008
NATIONALITIES (SHARE) OF  FIG. 52: 
THOSE APPREHENDED AT 
US BORDERS, FY 2008
Source: US Department of Homeland Security
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until the country of origin accepts repatriation. In 
this context, the migrant may be ‘released on their 
own recognizance’ with an order to leave the coun-
try.27 Release of irregular migrants is more likely to 
occur in areas where centres have less bed space, 
such as the Texas sectors of McAllen and Del Rio, 
where more than 90% of the “other than Mexicans” 
apprehended are released.28 Thus, when entering 
illegally through the eastern sectors of the border, 
Mexican nationals hide and run, while other nation-
als may wait to be detected.29 
Who are the smugglers?
It appears that smugglers face little risk of arrest, 
since they normally pretend to be irregular migrants, 
and are immediately repatriated.30 With low risks 
and high demand, it should come as no surprise 
that a wide range of smuggling groups is currently 
plying the trade. Some have argued that migrant 
smuggling from Mexico is mainly a mom-and-pop 
type of activity, primarily conducted by part-time 
smugglers.31 Others have claimed that drug smug-
gling gangs are implicated.32 Both might be true.
As mentioned above, the crossing points of Mexi-
can and other migrants are different. It may be 
easier for Mexican migrants to acquire the name of 
a local small-scale smuggler through family or social 
connections than it would be for nationals of coun-
tries further south. Also, non-Mexicans may need 
assistance travelling the entire length of Mexico 
illegally. As a result, it is possible that trans-Mexican 
smuggling of other nationals has become the 
domain of Mexico’s premier national organized 
crime groups: the drug cartels. Most of the cocaine 
entering the USA crosses the Texas border, just like 
the ‘other than Mexican’ migrants, particularly 
along the plazas (crossing spots) controlled by the 
Gulf Cartel. The Gulf Cartel has operations and 
allies (including their former enforcement wing, the 
now autonomous Zetas), down the east coast of 
Mexico to the Central American border, and may 
have links with Central American organized crime 
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groups. There have been anecdotal reports of their 
involvement in migrant smuggling.33 
In addition to the drug trafficking organizations, 
police have disrupted sophisticated organizations 
dedicated to migrant smuggling along the borders 
with California34 and Arizona.35 For example, 
Manuel Valdez-Gomez led a migrant smuggling 
group based in Arizona from 1997 until his arrest 
in 2005. The group, which began as a family-run 
illegal enterprise with 20 members, evolved into a 
large network active in document falsification, mail 
and wire fraud and social security fraud. They used 
a large network of truck drivers and “stash houses” 
for illegal transportation of aliens to Ohio, Califor-
nia, Florida, Nevada, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana 
and other states. 
The conviction of Valdez-Gomez was hailed as the 
elimination of “one of the largest and most lucrative 
human smuggling organizations on the Southern 
border,”36 yet authorities report that they may have 
smuggled only 100 migrants.37 Even if the true 
figure were ten times higher, this would be a drop 
in the bucket compared to the hundreds of thou-
sands of illegal migrants who enter the country each 
year, some 90% of whom are believed to have been 
assisted. This suggests that most illegal immigration 
from Mexico is in the hands of a large number of 
small operators.
How big is the ﬂow?
For this calculation it is necessary to distinguish 
between migration by Mexicans and ‘other than 
Mexicans’.
The Mexican Migration Project has been surveying 
Mexicans who have migrated to the USA about 
their migratory experiences since 1974.38 Based on 
this extensive experience, they estimate that the 
probability of being apprehended at the border is 
about 20% for Mexicans (one in five attempts). 
Some 661,000 Mexicans were apprehended at the 
border in 2008. Some of these may be the same 
people caught multiple times,39 so it is more accu-
rate to refer to these as ‘entries’. Five times 661,000 
is 3.3 million entries. The amount paid per migrant 
has varied substantially over time, but is currently 
in the neighbourhood of US$2,000. This would 
suggest that migrant smugglers could earn more 
than US$6 billion annually off the Mexican market 
alone.
In contrast, as discussed above, other nationals have 
less to fear from being apprehended, and being 
taken into custody may actually facilitate their 
migration. Assuming that most are, in fact, caught, 
then some 65,000-100,000 entries ‘of other than 
Mexicans’ occur each year. These people come 
from a wide range of origin countries, including in 
Asia and Africa, but most are from Latin America. 
PERCENTAGE OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS (NON-MEXICANS) RELEASED  FIG. 56: 
ON THEIR OWN RECOGNIZANCE BY US AUTHORITIES BY RESPONSIBLE 
BORDER OFFICE, FY 2004-2005 
Source: CRS analysis of CBP Data
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Different source countries and routes may result in 
different pricing, and migrants outside Mexico have 
less basis for comparison, but one source suggests a 
price as high as US$10,000 for the trip from the 
south-eastern coast of Mexico across the border.40 
But as the numbers involved are much smaller, so is 
the value of this market, realizing at most 1 billion 
dollars per year.
Overall, it appears that about 3 million Latin Amer-
icans are smuggled illegally across the southern 
border of the USA every year. Since 90% of them 
are assisted by smugglers, the total income for the 
smugglers is likely to be around 6.6 billion dollars 
per year.
This market appears to have been in sharp decline 
since 2005. Between 2005 and 2008, the number 
of Mexican apprehensions decreased by 35% and 
apprehensions of other nationals decreased by 
62%.41 
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What is the nature of the market?
The dynamics behind African migration to Europe 
are similar to those behind Latin American migra-
tion to the USA, except that the push and pull fac-
tors are even stronger. Poverty in Africa is much 
more severe than in Latin America, and European 
welfare and labour standards promise a more com-
fortable life for low-skill workers who manage to 
immigrate. It is surprising, then, that illegal immi-
gration from Africa to Europe is a fraction the size 
of that from Latin America to the USA. One expla-
nation for this difference is the relative difficulty of 
making the crossing and a smaller diaspora. 
As on the other side of the Atlantic, some migrants 
secure visas and overstay, but this form of travel is 
beyond the means of many Africans. For most, 
there is a simpler, but more hazardous, way of reach-
ing their destination. If they can make it by sea to 
one of the European islands close to the African 
coast, they know they will be transported to the 
mainland for processing. Like the “other than Mex-
ican” migrants, chances are they will eventually be 
released with a written order to depart the country, 
because many European countries lack repatriation 
agreements with the relevant African countries. If 
no identity documents are carried, it can be difficult 
to determine the national origin of the migrant at 
all. Once released, most ignore the order to depart.
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Although the numbers are not comparable to the 
Latin American presence in the USA, Europe does 
host the largest African-born population outside 
Africa, and Africans comprise, together with 
‘non-EU Europeans,’ the largest group of foreign-
born citizens in the European Union. African 
migrants’ remittances from Europe account for a 
sizeable portion of the gross domestic product in a 
number of countries, particularly in West and North 
Africa. 
The motivation to emigrate from Africa to Europe 
is strong, but so is Europe’s need for these migrants. 
What little population growth there is in Europe is 
attributable to migration. In 2005, the net gain 
from immigration (1.8 million people) accounted 
for almost 85% of Europe’s total population 
growth.42 The European population is also ageing. 
With rapid population growth, Africa has young 
workers to spare.
Partly for language reasons, African regular migrants 
tend to move to the countries that formerly colo-
nized their region. For example, the main destina-
tion for legal East African migrants is the United 
Kingdom, almost 60% of legal migrants from the 
Maghreb go to France, and most migrants from 
Southern Africa go to the United Kingdom and 
Portugal. Germany, however, is relatively popular 
across the continent, despite not having much of a 
colonial past, and France is popular among South-
ern Africans, despite the lack of Francophone coun-
tries in that region. Some of these anomalies may be 
explained in terms of immigration policy, social 
welfare policies or proximity to Africa. Eight to ten 
countries of the 27 in the EU receive the vast major-
ity of African migrants.
Globally, West Africans are more likely to emigrate 
than Africans from other regions, but in the EU, 
North Africans are the most prominent regional 
group. In 2006, Moroccans were the largest national 
group to have acquired nationality in an EU state, 
and the largest group of immigrants in the EU-27. 
CONTINENT OF RESIDENCE FIG. 61: 
OF AFRICAN MIGRANTS 
OUTSIDE AFRICA (% OF 
TOTAL AFRICAN EMIGRANT 
STOCK), 2000-2002
Source: UNDP, 2009 Human Development Report
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REMITTANCES AS PERCENTAGE OF FIG. 62: 
GDP; TOP 20 AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 
2007
Source: World Bank
SHARE OF NEW EU  FIG. 63: 
CITIZENS BY CONTINENT  
OF ORIGIN, 2006
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DESTINATION OF LEGAL MIGRATION FLOWS FROM AFRICA TO THE  FIG. 64: 
EUROPEAN UNION, BY SUBREGION OF ORIGIN, 2000
Source: Global migration origin database – UNODC elaboration
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How is the smuggling conducted?
Illegal migration from Africa proceeds along a 
number of well-established paths, although the 
exact route any particular migrant may take is rarely 
predetermined. Aside from those who can afford to 
purchase “full-packet solutions”, which frequently 
involve air travel and visa overstays, most migrants 
purchase services piecemeal at one of several well-
known hubs along the way.43 The journey from 
sub-Saharan Africa to Europe may take several 
years, and migrants may stop for longer periods 
along the way to collect resources for the journey 
onward.44 
Two significant hubs from West Africa on the way 
north are Gao (Mali) and Agadez (Niger). From 
here, migrants are collected in trucks departing to 
Algeria and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. On the 
Algerian side of the border, the city of Tamanrasset 
is another centre where many sub-Saharan migrants 
work in order to finance the rest of the journey.45 In 
Algeria, migrants head north by road and cross the 
border with Morocco at the Oujda (Morocco) - 
Maghnia (Algeria) border for the Moroccan depar-
ture points.46
On the other side of the continent, East African 
migrants gather in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). Somalis 
reach Addis Ababa either from the eastern border 
crossing with Ethiopia near Hargeisa (Somalia), or 
from the southern border crossing in Dolo (Ethio-
pia). From Addis Ababa, Somalis and Ethiopians 
travel across the Sudan, passing by El Gedaref and 
then north to Selima (Sudan) and Al Jawf / Kufra 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya). Recently, Somalis have 
started travelling to Sudan via Kenya and Uganda, 
as the Ethiopian southern border is more strictly 
controlled. Kassala, on the border between the 
Sudan and Eritrea, is another transit point for Eri-
treans and Ethiopians. From here, migrants travel 
directly to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or to the 
Egyptian coasts.
Once migrants have reached the African coast, the 
journey to Europe can be completed via four 
routes:
by sea from West Africa to the Canary Islands s 
(Spain);
by sea/land through Morocco and to southern s 
Spain, Ceuta and Melilla;
by sea from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ s 
Algeria/Egypt to southern Italy and Malta; and
by sea/land from Turkey to Greece.s 
Canary Islands
The overall share of migrants using this route has 
decreased markedly since 2006, but the Canary 
Islands remain popular for North and West Africans 
trying to reach the EU. Moroccan, Algerian, Sen-
egalese, Gambian and Guinean migrants are the 
most frequently encountered national groups along 
this route. Departure points are on the western 
African coasts, including in the territories of 
Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal, with most 
embarking in small wooden boats (cayucos from 
Mauritania and Senegal, pateras from the Maghreb) 
and, more recently, inflatable rubber boats. These 
boats are able to carry about 70 people at a time. 
Crews may be equipped with GPS and satellite 
telephones. The passage from the African coast to 
the Canary Islands may cost some €1,000-€1,500.
West Africans may initially go to Gao (Mali) by 
land, and from there, westward to the coast. Alter-
natively, sub-Saharan migrants depart from the Gulf 
of Guinea with larger boats. In this case, the boats 
follow the coast to the Canary Islands.
The shores on the western coasts of the Sahara, 
between Laayoune and Tarfaya are departure points 
for the Canary Islands, as the distance to the islands 
is no more than 115 km from there. Other points 
are Cape Bojador, El-Aaiun, Dakhla and Lagouira 
in Morocco, Fann, Ngor, Zinguichor, Casamance 
and St-Louis in Senegal, and Nouadhibou in Mau-
ritania. Cape Verde has also been a point of depar-
ture in the last few years. Migrants may arrive at the 
islands of Fuerteventura, Lanzarote, Gran Canaria 
(in the area of Las Palmas), Tenerife or, more 
recently, La Gomera.
Source: Eurostat estimate
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
M
or
oc
co
U
kr
ai
ne
C
hi
na
In
di
a
Bo
liv
ia
A
lb
an
ia
U
SA
Tu
rk
ey
Br
az
il
Ru
ss
ia
n
Fe
de
ra
tio
n
TOP TEN NATIONAL GROUPS FIG. 66: 
RECEIVING CITIZENSHIP IN 
THE EU-27, 2006
72
SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS
The passage is extremely risky due to the rough sea, 
the long distance and the fragile boats used by 
migrants. The survivors landing in the Canary 
Islands wait to be detected by the Spanish authori-
ties and then to be transported and sheltered on the 
mainland. In the absence of bilateral agreements 
with the countries of origin or when the nationality 
cannot be ascertained, migrants receive an order 
compelling them to leave the country and are then 
released.
Southern Spain, including Ceuta  
and Melilla
These routes are used mainly by North and West 
Africans. The latter cross the Sahara en route to 
Morocco. The risks and number of deaths during 
this leg of the journey are commensurate to the size 
and harshness of the desert.
The Spanish land and sea borders to Ceuta, Melilla 
and Andalusia are strictly controlled by the author-
ities. A 6-foot fence has been installed around Ceuta 
and Melilla - two Spanish cities on the North Afri-
can coast - and a radar system that covers the Strait 
of Gibraltar easily detects boats leaving the Moroc-
can coast. 
Algerians manage to enter Ceuta and Melilla by 
making use of forged Moroccan documents.47 Sub-
Saharan Africans try to clandestinely cross the fence, 
but few people succeed and it appears these attempts 
occur in a rather disorganized manner.48 Migrants 
camp in the areas beside the fence, waiting for a 
chance to take the final step into Europe. These 
spontaneous camps are in Mount Gourougou out-
side Melilla49 and Mount Hacho and Mount Jebel 
Musa outside Ceuta.50 Mass border crossing 
attempts have taken place in the last few years.51 
While smugglers play no role in the clandestine 
crossing of the fence, some Asian migrants have 
reported having paid smugglers to get into the EU, 
only to then be abandoned outside the fence.52 
In 2007, about 7,000 migrants reached Spain by 
crossing the Mediterranean sea from Morocco. 
Boats depart in the direction of Grenada and Alm-
ería or the Balearic islands. Small boats are used 
from the coast between Tangier and Rabat (Morocco) 
on the Atlantic coast to reach Cádiz (Spain). On the 
Mediterranean side of the Strait, the departure areas 
are Tétouan and Oued Laou (Morocco). 
Across the Alboran Sea, boats leave Morocco close 
to Melilla, and land in Grenada and Almería 
(Spain).53 Migrants may camp near the departure 
points while the trip is being prepared. Smugglers 
drop the migrants off 100 meters or more from the 
Spanish shores to minimize the risk of interception. 
While the sea smugglers return to Morocco, 
migrants may either meet the “smuggling receiving 
team” in Spain or simply be left on their own to 
continue inland.54
Southern Italy and Malta
Although drastically reduced in the second half of 
2009, the most prominent migrant smuggling 
routes from Africa to Europe in recent years have 
been those destined for the Italian islands of Lampe-
dusa, Sicily and Sardinia. Many of these migrants 
inadvertently find themselves, however, arriving in 
Source: Ministerio de educacion, politica y deporte, Spain
SHARE OF MIGRANTS ARRIVING AT THE CANARY ISLANDS, BY ISLAND, FIG. 67: 
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Malta. In 2008, some 37,000 migrants arrived in 
Italy by sea. Africans from the Maghreb, Egypt, the 
Horn of Africa and West Africa are crossing this 
part of the Mediterranean, embarking mainly from 
the Libyan coasts.
As a result of greater enforcement efforts at depar-
ture points, the sea route from Alexandria (Egypt) 
to Italy almost disappeared in 2008/2009. This 
route used to involve large fishing boats carrying 
more than a hundred migrants. The migrants were 
embarked and disembarked in open sea, using small 
boats.55
In the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, departure points are 
mainly Zuwara, Zliten, Misratah and Tripoli. Smug-
glers embark migrants in fibreglass boats and give 
them instructions on how to reach Lampedusa. 
They do not board with the migrants. Keeping the 
compass on 0:0, it should take some six to seven 
hours to cover the 260 kilometres between the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Lampedusa. If the 
migrants miss Lampedusa, they should reach Sicily 
in 12 hours or more. Although the sea journey is 
relatively short, the fragile boats and the weather 
conditions result in the death of many of these 
migrants.56 
While departures from Tunisia have nowadays vir-
tually disappeared, the number of migrants starting 
from Algeria and landing in Sardinia has increased 
in the last few years (800% growth from 2005), 
totalling 1,621 migrants in 2008.57 
Algerian boats depart from the harbour and shores 
of Annaba.58 The boats used are fishing boats con-
taining 15-20 people.59 While some have hypothe-
sized that ‘mother ships’ are used on this route, this 
has never been proven.60 On the contrary, according 
to Algerian accounts,61 most of the attempts are car-
ried out in a rather disorganized manner, with little 
or no involvement of smugglers or smuggling 
organizations. Migrants using this route are mainly 
young Algerian males,62 and the distance separating 
Annaba from the southern coast of Sardinia is no 
more than 355 kilometres. 
Eastern Greece
Most of the migrants who use the Greece-Turkey 
route are Asians. However, Somali migrants have 
been increasingly entering the EU from Turkey, and 
in 2007, they were the second largest national group 
among the migrants apprehended at the Greek sea 
border. 
Migrants depart from Turkey to land on the Greek 
islands of Samos, Chios and Lesbos, just 1.5 kilo-
metres from the Turkish coast. 
The land route used by Somalis to reach Turkey has 
not been documented. Some have hypothesized 
that the passage to the Greek islands is the final leg 
of a journey that started by crossing the Gulf of 
Aden to Yemen, across the Arabian Peninsula, to the 
Syrian Arab Republic and then to Turkey.63 It is 
known that a large number of Somalis enter Yemen 
irregularly by sea.
On the other hand, it is possible that Somalis follow 
the above-mentioned East African route across 
Ethiopia and the Sudan to Egypt. Palestinians and 
Egyptians are among the largest communities of 
ORIGIN OF IRREGULAR MI-FIG. 68: 
GRANTS ARRIVING IN ITALY 
BY SEA, BY SUBREGION, 
2008
Source: Ministero dell’ Interno, Italy
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migrants arriving on the Greek islands, and it 
appears that Somalis are starting to follow. Once in 
Greece, Somalis would be assisted and granted 
asylum or expelled. If expelled, in the absence of 
repatriation agreements, they would be released 
with an order to leave the country.
Who are the smugglers?
Migrants receive various kinds of assistance from 
diverse groups of people along their journey, 
although it would be difficult to describe many of 
the ‘helpers’ as organized crime figures. Some 
attempts appear to be entirely self-directed, includ-
ing the efforts of Algerian young men to reach Italy 
by sea,64 although Algerian migrants may also pay 
professional criminals for forged papers to enter 
Ceuta and Melilla. To cross the Sahara desert clan-
destinely requires professional assistance,65 and 
others who manage and broker services to migrants 
at the hubs may be full-time criminals.
For example, in Saguia El Hamra, about 20 well-
organized smuggling groups were providing passage 
to the Canary Islands in 2004. These groups pur-
chased pateras from central Morocco for the sole 
purpose of carrying migrants for around €3,000. 
For each vessel that arrived, they earned about 
€7,000. Each group was provided protection by its 
own law enforcement connections, and maintained 
recruitment operations in Rabat and Casablanca. 
Similarly structured groups have been found to 
operate in Mali, Mauritania and Senegal.66 
Moroccan organizations have a monopoly on the 
passage across the Alboran Sea and the Strait of 
Gibraltar into the south of Spain, as well as the 
document forgery operations aimed at gaining 
admission to Ceuta and Melilla.67 These groups 
employ a wide range of actors out of necessity. They 
may have links to receiving groups on the Spanish 
mainland, and even with Spanish employers in need 
of cheap labour.68 
The situation is quite similar in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya. The large number of migrants depart-
ing from that country is transported by organized 
smuggling rings located in the main points of depar-
ture, such as Zuwara, Zliten and others. Italian 
authorities indicate that at least five Libyan groups 
are active in Zuwara alone.69 Libyan groups may use 
Egyptian or Tunisian sailors, if sailors are used at 
all.70 At Laayoune, the boats used are bought for the 
purpose of migrant smuggling. They are quite cheap 
(€5,000) and can carry some 25-30 migrants. The 
sea leg costs about €2,000 per migrant, making the 
passage extremely profitable for the smugglers.71 
Libyan groups may be connected with other smug-
gling rings operating along routes from West and 
East Africa. There are indications of small regional 
networks, such as those connecting groups based in 
the main points of departure with those operating 
along the desert routes of the Sudan and Chad and 
in the hub of Kufra (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya).72 
Gao and Agadez are two important hubs for all of 
West Africa. Smugglers here work differently than 
those on the coasts. They act as brokers, providing 
all types of migration services, from forged docu-
ments to desert transportation. Truck drivers or 
“passeur” are traditionally Tuareg who know the 
desert and its harsh conditions. The brokers may be 
Tuareg, but the Tuareg mainly seem to be used as 
service providers, navigating the sands as far as 
Morocco or the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.
Addis Ababa plays a similar role for the East African 
route. Agents or brokers work with different types 
of migrants, according to ethno-linguistic or tribal 
ties. The broker is known by reputation among the 
community of reference, and is the best guarantee 
for the longevity of the business.73 Again, docu-
ments or merely passage can be purchased.74 As 
Tuareg are used in West Africa, other nomadic 
groups are used in the East. As is true everywhere, 
the migration business sees a lot of individuals at 
the disposal of the brokers on a part-time basis. 
While these people are not truly members of a 
smuggling group, the broker can rely on them when 
needed.75
Smuggler networks on the Turkish coasts (en route 
to Samos and Lesbos) are also structured organiza-
TOP FIVE ORIGINS OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS  FIG. 70: 
ARRIVING AT THE GREEK SEA BORDER, 2003-2007
Source: Greek Ministry of the Merchant Marine
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tions.76 Based at departure points, these groups are 
in contact with intermediaries at transit stations. 
The smugglers operating in the Middle Eastern 
transit points to Turkey are local agents or brokers. 
These agents take responsibility for different legs of 
the immigrants’ journey. As seen for the other 
routes, these networks are characterized by national, 
ethnic, kinship or friendship connections.77 
How big is the ﬂow?
Almost all irregular migrants arriving in Spain, Italy 
and Malta by sea are Africans. Arrivals in Spain by 
sea are mainly concentrated in the Canary Islands, 
the Strait of Gibraltar and the Alboran Sea. When 
migrants arrive on the Canary Islands, almost all are 
apprehended since they rely on the lack of repatria-
tion facilities to be released on the Spanish main-
land. When migrants arrive on the Spanish mainland, 
some prefer to escape rather than face processing. 
Apprehensions at the Spanish sea border peaked in 
2006 with about 40,000 detected migrants, mostly 
in the Canaries. In 2008, only 14,000 apprehen-
sions were recorded.
African migrants arriving in Lampedusa do not 
want to remain there. Therefore, they ensure that 
they are detected in order to be transported to main-
land Italy. Border apprehensions along the Italian 
coasts peaked in 2008 with about 36,000 migrants 
intercepted, mostly in Lampedusa and Sicily.
In addition, arrivals on the coasts of Malta totalled 
about 1,200 in 2007 and 2,500 in 2008. It is likely 
that all irregular migrants here are apprehended. 
Additionally, a few hundred East Africans and 
Egyptians (about 1,000 in total) land in Greece. 
Thus, the total number of African migrants appre-
hended at sea borders with the European Union in 
2008 was likely between 52,000 and 54,000.79
Since most of these migrants wish to be detected, 
these numbers are close to the number of migrants 
that paid to be smuggled. But not all the migrants 
who pay smugglers survive the trip. An estimated 
1,000 migrants died or disappeared in 2008.80 Also, 
a number of migrants arriving in mainland Spain 
may wish to avoid detection. The Spanish authori-
ties intercept at least 86% of the boats detected 
through their Electronic Surveillance System, so 
perhaps some 750 migrants entered Spain undetec-
ted in 2008. Finally, an unknown number of 
migrants may enter Ceuta and Melilla by making 
use of forged documents. All told, it can be esti-
mated that about 55,000 migrants paid to be smug-
gled to Europe in 2008.
The amount they paid varies depending on the 
services required. The cost of the sea journey to 
either the Canary Islands or Lampedusa is in the 
range of €2,000 to €2,500. Since most migrants 
purchase this service, coastal smugglers may earn in 
the region of US$110-140 million per year. For 
sub-Saharan migrants, it is often necessary to pur-
chase passage across the desert as well. Although the 
prices cited for this service vary widely, it is unlikely 
that total revenues exceed US$10 million annually. 
In sum, smugglers moving migrants from Africa to 
Europe probably grossed about US$150 million in 
2008.
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The trend for this market has been generally upward 
since 2003. In terms of specific routes, the trends 
have been mixed. Many former routes, such as the 
use of Gibraltar and Tunisia, have all but disap-
peared. Arrivals in Spain increased steadily, with a 
peak in 2006, then sharply decreased in 2007 and 
2008. Compensating for these decreases, arrivals in 
Italy increased in 2008 and the first half of 2009.
Cooperative agreements between Italy and the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya signed in May 2009 appear 
to have had an impact. The number of migrants 
detected in Italy was steadily rising until May, at 
which point they abruptly declined. Overall, the 
number of detections along Italian sea borders 
declined 74% between 2008 and 2009, with not a 
single landing recorded in Lampedusa in the last 
three months of the year. This sharp decline appears 
to have displaced some of the flow to the eastern 
coasts of Italy (Apulia and East Sicily) and possibly 
to Greece. The overall effect will only be deter-
mined as 2009 data become available for all affected 
regions.
NUMBER OF MIGRANTS APPREHENDED FIG. 73: 
IN SPAIN, ITALY, MALTA AND GREECE AT 
SEA BORDERS, 2004-2009
Source: UNODC elaboration of official figures
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Source: UNODC elaboration of official figures
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IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RESPONSE
Smuggling of migrants is largely an opportunistic 
crime. This is best seen in Africa, where the routes 
have shifted so much over time that it is difficult for 
any smuggling organization to have much longev-
ity. This means efforts directed at the smuggling 
groups are unlikely to have much effect, aside from 
perhaps diverting the flow once again. The hopes 
and dreams of the migrants themselves are driving 
this market. The smugglers are merely a parasitic 
infection, but one that is difficult to avoid.
What does seem to have had impact in stemming 
the tide on both sides of the Atlantic is the percep-
tion of declining opportunity. People will not pay 
to be smuggled unless there are good prospects of 
making this money back. The key to preventing 
smuggling, then, is to send the signal to migrants 
that it is not worth the expense and risk.
The same signal must be sent to the other end of 
the trafficking chain. Migrants who are willing to 
be packed shoulder to shoulder on a leaking wreck 
and launched onto the open sea are not likely to be 
deterred by a stern official and a written order to 
depart. Their employers, on the other hand, have 
considerably more to lose if they are caught in 
breach of the law, but only if that law is enforced. 
They could be deemed complicit in migrant smug-
gling, or in operating a criminal enterprise, if pros-
ecutors were so inclined. It would not take more 
than a few forfeitures to erode the competitive 
advantage of exploiting foreign labour.

COCAINE
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COCAINE
“Cocaine” comprises at least two distinct drug 
products: powder cocaine on the one hand, and a 
range of cocaine base products, mostly falling under 
the heading of “crack”, on the other. Powder cocaine 
is a milder drug generally snorted by the wealthy,1 
while crack and other base products present an 
intense high favoured by the poorer users. Chemi-
cally, the substance consumed is the same, but the 
addition of baking soda and heat allows cocaine to 
be smoked, a far more direct method of ingestion.
Both products are derived from a plant cultivated 
on some 170,000 hectares in remote areas of 
Colombia, Peru and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia. From there, cocaine is distributed to at least 
174 countries around the world. This chapter is 
about how this is done, focusing on the two largest 
destination markets: North America and Europe.
The coca plant is indigenous to Peru and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, and these two coun-
tries produced most of the world’s coca leaf from 
the 1960s until the mid-1990s. In the 1970s, 
Colombian traffickers were still exporting cannabis, 
at one point supplying 70% of the US market.2 But 
just as they began to lose market shares to cannabis 
produced closer to the consumers, the cocaine 
market began to boom, and they were well-posi-
tioned to make the transition. Colombia emerged 
as the world’s largest producer of cocaine as of the 
late 1970s. 
Initially, Colombian traffickers limited their role to 
cocaine processing and transportation, leaving the 
cultivation to farmers in the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia and Peru. This required large-scale transna-
tional trafficking of coca paste. After the demise of 
the large Colombian drug cartels and the successful 
interruption of flights from Peru in the first half of 
the 1990s, Colombian traffickers began to organize 
coca cultivation in their own country, and Colom-
bia emerged as the world’s largest coca leaf producer 
as of 1997. Following large-scale eradication efforts, 
the Colombian authorities succeeded in reducing 
the area under coca cultivation by 50% between 
2000 and 2008. Despite such decreases, Colombia 
remains, however, the single largest cultivator.
In 2008, global cocaine supply declined to 865 
metric tons, down from 1,024 tons a year earlier, 
equivalent to a fall of 15%. This was primarily a 
reflection of a strong decline in cocaine production 
in Colombia, more than offsetting the increases 
reported from Peru and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia. Colombia accounted for about half of 
global cocaine production in 2008 (450 tons), fol-
lowed by Peru (302 tons) and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia (113 tons).3
The value of the global cocaine market peaked 
during the US ‘epidemic’ of the 1990s, and it has 
declined considerably since that time. But use of the 
drug has spread to many more countries, and over 
the last decade, use has doubled in the high-value 
European market. In 1980, cocaine seizures were 
reported by 44 countries and territories worldwide. 
Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2009
GLOBAL COCA BUSH CULTIVATION, FIG. 75: 1990-2008
81,000
163,300
101,800
40,100
43,400
56,100
38,700
129,100
121,300
30,50014,600
50,300
38,000
167,600
211,700
181,600
221,300
190,800
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
H
ec
ta
re
s
Colombia
Peru
Bolivia
Total
82
COCAINE
This number almost tripled to 130 countries and 
territories in 2007/2008.
In 2007/2008, cocaine was used by 16 to 17 mil-
lion people worldwide (broad range:15-19 million), 
which is similar to the number of global opiate 
users. Most of the cocaine users are in North Amer-
ica (about 6.2 million users in 2008) and in Europe 
(about 4.5 million users in 2007/2008),4 most of 
whom are concentrated in the EU and EFTA coun-
tries (4.1 million). North America accounts for 
more than 40% of global cocaine consumption (the 
total is estimated at around 470 tons); whereas the 
27 EU and four EFTA countries were responsible 
for more than a quarter of global cocaine consump-
tion. These two regions comprise more than 80% 
of the value of the global cocaine market, estimated 
at US$88 billion in 2008.
Despite declines in cultivation area, cocaine pro-
duction has been largely stable since the mid-1990s 
(between 800 and 1,100 tons). Improved coca leaf 
yields and improvements in the techniques used to 
extract the drug are believed to have offset declines 
in the area under coca cultivation. In the face of a 
declining US market, the need to find buyers for 
this constant supply may have been a factor in its 
proliferation. 
Though the days of the big Colombian drug cartels 
are gone, international cocaine trafficking is still far 
more ‘organized’ and large-scale in nature than traf-
ficking of most other drugs, as reflected in the size 
of cocaine shipments. The average cocaine seizure is 
10 to 20 times larger than the average heroin sei-
zure.5 Several multi-ton cocaine seizures are made 
every year, a quantity unheard of in heroin markets. 
This suggests either very well-resourced organiza-
tions or cooperation between smaller organizations 
which reflects a high level of organizational matu-
rity. After more than 40 years of trafficking drugs, 
this is not surprising.
Traﬃcking to developing countries  
– the case of the Southern Cone
The third largest consumer market for cocaine is South 
America, home to some 2.4 million users. Most of this 
market is concentrated in the Southern Cone, and 
most of it emerged only recently. Due to its popula-
tion size, the greatest number of users (nearly 1 mil-
lion) is found in Brazil, but the problem is most in-
tense in Argentina, where an estimated 2.6% of the 
adult population used the drug in 2006, about the 
same as the United States. This ﬁgure has increased 
markedly since 1999, when it was just 1.9%. School 
surveys conducted in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay found 
the share of students who had used cocaine in their 
lifetime increased from 1% in 2001 to 2.2% in 2005 
and 2.7% in 2007.i  
The growth of cocaine consumption in the Southern 
Cone appears to be linked to production increases in 
both the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Peru. In 
particular, the Plurinational State of Bolivia used to 
be a supplier of coca paste to Colombian reﬁners, but 
enhanced control over air traﬃc and growing produc-
tion within Colombia seem to have broken this link. 
This left Bolivian cultivators - who had little experi-
ence in reﬁning or traﬃcking cocaine and poor access 
to precursor chemicals - in search of a new market for 
their products. Brazilian traﬃckers were quick to take 
advantage of this directionless supply.
It may be that coca paste was ﬁrst moved into the 
Southern Cone solely for further reﬁnement, but there 
soon emerged a market, often in startlingly poor com-
munities, for cocaine base itself, consumed as “merla” 
in Brazil and “paco” in Argentina. These products are 
similar to crack, but with greater impurities, as they 
emerge earlier in the reﬁning process. At the same 
time, cocaine hydrochloride, which was increasingly 
transiting the region on its way to growing markets in 
Europe, also found buyers among the most aﬄuent. 
Cocaine demand is declining in North America and 
appears to be peaking in Europe, while supply remains 
essentially unchanged. The targeting of markets in the 
developing economies of South America represents a 
disturbing trend, as these countries have fewer resourc-
es to combat the negative eﬀects cocaine can have on 
health and violent crime.
i UNODC and CICAD, Informe subregional sobre uso 
de drogas en población escolarizada. Lima, 2010.
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What is the nature of this market?
The largest regional cocaine market worldwide is 
North America. With close to 6.2 million annual 
users, it accounts for 36% of the global user popula-
tion, most of whom are found in the USA. The 
USA remains the single largest national cocaine 
market in the world, but this market has been in 
decline over the last three decades. In 1982, an 
estimated 10.5 million people in the US had used 
cocaine in the previous year.6 By 2008, this number 
had fallen to 5.3 million. In other words, over a 
25-year period, the cocaine trade has had to adjust 
to a loss of 50% of users in its largest market. 
This decline in demand has been particularly strong 
since 2006. In that year 2.5% of the US population 
aged 12 and above was estimated to have used 
cocaine in the previous year. This figure dropped to 
2.3% in 2007 and 2.1% in 2008.7 Similar trends 
can be seen in school survey data, where a declining 
share of young people is using the drug (down 40% 
from 2006 to 2009), and a growing share is saying 
it is difficult to find cocaine. Still, the 2009 US 
Drug Threat Assessment states that “Cocaine traf-
ficking is the leading drug threat to the United 
States.”8
A recent decline has also been seen in Canada, from 
1.9% in 2004 to 1.5% of the population aged 15 
and above in 2008.9 In Mexico, household surveys 
showed an increase in cocaine use from 0.35% in 
2002 of the population aged 18-64 to close to 0.6% 
in 2008. However, results from a survey in Mexico 
City in 2006 suggest that this net increase may have 
been due to a rapid rise between 2002 and 2006, 
with a decline since that time.
This sudden drop in overall cocaine popularity in 
North America can also be demonstrated by US 
forensic data. The share of the US workforce that 
tests positive for cocaine use, as detected by urine 
analysis, shows a 58% decline between 2006 and 
the first two quarters of 2009. Some 6 million 
people undergo these tests; a much larger sample 
than in the household surveys. 
The long-term decline of cocaine use in the USA 
over the 1985-2009 period has been attributed to a 
number of causes, including ‘social learning’ leading 
to a decline in demand. Crack cocaine became a 
highly stigmatized drug in the second half of the 
1980s, and powder cocaine use also became less 
fashionable. 
The more recent decline since 2006 appears to have 
been supply-driven. An analysis of prices and use 
rates suggests that it was caused by a severe cocaine 
shortage, reflected in rapidly falling purity levels 
and a consequent rise in the cost per unit of pure 
cocaine, doubling over the 2006-2009 period. Past 
shortages have been linked to interdiction efforts, 
but the market has generally recovered, typically 
after about six months. This time, recovery seems to 
have taken much longer, and price declines in 2009 
were not enough to recover lost demand.10 One 
reason may be the sheer scale of the disruption: in 
2007, five of the 20 largest individual cocaine sei-
zures ever made were recorded, including the very 
largest (24 tons in Mexico).11 Inter-cartel violence 
in Mexico also seems to have seriously undermined 
the market. Finally, recent declines in cocaine pro-
duction in Colombia, the main supplier to the US 
market, also seem to have played a role.
How is the trafﬁcking conducted?
The bulk of the cocaine that enters the United 
States comes from Colombia. Forensic analyses of 
cocaine seized or purchased in the USA have repeat-
edly shown that nearly 90% of the samples origi-
nated in Colombia.12 Peru is a lesser supplier, and 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia appears to have 
basically lost contact with the North American 
market.
The routes and means of conveyance by which 
cocaine is moved from South America to North 
America have varied over time, partly in response to 
enforcement efforts and partly due to changes in 
the groups doing the trafficking. In the 1970s, 
Colombian traffickers, often employing US veter-
POSITIVE TESTS FOR COCAINE USE AMONG FIG. 77: 
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ans as pilots, flew cocaine to the US, initially directly 
and later via the Caribbean. Once strict radar sur-
veillance made flights more difficult, a combination 
of air drops and maritime smuggling became popu-
lar, with the Caribbean still favoured. The Colom-
bians formed relationships with Cubans in the USA 
and later with Dominicans, paying them in kind 
rather than in cash, establishing in the process a 
Cuban and a Dominican wholesaling and retailing 
network that persists in Florida (Cubans) and in the 
north-east of the country (Dominicans) to this 
day.
Increased enforcement in the Caribbean in the 
1980s and the 1990s pushed the drug flow further 
westward, and Mexican traffickers became involved. 
A combination of maritime routes to Mexico with 
a land border crossing in the USA came into fash-
ion. The Mexican groups were paid to transport the 
drug across Mexico and the US border, turning it 
over to Colombian groups in the USA. 
Also paid in kind, the Mexicans had several advan-
tages over other groups. While radar and other 
surveillance measures made it difficult to traffic 
drugs directly into the United States via air or sea, 
the Mexicans controlled the land border, which is 
much more difficult to police, given the massive 
licit trade between the two countries. The Mexican 
groups were very experienced in smuggling drugs 
into the US, having moved Mexican heroin and 
cannabis across the border since the 1930s, and in 
huge quantities since the 1970s. The size of their 
expatriate network in the US was also much larger. 
As the Mexicans strengthened their hold in the 
main destination country, the Colombian groups 
were under pressure at home. The dismantling of 
the large Colombian drug cartels in the first half of 
the 1990s and the extradition of major players to 
the US after 199713 further tilted the balance of 
power in favour of the Mexicans, since the Mexican 
Government was more reluctant to extradite at that 
time.14 To avoid extradition, many Colombian 
groups moved out of direct trafficking to the USA. 
As a result, they were largely reduced to being sup-
pliers to the emerging Mexican cartels.
Today, cocaine is typically transported from Colom-
bia to Mexico or Central America by sea (usually by 
Colombians) and then onwards by land to the 
United States and Canada (usually by Mexicans). 
The US authorities estimate that close to 90% of 
the cocaine entering the country crosses the US/
Mexico land border, most of it entering the state of 
Texas and, to a lesser extent, California and Ari-
zona. According to US estimates, some 70% of the 
cocaine leaves Colombia via the Pacific, 20% via 
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
Pr
ic
es
 in
 U
S$
 p
er
 g
ra
m
-
25.0
50.0
75.0
Pu
ri
ty
 in
 %
Purity adjusted prices Unadjusted prices Purity (in %)
Purity adjusted prices  95.1  95.4  95.1  90.6  99.5  119.  130.  115.  123.  125.  184.  199.  172.  176.
Unadjusted prices  65.2  65.7  64.8  63.2  67.0  70.9  74.8  70.9  71.1  71.9  85.7  89.2  83.4  86.1 
Purity (in %)  68.6  68.9  68.1  69.8  67.4  59.4  57.2  61.3  57.7  57.5  46.5  44.7  48.3  48.9 
1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr
2006 2007 2008 2009
AVERAGE OF ALL COCAINE PURCHASE PRICES IN THE USA, FIG. 78: 
JANUARY 2006-JUNE 2009
Source: US Drug Enforcement Agency, based on STRIDE data, quoted in DEA Intelligence Division,  
“Cocaine Shortages in U.S. Markets, November 2009”
88
COCAINE
the Atlantic, and 10% via the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and the Caribbean.15
Direct cocaine shipments from Colombia to Mexico 
have been moved by a wide variety of marine craft 
over years, recently including self-propelled semi-
submersibles often transporting several tons of 
cocaine (typically between 2 and 9 tons). In 2008, 
29.5 tons of cocaine were seized by the Colombian 
navy on board semi-submersibles in the Pacific 
Ocean, equivalent to 46% of all seizures made at sea 
by the Colombian authorities in the Pacific (64.5 
tons). A few of these vessels have been detected on 
the Atlantic side as well.
The Colombian Government reported seizing 198 
tons of cocaine in 2008, of which 58% took place 
in the Pacific Region (departments of Choco, Valle 
and Nariño) and 31% took place in the Atlantic 
Region (departments of Guajira, Cordoba, Bolivar 
and Antioquia).16 A large and growing share of the 
Colombian maritime seizures are made in the 
Pacific.
The share of Colombian seizures made on land 
increased dramatically in 2008, largely due to over-
land shipments to the Bolivarian Republic of Ven-
ezuela. According to Colombian, US and European 
sources, that country has become a more prominent 
trans-shipment location for cocaine destined for 
Europe and the USA in recent years. The cocaine 
transiting the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
frequently departs from locations close to the 
Colombian border, and makes landfall in the 
Dominican Republic or Honduras en route to the 
USA.
The importance of the Central American countries 
as trans-shipment locations has increased in recent 
years. In 1985, negligible amounts of cocaine were 
seized in Central America, but in recent years the 
region has outpaced even Mexico. Most of this 
cocaine is destined for Mexico and the USA, but 
some heads for Europe or is consumed locally.
Who are the trafﬁckers?
One study, analysing data from the late 1990s, sug-
gested that there are at least seven layers of actors 
between a coca farmer in the Andean countries and 
the final consumer in the USA:17
Step 1: The farmer sells the coca leaf (or his s 
self-produced coca paste) to a cocaine base 
laboratory, operated by the farmers themselves 
or by various criminal traﬃcking groups. Some-
times these labs have the capacity to reﬁne the 
drug further into cocaine hydrochloride. 
Step 2: The cocaine base (or the cocaine hydro-s 
chloride) is sold to a local traﬃcking organiza-
tion, which transports and sells the cocaine to a 
transnational drug traﬃcking organization. 
Step 3: The drug traﬃcking organization s 
contracts yet another group to do the actual 
shipping. 
Step 4: The cocaine is shipped to Mexican s 
traﬃckers.
Step 5: The Mexican traﬃckers transport the s 
drug across the US border to wholesalers. 
Step 6: The wholesalers sell the cocaine to lo-s 
cal mid-level dealers or street dealers across the 
USA. 
Step 7: The street dealers sell the cocaine to the s 
consumer.
Following the dismantling of the Medellin and Cali 
cartels in the early 1990s, the Colombian organized 
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crime groups got smaller, and market competition 
increased, pushing prices down. After the Colom-
bian Congress amended the Constitution in 1997 
to allow the extradition of citizens,18 Colombian 
groups were largely relegated to the front end of the 
market chain (steps 1 to 4). Despite these precau-
tions, the number of extraditions continues to grow. 
Better controls, first for direct flights from Colom-
bia to the USA (starting in the 1980s), and later 
improved control over shipping in the Caribbean 
(in the 1990s) also reduced the ability of the Colom-
bian organized crime groups to traffic cocaine 
directly to the United States.
The displacement of non-Mexican groups contin-
ues in the US market. By 2008, Mexican organized 
crime groups were found in 230 US cities (up from 
100 cities three years earlier) while Colombian 
groups controlled illicit cocaine and heroin distri-
bution channels in only 40 cities, mostly in the 
north-east.
In addition, criminal groups from Caribbean coun-
tries are also involved in cocaine trafficking, notably 
groups with links to the Dominican Republic. 
Dominican organized crime groups have been iden-
tified in at least 54 cities. They operate mainly in 
locations along the east coast, including in New 
York/New Jersey, the New England and Mid-Atlan-
tic regions, as well as in Florida. In addition, US-
based Cuban organized crime groups pose a threat, 
because of their affiliations to drug traffickers in 
Peru, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 
Colombia. They were identified to operate distribu-
tion networks in at least 25 US cities.19
How big is the ﬂow?
One comprehensive attempt to gauge the size the 
US cocaine market was produced by the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in 2001. 
Entitled “What America’s Users Spend on Illegal 
Drugs,” the report estimated the number of chronic 
and occasional cocaine users, and multiplied these 
numbers with a per capita expenditure estimate, 
derived from interviews with arrested persons who 
had used drugs. Based on these dollar amounts, the 
actual amounts consumed could be calculated. 
Simply extending these trends, using the annual 
prevalence level from the national drug use survey 
data, would produce a total cocaine demand of 231 
tons for 2008. But this simple extension may not 
sufficiently capture the recent dramatic declines in 
cocaine use.
Revisiting these calculations and making use of new 
data,20 it is possible to generate an estimate of 2.3 
million chronic users and just under 3 million 
casual users in the USA21 in 2008. It is also possible 
to derive a new consumption estimate of 31 grams 
of pure cocaine per average user per year,22 resulting 
in an estimate of 165 tons total consumption for 
the year 2008. 
A simplified new model, proposed by ONDCP, 
applies different use rates to annual consumers who 
used cocaine in the month of the survey and those 
who did not.23 Applying this technique delivers a 
consumption range of between 140 and 164 tons or 
2008.24 
Source: Ministerio del Interior y de Justicia, República de Colom-
bia, “La Extradición – Naturaleza y Procedimiento”, presentation 
given to the UNODC expert group meeting: “The evidence base 
for drug control in Colombia: lessons learned”, Bogota, 9-10 
November 2009. 
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Based on these estimates, ranging from 140 to 231 
tons, UNODC’s ‘best estimate’ is 165 tons in 2008. 
This total is very similar to that produced by another 
study using a different methodology, which esti-
mated 2008 cocaine demand in the USA at less 
than 175 tons.26 
Using the simplified ONDCP model, a consump-
tion estimate of 17 tons for Mexico and 14 tons for 
Canada can be calculated for the year 2008. Thus 
the ‘best estimate’ of the demand for cocaine in 
North America is 196 tons for the year 2008, with 
a range from 171 to 262 tons.
How much cocaine must leave South America to 
satisfy this demand? Factoring in purity-adjusted 
seizures along the route, it appears that some 309 
tons of cocaine left South America for the North 
American market in 2008. This represents close to 
50% of total production after purity-adjusted 
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seizures in the three Andean countries. The share of 
all cocaine production destined for North America 
is down from around 60% in 1998.
Some of the decline in 2008 can be explained in 
terms of declining production in Colombia, the 
dominant supplier of the drug to North America. 
However, the decline of consumption in North 
America was even more pronounced than the 
decline in total cocaine availability in the Andean 
region. Interdiction in Mexico and Central America 
appears to have played an important role.
Based on this flow model, it is possible to estimate 
the value of the market at each point in the traffick-
ing chain. Returning again to the original ONDCP 
calculations, an extension of this series using updated 
price data suggests a drastic reduction in value for 
the US market, from almost US$134 billion in 
1988 (expressed in constant 2008 US dollars) to 
COCAINE PRODUCTION AND DEMAND FOR COCAINE, NORTH AMERICA, FIG. 84: 
1998-2008
Sources: Multiple sources28
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US$ 44 billion in 1998 and US$35 billion in 
2008.31 This decline is a result of the long-term 
trend; the recent sharp decline of cocaine supply to 
the USA has not resulted in a corresponding decline 
in value because the falling supply of cocaine went 
hand in hand with rising (purity-adjusted) cocaine 
prices. 
Using similar methods, the value of the Canadian 
cocaine market can be estimated at around US$2.4 
billion and the Mexican market at around US$300 
million for the year 2008. The analysis suggests that 
the total North American cocaine market declined 
from some US$47 billion in 1998 to US$38 billion 
in 2008, reflecting lower quantities and lower prices. 
Between 2006 and 2008, the market, in dollar 
terms, remained basically stable.
Who benefits most from this flow? Using price data 
and volumes for each point in the trafficking chain, 
the value accruing to each market player can be 
estimated. Based on the volume and price data col-
lected by UNODC in the Andean countries during 
the annual illicit crop surveys, the coca farmers in 
the three Andean countries earned about US$1.1 
billion in 2008, down from US$1.5 billion in 2007. 
About 50% of the farmers’ income came from coca 
production for the North American market. In 
other words, the share of the Andean farmers in 
total North American cocaine sales amounted to 
just 1.5% in 2008. The amounts generated from 
processing and trafficking activities within the 
Andean countries for cocaine destined to be shipped 
towards North America amounted to around 
US$400 million, or around 1% of the total cocaine 
business.
Some 309 tons of cocaine left the Andean region for 
destinations in North America in 2008. Deducting 
seizures, some 208 tons arrived in the hands of the 
Mexican cartels. Most of the trafficking from 
Colombia to Mexico remained, however, in the 
hands of Colombian groups. At a wholesale price of 
US$12,500 per kilogram (US$ 15,625 per kilo-
gram if purity adjusted), the value of the cocaine in 
Mexico amounted to US$3.3 billion. With a pur-
chase price of just under one billion dollars in 
Colombia, the total gross profits32 accruing to those 
importing cocaine to Mexico can be estimated at 
around US$2.4 billion (excluding costs of ship-
ping). Given the current price structure, the seizures 
made by the Colombian and Peruvian navies, the 
Central American and Caribbean countries and the 
Mexican authorities would have to increase by more 
than 150% to eliminate the profitability of import-
ing cocaine to Mexico. 
The next key step is to ship the cocaine from Mexico 
into the USA. This operation is primarily under-
taken by the Mexican drug cartels. Taking seizures, 
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domestic Mexican consumption, and purity into 
account, Mexican cartels moved some 191 tons of 
pure cocaine across the border to the United States 
in 2008, valued at US$3 billion. If all of this were 
sold to wholesalers in the USA, this would be worth 
US$6.4 billion. But border seizures reduced the 
amount available for sale to 178 tons in 2008, or 
US$5.8 billion. Deducting purchase costs, a gross 
profit of US$2.9 billion was generated that year 
moving the cocaine across the border into the USA. 
Most of these profits are reaped by the Mexican 
drug cartels.
The largest profits, however, are generated within 
the USA: US$29.5 billion between the US whole-
sale level and US consumers. Out of these gross 
profits, the bulk is made between the mid-level 
dealers and the consumers, accounting for more 
than US$24 billion or 70% of the total size of the 
US cocaine market. Some Mexican cartel groups 
such as La Familia Michoacan are tapping into this 
highly lucrative market, but most appears to go to 
a large number of small domestic US groups, oper-
ating across the USA.
While retail sales were responsible for the largest 
share of the profits, they were also spread among a 
much larger number of actors. Estimates by the 
Institute for Defense Analyses on the number of 
persons involved in cocaine trafficking in the 1990s 
suggested that there were some 200 cocaine whole-
salers in the USA and some 6,000 mid-level cocaine 
dealers.33 This would give a ratio of 1:30, suggesting 
that the per capita gains in the last trafficking phase, 
from the mid-level dealers to the consumers, are 
actually much smaller than the per capita gains 
generated at the earlier phases of the trafficking 
chain.
Source: Original calculations
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What is the nature of this market?
The 27 countries of the European Union34 (EU) 
and the four countries of the European Free Trade 
Association35 (EFTA) host the world’s second larg-
est cocaine market after North America. Nine out 
of ten of Europe’s 4.1 million cocaine users are 
found in the EU/EFTA countries. The single largest 
cocaine market within Europe is the United King-
dom (1 million users in 2007/08), followed by 
Spain, Italy, Germany and France.
The number of cocaine users in the EU/EFTA 
countries has doubled over the last decade, from 2 
million in 1998 to 4.1 million in 2007/08. Despite 
this increase, the cocaine prevalence rate in the 
EU-27 as well as in the EU-15 countries is still 
lower than in North America. Individual European 
countries, notably Spain (3.1% in 2007/08) and the 
UK (3.0% in 2008/09), have higher annual preva-
lence rates than the USA, however. But preliminary 
data suggest the rapid growth of the European 
cocaine market is beginning to level off.
How is the trafﬁcking conducted?
Most of the trafficking of cocaine to Europe is by 
sea, often in container shipments, though deliveries 
by air and by postal services also occur. According 
to data from the World Customs Organization, 
69% of the total volume of cocaine seized en route 
to Western Europe was detected on board boats or 
vessels, concealed in freight or in the vessels’ struc-
ture. While bulk shipments come by sea, a large 
number of smaller shipments are detected at air-
ports and in the post.38 
Most cocaine shipments to Europe are destined for 
one of two regional hubs: Spain and Portugal in the 
south and the Netherlands and Belgium in the 
north. The Iberian peninsula has cultural, linguistic 
and colonial ties to Latin America as well as a long 
and proximate sea coast. Parts of the Netherlands lie 
in the Caribbean (Aruba and the Netherlands Anti-
lles) and Suriname in South America was a former 
Dutch colony. Rotterdam (Netherlands) and Ant-
werp (Belgium) are Europe’s largest seaports. From 
these hubs, cocaine is distributed to the rest of 
NATIONAL SHARES OF THE COCAINE FIG. 88: 
USER POPULATION IN EUROPE,  
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Europe. Between them, Spain, Portugal, the Neth-
erlands and Belgium accounted for close to 70% of 
all cocaine seized in Europe in 2008, but less than 
one quarter of the cocaine use.
Colombia remains the main source of the cocaine 
found in Europe, but direct shipments from Peru 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia are far more 
common than in the US market. The relative 
importance of Colombia seems to be in decline. For 
example, in 2002, the UK authorities reported that 
90% of the cocaine seized originated in Colombia, 
but by 2008, the figure fell to 65%. In a number of 
other European countries, Peru and the Plurina-
tional State of Bolivia seem to be the primary source 
of cocaine. 
The routes taken to arrive in Europe have changed 
in recent years. Between 2004 and 2007, at least two 
distinct trans-shipment hubs emerged in West 
Africa: one centred on Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, 
and one centred in the Bight of Benin which spans 
from Ghana to Nigeria. Colombian traffickers trans-
ported cocaine by ‘mother ship’ to the West African 
coast before offloading to smaller vessels. Some of 
this cocaine proceeded onward by sea to Spain and 
Portugal, but some was left as payment to West 
Africans for their assistance – as much as 30% of the 
shipment.39 The West Africans then trafficked this 
cocaine on their own behalf, largely by commercial 
air couriers. Shipments were also sent in modified 
small aircraft from the Bolivarian Republic of Ven-
ezuela to various West African destinations.
Political turmoil in the northern hub and successful 
interdiction elsewhere appears to have dampened 
this transit route for the time being, although it 
could quickly re-emerge. The decline in trafficking, 
affecting in particular Lusophone Africa, may also 
be a reason why Portugal has seen a sharp decline in 
cocaine seizures between 2006 and 2008, following 
strong increases over the 2003-2006 period.
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has also 
emerged as a key transit country for shipments to 
Europe, particularly for large maritime shipments. 
The single largest cocaine seizure in 2008 was 4.1 
tons of cocaine seized from a commercial vessel 
coming from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
and 2.5 tons were also seized on a fishing boat 
coming from that country.40 According to the new 
Maritime Analysis Operation Centre (MAOC-N), 
more than half (51%) of all intercepted shipments 
in the Atlantic started their journey in the Bolivar-
ian Republic of Venezuela. Direct shipments from 
Colombia, in contrast, accounted for just 5%.41 
MAOC-N also reports that sailing vessels travelling 
from the Caribbean to Europe are the most common 
source of seizures, followed by freight vessels, and 
other motor vessels.42 In contrast, semi-submersi-
bles, which have gained strongly in importance in 
trafficking cocaine from Colombia to Mexico in 
recent years, do not as yet play any significant role 
in Europe – only one has been sighted, in Galicia, 
northern Spain in 2006.43
Overall seizure data for Europe showed a strong 
increase of cocaine interceptions over the 1998-
2006 period, from 32 to 121 tons, followed by a 
significant decline over the 2006-08 period. None-
theless, overall cocaine seizures in 2008 were almost 
twice as high as in 1998. By far the largest national 
seizures were reported by Spain, accounting for 
45% of all European cocaine seizures made over the 
1998-2008 period. 
Not surprisingly, the Spanish figures reflect both 
the strong increase and the recent decline of cocaine 
seizures in Europe. These trends are also seen in 
Spanish survey data about the ease of obtaining 
cocaine in the country.44 Two thirds of the seizures 
made by Spain in 2007 took place in international 
waters and a further 11% were made in containers. 
A much smaller share (2%) were made close to the 
country’s beaches, whereas seizures at airports 
accounted for just 6% of all the cocaine seized.45 
Seizures made by the Portuguese authorities reflect 
the patterns seen in Spain. The increases until 2006 
and the declines thereafter (from 34 tons in 2006 to 
5 tons in 2008) were, however, even more pro-
nounced. This seems to reflect the strong increases 
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and declines of West Africa, notably of the Luso-
phone countries (Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) as 
major cocaine transit zones in recent years.
Seizures in the Netherlands have also declined 
sharply in recent years, partly due to growing efforts 
to stop shipments before they leave their origins For 
example, the National Crime Squad arrested several 
men in 2008, suspected of planning to transport 
2.6 tons of cocaine from a warehouse in Sao Paulo, 
Brazil, to the Netherlands. The arrests occurred 
before the cocaine was actually shipped to the Neth-
erlands. In addition, the “100% control” policy in 
the Antilles and Schiphol airports appears to have 
deterred the use of air couriers. Large amounts of 
cocaine, however, continue to be seized by the 
coastguards of the Dutch Antilles and Aruba. Out 
of 6.8 tons seized in 2008, 4.2 tons were taken by 
the Dutch navy from a cargo vessel sailing under a 
Panamanian flag from the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela to Europe. Another factor may be diver-
sions to Belgium, notably the port of Antwerp.
In 2008, the second largest annual cocaine seizure 
total in Europe was reported, for the first time, by 
France. The bulk of the French cocaine seizures 
were made at sea, mostly close to West Africa or 
close to the French overseas territories in the Carib-
bean. The main identified transit country in 2008 
was Brazil, reflecting the growing importance of 
cocaine production in Peru and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia. The next largest transit country was 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Over the 
2003-08 period, 34% of the cocaine seized by the 
French authorities left South America via the Boli-
varian Republic of Venezuela, 14% via Brazil, 5% 
came directly from Colombia, 6% via other South 
American countries, 14% left the Americas via the 
Caribbean and 1% via Central America.47 The Ibe-
rian Peninsula is still the main transit zone within 
Europe, followed by the Netherlands,48 but more 
direct shipments from the French Caribbean to 
France are gaining in importance.49
Who are the trafﬁckers?
Trafficking of cocaine to Europe is largely organized 
by Colombian organized crime groups. These 
groups may be motivated in part by a desire to 
make up for their losses in the Western Hemisphere. 
Colombian groups act as importers and wholesal-
ers; their involvement in retail markets is limited to 
Spain. But the European markets are more complex 
and diverse than the North American ones, and a 
variety of groups are involved.
Caribbean groups are important in a number of 
countries, including Dominicans in Spain, Jamai-
cans in the United Kingdom and Antilleans in the 
Netherlands. Other South Americans are also 
prominent, especially on the Iberian peninsula. 
West Africans are active retailers (as well as small-
scale importers) in a number of countries in conti-
nental Europe, including France, Switzerland, 
Austria, Italy and Germany. North Africans are 
prominent in countries with a Mediterranean coast-
line or a large North African diaspora, including 
Spain, Italy, France and the Netherlands. In addi-
COCAINE SEIZURES REPORTED FROM COUNTRIES IN EUROPE (IN METRIC FIG. 91: 
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tion, a few groups from the Balkan region (notably 
from Romania, the countries of the former Yugosla-
via, Albania and Turkey) have emerged as players in 
recent years. While there have been rumours of 
Mexican interest in the European market, there is 
little concrete evidence to suggest an active role by 
these groups so far.
The bulk of the trafficking towards Europe still 
seems to be in the hands of Colombian organized 
crime groups, forging alliances with various crimi-
nal groups operating in Europe. Data for Spain, 
Europe’s main entry point of cocaine, show that 
over the 2004-2007 period, between 21% and 26% 
of all foreigners arrested in Spain for cocaine traf-
ficking were Colombian nationals. In 2008, the 
proportion rose to 29% (970 individuals, 11% of 
the total). The Colombian groups have traditionally 
cooperated closely with local organized crime groups 
in Galicia (northern Spain). 
Cocaine-related arrest data for neighbouring Portu-
gal show a somewhat different picture, though also 
reflecting the historical and cultural ties with the 
former colonies. Colombian traffickers do not seem 
to play any significant role there. The largest pro-
COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY OF PERSONS ARRESTED IN SPAIN FOR  FIG. 92: 
TRAFFICKING COCAINE INTO OR WITHIN THE COUNTRY, 2008
Source: UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data
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Source: UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data
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portion of non-Portuguese cocaine traffickers 
arrested in 2008 were from Cape Verde (27%) and 
Guinea-Bissau (19%) 14% and 9% of the total 
number or arrestees, respectively. The recent sharp 
decline in seizures in Portugal may be reflective of 
the decline in the use of these West African coun-
tries as transit areas.
In the Netherlands, people from the ‘Dutch Carib-
bean’ (Aruba, Netherlands Antilles and Suriname) 
have long been active alongside Colombian groups. 
The Colombian expatriate community in the Neth-
erlands is largely from the areas around Cali and 
from the Antioquia region around Medellin, and in 
the late 1990s, was incarcerated at a rate 20 times 
higher than Dutch citizens.50 More recently, Nige-
rian groups have expanded in Amsterdam, largely 
working through air couriers flying from the Neth-
erlands Antilles and Suriname. With improved con-
trols on direct flights, they are increasingly using 
other transit countries such as the Dominican 
Republic, Peru and Mexico.51 Improved controls in 
the port of Rotterdam (Netherlands) have also dis-
placed some of the traffic to the neighbouring port 
of Antwerp (Belgium), still controlled by Colom-
bian groups,52 though Albanian groups, working at 
the port facilities, also seem to play a role. In con-
trast to cocaine trafficking to Spain, where the 
‘mother ship’ approach is used to unload shipments 
onto smaller local craft at sea, the cocaine destined 
for the Netherlands is typically transported along-
side legal merchandise.
Cocaine trafficking operations in the UK are domi-
nated by local British criminals, importing from the 
Iberian peninsula and, to a lesser extent, from the 
Netherlands. UK authorities estimate that some 
75% of the cocaine transited continental Europe 
before reaching the UK53. Attempts to organize 
direct shipments from South America to the UK or 
Ireland are being made as well, as British traffickers 
increasingly attempt to source cocaine further 
upstream.54 Direct shipments of cocaine by organ-
ized Colombian groups, in contrast, are rather the 
exception. The UK is one of the few EU countries 
that has a problem with crack cocaine, mostly dealt 
by British nationals of West Indian descent.55 Most 
of the cocaine from the Caribbean (notably from 
Jamaica) is trafficked by air into the UK, often by 
using female mules, though this has declined in 
recent years. West African groups (mainly Nigeri-
ans, Ghanaians and British nationals of West Afri-
can descent) are increasingly involved in shipping 
cocaine via West Africa to the UK.56 
The Italian drug scene involves Colombian, Domin-
ican and other Latin American trafficking groups 
working with domestic Italian organized crime 
groups, in particular the Calabrian N’drangheta, 
largely using containerized shipments.57 As of 2007, 
the Camorra, located in Naples, was reported to 
have begun trafficking cocaine to Italy from Spain, 
as well as directly from South America. And more 
recently still, the Sicilian Mafia has got involved, 
getting support from the ‘Ndrangheta and the 
Camorra to bring cocaine into the areas it con-
trols.58 West African and North African groups are 
also active in retailing and small-scale import, as 
well as groups from the Balkans, in particular Alba-
nians and Serbs. 
COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY OF TRAFFICKERS ARRESTED IN ITALY FOR  FIG. 94: 
TRAFFICKING COCAINE INTO OR WITHIN THE COUNTRY, 2008
Source: UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data
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France has not had a large cocaine problem in the 
past, though this has started to change in recent 
years, partly due to the growing importance of West 
Africa as a cocaine transit location. When West 
Africa became a more prominent transit area after 
2004, West African traffickers also became more 
prominent in France. Nigerian nationals became 
the top nationality among foreign cocaine traffick-
ers, comprising a third of all arrests among foreign 
traffickers in 2006. Other important players come 
from Europe and North Africa.60
The German authorities divide trafficking into 
‘sales’ and ‘import’ offences. In 2008, the German 
authorities arrested 4,325 persons for cocaine sales 
and 605 persons for cocaine import.61 The propor-
tion of non-German citizens in cocaine sales was 
48%, but 63% for cocaine import offences. Analy-
sis of participants in organized crime groups revealed 
that more than one fifth (22% in 2008) of German 
passport holders in organized crime groups were 
not born in Germany. Thus data suggest that traf-
ficking of cocaine in Germany is primarily con-
ducted by persons not born in Germany.
The single largest group of foreigners arrested for 
cocaine sales were Turkish (450 persons or 22% of 
all foreign cocaine traffickers). The proportion was 
smaller than for heroin, but surprising given the 
fact that dealing in cocaine is a relatively new activ-
COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY OF TRAFFICKERS ARRESTED IN FRANCE FOR FIG. 95: 
TRAFFICKING COCAINE INTO OR WITHIN THE COUNTRY, 200659
Source: UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data
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ity for these groups. The second largest nationality 
was Italian (142 persons or 7% of all foreign cocaine 
traffickers) many of whom were associated with the 
‘Ndrangheta and other Italian mafia groups.62
Those arrested for cocaine import comprise a 
smaller and more varied group, with the top foreign 
nationalities being Dutch (48 persons or 13% of all 
foreign importers) and Turkish (10%, typically 
acquiring the cocaine from the Netherlands).63 
Nigerian and Italian individuals also feature promi-
nently.
How big is the ﬂow?
While there are good data on the number of cocaine 
users in Europe, much less is known about how 
much they consume annually. Using four different 
estimation methods,64 average per user consump-
tion rates of between 25 and 35 grams can be 
derived. Multiplying these averages by the number 
of users yields a cocaine consumption level between 
101 and 144 tons per annum for the EU and EFTA 
countries. The average of the four results was calcu-
lated as UNODC’s ‘best estimate,’ showing an 
increase in the amounts of cocaine used from 63 
tons in 1998 to 124 tons in 2008. The European 
cocaine market thus doubled in volume over the 
COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY OF ‘COCAINE IMPORTERS’ ARRESTED IN  FIG. 97: 
GERMANY, 2008
Sources: UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data and Bundestriminalamt, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2008, Wiesbaden 2009
Other, 195, 32%
Netherlands, 48, 8%
Turkey, 37, 6%
Nigeria, 30, 5%
Italy, 26, 4%
Jamaica, 11, 2%
Morocco, 12, 2%
Poland, 11, 2%
Albania, 10, 2%
Foreigners
 380, 
63%
Germany,
 225,
 37%
AMOUNTS OF (PURE) COCAINE CONSUMED IN THE EU/EFTA COUNTRIES, FIG. 98: 
1998-2008
Sources: Multiple sources65
 58 
101
144
108
50
112
75
145
139
63
68
82
92 98
124127126
119114
101
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
m
et
ri
c 
to
n
s
Average of all estimates
Estimate based on annual
and monthly prevalence
and multicity study per
capita estimates
Estimate based on annual
prevalence and UK per
capita estimates
Estimate based on annual
prevalence and 2005 WDR
per capita estimates
Estimate based on annual
and past month prevalence
(ONDCP model)
Case studies of transnational threats 103
4
1998-2006 period, before stabilizing over the 
2006-08 period. 
As volumes have rapidly increased, prices have 
declined. Retail cocaine prices, at street purity, 
expressed in constant 2008 euros,66 declined from, 
on average, €143 in 1990 to €91 per gram in 2000 
and to €70 per gram in 2008. Expressed in constant 
2008 US dollars,67 cocaine prices declined over the 
1990-2000 period but increased over the 2000-
2008 period, from $88 to $102 (as the US dollar 
depreciated against the euro). Most of this increase 
took place over the 2006-08 period. Wholesale 
prices followed a similar trend.
Cocaine prices fell in parallel with falling purity 
levels.68 Taking purity into account, retail cocaine 
prices, expressed in constant 2008 euros, appear to 
have remained basically stable over the 1998-2008 
period (€183 per pure gram in 1998, €189 per 
pure gram in 2008).69 The same is true for purity-
adjusted wholesale prices in euros. Both retail and 
wholesale prices, expressed in constant US dollars, 
however, showed a marked upward trend over the 
1998-2008 period.70
Given the significant changes in exchange rates in 
recent years, Colombian drug traffickers were 
reported to increasingly favour transactions in euros 
COCAINE PRICES (NOT ADJUSTED FOR PURITY) IN WESTERN EUROPE* IN FIG. 99: 
CONSTANT CURRENCY UNITS PER GRAM, 1990-2008 
*Average price of 18 western European countries (accounting for the bulk of cocaine consumption in Europe), weighted by population size. 
Sources: UNODC, World Drug Report 2009 (and previous years) and UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire Data
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rather than in US dollars, the main transaction 
currency in the past. The large euro notes (€500) 
also seem to have been contributing to its rising 
popularity. Transactions of Colombian drug traf-
ficking groups with counterparts in Mexico and 
the USA, however, continue to take place in US 
dollars.
Multiplying the amounts of cocaine consumed with 
the purity-adjusted retail prices show an increase of 
the EU/EFTA cocaine market from US$14 billion 
in 1998 to US$34 billion in 2008, about the same 
size as the cocaine market in the USA (US$35 bil-
lion). 
How much cocaine must leave South America to 
meet this demand? After deducting purity-adjusted 
seizures,71 the shipments of cocaine from the Andean 
region appear to have risen from 110 tons in 199872 
to almost 250 tons in 2006 (range: 231–268 tons) 
before falling to 212 tons in 2008.73 Expressed as a 
percentage of global cocaine production, the ship-
ments from the Andean region towards the EU/
EFTA countries increased from 13% of Andean 
cocaine production in 1998 to 25% in 2008. 
Using a similar analysis as was applied in the US 
example, it appears that less than 1% of the cocaine 
sales in Europe goes to the Andean coca farmers. 
Another 1% goes to the traffickers within the 
Andean region. The international traffickers who 
ship the cocaine from the Andean region to the 
main entry points (notably Spain) obtain 25% of 
the final sales value. A further 17% is generated in 
shipping the cocaine from the entry points to the 
wholesalers in the final destination countries across 
Europe. The largest income is generated in the des-
tination countries, between the wholesaler and the 
consumer, generating more than 56% of the total. 
As there are far more dealers at the national level, 
the per capita income of the dealers at the national 
level is in Europe (like in North America) lower 
than among the smaller group of internationally 
operating cocaine dealers.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RESPONSE
The cocaine market, particularly the flow to the 
United States, is one of the best documented organ-
ized crime problems. It also appears to be a market 
in decline. What can be learned from this example?
First, organized crime markets do not necessarily 
expand indefinitely. At its peak in the mid-1980s, 
about one in seven 12th grade students in the 
United States had used cocaine in the previous year; 
the figure is about one in 20 today. There may be 
many reasons for this decline, but prevention and 
treatment programmes surely played a role. Not all 
prevention programmes are equal, of course, and 
some of those evaluated in the United States were 
found to be worse than useless, but drugs move in 
and out of fashion, and intelligent interventions can 
promote declines in demand. Treatment is expen-
sive and rarely works the first time around, but it 
remains cheaper and more effective than incarcera-
tion.
Second, law enforcement can have a big impact on 
criminal markets, but needs to be applied strategi-
cally or it can have perverse effects. For example, 
breaking the big cocaine cartels led to the emer-
gence of a number of smaller criminal groups. 
Competition between these groups pushed down 
the price, encouraging higher levels of use. Of 
course, the big cartels had become a serious threat 
to the stability of Colombia, and they had to go, 
but intervention at any point in an international 
criminal market will have repercussions throughout 
the chain, and these need to be monitored and 
addressed.
It is also true that interdiction efforts can push 
cocaine trafficking routes into areas even more vul-
nerable to disruption than the original transit zone. 
This is the story of West Africa between 2004 and 
2008. International attention was brought to this 
detour quickly enough, however, that potential dis-
aster appears to have been averted. Similarly, in the 
mid-1990s, law enforcement efforts to end the 
large-scale air trafficking of coca paste or cocaine 
base between Peru and Colombia caused coca leaf 
prices to fall in Peru, and farmers turned to other 
crops. Over time, unfortunately, this appears to 
have encouraged both coca cultivation in Colombia 
and cocaine processing in Peru, with a subsequent 
resurgence in Peruvian cultivation. More broadly, 
declines in the US market may have prompted the 
growth of the European and South American mar-
kets. 
All this underscores the need for a global strategy to 
deal with the cocaine problem, one that coordinates 
supply- and demand-side measures (as well as more 
innovative approaches) across a range of countries 
and monitors for any side effects. Member States 
clearly recognized this fact in their Political Declara-
tion of March 2009,76 stressing that “the world drug 
problem remains a common and shared responsibil-
ity that requires effective and increased interna-
tional cooperation and demands an integrated, 
multidisciplinary, mutually reinforcing and bal-
anced approach to supply and demand reduction 
strategies.” What is still needed, however, is to trans-
late this widely accepted ‘declaration of intent’ into 
practical action that can lead to tangible results.

HEROIN
5
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Heroin is arguably the world’s most problematic 
drug. More users die each year from problems 
related to heroin use, and more are forced to seek 
treatment for addiction, than for any other illicit 
drug. Users develop both tolerance and physical 
dependence, meaning that their brains adjust to the 
presence of heroin over time, requiring more to 
produce the same effect and inducing severe with-
drawal symptoms if the drug is not taken in suffi-
cient quantities. The difference between a recreational 
dose and a fatal one is small, and variations in street 
drug purity result in many overdoses. In addition, 
heroin is the drug most associated with injection, 
which brings about a host of acute and chronic 
heath problems including the transmission of blood-
borne diseases such as HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C. 
Heroin is also the illicit drug most highly associated 
with a single source: some 90% of the world’s heroin 
comes from opium grown in just a few provinces in 
Afghanistan. Some 380 tons of heroin are produced 
from Afghan poppies and exported all over the 
world. This has not always been the case: while 
opium has been used in the northern areas of 
Afghanistan since the eighteenth century, it was 
only in the 1980s that the country began to emerge 
as a key source of global supply. Myanmar, the 
world’s leading opium producer in the 1970s and 
1980s, saw a reduction in cultivation after 1996. 
Today, Afghanistan has a virtual monopoly on the 
illicit production of the drug,1 producing 6,900 
tons in 2009 or 95% of global supply. Due to dra-
matic production increases after 2005, as much as 
12,000 tons of opium may have been overproduced 
since 2006, enough to meet global demand for two 
years.
The Taliban was able to halt virtually all cultivation 
in 2001, though at that point substantial stocks had 
been accumulated, and the trade in opium, which 
itself was not prohibited, continued. Today, poppy 
farming has been mostly confined to the south of 
the country, particularly the province of Hilmand, 
where the Taliban insurgency is strong. This is also 
the region where the vast majority of heroin process-
ing takes place. 
This geographic concentration is unique. It is 
tempting to think that if control could be main-
tained over a single province in one of the poorest 
countries on earth, one of the world’s most intrac-
table drug problems could be solved overnight. 
Experience has shown, though, that it is rarely as 
simple as that, and this perspective may have led to 
a disproportionate focus on reducing production, at 
the cost of efforts in other parts of the market chain. 
With heroin, as with every other issue discussed in 
this report, it is vital to maintain an international 
perspective on what is truly an international prob-
lem.
At current levels, world heroin consumption (340 
tons) and seizures represent an annual flow of 430-
450 tons of heroin into the global heroin market. 
Opium from Myanmar and the Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic yields some 50 tons of heroin and 
the rest, some 380 tons of heroin/morphine, is pro-
duced exclusively from Afghan opium. About 5 
TONS OF OPIUM PRODUCED, AFGHANISTAN AND THE REST OF THE FIG. 103: 
WORLD, 1979-2009
Source: UNODC, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The transnational threat of Afghan opium
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tons are consumed and seized in Afghanistan. The 
country seized less than three tons of heroin in 
2008, a seizure rate of less than 1 %. The remaining 
375 tons of heroin are then trafficked worldwide via 
routes flowing into and through the neighbouring 
countries of Pakistan (150 tons), the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran (105 tons) and the Central Asian coun-
tries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
(95 tons) towards their destinations in Europe, the 
Russian Federation and Asia.
The Balkan and Northern routes are the main 
heroin trafficking corridors linking Afghanistan to 
the huge markets of the Russian Federation (US$13 
billion) and western Europe (US$20 billion). 
Organized crime groups controlling the trade along 
these routes accrue the lion’s share of this value per 
annum but some insurgent groups also partially 
fund their operations by tapping into this pipeline. 
While organized crime groups are reaping huge 
profits, their host societies are paying a heavy price. 
On the Northern Route, official statistics indicate 
that in the past ten years, Central Asia has 
experienced the highest increase in prevalence of 
drug abuse worldwide. On the Balkan route, the 
ravages of opiate consumption in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran have been well documented, with 
one of the largest opiate user populations in the 
world. Because of their proximity to the source of 
the trade, organized crime groups in Pakistan, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Central Asia have 
developed strong and well-established connections 
to Afghanistan and are directly dependent on 
Afghanistan’s opium trade to sustain their liveli-
hoods. 
Afghan heroin has also penetrated other markets, 
including those traditionally supplied by Myanmar 
opium. Among these is China, where it is now esti-
mated that 25% of the heroin market is supplied by 
Afghan heroin. Afghan heroin is also trafficked to 
other south and southeast Asian countries such as 
India, Thailand and Malaysia. At least 50% of the 
heroin market in Australia is supplied by Afghan 
production. Finally, current opium production fig-
ures in Latin America and Mexico suggest that a 
significant percentage of the US heroin market may 
be supplied from Afghanistan.
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Europe is the most important market for Afghan 
heroin with around 250 kg of heroin consumed on 
a daily basis. Most of the profits in this market go 
to the international drug traffickers. Out of a global 
market of perhaps US$55 billion for Afghan heroin, 
only about US$2.3 billion accrues to the famers and 
traders in Afghanistan. A larger share goes to the 
retailers in destination countries, but the bulk of the 
profits go to traffickers plying two main routes:
The so-called “Balkan route”, which traverses s 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (often by way of 
Pakistan), Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria across 
South East-Europe to the western European 
market which commands by itself an annual 
market value of about US$20 billion; and 
The northern route, which mainly runs through s 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (or Uzbekistan or 
Turkmenistan) to Kazakhstan and the Russian 
Federation where the size of the market is esti-
mated to total US$13 billion per year.
There is also a relatively recent variant on the Balkan 
route, which traverses the Caucasus to both Euro-
pean and Russian markets. In all instances, prima-
rily land transport is used to move the opiates 
through regions which, at least in part, have stabil-
ity problems. 
There is some maritime transport, especially through 
the Black Sea, and air couriering is an issue, par-
ticularly involving West Africans based in Pakistan 
and, to a lesser extent, couriers from Tajikistan. This 
chapter focuses on the land routes, however, since 
this is the primary way used for moving the drugs 
to main consumer markets.
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Poppy, opium, morphine, heroin
The discussion of opiates markets is somewhat con-
fused by the fact that more than one product is in-
volved. Heroin comes from the opium poppy, which 
is lanced to produce opium gum, better known simply 
as opium. Opium is a drug in its own right, some 450 
tons is consumed each year in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran alone.
Not all of the opium destined to become heroin is 
processed in Afghanistan, and it may be easier to ac-
cess the necessary precursor chemicals in other coun-
tries. As a result, opium or morphine (an intermediate 
stage between opium and heroin) may be exported for 
processing in other countries. In 2008, Pakistan and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran seized a combined 16.3 
tons of morphine, most of it close to the Afghan bor-
der. This represents 95% of global morphine seizures 
that year, suggesting that much of this processing is 
taking place close to Afghanistan.
It is also possible to make a concoction from the lefto-
vers of opium harvesting (known as “poppy straw”), 
referred to as “kompot” in the Russian Federation and 
other CIS countries. Collectively, the markets for opi-
um, morphine, heroin and related products are known 
as “opiates” markets. Since opiates other than heroin 
have distinct markets with their own characteristics, 
for the purposes of precision and clarity, this chapter 
focuses on the dominant substance: heroin.
GLOBAL HEROIN CONSUMPTION  FIG. 105: 
(340 TONS), 2008  
(SHARE OF COUNTRIES/REGIONS)
1 000
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
2002 03 04 05 06 07 2008
Afghanistan
Myanmar
Production of opium
(in metric tons)
Source: UNODC World Drug Report, 2009
U
N
O
D
C
 / 
SC
IE
N
C
ES
 P
O
OPIUM PRODUCTION IN  FIG. 106: 
AFGHANISTAN AND  
MYANMAR, 2002-2008
112
HEROIN
Not all of the heroin that leaves Afghanistan on 
these routes makes it to its destination. Some is 
seized, some is consumed in transit countries. In 
recent years, UNODC estimates that 95 tons have 
been exiting Afghanistan toward the Russian 
Federation, of which 70 tons is eventually consumed 
in Russia. About 140 tons leaves Afghanistan along 
the Balkan route, of which only about 87 reach the 
highest-value consumers in Europe. 
Using the same corridors in reverse and relying on 
the same networks of crime and corruption, precur-
sor chemicals are trafficked into Afghanistan to 
process its opium into heroin. This necessitates 
thousands of tons of precursor chemicals, including 
acetic anhydride, crucial for the conversion of mor-
phine into heroin. Over the past decade, the price of 
acetic anhydride has shot up from US$24 per litre 
to US$350 per litre, either due to more effective 
interdiction or increased demand. As with heroin, 
most profit is realised outside of Afghanistan. 
Although profit remains the main variable, kinship 
ties across the border facilitate illicit activity all 
along the trafficking routes, from Balochi and Pash-
tun networks straddling the Pakistan-Iran-Afghani-
stan borders to drug networks in southeast Europe. 
Ethno-linguistic links between groups in northern 
Afghanistan and Central Asia – such as ethnic Tajiks 
– also facilitate illicit transnational activity.
These routes are subject to change, of course, and 
are the elements of the market quickest to adapt 
when encountering resistance. Cultivation can also 
shift, as history has shown, although the process is 
slower. While opium poppy can be grown across a 
wide range of countries, climatic conditions can 
make a big difference in yield: the productivity of 
crops in Afghanistan’s primary market rival – Myan-
mar – is far less, but production in Afghanistan is 
reliant on irrigation. Afghan opium also generally 
has higher morphine content than the opium pro-
duced in Myanmar; Afghan laboratory owners 
therefore face somewhat lower processing costs in 
the initial phases of heroin production. The most 
inflexible part of the market is demand. While new 
user communities can be developed, there are a 
limited number of traffickers with sufficient time 
horizons to intentionally undertake this task. 
However intractable the problem may seem eight 
years after the international coalition’s intervention 
in Afghanistan, it is worth bearing in mind that the 
Afghan opium trade benefits from a nearly-ideal 
conjuncture of factors around which it has thrived. 
The phenomenon is rooted in the large and stable 
global demand for opiates; the continuing conflict 
in Afghanistan, and the country‘s enormous pro-
duction capacity. A number of factors within 
Afghanistan and the greater region compound these 
such as poverty and corruption.2 Simultaneously, 
smuggling feasibility has increased in line with the 
multiplication of transport links and the growth of 
international trade. 
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What is the nature of this market?
Opiate addiction has long been a problem in the 
former Soviet Union, but was largely associated 
with the consumption of “kompot”, a poppy-straw 
derivative. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
global integration of the Russian economy, use of 
heroin appears to have rapidly grown, with indica-
tions of stabilization since around 2001.3 Today, 
there are an estimated 1.5 million heroin users in 
the Russian Federation, making it the single largest 
national heroin consumer in the world.
To get to Russian markets from Afghanistan, land 
transport appears to be the most popular route. 
Twenty years ago, all the countries north of Afghan-
istan were part of the USSR, so cross-border linkages 
are common. These new states are mostly poor and 
some have had problems with political insurgencies. 
Under-resourced and struggling to find their feet, 
addressing trans-shipments of heroin was not an 
early priority. Today, efforts are being made, and 
several tons of heroin are seized each year. The 
regional seizure trend declined after 2003, however, 
largely due to the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
the Tajik-Afghan border. It is unlikely that the flow 
similarly declined during that period.4 
Institutions are not only weak – they may also be 
mistrusted. The people of this region have a long 
tradition of survival independent of, and some 
times in spite of, the state. Shortages under the 
centrally planned economy were commonplace, 
and people did what they could to make ends meet. 
The thriving black market was a lifeline, and people 
in the border regions were well positioned to par-
ticipate in this early capitalism. As national govern-
ments continue to gather popular support, the 
tradition continues, often making use of ethnic and 
familial ties that do not acknowledge the new bor-
ders. Heroin is not the only commodity to illicitly 
cross Central Asian borders, and price differentials 
between food and oil, for example, have led to 
extensive smuggling.
According to 2009 UNODC estimates, 95 tons or 
25% of all Afghan heroin exports pass through the 
porous borders of Central Asia, in particular 
Tajikistan which handles most of this flow. Acting 
as transit zone has had a profound effect on Central 
Asian societies, particularly given the nature of the 
smuggling, which appears to involve a large number 
of small couriers. An estimated 11 tons remain in 
the region for local consumers, which means that 
Central Asian users consume about one third as 
much heroin per capita as Russian users, but this 
use appears to be highly concentrated along major 
transit routes. This is reflected in high levels of HIV 
infections in these areas. There are an estimated 
280,000 heroin users in Central Asia. On a national 
basis, however, Tajikistan, the country most utilized 
by traffickers, has relatively low use rates. This may 
be due in part to the fact that Tajikistan is the least 
developed country in Central Asia. It may also 
suggest that heroin through this country is 
particularly well organized, with little spilling over 
into local markets. Tajik opiates use rates are 
estimated to be about the same as those found in 
the European Union (0.6% annual prevalence), 
whereas Kazakhstan has rather high rates (1%), 
similar to England, Wales and Italy. 
Aside from local use and seizures, most of the heroin 
trafficked into the region is headed for the Russian 
Federation, and most of it is consumed there. There 
has been talk for years of the Russian Federation 
becoming a transit area for heroin destined to West 
Europe, but there has been very little evidence to 
suggest this potential has been realised. Instead, the 
country has evolved into a preferred destination. 
On average, 200 kilograms of heroin per day need 
to be trafficked into the Russian Federation to meet 
the annual 70 tons worth of domestic demand.
how is the trafficking conducted?
To get to the Russian Federation, most of the heroin 
must first make the journey to the northern border. 
The northern provinces of Afghanistan used to be a 
significant opium growing area, and the only area 
to continue cultivation under the short-lived Tali-
ban prohibition; but these provinces have been 
largely poppy-free since 2006. Today, most of the 
opiates trafficked north come from crops in the 
south, and so the drugs first must transit the coun-
try before crossing the border. This is no small 
matter: nearly 100 tons of contraband must cross 
up to 800 kilometres of territory along a limited 
number of roads, evading the detection of both 
local and foreign security forces. The Government 
of Afghanistan seizes on average 1% of Afghan 
opium production. Once it reaches the border, the 
value of the heroin headed north is estimated at 
US$350-400 million annually. The portion that 
eventually reaches the Russian Federation will be 
worth thirty times this amount. 
From Afghanistan to the north, traffickers are 
offered a choice of three countries: Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. These northern bor-
ders span a length of some 2,600 kilometres. The 
Uzbek and Tajik borders are marked by the Amu 
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Darya River, while the Turkmen border is mostly 
desert. Although there is no shortage of possibilities 
for clandestine crossings, it appears that most of the 
trafficking occurs along established trade and tran-
sit routes. There are nine official crossings between 
Afghanistan and Central Asia, including two river 
ports, one on the Uzbek border and one on the 
Tajik border. These river ports are the primary con-
duit for legitimate trade, and also, it appears, for 
trafficking.
Hayraton (Afghanistan’s Balkh province-Su-•	
khandaraya province of Uzbekistan) 
Ninji Pianj (Afghanistan’s Kunduz province- •	
Khatlon Province Tajikistan). 
Once in Central Asia, heroin can be moved north-
ward by several means, including rail, air, across the 
Caspian Sea, and post. Based on the seizure figures, 
most of the heroin appears to be conducted in pri-
vate and commercial vehicles, often in relatively 
small amounts. Of 45 heroin seizures above 500 
grams (a commercial quantity) in Tajikistan between 
2005 and 2007, 80% amounted to 10 kilograms or 
less, and of these, the average size was 2.6 kilo-
grams. The largest seizure, made in 2005, was 119 
kilograms. This is a large seizure, but it would take 
hundreds of similar shipments to accommodate a 
70 ton consumption level. In contrast, large cocaine 
seizures are typically multiple tons, and the whole-
sale value of these drugs is about the same in their 
primary destination markets.5
However, there does appear to be a recent trend 
toward larger seizures, suggesting increasingly well-
resourced organizations. As noted above, it was rare 
to find a seizure of over 100 kilograms in Central 
Asia prior to 2008, but since that time, at least 14 
such seizures have been made, including two of a 
half ton or more. Of course, it remains unclear 
whether these trends reflect changes in the nature of 
the trafficking or in the nature of enforcement.
Tajikistan seems to be particularly favoured by 
heroin traffickers, as does Kyrgyzstan beyond it, 
although Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan see their 
share, as evidenced by recent seizures. Wherever it 
comes from in Central Asia, the heroin must cross 
the vast expanse of Kazakhstan to enter the Russian 
Federation by land. 
Although Kazakhstan is the inescapable gateway to 
the Russian Federation if travelling by land, only 
about 1% of the heroin passing through its territory 
is seized by authorities. This is about the same share 
as Afghanistan. Border control is difficult in Kaza-
khstan: it must police some 12,000 km of land 
borders and 1,900 km of Caspian Sea coastline. A 
2008 report from the Central Asian Regional Infor-
mation and Coordination Center (CARICC) starkly 
concluded: “If drugs reach the territory of Kaza-
khstan then the probability of safe shipping to the 
Russian Federation can be around 95%.”6 Once the 
heroin reaches Kazakhstan, most passes through the 
north-western borders into the Russian Federation. 
Some 95% of the heroin entering the Russian Fed-
eration stays in the country with the remainder 
exiting into Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Belarus 
and the Nordic countries.
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Who are the traffickers?
On the Afghan side of the border, trafficking to 
Central Asia appears to be dominated by five major 
Afghan narcotics networks, comprised of officials, 
warlords, organized crime groups and possibly one 
insurgent group (Hizb-I-Islami). These groups work 
alongside much smaller, often family-based, net-
works. Ethnic Tajiks living on both sides of the 
border are important in this respect.
Officials in most Central Asian countries also claim 
that a limited number of groups control the trade, 
but it is hard to reconcile this with the small size of 
most detected seizures. It would be difficult for a 
small number of groups to coordinate the hundreds 
of micro-shipments required to satisfy a 70-ton 
Russian demand a few kilograms at a time. In con-
trast, the incentives are all in place for a large 
number of entrepreneurs to try their hand at small 
shipments. On arrival in the Russian Federation, a 
2.5 kilogram consignment would be worth well 
over US$50,000. This is about 100 times the annual 
GDP per capita in this region. At the very least, the 
situation is likely to be similar to that seen on the 
Afghan border, with large and small groups working 
in parallel. The small groups tend to trade across 
borders with members of their family, clan or ethnic 
group.7 They may also deal in opium or hashish, 
alongside heroin.8
Of course, it is possible that a well-organized paral-
lel stream of large consignments is flowing undetec-
ted, protected by high level corruption. There do 
appear to be some larger groups operating in 
Tajikistan9 and parts of Uzbekistan, and these 
groups specialize in heroin, in contrast to more 
opportunistic smaller groups.10 For example, West-
ern law enforcement sources in Uzbekistan esti-
mated at ten the number of large networks (16 or 
more individuals) who share the market with “hun-
dreds of small independent trafficking organiza-
tions.” According to the head of the Tajik Drug 
Control Agency, approximately 20 large “networks” 
control the drug trade in Tajikistan, with many 
smaller groups in the border areas. These less numer-
ous, larger groupings, are well-established highly 
hierarchical groups, often based around a specific 
clan and sometimes (such as in the case of 
Uzbekistan’s Fergana valley region or Kyrgyzstan’s 
Batkent region) with trafficking operations built 
around specific ethnic enclaves. Further down-
stream, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs 
estimates that there are 450 criminal organizations 
with some 12,000 members in the Russian Federa-
tion, suggesting a proportionately smaller number 
of larger organizations. 
Based on customs seizures, there is plenty of evi-
dence of transnational activity, but no national 
groups appear to dominate regional trafficking. Rus-
sian nationals comprise a large share of arrestees in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but a much smaller 
share among countries that span the Afghan border. 
Conversely, a small number of Afghans are arrested 
in Tajikistan but usually not further afield. Tajiks 
appear to be major players in a number of countries, 
including the Russian Federation, but are detected 
in much smaller numbers in Kazakhstan. It is pos-
sible that Tajik groups source the drug and pass it on 
distribution of nationality of arrested heroin traffickers at fig. 109: 
customs, 2000-2008
Source: World Customs Office database
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Russia Kazakhstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan
Other
Afghan
Turkmen
Kyrgyz
Uzbek
Tajik
Kazakh
Russian
Case studies of transnational threats 117
5
to Russian groups in Kazakhstan but it seems more 
likely that the drugs change hands several times 
before reaching the consumer. Outside these 
“regional” nationalities, West African, especially 
Nigerians, have also been reported, particularly 
in Tajikistan. These may act as simple couriers, as 
demonstrated with the 2006 attempt by a Nigerian 
group to have one of their own cross the Kazakh-
Chinese border with heroin.
Given the permeability of the border and ethnic 
linkages, the Tajik groups have direct access to 
Afghan production, and some of them appear to be 
led by former warlords still armed with weapons 
from the Tajik civil war (1992-1997). There may 
also be trade in drugs for surplus arms. The integra-
tion of Afghan-Tajik networks becomes more obvi-
ous when groups based in Tajikistan are active in 
supplying weapons to traffickers in Afghanistan. 
This trade has been active for decades and features 
an efficient barter system developed since the Soviet 
invasion. There are similar reports from the Kaza-
kh-Chinese border where Kazakh smugglers report-
edly exchange weapons for Chinese drugs. 
The drugs-for-arms trade is also of importance 
because of its intersection with political insurgents 
in both Afghanistan and Central Asia. In Central 
Asia, this nexus is particularly obvious in the Fer-
gana Valley and in Tajikistan where the porous 
border with Afghanistan is crossed by militants 
linked to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and 
other Al-Qaida linked groups.
But, on the whole, the evidence seems to point to a 
good deal of “ant” trafficking, with the heroin 
changing ownership several times between the 
farmer and the consumer. For cross-border transac-
tions, ethnic and familial ties are important. In 
some cases, this traffic may be coordinated by higher 
level brokers, who, it has been argued, profit most 
from the trade.11
how big is the flow?
Based on studies of drug demand in the Russian 
Federation, UNODC estimates that 70 tons of 
“pure” heroin are required to meet the requirement 
of the Russian market.12 To get this amount to the 
Russian users, considerably more has to leave 
Afghanistan into Central Asia. First, heroin use in 
Central Asia must be deducted. The most recent 
UNODC estimate of the heroin using population 
is Central Asia is 280,000. Based on 2008 surveys 
of drug treatment centres conducted by UNODC 
in Central Asia, an estimate of 40 grams of pure 
heroin per user/year was used as a regional aver-
age.13 Central Asia’s heroin users are thus estimated 
to consume approximately 11 tons of heroin per 
annum. 
Also to be deducted are seizures in Central Asia, 
which have been in the region of 5 tons per year. 
Some heroin is also diverted from Central Asia to 
the Caucasus and China (about 3 tons). Heroin is 
also seized in the Russian Federation (about 3 tons) 
and some transits the country for Eastern or North-
ern European countries (about 4 tons). As a result, 
some 95 tons of heroin must leave Afghanistan in 
order for 70 to arrive and stay in the Russian Fed-
eration.
Price figures for heroin in the Russian Federation 
were provided by the Russian Government. At 
US$15,000 per kilogram, these 70 tons wholesale 
for just over one billion dollars and retail (adjusted 
for purity) for some 13 billion US dollars.
These figures are necessarily imprecise, particularly 
due to the lack of data on heroin purity levels in 
Central Asia and lack of certainty regarding the size 
of the Russian heroin using population.
distribution of heroin market on fig. 110: 
the northern route,	2000-2008
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What is the nature of this market?
Western Europe has had a longstanding problem 
with heroin, and since the end of the Cold War, 
many other countries have been affected. Since 
2000, though, demand in Western and Central 
Europe has been stable or declining, as have prices. 
Today, an estimated 87 tons of heroin are consumed 
in Europe (excluding the Russian Federation) per 
annum, the bulk of which (92%) is consumed in 
Western and Central European countries. Most of 
this consumption (about 60%) takes place in just 
four countries: the United Kingdom, Italy, France 
and Germany. The vast majority of this demand is 
satisfied by heroin trafficked along the Balkan 
route. 
The “Balkan route” consists of much more than the 
Balkans, of course, and the routes through the Bal-
kans have varied over time. Far more consistent is 
the use of the first part of the route, through the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey. From there, 
the flow fragments, traversing a wide variety of 
routes to the final destinations. In Europe, the 
Netherlands appears to serve as a clearing house; 
drugs pass through other consumer countries on 
their way to the Netherlands, only to return again. 
This is particularly the case for Germany.
Traffickers through Central Asia have, at least, a 
lingua franca in Russian, but Balkan route traffick-
ers cross a much more diverse region. They do have 
the advantage of a better transportation infrastruc-
ture and massive commercial flows for cover, how-
ever. They have also been plying this route for 
decades, longer than their Central Asian counter-
parts. Over this time, Balkan route trafficking has 
become very well-organized and professional. 
How is the trafﬁcking conducted?
Considerable quantities of heroin are trafficked to 
Europe by sea and air, but the Balkan route resem-
bles the Central Asian one in that the bulk of the 
flow proceeds by land. Most of the heroin headed 
for Western European markets leaves Afghanistan 
into the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and 
Turkey, which collectively seize most of the heroin 
interdicted in the world (40% of the estimated flow 
intercepted between 2002-2006). Despite these 
remarkable enforcement efforts, traffickers never-
theless succeed in getting sufficient volumes through 
so that most of the heroin consumed in Europe in 
recent decades has passed through these countries.
Today, around 30% (110 tons) of Afghanistan’s 
heroin continues to move west/south-west into the 
Islamic Republic of Iran toward Europe. Out of this 
amount, an estimated 10 tons arrives by air or sea 
from various points of departure. Another 7 tons 
are trafficked via what has been called the “North-
ern Balkan route”, transiting the Caucasus rather 
than Turkey. As discussed above, a small amount 
(4%) passes through the Russian Federation to 
Northern Europe, but the bulk of the supply (at 
least 80%) travels the traditional Balkan route, 
mainly via road transportation. 
The core Balkan route crosses directly into the 
Islamic Republic of Iran along its rough 949 kilo-
metre border with the Afghan provinces of Hirat, 
Farah and Nimroz, and at least 90 crossing points 
have been identified.14 In contrast to Central Asia, 
smugglers rarely use official crossing points.15 Traf-
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fickers along the Iran-Afghan borders are generally 
well-organized and well-armed; deadly clashes 
between Iranian troops and traffickers are common-
place, as demonstrated by the more than 3,500 
casualties sustained by the Iranian border guards in 
the past three decades. Violence is most often asso-
ciated with smuggling from south-western Afghani-
stan, such as from Nimroz province, where heavily 
armed convoys of five or six trucks take the contra-
band to the Islamic Republic of Iran either through 
Pakistan or directly.
Across the Afghanistan/Iran borders and through 
multiple methods of transportation - including the 
wide usage of camels and pack animals- upwards of 
105 tons of heroin are transferred to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran for further shipment to Turkey. An 
additional 35 tons of Afghan heroin are trafficked 
across the 976 km Pakistan-Iran border, from Paki-
stan’s Balochistan province into south-eastern Iran’s 
Sistani-Baluchistan province.
One kilogram of heroin is worth around US$2,000-
2,500 in Afghanistan. The price rises to US$3,000 
on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and to around 
US$5,000 on the Iran/Afghanistan border. When 
the same heroin reaches the Iran/Turkey border, its 
price per kilogram increases to approximately 
US$8,000, a 60% increase.16 Based on the esti-
mated flows through this route, Iranian crime 
groups organizing heroin trafficking from the 
Afghanistan/Iran border to the Turkey/Iran border 
stand to pocket some US$450-600 million per 
year.17
Trafficking patterns indicate that heroin crosses 
from the Azarbaycan-e-Khavari province of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran into Turkey and traverses 
Turkey’s Hakkari and/or Van districts. In all, an 
estimated 95 tons of heroin are shipped across Tur-
key’s borders every year along the following routes:
Hakkari/Van - south-eastern cities - central s 
Anatolia cities - Istanbul - Edirne to Bulgaria/
Greece.
Hakkari/Van - south-eastern cities - southern/s 
western Anatolia cities to Greece/Cyprus with 
sea transportation.
Hakkari/Van - south-eastern cities - central s 
Anatolia cities - northern Anatolia cities - 
Ukraine (with smaller amounts to Georgia).
From Turkey, around 82 tons of heroin then flow 
towards Western Europe (particularly Germany/
Netherlands and Italy) along several routes:18
Approximately 20 to 25 tonss  19 of heroin 
travel across the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM) to Albania for 
further shipments towards Italy (by sea) and 
Switzerland. A smaller route proceeds directly 
from Greece by sea towards Italy while a larger 
portion also ﬂows via FYROM to Serbia to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia and Slove-
nia and further north.
The bulk of the heroin (approximately 55 to 60 s 
tons) travels to Germany and the Netherlands, 
travelling from Bulgaria to Serbia to Hungary 
to Austria to Germany and the Netherlands or 
from Bulgaria to Romania to Hungary to Slova-
kia to Austria to Germany and the Netherlands. 
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From Germany and the Netherlands, heroin 
shipments are further traﬃcked to France, the 
UK and Spain.
Smaller routes include directly through the Black 
Sea into the Ukraine. This flow is estimated at 2-3 
tons annually. In addition, trucks carrying heroin 
are reportedly transported on ferries from Turkey to 
Italy (notably Trieste).
The estimated average annual net profit of organ-
ized crime groups managing heroin trafficking 
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey 
and further to the Turkey/Bulgaria and/or Turkey/
Greece borders is around US$8,000 per kilogram, 
totalling US$600-700 million.
In the Balkans, very little heroin is seized, suggest-
ing the route is very well organized and lubricated 
with corruption. Most passes through Bulgaria, a 
country which has reported some fairly large heroin 
seizures in the past, but where figures have been 
erratic, despite little evidence of fluctuation in the 
flows. 
Looking at the Balkan route, it becomes obvious 
that shipments need to cross 5-10 borders before 
reaching their final destination, while on the north-
ern route, traffickers generally cross an average of 
four borders from Afghanistan to the Russian Fed-
eration. Drug smuggling along the Balkan route is 
systematic and seems to involve well-resourced 
groups, with much larger consignments than found 
in Central Asia. Seizures are especially large up to 
Turkey, at which point loads appear to be broken 
down into smaller parcels. On the Balkan route, the 
average heroin seizure amounts to approximately 10 
kg which is twice the average of the northern route. 
However, the average seizure per case climbs to 
around 25 kg in south-eastern (including Turkey) 
and eastern European countries. Multi-hundred 
kilogram shipments have been seized in Istanbul on 
many occasions, a distinction no Central Asian city 
can claim, despite being much closer to the source. 
This suggests the country is being used as a whole-
sale market. The Netherlands seems to serve a simi-
lar function, with heroin destined for Germany 
being first trafficked to the Netherlands. Overall, 
European countries seize a relatively small share of 
the heroin entering their borders, and most of the 
seizures are quite small.
Who are the trafﬁckers?
Organized crime groups involved in international 
trafficking on the Balkan route are often composed 
of nationals from the source or transit countries. 
But, at various stages, many of the traffickers may 
be transportation professionals contracted to do the 
job, not necessarily members of the group that owns 
HEROIN SEIZURES IN BULGARIA, FIG. 114: 1980-2008
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the drugs. This is particularly true along the Iran/
Turkey border, but even crossing into the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, traffickers may make use of expe-
rienced traffickers from local border tribes.20
Opiates destined for Western Europe are trafficked 
out of Afghanistan by Balochi and Pashtun net-
works operating in the border regions of Afghani-
stan, Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Some of these networks have been active since the 
time of the Soviet invasion and have long-estab-
lished links with the political and security apparatus 
on both sides of the border. Analysts from the 
United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) estimate at 10-12 the number of large 
Afghan networks with links to the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. Additionally, many Afghan traffickers are 
reported to operate out of Pakistan. The Afghan-
Iran trafficking channels support a variety of other 
smuggled goods, including human beings, ciga-
rettes, fuel, precursor chemicals and weapons.
Balochi groups are believed to offload their ship-
ments in the Islamic Republic of Iran to groups 
with greater regional and international ties, such as 
Azeri, Arab, Persian and Kurdish groups. Once opi-
ates have changed hands, these groups are then 
mainly responsible for shipping the drugs from the 
eastern to the western borders of the country. Inside 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, organized crime net-
works also supply opiates to the large domestic 
market.
On some part of the Balkan route, organized crime 
and insurgency overlap, such as elements of the 
Kurdistan Workers` Party (PKK) who are reported 
to tax drug shipments crossing into Turkey from the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and, it is speculated, from 
Iraq. The PKK also reportedly collect taxes (or 
receive donations) from Kurdish heroin traffickers 
based in Europe.21 According to NATO intelligence 
analysts, the PKK pockets upwards of US$50 mil-
lion to US$100 million annually from heroin traf-
ficking alone. PKK involvement in the trade is 
further demonstrated by the 2008 arrest of several 
of its members in Europe on heroin trafficking 
charges.22 
Ethnic Kurdish groups, with large border popula-
tions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and 
Turkey, may be responsible for border crossings in 
those regions. These groups may sell on these drugs 
in Turkey or traffic them to Europe through their 
own networks. The UK’s Serious Organised Crime 
Agency (SOCA) argues that in 2009, Turkish net-
works continued to control the heroin supply to 
Europe.23 According to WCO seizure statistics 
between 2000 and 2008, the majority of drug traf-
fickers arrested in Turkey were Turkish nationals. 
This might suggest that Turkish groups are organ-
izing the heroin trafficking all through Turkey up to 
the borders with Bulgaria and Greece where Balkan-
based groups take over. 
Organized crime in the Balkans involves a large 
variety of criminal activities and as such, heroin is 
but one, albeit the most lucrative, commodity illic-
itly trafficked through this region. The routes 
through this region also operate in the reverse direc-
tion with cocaine, precursors and ATS moving east-
ward into Turkey and beyond. Organized crime 
Bulgarian
41%
Turkish
27%
Other Balkan 
nationalities
18%
Others
5%
Dutch
2%
Romanian
5%
Albanian
2%
Albanian
32%
Turkish
13%Other Balkan 
nationalities
13%
Italian
10%
Pakistani
8%
Other African 
nationalities
6%
Nigerian
6%
Other
12%
DISTRIBUTION OF ARRESTED HEROIN FIG. 115: 
TRAFFICKERS BY NATIONALITY IN  
BULGARIA, 2000-2008
 Source: World Customs Organization
DISTRIBUTION OF ARRESTED HEROIN FIG. 116: 
TRAFFICKERS BY NATIONALITY IN  
ITALY, 2000-2008
 Source: World Customs Organisation
124
HEROIN
groups controlling these corridors have thus com-
paratively better access to more numerous and 
diversified crime markets than their Northern Route 
counterparts. Thus, many tend to be poly drug 
(heroin, cannabis etc.) and poly crime, trafficking 
in human beings, weapons and stolen vehicles to 
name but a few. Another notable feature is that 
some important networks have clan-based - and 
hierarchically organized - structures such as Alba-
nian and Kurdish groups, making them particularly 
hard to infiltrate.
Heroin interception rates in the Balkan region are 
very low (2%), especially when compared with 
Turkey (10%) and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(18%). This suggests inadequate border controls 
and high fragmentation/inefficiency of law enforce-
ment bodies in a region where high levels of unem-
ployment and low salaries also create conditions for 
corruption-related behaviour.
As seen below, Balkan groups are important through 
the Balkans, but do not appear to control the drugs 
in destination markets. In most European coun-
tries, nationals control the local drug markets. There 
are notable exceptions, however. Dutch groups are 
frequently encountered in the UK, and West Afri-
cans act as important small-scale importers and 
retailers in many countries. Albanian nationals are 
very important in destination markets such as Swit-
zerland and Italy. Turkish groups play a key role in 
Germany, as do German groups.
In Bulgaria, most of the arrested heroin traffickers 
are nationals of that country. However, the propor-
tion of Turkish nationals also stands out. The other 
main nationalities are Balkans such as Serbs and 
Macedonians. Albanians are notably, nearly absent. 
Ethnic Albanians appear to be especially active in 
Greece, Switzerland and Italy. In Italy, one of the 
most important heroin markets in Europe and fre-
quently identified as a base of operation for Balkan 
groups, Albanians make up the single largest group, 
constituting 32% of all arrestees between 2000-
2008. The next active group was Turks followed by 
Italians and citizens of Balkan countries. There were 
a number of Pakistani and Nigerian traffickers 
arrested in Italy as well.
British
44%
Dutch
14%
Others
21%
Turkish
5%
Belgian
5%
P akis tani
4%
German
4%
Nigerian
3%
Turkish
19%
German
39%
Other Balkan 
nationalities
5%
Other African 
nations
5%
Dutch
5%
Serbian
4%
Nigerian
3%
Albanian
3%
Other
17%
DISTRIBUTION OF ARRESTED HEROIN FIG. 117: 
TRAFFICKERS BY NATIONALITY IN  
GERMANY, 2000-2008
Source: World Customs Organisation
NUMBER OF ARRESTED HEROIN TRAFFICK-
ERS BY NATIONALITY, NETHERLANDS,  
2000-2008
Nationality
Number of 
heroin traffickers 
arrested
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In Germany, the number of Turks arrested for 
heroin trafficking outnumbers all other nationali-
ties but remains lower than the number of German 
citizens arrested. Dutch citizens represent 5% of all 
heroin trafficking arrests and generally, enter the 
trafficking chain only after heroin arrives in Ger-
many. Balkan nationalities make up a minority of 
arrestees in Germany, followed by Nigerian nation-
als.
In the Netherlands, a regional hub for heroin distri-
bution, the absolute number of arrests made by 
customs is limited. Dutch, Nigerian and Turkish 
nationalities are nearly equally represented, while 
Balkan nationals are conspicuously absent. 
In the UK, British citizens predominate but a con-
siderable number of Dutch citizens also show up in 
arrest statistics. The proportion of arrested Turkish, 
German, Pakistani and Belgian nationals is consid-
erably smaller than Dutch or British nationals 
between 2000 and 2008. Here too, Balkan nation-
alities comprised a negligible percentage of all 
heroin trafficking arrests.
How big is the ﬂow?
As discussed above with regard to the Russian Fed-
eration, the estimates on the Balkan route are based 
on both supply and demand side data.
Based on UNODC annual assessments, approxi-
mately 105 tons (around 30%) of Afghan heroin is 
trafficked directly into the Islamic Republic of Iran 
from Afghanistan. An additional 35 tons of heroin 
flow from Pakistan to the Islamic Republic of Iran 
every year, so an estimated total of 140 tons of 
Afghan heroin enter Iran each year.
The estimated heroin user population in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is around 400,000 individuals, 
consuming, at a rate of about 35 grams per year, 
almost 14 tons of heroin annually. A sizeable por-
tion of this flow - an average of 16 tons of heroin or 
11 per cent of the total heroin flow to the country 
– is seized by Iranian law enforcement annually. 
This leaves approximately 110 tons available for 
export. Based on seizure data, most of this (95 tons) 
flows towards Turkey to meet European demand. 
Turkish counter-narcotics officials seize around 10 
tons of heroin per annum while domestic heroin 
consumption is estimated at 1 ton. The remainder, 
80-85 tons, is trafficked to Western and Central 
Europe via Bulgaria/Greece and through the Balkan 
countries. 
This quantity is almost sufficient to meet European 
demand, as a total of 87 tons of heroin are esti-
mated to be consumed in Europe per annum. The 
bulk (92% or 80 tons) is consumed in Western and 
Central European countries. 
Four countries (United Kingdom, Italy, France and 
Germany), account for 60% of the total heroin 
consumption in Europe. 
Country
Annual heroin 
consumption 
(kg)
Cumulative 
percentage in 
total
Estimated 
number of 
heroin users
Cumulative 
percentage 
in total
United Kingdom 18,610 21% 321,440 20%
Italy 17,680 42% 305,360 39%
France 9,570 53% 165,290 49%
Germany 6,830 60% 117,940 56%
Rest of Europe 34,470 100% 703,470 100%
Total 87,160 1,613,500
HEROIN CONSUMPTION IN EUROPE  
(EXCLUDING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
Source: UNODC, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency - The transna-
tional threat of Afghan opium, Vienna 2009 
Region Heroin consumption (tons)
Eastern Europe 4.4
Southern Europe 2.4
Western Central 
Europe 80
Total 87
HEROIN CONSUMPTION DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY24
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IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RESPONSE
A global market has developed around the trade in 
Afghan opiates, involving millions of people in 
many countries and regions. In one way or another, 
wittingly or not, they act as agents of that market. 
Opium farmers, traders in chemical precursors, 
heroin manufacturers, organized criminal groups, 
insurgents, corrupt law enforcement officials, trans-
porters, money launderers and drug users all play a 
part in the operation of what has become a huge 
transnational illicit economy, with a yearly turnover 
in the tens of billions of dollars. Yet, our under-
standing of that economy remains surprisingly frag-
mented, as does the response to the problem. 
Historically, efforts have tended to focus on the 
elimination of illicit opium production. National 
supply-side efforts have been successful, in some 
cases spectacularly so. Illicit opium production has 
been virtually eliminated in Turkey, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, the Lao Peo-
ple’s Democratic Republic, China and Lebanon. 
Other states – including Mexico, Colombia and 
Myanmar – have not yet managed to completely 
halt production, but have certainly significantly 
curtailed it, periodic resurgences notwithstanding. 
Nevertheless, while illicit opium production was 
moving from one area to another and becoming 
increasingly concentrated in Afghanistan, global 
illicit opium production increased by a factor of 
eight during the last three decades. 
Given the very strong concentration of today’s 
global illicit opium production in one place, one 
could legitimately hope that eliminating poppy 
cultivation there could be a most effective way of 
dismantling the transnational opiate market. Unfor-
tunately, the insurgency in Afghanistan has created 
a formidable obstacle to law enforcement and alter-
native development measures, and national and 
international efforts could not stop the expansion of 
opium production after its resumption in that 
country in 2002. Significant declines in 2008 and 
2009 were good news, but the security situation 
remains a serious problem and it is very uncertain if 
this positive trend will continue.
The solution to the transnational trade in Afghan 
opiates requires a response that reaches well beyond 
the opium producing provinces of Afghanistan. 
Clear steps in that direction have been made by the 
international community, particularly through what 
has come to be known as the “Paris Pact”. In 2003, 
representatives of 55 nations and 13 international 
organizations met in Paris with the aim of develop-
ing a “comprehensive, balanced and coordinated 
national and international response” to the Afghan 
opium problem. The “Paris Pact” members, with 
the support of UNODC, created a consultative 
framework for the exchange of information on drug 
trafficking trends, piloted an automated donor 
assistance mechanism and helped to develop the 
“Rainbow Strategy”. The strategy is made of a set of 
distinct components that address various issues, 
such as border control between Afghanistan and its 
neighbors, the illicit trade in precursors, opiate-re-
lated financial flows to and from Afghanistan and 
preventing and treating opiates addiction and HIV/
AIDS in the region.
While progress in international collaboration has 
been made, more needs to be done. The history of 
drug control has shown that disjointed efforts could 
turn local successes into global failures. Opiate pro-
duction and trafficking have been displaced from 
one area to another, and often to places where geog-
raphy, instability and other obstacles to governance 
made it particularly intractable. When reduced in 
one country, heroin has increased in another and 
unabated world demand has continued to stimulate 
global supply. 
National and international drug control agencies 
have long been familiar with the heroin problem. 
Despite that experience, they could not stop its 
growth during the last three decades. Eliminating or 
significantly reducing the world heroin market 
would thus require developing a more effective 
approach than in the past. 
What can be done? The first thing is to identify and 
remedy the biggest shortcomings of past approaches. 
Governments have recognized an essential one: the 
lack of integrated approaches. In a 2009 Political 
Declaration, United Nations Member States decided 
to make decisive progress by 2019 and acknow-
ledged “the importance of promoting, in order to 
enhance the effectiveness of drug control measures, 
an integrated approach in drug policies”.25 The 
associated Plan of Action stressed the need to 
address “supply and demand reduction together”: 
“While drug trafficking is a multifaceted issue than 
can be effectively tackled only by reducing both 
supply and demand, this interlinkage is often not 
taken into account”.26 The international commu-
nity needs to strengthen the link between supply 
and demand reduction measures and to better inte-
grate national efforts in the framework of an inter-
national strategy on the scale of the market. To do 
both, getting a better understanding of the transna-
tional heroin economy is a matter of urgency.
FIREARMS
6

Case studies of transnational threats 129
6
FIREARMS
The trafficking of firearms is unlike many of the 
other forms of trafficking discussed in this report 
because firearms are durable goods.1 Unlike drugs, 
rhino horn, or counterfeit pharmaceuticals, a well-
maintained AK-47 will last indefinitely. As a result, 
there is little need for a continuous contraband 
flow. Trafficking tends to be episodic, often from an 
established stockpile to a region descending into 
crisis.
In addition, the modern pistol or assault rifle repre-
sents a “mature technology,” so current weapons 
holders do not need to regularly update their stock 
to remain competitive. There has been very little 
innovation in small arms design in the last 50 years 
– it appears there are few ways to make small arms 
more accurate or more deadly than they are today. 
Consequently, the number of new small arms pur-
chased each year is only about 1% of those already 
in circulation. Even the world’s most innovative 
militaries only update their small arms every second 
decade or so. 
As the global turnover in the licit arms industry is 
limited, the same is likely true for the illicit arms 
industry. Many still-functional weapons were dis-
tributed in developing countries during the Cold 
War and thereafter, and since weapons destruction 
has been limited in many parts of the world, there 
is little need to import new weapons into these 
regions today. The value of the documented global 
authorized trade in firearms has been estimated at 
approximately US$1.58 billion in 2006, with unre-
corded but licit transactions making up another 
US$100 million or so.2 The most commonly cited 
estimate for the size of the illicit market is 10%-
20% of the licit market, which would be about 
US$170 million to US$320 million per annum.3 
There are two primary markets for illicit arms – 
those who need weapons for criminal purposes, and 
those who need them for political ones. 
Firearms for crime
For criminals, there are often more immediate 
sources of firearms than those trafficked interna-
tionally. In most cities in the developed world, there 
is limited use for military-type weapons (see Box), 
and so the demand is for concealable handguns. For 
example, despite availability of a wide range of small 
arms in the United States, including semi-automatic 
assault rifles, 88% of firearm murders in 2008 were 
committed with handguns,4 and earlier studies have 
found the same for 87% of all violent firearms 
offences.5 Firearms used in crime are often diverted 
from the legal handgun market that exists in many 
countries. If handgun controls are tight in a coun-
try, they may be looser in a neighbouring one, and 
while the trans-border movement of these weapons 
could be considered trafficking, the volumes are 
rarely big or concentrated enough to be deemed an 
organized trafficking flow. 
To get a sense of the relative value of the market for 
firearms compared to other forms of contraband, it 
helps to look at some concrete examples. On 16 
November 2009, the Nicaraguan Government 
made what was hailed as “one of the largest seizures 
of weaponry ever made by the Nicaraguan authori-
ties”6 – a consignment of arms for the local repre-
sentatives of the Mexican Sinaloa cartel. The 
shipment comprised 59 assault rifles, two grenade 
launchers and 10 grenades, eight kilos of TNT and 
nearly 20,000 rounds of ammunition. While this 
sounds impressive, the total value of this shipment 
was likely less than US$200,000 at point-of-sale. 
Three days later, the Nicaraguan navy seized 2.4 
tons of cocaine off the Caribbean coast. The value 
of this shipment was at least 400 times as much, 
around US$80 million in US wholesale markets.
One area where criminal weapons flows could con-
ceivably provide attractive long-term profits for 
organized groups is the movement of weapons from 
the USA to Mexico, one of the two trafficking flows 
discussed further below. Due to a constitutional 
provision that asserts that the right to bear arms 
must be protected in a free state, the United States 
has the most heavily armed civilian population in 
the world, and so opportunities for diversion by 
theft are plentiful. But, as will be discussed, it 
appears that most of the guns trafficked into Mexico 
are actually purchased legally and then transported 
clandestinely across the border.
Firearms for conﬂict
The second source of demand for illicit weapons – 
demand from groups whose objectives are political 
rather than criminal – emerges when a set of mili-
tants finds the resources to equip an unauthorized 
force, or when a state subject to international 
embargoes attempts to circumvent these controls. 
Similar to criminals, insurgents may be able to 
access the weaponry desired from local sources, 
either stealing, renting or purchasing weapons from 
the police and military. In particular, poorly 
resourced insurgents may have to fall back on what-
ever is available locally. State actors and some insur-
gent groups may have state allies willing to shuttle 
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weaponry around the international agreements in 
what is often referred to as the “grey market”. It 
remains unclear what share of transnational arms 
trafficking could be considered organized crime, 
and what share can be attributed to those with 
political, rather than economic, motivations.
In practice, firearms trafficking is similar in nature 
to the trafficking of any other ostensibly licit good. 
Although clandestine cross-border movement does 
occur, it is often easier to ship the weapons through 
regular commercial channels, relying on false or 
fraudulently acquired paperwork and/or corrupt 
officials to ensure passage. To get to their final users, 
a combination of licit shipping and clandestine 
movement may be required. But, in theory, the 
“organized crime group” responsible for the traffick-
ing could be as small as one well-placed broker and 
his conspirators on the receiving end. The rest of the 
people in the trafficking chain may be comporting 
themselves entirely within the ambit of the law.
Firearms flows should be relatively easy to docu-
ment compared to consumables, since each weapon 
should contain unique serial numbers that could be 
traced back to the manufacturer and original owner. 
At the very least, the make and model of the weapon 
should give some clues as to its origin when a crimi-
nal seizure is made. But, remarkably, no interna-
tional database of firearms seizures exists. To 
document contraband flows, analysts rely on other 
sources of information.
Some information on firearms stocks is available, 
for example, and these data give an indication as to 
the most likely sources of military arms. A key 
source historically has been the armouries of the 
CIVILIAN FIREARMS OWNERSHIP, FIG. 119: 2006 OR LATEST YEAR AVAILABLE
Source: UNODC International Homicide Statistics; 
Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the city.
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former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries. 
After the end of the Cold War, many of these states 
were left with considerable stockpiles in an environ-
ment of declining military spending, low regula-
tion, and high economic insecurity. These resources 
were quickly exploited by those with the logistic 
capabilities to transport them to combat zones, 
such as the civil wars that afflicted Africa in the 
1990s. But many of these stockpiles remain, and 
grow as countries in transition continue to down-
size their militaries. 
To get a sense of where the stockpiles are most 
acute, estimates of the size of the largest firearms 
arsenals in the world can be compared to the size of 
the active military in each country. Where there are 
many more weapons than there are soldiers to use 
them, this could be seen as a potential point of 
vulnerability to firearms trafficking.
In this analysis, Ukraine emerges as the country 
with the most spare firearms per active duty sol-
dier.7 The absolute size of the surpluses in China 
and the Russian Federation are larger, but, given the 
size of their militaries, it is more likely that these 
surpluses might be reabsorbed in the future. Eastern 
Europe is thus the focus of the second flow study in 
this chapter.  
Are military weapons used in street crime?
Handguns have obvious advantages over long arms for use in street crime. They can 
be concealed and carried constantly; they are easier to use at close quarters; and they 
are every bit as deadly. But they can be diﬃcult to ﬁnd in many developing coun-
tries, since few can aﬀord them. Criminals wishing to use ﬁrearms in poorer countries 
would have to make use of military arms left over from past conﬂicts, or somehow ac-
cess (buy, rent, steal) handguns from the police. Given that most people are unarmed 
and bullets are expensive, bladed weapons, which may also have agricultural uses, may 
be more commonly used in crime. For example, in South Africa, a country with very 
high murder rates and widespread availability of both military and civilian ﬁrearms, 
the majority of murders are still committed with sharp instruments, and less than 
30% are committed with a gun.8 In 2007/2008, for the ﬁrst time, docket research 
indicated that guns had outpaced knives as the most common weapon used in rob-
beries in South Africa.9
In states where handguns are accessible, most criminals prefer to use them. Military 
weapons may be used, however, when criminal conﬂict becomes tantamount to a low 
intensity military conﬂict. Some of the best known examples include conﬂicts in the 
favelas of Brazil and some states in Mexico. The Mexican example is discussed in the 
ﬂow study below.
In Brazil, an analysis of over 200,000 ﬁrearms seized between 1974 and 2004 in the 
state of Rio de Janeiro found that just under 92% were civilian-type arms (68% were 
revolvers, 16% pistols, and 8% shotguns). Less than 2% were assault riﬂes or subma-
chine guns, and 82% were manufactured in Brazil. Some 70% of the weapons seized 
chambered either 38 short or 32 short rounds. In other words, in one of the areas best 
known for the use of military arms, smaller weapons were far more commonly seized 
by the police.10
An updated study found that assault riﬂes had indeed increased their share of the 
weapons seized in crime in the city of Rio de Janeiro after 1992, but only to 4%. The 
share of pistols also increased while the share of revolvers decreased.
BREAKDOWN OF FIREARMS SEIZURES IN RIO DE JANEIRO 
OVER TIME
Source: Small Arms Survey, Viva Rio, ISER11
In short, even in those few countries where military weapons are used by criminals, 
handguns still seem to be preferred for most forms of street crime.
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What is the nature of this market?
Addressing the United Nations Security Council, 
Mexican President Felipe Calderón recently said:
Trafficking of small arms and light weapons causes 
around three thousand deaths every day globally. 
Mexico exhorts to the members of the Security 
Council to look for formulas to restrain this illicit 
trade, notwithstanding the right of each State to 
buy the armaments necessary for its legitimate 
defense, to maintain public order, and protect the 
rights of the citizens.12 
He was clearly thinking of his own country, where, 
despite tough firearms laws, armed violence related 
to the drug cartels is said to have dramatically 
reversed a long-term decline in homicide and 
resulted in over 10,000 deaths in recent years.
The United States is a convenient source of weap-
ons for criminals in Mexico. The United States is 
the world’s largest exporter of small caliber ammu-
nition and military small arms and light weapons. 
It is also the world’s largest importer of small caliber 
ammunition, sporting shotguns, and pistols and 
revolvers.13 As noted above, it has the most heavily 
armed civilian population in the world, with about 
one quarter of all adults having at least one firearm. 
The gun trade in the United States is subject to 
competitive pressures, so weapons are also inexpen-
sive in comparison to countries where firearms sales 
are highly regulated, like Mexico.
Firearms are relatively easily acquired in the United 
States. Firearms ownership is restricted for those 
convicted of serious crimes, but every other adult 
American has the right to own as many firearms as 
desired. Although the operation of licensed gun 
shops is regulated by the national government, fire-
arms can also be legally acquired from private indi-
viduals at gun shows. For these sales, no background 
check is conducted and the sale is not recorded or 
registered. In contrast, there are no retail gun shops 
in Mexico. The military has the monopoly on legal 
sales and private handgun ownership is restricted to 
the lower caliber weapons (.38 or below).
For obvious reasons, criminals in the United States 
avoid using weapons registered in their names. 
Research among convicts in the United States shows 
that some purchased their weapon directly from a 
licensed dealer, but most acquired it through social 
networks or from criminal sources.15 There is a large 
market in stolen firearms in the US: the FBI received 
an average of over 274,000 reports of stolen fire-
arms per year between 1985 and 1994, most of 
which were handguns.16
Although US criminals may favour stolen firearms, 
those involved in trafficking US firearms interna-
tionally seem to prefer to purchase from licit sources, 
perhaps because ownership tracing is less of a con-
cern. Large numbers of weapons can be safely and 
predictably acquired this way. Federally licensed 
firearms dealers are required to report the sale of 
two or more handguns to the same individual in a 
five-day period, but the large number of retailers 
makes it possible to employ people to make a series 
of purchases from different establishments. In addi-
tion, an unlimited number of long guns, including 
semi-automatic assault weapons, can be purchased 
without a reporting requirement.
In 2000, the United States Department of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) conducted a study of 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía14
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federal gun trafficking investigations in the United 
States, and found that licensed dealers were involved 
in trafficking the largest share of the firearms inves-
tigated. Also common were “straw purchasers” – 
citizens with clean records sent to buy weapons for 
those who could not purchase them on their own 
behalf – and purchases made at gun shows. Research 
has repeatedly shown that a large number of the 
licensed weapons used in crime were purchased 
from a small number of distributors, suggesting that 
some retail owners may be complicit in straw pur-
chases. Theft was implicated in only 10% of the 
firearms investigated.18
As discussed below, it appears that the flow of fire-
arms from the United States to Mexico is largely 
conducted by straw purchasers, who pass the weap-
ons on to cross border smugglers.
How is the trafﬁcking conducted?
Subcomandante Marcos, the Zapatista spokesman, 
has said that the most common way of importing 
firearms for the rebel cause was through hormiga 
(ant) trafficking from the United States.19 This 
technique also appears to be popular with criminal 
traffickers.20 A large number of legal buyers pass on 
the weapons to a large number of cross border 
smugglers, who drive very small batches of weapons 
across the border concealed in private vehicles.
It appears that most of the weapons are acquired 
near the border. There are 6,700 gun dealers along 
the border with Mexico, accounting for 12% of the 
55,000 registered dealers in the United States.21 
Some 70% of the firearms seized in Mexico and 
traced to the United States between 2004 and 2008 
came from just three border states: Texas (39%), 
California (20%) and Arizona (10%).23
While thousands of illegal migrants make their way 
into the United States at unauthorized crossing 
points each year, it appears that most of the weap-
ons entering Mexico do so at the official points of 
entry. Most of the firearms recovered at the border 
have been seized in small amounts during inspec-
tions of private vehicles entering Mexico.24 Traffick-
ers move the weapons in consignments as small as 
two guns per car, since these shipments are less 
likely to attract attention if detected.25 About 88 
million passenger cars cross the border each year,26 
and most of those crossing the border do so every 
day, because many work on one side of the border 
and live on the other. A single smuggler following 
this ebb and flow can transport more than 500 
weapons per year in loads too small to be suspected 
as organized trafficking.
On entering Mexico, it seems that many of the 
weapons remain close to the border: Tamaulipas has 
been the source of some of the largest seizures of 
firearms and ammunition. The rest are trafficked by 
road to points further south along well established 
routes. According to one US government agency:
Once in Mexico, the firearms are generally depos-
ited in border towns or trafficked along major 
highways to their destinations. The transporter 
drops off the firearm or firearms at a set location for 
pick up and use by members of a drug cartel.27
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Who are the trafﬁckers?
There is some dispute concerning the extent to 
which the cartels coordinate the importation of 
firearms to Mexico. According to the United States 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms:
[Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)] oper-
ating in Mexico rely on firearms suppliers to 
enforce and maintain their illicit narcotics opera-
tions. Intelligence indicates these criminal organi-
zations have tasked their money laundering, 
distribution and transportation infrastructures 
reaching into the United States to acquire firearms 
and ammunition. These Mexican DTO infra-
structures have become the leading gun trafficking 
organizations operating in the southwest United 
States.28
But according to the Attorney General of Mexico:
At the present time, we have not detected in 
Mexico a criminal organization, domestic or for-
eign, dedicated to arms trafficking…Drug traf-
ficking organizations do not control firearm 
trafficking; their distribution networks contact 
people who buy weapons. These people are neces-
sarily linked to the organization, but they work 
semi-independently.29
Given the agreement that hormiga trafficking is 
the order of the day, it seems unlikely that the 
carteles orchestrate the purchasing and smuggling of 
weapons. Coordinating the actions of hundreds of 
buyers and smugglers would be a logistical night-
mare. On the other hand, if it were well-known in 
the border underworld that a firearm bought in the 
US could be sold for much more on the other side 
of the border, then a large number of players could 
be coordinated by nothing more than the invisible 
hand of the market.
A 2009 review of 21 cases of firearms trafficking 
from the United States to Mexico concluded, “The 
vast majority of the firearms listed in the court 
documents were acquired from Federal Firearms 
License holders, mainly through the use of straw 
buyers…”30 Straw buying is illegal in the United 
States, and it is greatly facilitated by willing blind-
ness on the part of complicit retailers. Research has 
repeatedly shown that a very small number of retail-
ers are responsible for a very large share of the trace-
able weapons that are used in crime. So the first 
element in the “organization” would be a well-
known network of licensed vendors who do not ask 
questions when clients buy from a shopping list. 
But even with a cooperative source, there is value in 
novelty when conducting straw purchases, espe-
cially if handguns are the target. So there is probably 
substantial turnover in the small army of people 
making straw purchases. The same pertains to the 
smugglers, moving arsenals across the border a gun 
or two at a time. It is likely these people play a role 
similar to drug mules. They are disposable tools, 
rather than decision makers, in the gun trade.
The consistent players in this market are indepen-
dent brokers, who communicate with the carteles, 
arrange financing, coordinate the lesser players and 
conduct the final sale. As in most industries, there 
are probably more and less successful brokers oper-
ating in parallel, coordinating both large and small 
operations, although the hormiga method likely 
constrains growth. This is undoubtedly organized 
crime, but organized crime of a type frustrating for 
law enforcement, since there are too many loosely 
connected players to make much headway through 
arrests and seizures.
In the end, the cross-border trade in arms is best 
seen as a market, rather than a single criminal enter-
prise or a series of enterprises. The barriers to entry 
in this market are low: any US citizen with a clean 
record can buy an unlimited number of firearms, 
and anyone with a car can drive them across the 
border. Brokers only need a connection to a single 
buyer in Mexico. If any element of this chain were 
to be removed, they are very easily replaced.
How big is the ﬂow?
There are two sources of data from which a firearms 
trafficking flow could be estimated: data on demand 
and data on seizures.
Starting with demand, there is a limit to the amount 
of new firearms the Mexican criminal market can 
absorb. As discussed in the opening section of this 
chapter, there is little need to import firearms into 
areas where substantial quantities of weapons already 
reside. According to expert estimates, despite having 
restrictive firearms ownership laws, Mexico has the 
seventh largest civilian firearms holdings in the 
world, some 15,500,000 firearms, about one third 
of which are registered.31 This suggests around 10 
million unregistered weapons, or enough to arm one 
in three of the adult males in the country. Mexico’s 
underworld appears to be well armed, and further 
import would be necessary only to replace lost or 
stolen firearms or to access specialty weapons.
The consensus among both US and Mexican 
authorities is that the primary client of the gun traf-
fickers are the major drug cartels. Calculating the 
number of cartel members should give a rough 
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understanding of the number of firearms needed to 
arm them. Depending on how they are counted, 
there are between four and ten large cartels, which 
periodically incorporate, fragment into, or eliminate 
smaller groups. The Mexican federal authorities use 
a simplified classification in which the cartels are 
reduced to four major groups: 
the Arellano Felix Organization  s 
(also known as the Tijuana Cartel)
the Paciﬁc Cartel (including the Beltran s 
Levya Organization, also known as the Sinaloa 
Federation)
the Gulf Cartel (including the Zetas and  s 
La Familia Michoacana)
the Carrillo Fuentes Organization  s 
(also known as the Juarez Cartel)
Between 1 December 2006 (when President Calde-
ron took office) and 15 February 2009, over 40,000 
members of these four organizations have been 
arrested. This represents just under 20,000 arrests 
per year. The number of drug trafficking arrests has 
doubled since 1993, and for the past two years has 
also been around 20,000 per annum. The question 
is: what share of total members do these arrests 
represent?
To understand the interdiction capacity of the Mex-
ican government, it is useful to look at the amount 
of drugs entering and exiting the country. Accord-
ing to United States estimates, in 2007 between 545 
and 707 tons of cocaine left South America for the 
US, of which 90% transited the Central America/
Mexico corridor.32 That same year, the Mexican 
government seized 48 tons of cocaine.33 This repre-
sents some 8-10% of the cocaine entering the coun-
try. If the share of cocaine seized corresponds to the 
share of cartel members arrested, then one in ten 
cartel members would be arrested each year. This 
suggests a total cartel membership of about 200,000 
members, larger than most estimates. To equip each 
with a firearm would require 200,000 weapons, or 
about 2% of the unregistered weapons in the coun-
try. This represents the minimum cartel demand for 
illicit weapons.
With regard to firearms seizures, there has been a 
dramatic increase in recent years. According to Mex-
ican federal law enforcement, between 1 December 
2006 and 1 April 2009, they seized 38,404 small 
CARTEL MEMBERS AND OTHERS  FIG. 126: 
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arms from organized crime groups. Of these, over 
half (21,308) were long arms, of which the “major-
ity” were assault rifles.34 These are weapons seized by 
federal law enforcement, which focuses on orga-
nized crime, particularly drug trafficking. Most of 
these weapons are therefore likely to have been 
seized from drug traffickers and cartel members. 
The Mexican government placed national seizure 
total during the Calderon administration at 78,961 
in March 2010, which would amount to about 
25,000 per year, of which about half were hand-
guns. Most of these weapons were seized in small 
quantities. By far the single largest seizure, made in 
November 2008 in Reynosa, was only 424 firearms, 
less than 1% of the national seizure total.
But not all of these weapons were imported from 
the United States. A frequently cited statistic is that 
90% of the firearms submitted by the Mexican 
government and successfully traced by US authori-
ties were found to have originated in the United 
States. But, as has been discussed extensively else-
where, this does not mean that 90% of the weapons 
in Mexico came from the United States. Since the 
US tracing process involves searching the federal 
firearms databases, which are largely comprised of 
sales records submitted by federally licensed fire-
arms dealers, it should be expected that almost all 
of the traceable weapons came from the United 
States. But two thirds of the weapons seized by the 
Mexican authorities were never submitted for trac-
ing. In 2008, 27,721 firearms were seized by the 
Mexican federal authorities, of which 7,200 were 
submitted to the ATF for tracing. Given that trac-
ing was selective, it is unlikely that many firearms 
would be submitted that were clearly not from the 
United States. As a result, the pool of firearms sub-
mitted for tracing cannot be said to be representa-
tive of the firearms seized or the firearms in 
circulation.
According to the ATF, about 75% of the weapons 
traced between financial years 2005 and 2007 were 
handguns, with only 25% being long guns, some of 
which could have been military weapons. In finan-
cial year 2008, however, about 25% of the weapons 
traced were semi-automatic variants of AK-47 and 
AR-15 rifles. As of 2008, the Mexican authorities 
had submitted 25 machine guns for tracing, of 
which six were traced back to US military sources.35 
The 7.62x39 mm ammunition used in the AK-47 
has been seized in large quantities in Matamoros on 
the US border. Tamaulipas leads Mexican states in 
ammunition seizures, including the single largest in 
the country’s history: nearly one million rounds 
seized in Reynosa in November 2008. Over half a 
million rounds were seized in Mexicali in January 
2009.
In addition to these US sources, there are a number 
of possible alternative sources for weapons, particu-
larly the military weapons that appear to be growing 
in popularity in the cartel wars. Some may have 
been diverted from the Mexican military, perhaps 
alongside the sort of desertion of troops to the carte-
les that gave birth to the Zetas. In fact 1.74% of the 
weapons (403 firearms) submitted to the ATF 
turned out to be Mexican military arms. 
There is also growing evidence of importation of 
military arms, including grenades, from the consid-
erable stocks left over from the civil wars in Guate-
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mala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, or from corrupt 
elements in the military of these countries. During 
the Calderon administration, the government has 
seized nearly 1,500 firearms, some 850 grenades, 
and over 140,000 rounds of ammunition in Chia-
pas, on the border with Guatemala. Military weap-
ons could be trafficked along with cocaine all the 
way from Colombia or the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, or even alongside ephedrine from 
China.36 If half the long arms were from countries 
other than the United States, at most 75% of the 
seizures made in Mexico were of US origin, or 
about 21,000 arms in 2008. 
The seizures include not only weapons imported in 
2008, but rather are drawn from the pool of all 
weapons available to organized criminals in the 
country. If a similar interdiction rate is taken for 
guns as for drugs and cartel members (10%), then 
there would be about 210,000 US weapons held in 
stock by the cartels. Since this is adequate to meet 
basic demand, and firearms have been trafficked 
into the country for many years, it is likely that the 
current flow is simply to compensate for attrition. 
The various US agencies involved in border control 
also seized about 10,000 arms in 2008, so it appears 
that about 30,000 arms are purchased in the United 
States, of which some 20,000 make it to Mexico to 
be sold. This would represent just under five fire-
arms from each of the licensed dealers operating 
along the border, although in reality the sales are 
much more likely to be concentrated in a few com-
plicit dealerships. At a liberal price of US$1,000 per 
weapon, this would represent a flow worth US$20 
million per year, or about 10% of the global esti-
mate for the value of the illicit firearms market.
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What is the nature of this market?
The dissolution of the former Soviet Union left 
many of the new countries with an unwanted 
legacy: large stockpiles of aging, but still functional, 
arms and ammunition. Safely destroying these sur-
pluses remains a mammoth and costly task, and in 
the disorderly years of early independence, many of 
these weapons found their ways into the wrong 
hands.37 At the same time, Africa was experiencing 
a particularly bloody decade, and surplus arms 
added fuel to the fire.
Many cases of trafficking or questionable transfers 
have been linked to the region. In addition to the 
legacy arsenals of the former Soviet Union, Eastern 
Europe also saw an influx of weapons during the 
Yugoslav Wars (1991-1995), and an estimated 8 
million small arms remain in the former Yugoslav 
countries. While many of these weapons might be 
considered out-of-date, they may still be sold to 
combatants in civil wars in developing countries, 
and so are vulnerable to trafficking. 
Ukraine is a case in point, a country burdened with 
weapons stocks far in excess of what the local mili-
tary can possibly use. A large share of the Soviet 
small arms arsenal was placed in Ukraine, the west-
ward frontier of the Union. After dissolution, 
Ukraine essentially inherited 30% of the Soviet 
military-industrial complex. This consisted of 1,810 
enterprises with a combined work force of 2.7 mil-
lion people, including research specialists.38 The 
country currently holds an estimated 7 million 
small arms, as well as larger weapons systems; in 
absolute terms, the third largest stockpile in the 
world, after China and the Russian Federation.39 
Despite Ukrainian and international efforts to 
reduce these stocks, the ageing firearms pose a risk 
because these stocks have proven vulnerable to 
weapons trafficking in the past. Since the early 
1990s, there have been numerous reports of 
attempted or completed transfers to states subject to 
sanctions or involved in regional conflicts, particu-
larly in Africa. These reported transfers were illicit, 
destabilizing, or subject to a high risk of diversion. 
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In addition, individuals and companies of Ukrai-
nian origin have been involved in illicit trafficking 
or destabilizing transfers from Ukraine and other 
states, although much of this activity has occurred 
outside the territorial control of Ukraine.40 Similar 
issues are found in a number of Eastern European 
countries.
Thankfully, both transnational and domestic wars 
and conflicts have declined since the early 1990s. 
Many of the current conflicts are longstanding, 
reducing the demand for trafficked weapons.41 But 
as noted above, there have been few innovations in 
firearms design in recent years, so weapons from the 
Cold War retain their attraction, particularly in 
developing countries. Eastern Europe therefore 
remains vulnerable to trafficking.
Due to weaknesses in the international system, this 
trafficking can occur despite the best efforts of the 
source countries to prevent it. Returning to the 
Ukrainian example, the Government has taken 
measures to address the flow of guns to embargoed 
areas, yet it appears to continue. There is evidence 
that weapons originally sourced in Ukraine have 
recently been transferred to the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo42 and South Sudan.43 In addition, 
foreign arms traffickers who have been identified as 
international arms traffickers by the United States 
Government and others have continued to access 
surplus Ukrainian small arms at least as recently as 
2008.44
Further, exports have occurred to countries which, 
while not embargoed, may have been diverted to 
embargoed parties. The countries supplying the 
arms cannot entirely prevent this from happening, 
but by exercising caution in questionable cases, they 
can possibly avoid fuelling violence. For example, 
between 2004 and 2008, Ukraine was apparently 
the most significant source of arms for Chad, a 
country where it appears that weapons are being 
diverted to fuel the conflict in Darfur.45 Equatorial 
Guinea is another such country where weapons 
transfers have recently been detected.46 Another 
example is the 2008 MV Faina affair (see Box), 
which saw shipping of AK-type weapons from 
Ukraine to Kenya, despite the fact that the Kenyan 
forces use the NATO-standard ammunition. The 
tanks that accompanied this shipment were later 
found to have been trafficked to South Sudan.47 
Similarly, in 2009, the United Kingdom began an 
investigation into companies registered in the UK 
that were sourcing arms from Ukraine for states in 
Africa in violation of British controls.48 Similar 
cases can be found for other Eastern European 
countries.
How is the trafﬁcking conducted?
To arm a revolution or embargoed military, a large 
number of military weapons is required. These 
weapons are either produced by tightly regulated 
companies or drawn from stocks controlled by a 
national military. In either case, it is generally dif-
ficult to steal and clandestinely traffic sufficient 
quantities to make the venture worthwhile. As a 
result, most military arms “trafficking” takes place 
under a veneer of legality. 
Like other commodities where the legality of a ship-
ment is entirely dependent on paperwork, most 
large-scale arms trafficking hinges on corruption. 
Leonid Minin and Dmitri Streshinsky
Although his case is dated, Leonid Minin still provides an instructive example of the way ﬁrearms and other weapons 
are traﬃcked. Dmitri Streshinsky is less notorious, but his activities follow a similar pattern.
In 1999, Minin shipped 68 tons of small arms to Burkina Faso, ultimately bound for Liberia, at that time under 
embargo. The Ukrainian government issued an export licence based on an end user certiﬁcate allegedly issued by the 
Burkina Faso authorities. According to the contract, the Burkina Faso Ministry of Defence had authorized an oﬀshore, 
Gibraltar-based company called “Chartered Engineering and Technical Services” to act as intermediaries. Upon delivery 
in Burkina Faso, the arms were shipped onwards in a BAC-111 aircraft with an operating certiﬁcate from the Cayman 
Islands. The company that owned the aircraft, LIMAD, was registered in Monaco and belonged to Minin. Minin was 
also involved in the Liberian timber trade.49
In 2000, Minin coordinated a similar delivery of 113 tons of small arms to West Africa from Ukraine, including 10,000 
AK-47-type assault riﬂes. He chartered a company owned by an associate, Aviatrend, to transport small arms to Côte 
d’Ivoire, also under embargo at that time. He was arrested later that year in Italy for possession of cocaine.50
Streshinsky also set up an oﬀshore company, Global Technologies Limited, registered in Panama but with an oﬃce in 
Kyiv. He acquired weapons from Progress, a subsidiary of Ukraine’s state-owned arms export company Ukrspetseksport, 
using end user certiﬁcates from Morocco and Egypt. Despite warnings from the Ukrainian state security service (SBU), 
both export licenses were granted. The weapons were promptly shipped to Croatia, then (1992) under international 
embargo. The second shipment was intercepted by the Italian navy due to a tip-oﬀ from the SBU, and included some 
30,000 AK-47s. The subsequent arrests included a number of Streshinsky’s associates who were managing bank ac-
counts located oﬀshore on the UK Channel Island territory of Jersey. 
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The MV Faina case
One recent case of arms traﬃcking would never have been detected 
if the vessel had not been hijacked en route. The MV Faina was a 
cargo ship ﬂying a Belizean ﬂag of convenience, owned by a Panama-
based company, managed by a Ukrainian ﬁrm and crewed mostly 
by Ukrainians. It was hijacked by Somali pirates in September 2008 
and its crew was held hostage until February 2009, when a ransom of 
US$3.2 million was allegedly paid. The vessel was carrying approxi-
mately US$33 million worth of grenade launchers, small arms am-
munition and 33 battle tanks, allegedly bound for Kenya. Paperwork 
subsequently emerged indicating that the true destination was South 
Sudan. Two European transportation agents involved in the transfer 
have also conﬁrmed that they were aware of the ﬁnal destination.51
The T72 tanks, the largest and most easily identiﬁable element of 
the shipment, were repeatedly sighted by observers on their way to 
Sudan52 and Small Arms Survey reports that the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Army has since conﬁrmed the transfer.53 The shipment 
captured was apparently the third in a series declared by Ukraine in 
its annual arms export report as licensed for export to Kenya. At least 
three contracts were signed with Ukrainian state-owned arms exporter 
Ukrinmash. These contracts included 40,000 AKM assault riﬂes, am-
munition, and many heavier weapons, including the tanks.54 The two 
other vessels involved in the three shipments were the Radomyshl and 
the Beluga Endurance, both of which sailed in late 2007. The Beluga 
Endurance sails under the Antigua and Barbuda ﬂag of convenience 
and was chartered for the shipment by an oﬀ-shore company based 
on the Isle of Man. The Radomyshl sails under a Ukrainian ﬂag and 
was chartered by a UK shell company comprised of two British Virgin 
Island companies.
The primary mechanism of international arms con-
trol is the “end user certificate” – a document that 
verifies that the end user of the weaponry sold is a 
legitimate buyer and not an embargoed state or 
rebel group. But much of the diversion of arms 
occurs after the delivery to the nominal end users, a 
practice known as “Post Delivery Onward Diver-
sion” (PDOD). In these cases, corrupt elements 
within the named destination state are complicit. If 
all the paperwork is in place, there may be no legal 
reason for the vending state to refuse the request for 
export. 
Another method is Point of Departure Diversion 
(PDD), where unauthorized or fake end user cer-
tificates provide arms traffickers with the documen-
tation necessary to obtain arms export licenses. 
Rather than being delivered to the specified destina-
tion, the weapons are directly diverted to an embar-
goed state or group. This technique only works 
when the exporting state is negligent in verifying 
that the country named in the end user certificate 
has actually requested the arms. Corruption in the 
exporting country is implicit.
Both forms of trafficking have been seen in firearms 
exports from Eastern Europe. PDD is controllable 
if the official request for export is verified. Even in 
cases where the request is documented as genuine, 
there may be other reasons to deny permission. The 
requesting state may be known to favour one party 
or another in the conflict, or it may be known to 
suffer from high-level corruption. The traffickers 
involved may be known to be shady, and there may 
be obvious signs that the transaction is something 
other than what it purports to be. As with arms 
trafficking anywhere in the world, these cases often 
involve the use of offshore holding companies to 
transfer and receive the money, as well as vessels 
flying flags of convenience. Although perhaps two 
thirds of maritime vessels are registered in low-vigi-
lance countries, the same is not true for aircraft, so 
the use of these planes should raise suspicion. Any 
of these considerations can provide a basis for deny-
ing the export request.
Since the shipments are ostensibly legal, the full 
range of mainstream mechanisms for shipping legit-
imate goods is available. By land, sea or air, the port 
of departure and routing is entirely dependent on 
the location of the buyer and ordinary commercial 
concerns. Air transport is particularly favoured, 
using craft owned by the trafficker or his associates, 
as arms traffickers prefer to control all aspects of the 
transaction from procurement to delivery.
Who are the trafﬁckers?
Because large-scale arms trafficking is dependent on 
corruption, most transactions involve a combina-
tion of officials and international arms traffickers. 
These traffickers sell their connections, their access 
to fraudulent paperwork and their transportation 
services to both insurgent groups and embargoed 
states. The traffickers and their support organiza-
tions can clearly be described as transnational orga-
nized crime groups, and may be involved in other 
forms of shady commerce, particularly involving 
natural resource extraction and money-laundering.
The traffickers themselves are a diverse group, with 
some originating in countries with large arms sur-
pluses, some in regions with stability problems, and 
some from the wealthier nations. Most are multilin-
gual and hold a number of passports. They operate 
chains of shell companies and often own small fleets 
of surplus planes and other vehicles (in particular, 
the Antonov and Ilyushin cargo aircraft that were 
sold off after the dissolution of the Soviet Union). 
Because warring parties may lack an international 
currency, traffickers may take payment in the form 
of natural resource concessions, making money on 
both the sale of the arms and the sale of exported 
commodities. As a result, they may have a back-
ground in dealing in natural resources.
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How big is the ﬂow?
As stressed above, arms trafficking to political com-
batants is episodic, and so it is difficult to speak of 
a consistent flow. During a crisis, demand may be 
high, only to subside as peace is restored. It is neces-
sary to look at concrete figures for recent years and 
discuss volumes and values on that basis.
Since almost all of the weapons diverted to embar-
goed parties go through the formal export proce-
dure, these exports are reported. For example, since 
2004, the Ukrainian Government has published an 
annual report on its arms sales, which is more com-
prehensive than those provided by most other 
major arms exporters. In 2004, the Ukrainian 
Defence Ministry reported that their arms export 
control authorities received between 5,000 and 
8,000 export applications every year from Ukrai-
nian arms manufacturers and stockpile vendors 
alone. Of these, only 2,500-3,000 are subsequently 
assessed as requiring an export licence. In 2003, 
some 2 or 3% were rejected because they involved 
countries subject to international sanctions.55 In 
other words, at that time, between 55 and 90 export 
license applications were made on behalf of sanc-
tioned clients every year, highlighting the ongoing 
attraction of these arms to embargoed parties.
At the end of 2005, the head of the Ukrainian par-
liamentary commission investigating cases of illegal 
arms and munitions sales declared that between 
1992 and 1997, approximately US$32 billion 
worth of military equipment and munitions was 
stolen and illegally sold abroad. According to the 
commission, the main reason for such uncontrolled 
criminal activity was the “absence at the time of 
relevant export control legislation regulating arms 
transfers.” Illegal arms sales peaked in 1996, when 
114 companies were engaging in weapons transfers, 
but only 20% of the transactions were carried out 
by entities officially authorized by the Ukrainian 
government.56
Much progress has been made since that time, but 
shipments like the MV Faina show that large-scale 
exports may continue to wind up in the hands of 
combatants. The contracts detail shipments to 
Kenya in 2007/2008 totaling 40,000 AKM assault 
rifles, hand-held RPG-7Vs, 14.5 mm and 23 mm 
anti-aircraft weapons. In addition to these lighter 
arms, the contracts covered 100 T-72 main battle 
tanks, BM-21 “Grad” 122 mm multiple-launch 
rocket systems, as well as trucks, spare parts and 
large quantities of ammunition.57 The value of this 
single deal has been estimated at more than US$2.5 
billion, but most of this value derives from the 
tanks and other heavy arms. The assault rifles alone 
were worth at most US$40 million at destination.
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IMPLICATIONS  
FOR RESPONSE
It is clear in both examples that the large numbers 
of weapons available renders both the United States 
and Eastern Europe vulnerable to trafficking. It fol-
lows that reducing this availability would under-
mine organized criminal activity. In both instances, 
there are controls in place to prevent the misappro-
priation of weapons, but there are clearly problems 
with the implementation of these controls. Traffick-
ers have found ways of skirting the regulations and 
moving guns across borders without drawing exces-
sive attention from the authorities.
With regard to the trafficking of handguns and 
other weapons used by criminals, tighter domestic 
regulation may be appropriate. Firearms suppliers 
clustered around border areas should expect more 
than the usual amount of scrutiny, for example. 
Firearms trade associations should establish and 
enforce good practice guidelines. Those who gain a 
competitive advantage by looking the other way 
should be expelled and identified to the authorities. 
All sales should be registered and national records 
kept of these transactions, including the identity of 
the purchaser. Those buying firearms should be 
compelled to identify the beneficial owner, limita-
tions should be placed on immediate re-sale, and 
those who make false claims should face prosecu-
tion. Large purchases by individuals of any type of 
firearm should be flagged and investigated. All this 
is simply good accounting in a field where com-
mercial gains can have devastating social conse-
quences.
With regard to the trafficking of military weapons, 
the international system itself could be improved. 
At present, embargoed parties can still access weap-
ons, even when all involved comply with the letter 
of the law. Since securing an embargo is a difficult 
and time-consuming process, a less formal system 
of information-sharing and good practice between 
the countries that supply arms could be beneficial. 
As these countries may be competing for business in 
other respects, an international body could act as a 
mediator in this exchange.
No matter how sound the regulatory system is, cor-
ruption can be its undoing. In both of the flows 
discussed above, corruption is implicated: in the 
US, on the part of the Federal Firearms License 
holders, and in Eastern Europe, among some of 
those charged with authorizing weapons shipments. 
More effective measures taken to address corrup-
tion, including the use of sting operations, could 
dampen the flow of guns. 
Mexico already has many weapons, and the cartels 
could import them from a number of other sources 
even if the US supply were completely cut off. But 
even though US gun stores cannot be said to be the 
cause of the cartel violence, the problem remains: 
an under-regulated supply of guns is allowing crim-
inals to arm themselves, and criminals are making 
money by trafficking these weapons internationally. 
By further investigating the ways traffickers are 
beating the system, the system can be strengthened 
to stop this abuse.
The countries of the former Soviet Union did not 
ask for the burden of these weapons, and cleaning 
them up is an international responsibility. Rebel 
groups have made a kind of an icon out of the 
Kalashnikov, but the legitimate demand for Soviet-
era weapons is limited. Decommissioning the stock-
piles is a politically sensitive task, and progress to 
date has been slow, but the excellent work done on 
nuclear armaments illustrates the potential for fur-
ther progress on small arms. Though expensive, the 
costs of destroying these firearms pales next to the 
damage they could inflict in the wrong hands.
ENVIRONMENTAL
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ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCES
The topics discussed in this chapter lie at the inter-
section of two central areas of transnational organ-
ized crime: the theft and smuggling of a country’s 
natural resource assets, and environmental crime.
The trafficking of environmental resources is a key 
challenge for some developing countries. Many 
emerging economies are based on exporting raw 
materials, but under-resourced governments may 
lack the capacity to regulate the exploitation of 
these assets. Rather than promoting economic 
progress, poorly managed natural wealth can 
become a cause of bad governance, corruption or 
even violent conflict. The best documented instances 
involve mineral resources, such as oil, diamonds, 
gold or other valuable metals and ores. But biologic 
resources are also vulnerable, and their misappro-
priation and trafficking is an important form of 
transnational organized crime.
There are many forms of transnational organized 
environmental crime, and as global regulations 
grow, new forms will emerge. Classically, there are 
two major subheadings under which these offences 
fall. One is crime related to pollution, in particular 
hazardous waste dumping and the trade in ozone-
depleting substances (such as chlorofluorocarbons 
- CFCs).1 The second is crimes related to illicit 
harvesting of natural resources, in particular threat-
ened animal species, timber and fish. 
For reasons described below, this chapter deals with 
two important instances of environmental resource 
theft and trafficking: the trafficking of endangered 
species from Africa and South-East Asia to Asia as a 
whole, and the trafficking of timber from South-
East Asia to Europe and Asia.
Africa’s wildlife population, including many large 
mammal species, is part of what makes the conti-
nent unique. It is the basis for a tourist trade that 
comprises a key part of many national economies. 
But widespread poverty and conflict have left this 
population exposed to poaching, and exotic animal 
products command high prices due to strong global 
demand, especially from Asia. This chapter looks 
particularly at the markets for two of the best docu-
mented commodities: elephant ivory and rhinoc-
eros horn.
The poaching of large mammals in Africa receives 
considerable attention, but species in Asia are also 
under threat. There are only an estimated 3,200 
tigers remaining in the wild, and the skin and bones 
command high prices. While high value large mam-
mals garner much sympathy, many other wild spe-
cies are harvested in South-East Asia for traditional 
medicine, food and decor products, as well as being 
captured for the pet trade. In terms of volume and 
market value, this trade dwarfs that of the larger 
species, and much less is known about its long-term 
sustainability.
South-East Asia is also home to some of the world’s 
few remaining old-growth forests, containing many 
unique tree species, and the problem of timber traf-
ficking is particularly acute. In order to protect 
these resources, national bodies have attempted to 
regulate the timber trade, but it is still possible to 
make money by skirting these controls, and illicit 
harvesting remains at unacceptably high levels. 
Demand for these hardwoods is broad, and con-
sumers around the world may be unwittingly con-
tributing to irreversible environmental damage. By 
concealing the nature and origin of this wood, 
organized crime makes this tragedy possible.
These issues are inherently international, because all 
countries share a global ecosystem. The release of 
CFCs anywhere in the world affects the common 
ozone layer. Toxic waste dumping at sea damages a 
common and essential global resource. Elimination 
of plant and animal species irrevocably destroys part 
of our joint environmental heritage. Further, many 
of the consumer markets for these forms of contra-
band are situated in another part of the world than 
the supply. Trans-shipment often involves third 
countries, and thus the problem is beyond the scope 
of any national power to address.
Coming to grips with this global responsibility 
requires international action. Many international 
conservation agreements have been signed, among 
the most influential of which is the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (known as CITES), adopted in 
1973 at a meeting of members of the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Around 
175 countries have adopted CITES, although the 
extent of compliance varies. Under the Convention, 
states that do not take measures to protect endan-
gered species are subject to escalating international 
pressure, which can ultimately result in trade sanc-
tions. 
No matter how dedicated to environmental regula-
tion, however, many countries struggle to protect 
their natural resources. Criminals make money cir-
cumventing these controls, subverting attempts to 
distinguish licit and illicit trade in natural resource 
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products. In addition to an inherent tension between 
development and environmental protection, some 
countries lack the capacity to police vast tracts of 
wilderness. Poverty and instability mean that offi-
cials may be easier to corrupt. Borders, especially 
wild borders, may have very few controls. Rural 
populations may have few sustenance alternatives to 
what they can harvest from their natural environ-
ment. Most importantly, corruption can undermine 
even the best designed regulatory system.
For these reasons, it is essential that the interna-
tional community think creatively about ways of 
preventing the global looting of natural resources. 
Since many of these products are licitly traded and 
openly consumed, increased scrutiny of these open 
markets would be beneficial. In addition to tracking 
licit exchange, a global seizures database would 
greatly assist in understanding trends and develop-
ments. Cooperative action is key because local 
weaknesses in enforcing environmental controls can 
have global consequences. 
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What is the nature of this market?
Between them, sub-Saharan Africa and South-East 
Asia are home to a large share of the world’s endan-
gered large mammal species. Both regions face seri-
ous challenges to environmental protection, 
including a lack of effectively managed resources for 
law enforcement, few alternative livelihoods for 
rural people, long hunting traditions, periodic 
insurgencies and conflicts, weak border enforce-
ment, and some enforcement officials who may find 
the economic potential of this market more attrac-
tive than their salary. These problems are not unique 
to these regions, but, unfortunately, the wildlife 
species are.
Destinations for products sourced from endangered 
species are broad, but, for a number of reasons, are 
especially concentrated in East Asia. Demand in 
Asia for Asian species is rooted in tradition, and 
Africa hosts species of many of these same animals, 
such as rhinoceros and elephant. Some feature in 
local cuisine, some are valued in traditional medi-
cine, while others are prized for their decorative 
value and are regarded as status symbols. As habitats 
shrink and human populations grow, the demands 
placed on these resources multiply. As species 
become more scarce, some of their parts are worth 
more than their weight in gold. Despite the efforts 
of many dedicated rangers, in some areas these pre-
cious commodities are essentially free for the 
taking.
Enforcement efforts are hampered by the parallel 
licit trade in wild animals. Hunting for “bush meat”, 
as well as for trophies and commercial gain, is legal 
and common in many countries. Wildlife markets 
are found throughout Asia, and wild species are 
available in many specialty restaurants. Few openly 
sell endangered species, but these may often be 
acquired in backroom transactions; those with the 
networks to source legally culled wildlife can also 
access banned products. Many endangered species 
closely resemble more common ones, and it may 
take an expert to distinguish between them, espe-
cially when they have been butchered or proc-
essed.
Attempts have been made to “farm” some wild spe-
cies in order to meet demand, but this does not 
necessarily reduce demand for wild animals. In fact, 
the legal availability of these products may increase 
demand beyond what the licit market can supply. 
Farms are necessarily required to maintain certain 
standards, and these restrictions limit the number 
of producers and increase costs. If demand outstrips 
supply, even licit producers may feel compelled to 
buy poached animals to remain competitive. In this 
way, “laundered” animals can enter the market 
though the licit trade.
How is the trafﬁcking conducted?
The first step in the trafficking chain is poaching. 
Well-organized groups have been documented, and 
it is clear that some have turned environmental 
exploitation into a business. Not all players in the 
market are full-time professionals, however, and 
some of those sourcing wildlife products may be 
informal participants. Hunting remains a form of 
livelihood for communities in both Africa and Asia.2 
Even if cashing in meant a long trek to a regional 
selling point, such a kill would represent one of the 
few opportunities for income in families otherwise 
focused on subsistence. Poachers may also approach 
local hunters with an offer to buy the wildlife prod-
ucts desired.
The concentration of endangered species in game 
parks may make the professional poacher’s job 
easier. If they are able to corrupt game wardens, 
they can secure access to a steady stream of well-
tracked and healthy animals. Every year, the national 
parks of Africa and Asia report thousands of cases of 
poaching. It is unclear how many of these cases 
involve the collaboration of rangers.
Once poached, the animal may be butchered for 
particular parts, or the whole carcass transported for 
further processing. Other species are captured and 
trafficked alive, to be used as pets, food, or medi-
cine, though many die on the journey. Transporta-
tion, as described below, varies depending on the 
source and destination. As described below, the traf-
fickers may be a completely different group of 
people than the poachers, acting as brokers with 
contacts in both source and destination countries.
From Africa to Asia
Every state in Africa with a wildlife population is 
affected by poaching, but some much more so than 
others.3 Governance seems to be an especially 
important factor in determining whether or not 
heavy poaching occurs.4 It appears that Central 
Africa is the main source of elephant ivory and 
Southern Africa the main source of rhino horn. 
Once the desired parts are removed, they may be 
transported and processed further in Africa before 
being shipped abroad. A number of African coun-
tries have been identified as carving sites for ele-
phant ivory, for example. Some products are also 
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moved north to the Middle East. While Yemen is a 
key destination for rhino horn, it is unclear how 
much of this flow is consumed locally and how 
much is for onward shipment to Asia.
Small players may be important in sourcing ivory 
and rhino horn in some areas, but they also play a 
role in trafficking it internationally. Africa serves as 
a retail centre for animal parts, with individual 
buyers from Asia transporting small items home in 
their luggage. In November 2008, INTERPOL 
coordinated “Operation Baba”, which targeted 
ivory markets in five African countries involving 50 
markets: Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Kenya, 
Uganda and Zambia. In November 2009, INTER-
POL coordinated “Operation Costa” targeting ivory 
markets in six East African countries – Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and the United 
Republic of Tanzania. In Ethiopia, in particular, 
large volumes of ivory items obviously destined for 
the Far East were recovered (chopsticks, cigarette 
holders and signature seals). What share of these 
items are bought for personal use and what share 
resold for profit in Asia remains unclear. A similar 
situation has been observed in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, where ivory is sold to Asian 
buyers. Asian buyers have also been found purchas-
ing ivory on ships in the harbour of Douala, Cam-
eroon.5
There are also documented cases of African vendors 
making larger-scale sales. In 2002, a sophisticated 
operation was found selling large amounts of ivory 
to Asian buyers from Malawi (see Box). Recently, a 
collective of Tanzanian businessmen were charged 
with smuggling 11 tons of ivory to the Philippines 
and Viet Nam between October 2008 and March 
2009. The accused are representatives of domestic 
transportation companies, and their relationship 
with the poachers is not yet clear.6
From Africa, the contraband takes a number of 
routes to Asia. Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam 
increased in prominence as transit countries for 
elephant ivory in 2009.7 For rhino horn, China, 
Viet Nam and Thailand have been identified as 
both transit and consumer areas,8 along with Singa-
pore, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia 
(excluding Sarawak), Brunei Darussalam and 
Macao, China.9 
Endangered species parts are often concealed in 
legitimate cargo, taking advantage of the growing 
trade between Africa and Asia. Ivory has been seized 
hidden in shipments of plastic waste, dried fish, 
stone statues, precious stones and timber. Many of 
the largest shipments detected have been hidden in 
containerized cargo, often originating in the United 
Republic of Tanzania, but air cargo has also been 
used. In July 2009, Kenyan authorities seized 300 
kg of ivory packed into coffins on a flight that 
originated in Mozambique. Both tusks and black 
rhinoceros horn were seized, and the flight was 
destined for the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
via Thailand.10
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Source: IUCN SSC African Rhino Specialist Group 2008, “Diceros bicornis”. In: IUCN 2009. IUCN Red List of 
Threatened Species, (Version 2009.2 and IUCN, African Elephant Status Report 2007, page 24.
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Case study – Singapore 2002
Ivory poached in Zambia and Mozambique was smuggled to Malawi 
by road. Malawi does not ban the domestic trade in ivory, leaving 
it vulnerable to exploitation by traﬃckers. In Malawi, some of the 
ivory was processed in a factory and stored in warehouses for buyers. 
The factory’s records indicated buyers with contact details in Singa-
pore, Japan and Hong Kong, China. Investigations revealed a complex 
network of shell companies and pseudonyms used in procuring the 
ivory. 
The case came to the attention of the authorities when more than 6 
tons of ivory was discovered in Singapore, concealed in a shipment 
that had been declared as stone sculptures. The haul was equivalent 
to perhaps 300 elephants, and DNA testing later revealed that much 
of the ivory originated from Zambian savannah elephants.11 Further 
investigations revealed that the networks in Zambia and Malawi had 
been in operation since 1994, having made at least 19 suspected ivory 
shipments: 15 destined for Singapore and four for China. Given, how-
ever, that some of the tusks seized in Singapore were marked with the 
name of a Japanese port, and that ivory hankos (Japanese signature 
seals) were also seized, investigators concluded that the ﬁnal destina-
tion of the contraband was Japan. The criminal network responsible 
was said to have the capability ‘to receive and launder tens of thou-
sands of hankos into existing legal markets’ and to date no signiﬁcant 
members of the network have been prosecuted.12
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In Asia
Asia serves as source, transit, and/or destination for 
a large share of the endangered animals poached in 
the world. Some products are sourced and con-
sumed in the same country, but, for economic rea-
sons, most are trafficked transnationally. Myanmar, 
which still contains extensive forested areas, is the 
main source country, but the Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic and Cambodia are also affected. 
Myanmar is also the primary country used to smug-
gle South-East Asian wildlife into China, the single 
largest consumer, while wildlife from Cambodia 
and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic are prin-
cipally smuggled into Viet Nam, another major 
destination market. Thailand serves as a transit 
country and a retail centre for buyers throughout 
the region. Japan and the Republic of Korea are also 
destination markets for certain products.
The variety of wildlife products used in Asia is 
extensive, and include many species that have not 
been designated as endangered or threatened. Local 
wildlife markets feature snakes, spiders, turtles, 
scorpions, squirrels and birds, and some offer 
endangered species products as well. In addition to 
high profile commodities like ivory, rhino horn and 
tiger skin, less well-known animals such as the pan-
golin (see Box) and the slow loris may be sold. 
Many are transported alive to destination markets, 
but when trafficked, many die in transit. 
A key source of demand is the catering industry. 
The China Wildlife Conservation Association 
(CWCA) conducted an opinion poll in 16 Chinese 
cities18 in 2007 on the consumption of wild animals 
as food. According to the survey, 88 wild animals 
were identified as species which might be consumed 
as food. This was 26 more than indicated in a com-
parable poll in 1999. The number of grocery stores 
and supermarkets selling wild animals and products 
also increased by 22.8% during this period. A recent 
survey of 969 people in six Chinese cities19 found 
that 44% of respondents claimed to have con-
sumed wildlife in the past year, mostly as food. 
People with higher incomes and education levels 
were significantly more likely to consume wildlife 
as food, and 20% of respondents were open to 
eating protected animals, such as pangolin.20
Cross-border wilderness areas are clearly a point of 
vulnerability for transnational trafficking, since they 
can be used to move illicitly harvested animals into 
the jurisdiction of least resistance. As with other 
commodities, trans-border ethnic groups can also 
be a factor. A key facilitator of wildlife trafficking in 
South-East Asia seems to be conflict and insur-
gency. 
The frontier town of Mong La in Myanmar, situ-
ated along the Chinese border, is a case in point. 
Mong La is located in a “Special Region”, a rebel 
area where the Myanmar Government has come to 
terms with the rebels: in return for ending hostili-
ties, the insurgent army has been essentially granted 
control over local affairs. In the case of Mong La, 
Pangolin
Pangolin (also known as the scaly anteater) are nocturnal mammals inhabiting areas 
of Asia and Africa. The distinctive keratin scales of the pangolin have historically been 
used to make clothing and are used in traditional Asian medicine. One environmental 
group has argued that the “greatest threat to the conservation of pangolins is illegal 
hunting for trade, largely to supply demand in China for meat and scales used for 
tonics and traditional medicines,” although pangolins are also utilized in “other East 
Asian pharmacopoeia.”13 
Asian pangolins are currently listed on CITES Appendix II (vulnerable species) with 
an annotation for zero trade. They are receiving ever more attention, partly due to a 
growing number of seizures within Indonesia, Malaysia, Viet Nam, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Thailand, the Philippines and China. It is not uncommon for 
traﬃckers to use one consignment for the transportation of a variety of species, in-
cluding pangolin. For example, pangolins have been seized with bear paws in China in 
2008 and 2009, and in Taiwan, Province of China in 2005, pangolin derivatives were 
seized with ivory and tiger bones. 
The pangolin in Asia is threatened by habitat loss in addition to the illegal trade, and 
its relatively slow reproduction rate impedes short-term population recovery.14 Trad-
ers in Asia have reported pangolins as increasingly scarce.15 There are several species 
of pangolins in Africa, where they are subject to the pressures of poaching for bush 
meat.16 There is some evidence of African pangolins being seized in Asia,17 and it is 
possible that if Asian populations continue to be decimated, African pangolins will 
become increasingly targeted. 
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this opened up a lucrative vice market with China. 
Following a pattern seen around the world, the 
presence of an unregulated mini-state next to a 
large, highly-regulated consumer creates tremen-
dous opportunities for shady entrepreneurs. Gam-
bling, prostitution and the wildlife trade were 
among the biggest industries when the Chinese 
Government cracked down on this cross-border 
tourism in 2005. But while no longer so visible, the 
vice trade continues alongside the sale of wildlife, 
with at least eight active markets where items such 
as tiger skins are sold openly. Mong La is headed by 
Lin Mingxian (also known as Sai Leun and U Sai 
Lin), a former Red Guard volunteer and Commu-
nist Party of Burma commander. Areas under con-
trol of the United Wa State Army, the largest 
ceasefire group, are also used for trafficking.
Myanmar also serves as a conduit for wildlife smug-
gled from north-east India and Nepal to China. 
One of the key commodities sourced in the subcon-
tinent is tiger skin. 
There are about 3,200 tigers left in the wild, with 
around half of these in India.21 Hunting of tigers is 
deliberate and systematic and there is evidence that 
‘commissioning’ may occur.22 Traders in China have 
indicated that they can submit orders for animal 
parts, which are then procured, not from the poach-
ers directly, but from a network of dealers in trade 
hubs such as Delhi and Lucknow23 in India, and 
Kathmandu and Burang in Nepal.24 Tigers are also 
smuggled across the Himalayas into China with 
important retail centres in Linxia, Xining, Lhasa, 
Nagqu, Shigatse and Litang. At the peak of the skin 
trade (1999 – 2005) the primary demand for skins 
came from Tibet, where the skins are used to make 
traditional costumes known as “chupas”. One sei-
zure in Tibet in 2003 consisted of 31 tiger skins, 
581 leopard skins, 778 otter skins and two lynx 
skins.25 This seizure alone represents 1% of the 
remaining tiger population. But this trade has 
declined significantly since 2006. Today, much of 
the demand comes from wealthy urban Chinese 
who use the skins as home décor items.26 
Rhino horn is also sourced in national parks on the 
subcontinent. In Assam’s Kaziranga National Park, 
which is famous for its rhinos, two hornless rhino 
carcasses were found in mid-December 2009. At 
least 10 others had been killed that year.
The border between India and Myanmar is another 
area where insurgent groups, mainly on the Indian 
side of the border, may play a role, primarily by 
taxing the trade. Traffickers seem to have adjusted 
to this, avoiding the main crossing spot at Moreh/
Tamu on the Manipur border and rather transiting 
Mizoram into Myanmar’s Chin State. But wildlife 
is also smuggled through government-controlled 
areas of Myanmar. The Chinese town of Ruili is 
connected by a bridge to a Chinese enclave south of 
the Ruili (Shweli) river, which otherwise forms the 
border between China and Myanmar, and this area 
serves as a major smuggling centre. The town of 
Tachilek, on the border with Thailand, is another 
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notorious open market, although there appear to be 
fewer traders today than in the recent past, perhaps 
because the site is in a government-controlled area 
and has received media attention. Some of this 
trade may have moved to the Mekong settlement of 
Keng Lap, an area near the one crossing between 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myan-
mar, across from Xieng Kok. It remains unclear how 
recent government crackdowns on insurgent groups 
will affect the wildlife trade.
In part due to the role of tourism, Thailand serves 
as a trafficking hub for many commodities, although 
the wildlife trade cannot be conducted as openly as 
in some other countries. One wildlife trade moni-
toring group has recently argued that, due to legal 
loopholes, “Thailand continues to harbour the larg-
est [open] illegal ivory market in Asia,” highlighting 
its role as a retail center for the larger buyers to the 
north.27 The group detected 13 ivory workshops in 
Thailand, eight of them in Uthai Thani and much 
of the ivory being processed there was illegally 
imported from Africa.
Viet Nam has emerged as a key destination market. 
Trade in ivory was outlawed in Viet Nam in 1992, 
with an exception for the sale of stocks existing at 
that time. 28 This parallel licit trade provides cover 
for trafficking. Much of the ivory seized in Viet 
Nam is in raw form, including pieces of tusks, sug-
gesting it is mainly a transit country for this prod-
uct. But it has emerged as a key consumer of rhino 
horn, and may be partially responsible for the boom 
in demand seen recently. 
Vietnamese networks source wildlife in the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia and 
are involved in trafficking to China (from Lao Cai 
province to Hekou Yao Autonomous County). In 
Laos, wildlife is for sale near the Boten Golden City 
casino/hotel project on the Chinese border. The 
Golden City area has been leased by the Lao Gov-
ernment to a Chinese company; only Chinese is 
spoken, only Chinese currency is accepted, and 
most of the staff are Chinese. Chinese require no 
visa to enter the “special economic zone.” In short, 
this enclave serves much the same purpose as vice 
centres like Mong La.
Regardless of source and transit countries, the pri-
mary destination of wildlife products sourced in 
Africa and South-East Asia is China. China has 
moved from being a key source country for endan-
gered wildlife to being the largest destination. In 
the 1980s, pandas, saker falcons, Tibetan antelope 
and other species were trafficked out of the country, 
and some of this trade continues. Since China’s 
economy began to grow in the 1990s, however, a 
huge number of potential consumers have been 
brought on to the global market. In 2005, the 
CITES Secretariat declared that China was “the 
single most important influence on the increasing 
trend in illegal trade in ivory since 1995.”29 In 2008, 
China was said to be “the most important country 
globally as a destination for illicit ivory,”30 and much 
the same was concluded the following year.31 It is 
also a significant exporter of wildlife products; for 
example, it was the second largest source of wildlife 
imports refused entry by the US Government 
between 2000 and 2004, after Mexico.32
Animals sourced in South-East Asia enter China 
through the provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan, 
especially via the autonomous regions bordering 
Myanmar, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
and Viet Nam. The provinces of Guangdong, 
Jiangsu, Yunnan, and Guangxi, as well as the cities 
of Hong Kong and Macao, are the primary destina-
tions, but also important are Beijing and Dalian in 
the north and Shanghai in the east. A large share of 
the wildlife trafficked into China is believed to pass 
through Guangdong, and this flow has been the 
subject of a recent law enforcement crackdown.33 
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In addition to land routes, high-powered speedboat 
traffic from Hong Kong to Shenzhen (Guangdong) 
is another vector. The traffickers use “zhongfei” 
boats, which are faster than the cutters used by the 
Coast Guard. Routes include use of the waters near 
Shenzhen and Shekou of Guangdong province; the 
Beibu Gulf close to Hainan province; the waters 
near Beihai and Fangchenggang of Guangxi prov-
ince; the waters near Shantou and Chaoyang of 
Guangdong province; and the waters near Xiamen 
of Fujian province.34
Who are the trafﬁckers?
While well-organized and integrated groups exist, it 
appears that much of the poaching in South-East 
Asia is conducted by a large number of people who 
live in the wilderness areas, including armed groups. 
These people need not be professional poachers – 
they simply need to have a firearm and reside in a 
wildlife domain. There are, however, professional 
groups of poachers, some of whom will source spe-
cific wildlife on order.
The same is true in Africa, where the degree of 
professionalism is largely determined by the degree 
of law enforcement resistance. Groups harvesting 
wildlife in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
are not necessarily well-organized, although having 
a militia connection can facilitate weapons and 
market access. In contrast, since the majority of the 
world’s African rhinos reside in relatively well-pro-
tected parks in South Africa, more sophisticated 
poachers have started using techniques less likely to 
attract attention than a gunshot, including the use 
of veterinary drugs, poison and cross bows.35
There is evidence of militant groups being involved 
in the trade. The Janjaweed militia have long been 
implicated in poaching elephants in Chad, and on 
15 May 2007, they attacked the national storehouse 
of confiscated ivory in Zakouma, killing three rang-
ers before being repelled. Similar battles have been 
fought between Kenyan rangers and Somali poach-
ers, some of whom are linked to militant groups.36
The lynchpin in the system, the large-volume traf-
fickers, are generally brokers with connections in 
both source and destination countries, though not 
necessarily citizens of either. Destination country 
diasporas in source and transit countries do seem to 
play a key role in trafficking. For example, one 
wildlife trade monitoring group has argued that 
“there is also evidence of commercial-scale illegal 
ivory operations involving Chinese nationals in 22 
African elephant range states.”37 More recently, they 
noted that Vietnamese nationals are active as mid-
dlemen in rhino poaching in Southern Africa. Chi-
nese expatriate businessmen, some of whom may 
have taken foreign citizenship, also seem to be active 
in organizing trafficking in South-East Asia. Viet-
namese networks are active in Cambodia and the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
While some of the trafficking is conducted by indi-
viduals purchasing ivory on their own behalf, there 
is much evidence of active well-organized commer-
cial groups. Since 1989, there have been at least 55 
very large ivory seizures, the average volume of 
which was 2.3 tons.38 These shipments would have 
been worth about US$2 million at wholesale level 
in destination markets. The ratio of large seizures to 
total seizures suggests especially large groups are 
involved in trade to or through China (including 
Hong Kong and Taiwan), Japan, Singapore, Viet 
Nam, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines.
How big is the ﬂow?
For estimation purposes, it is easiest to break down 
the flows by species.
Elephant ivory
Globally, there are, on average, 92 ivory seizures a 
month, or about three per day.39 Seizures reported 
to the Elephant Trade Information System40 indi-
cate that more than 361 tons of ivory were seized 
worldwide between 1989 and 2009.41 While annual 
seizures varied substantially, the average is less than 
20 tons per year. Based on 10,737 seizure records 
from 1992 to 2009, the average seizure size was 
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28.7 kilograms. However, as mentioned above, the 
55 largest ivory seizure cases from 1989 through 
2009 total 124,260 kg, or 34% of the total. This is 
an average large seizure size of some 2.3 tons. The 
number of large seizures in any given year can 
explain some of the volatility in annual seizure 
totals. 
Almost all this ivory is sourced in Africa.42 To supply 
the unregulated domestic ivory markets in Africa 
and Asia, it is estimated that between 5,000 and 
12,000 African elephants would need to be killed 
every year,43 assuming no stockpiling takes place. 
Tusk weights vary substantially, but with an average 
weight of 10 kg of ivory per elephant, this suggests 
a total of between 50 and 120 tons of ivory entering 
the market annually. Since global annual seizures 
amount to about 20 tons on average, this suggests 
an interception rate of between 17% and 40%. On 
the upper end, this seems a rather high interception 
rate to be maintained over time, suggesting the 
figure is closer to 120 tons.
The value of illicit ivory depends on where in the 
world it is located, and accurate data on the price in 
destination markets are extremely limited.44 It is 
said that a kilogram of ivory sold in Africa for 
US$15 can fetch over fifty times that amount in 
Japanese markets.45 For raw ivory in destination 
markets, a number of sources agree on figures 
around US$850 per kilogram.46 Value may also be 
added to the raw material in the form of carving. 
The true value of the objects seized may be much 
greater than the weight of the ivory alone would 
imply.
The illicit nature and size of the sale can also sub-
stantially impact the price. For example, in 2008, 
the Namibian Government sold 7.2 tons of stock-
piled ivory for US$1.2 million, or only US$164 per 
kg. This was actually an increase over the price com-
manded in a similar auction in 1999, when only 
Japan was allowed to purchase.47 Much higher prices 
have been cited to foreign buyers for smaller quanti-
ties in destination markets.48 
Using the figure of US$850 per kilogram and taking 
the high end of the volume estimates cited above 
(120 tons), the total value of ivory entering the 
market would be about US$100 million annually. 
The share of this production that heads to Asia is 
difficult to determine. Seizure figures may be more 
reflective of enforcement action than real preva-
lence of the problem, especially given the parallel 
licit market. China appears to be the largest national 
destination. In 2008 and 2009, China itself made 
51 ivory seizures but was mentioned as destination 
in 120 other seizures that took place elsewhere in 
the world, many of which resulted in the arrest of 
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Chinese nationals. Total seizures amounted to 43 
tons in the decade between 1999 and 2009, or 
about one fifth of the global total during that 
period. This would suggest that China alone is the 
destination of ivory worth perhaps US$20 million 
per year.
In 2007, selected countries in East Asia accounted 
for 62% of the ivory recovered in the 49 largest 
recorded seizure cases in the Elephant Trafficking 
Information System database.49 Taking 62% of 
US$100 million would indicate an Asian ivory 
market worth about US$62 million per year, gener-
ated through around 75 tons of ivory transferred to 
Asia at a cost of 7,500 elephants poached.
Rhino horn
While seizures are smaller, rhino horn is worth far 
more than elephant ivory per kilogram. As with 
elephant ivory, prices paid in source countries may 
be as little as 1% of the final retail price. The 
reported wholesale value of Asian rhino horn 
increased from US$35/kg in 1972 to US$9,000/kg 
in the mid-1980s. The retail price, after the horn 
has been shaved or powdered for sale, has at times 
reached US$20,000-30,000 per kilo.50 The key 
factor is demand, which reportedly spiked in 
2009. 
Based on a detailed consideration of both African 
and Asian rhino poaching, one recent assessment 
concluded that more than 3,100 kg of illicit rhino 
horn reached Asian markets between January 2006 
and September 2009, or about 800 kg per year.51 At 
a value of US$10,000 per kilogram (a conservative 
figure given the peak valuations above), this would 
represent a market of just over US$8 million per 
year.
Tiger
Tiger parts continue to fetch high prices, with skins 
retailing in 2009 for up to US$20,000 in China, 
and raw bones selling for up to US$1,200 per kg.52 
A single kill would represent a large amount of 
money to individual traffickers in the region, 
because they are relatively close to the destination 
market, and so could be expected to earn a good 
share of the final retail figure. As a result, the incen-
tives for poaching and trafficking remain strong.
Tiger populations are less monitored than herd 
animals like elephant and rhino, and seizures of 
tiger products are less well documented. This makes 
it difficult to say how much product enters the 
market each year, but the market is likely to be 
much smaller than that for ivory or rhino horn. The 
National Tiger Conservation Authority of India 
detected 66 tiger deaths (not all of which were 
poached) and 29 seizures of tiger products in 2009,53 
out of an estimated population of 1,411 tigers.54 
This suggests a known loss of 5% from all causes. 
Since all parts of the tiger are used, however, it is 
possible that many are disappearing unrecognized. 
If as much as 5% of the remaining tiger population 
were poached each year, there would be about 150 
tiger skins and about 1,500 kilograms of tiger bones 
entering the market. At optimal prices, this market 
would be worth less than US$5 million per year.
Other South-East Asian wildlife trafficked 
to China
Tens of tons of wild animals are shipped into China 
on a daily basis, with terrapins and reptiles account-
ing for much of the total volume. Not all of this 
traffic is illicit, but from January to April 2009 
alone, 129 cases of wildlife trafficking were opened 
in Guangdong, with wildlife seized valued at 48.3 
million yuan (US$7 million). This surge was a result 
of a crackdown in the area, however, and may rep-
resent a significant share of the total flow. 
The scale of the trafficking in smaller species is 
alarming. For example, the pangolin is largely noc-
turnal, highly evasive, and considered endangered 
in mainland South-East Asia. Adults typically weigh 
only a few kilograms, but seizures of trafficked pan-
golin are often measured in tons. In 2008, some 23 
tons of pangolin carcasses and scales, the remains of 
approximately 8,000 animals, were seized in the 
province of Hai Phong, Viet Nam, in a single 
week.55 
A pangolin typically sells for about US$15 in 
Malaysia. They are even cheaper in Indonesia 
(between US$5 and US$10), increasingly the source 
as mainland stocks are decimated.56 However, the 
same pangolin commands more than US$100 per 
kilo on the black market of Guangdong, yielding at 
least seven-fold profits. At these rates, the 23 tons 
seized in Hai Phong would have been worth over 
US$2 million in Guangdong. This is just one spe-
cies among at least 88 that are imported daily. It 
appears that the market for South-East Asian wild-
life is worth far more than that for African wild-
life.
This suggests that while the high profile poaching 
of large protected mammals in Africa receives much 
of the media coverage, the wholesale looting of 
South-East Asia’s wildlife may not be getting the 
attention it deserves.
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What is the nature of this market?
The transportation of wild animal parts, when 
detected, tends to raise questions. In contrast, the 
transport of large volumes of timber and wood 
products is a staple of international commerce. As 
with other ostensibly licit goods, the legality of any 
particular shipment of timber is based on paper-
work. Fraudulent paperwork can be used for a 
number of purposes. It can transmute a protected 
hardwood into a more mundane variety. It can 
render a product originating in a protected area into 
one from an authorized source. In Asia, much of 
this paperwork is not forged – it is bought from 
corrupt officials in timber source countries. 
Fraudulent paperwork can be used to evade the 
forest management policies of countries whose 
woodlands are threatened. For example, in Indone-
sia, the majority of illegal logging has involved clan-
destine harvesting of trees outside of authorized 
forest concessions or approved cutting plans.57 In 
the past, illegal logging has outpaced the licit indus-
try in Indonesia.58 A number of countries have strict 
controls on logging, and some ban the export of 
whole logs or rough sawn wood, which serves both 
to protect the local timber processing industry and 
to reduce forest loss. For example, Indonesia has 
had a log export ban since 2001, and, in a reciprocal 
policy arrangement, Malaysia has banned the 
import of logs from Indonesia since 2003.59 Laos 
has had a ban on export of all unfinished wood 
products since 2007. Cambodia previously had a 
general logging ban, but has in place a quota system 
for national demand today.60 Thailand has had a 
logging ban since 1989.
There are a variety of ways wood can become con-
traband. It can be harvested illegally, in contraven-
tion of national law. Most countries in South-East 
Asia have a range of regulations on commercial log-
ging, in an effort to try to restrict the scope and 
scale of the enterprise. It can also be exported and 
imported illegally. Some countries prohibit the 
importation of particular strains of hardwood, while 
for others, the provenance of the wood is also sig-
nificant. In either case, fraudulent paperwork pits 
the word of one national official against another. 
Due to the bulk of the product, timber is generally 
transported by sea or by road, entering through 
official border crossings. Purely clandestine smug-
gling is rare, but where paperwork is lacking, a cor-
rupt customs official on the receiving end will 
suffice. Since the import of illicit timber damages 
the source country and not the receiver, there may 
be little moral stigma attached to looking the other 
way for fraudulent imports. Often, importing coun-
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tries lack the required legislation to seize shipments 
of illicit timber.
As with wildlife trafficking, the role of “special” or 
autonomous zones in both the source and destina-
tion areas is important. These are areas where the 
national government may have limited authority, 
and may assume limited responsibility. When these 
areas lay astride a strategic border, they are espe-
cially vulnerable to trafficking. In addition, some 
South-East Asian countries make provision for a 
‘barter’ trade, where goods are exchanged instead of 
cash. The barter trade has special designated jetties 
and landing points and customs forms are manda-
tory, but little other paperwork is required for 
imported products, including timber.61
South-East Asia is experiencing deforestation at the 
fastest rate on earth, but still retains some 7% of the 
world’s old-growth forests. These forests provide 
habitat to many species found nowhere else on 
earth. Wildlife trafficking exterminates species one 
animal at a time, but deforestation can eliminate 
whole ecosystems in short order, and the impact 
that this loss of cover has had on waterways, soil 
erosion, and climate is well documented. The 
impact of this loss is global and many of the changes 
are irreversible.
The motive for this crime is economic, and with 
globalized commerce, all nations bear some respon-
sibility. The EU and Asia are two of the world's 
biggest markets for timber and wood products. The 
EU has been estimated to import about 20% of the 
illegally felled timber in the world, and China an 
estimated 25%.62 Adding other significant import-
ers like Viet Nam, the demand discussed in this 
section constitutes at least half the global market. 
How is the trafﬁcking conducted?
According to a 2008 assessment, as much as 40% of 
wood-based products imported into the EU from 
South-East Asia are said to have originated from 
illegal logging. Most of these are in the form of 
furniture and other finished products, but raw 
timber is also involved. The primary source of illic-
itly harvested timber is Indonesia. Indonesian 
timber is frequently misrepresented as coming from 
Malaysia, often trans-shipped from China.63
Over the past decades, European wood products 
traders have increasingly outsourced manufacturing 
to Asia. Initially, these contracts went to countries 
with abundant forest resources of their own, like 
Indonesia and Malaysia. But today, Viet Nam and 
China are the most prominent contractors. Since 
these countries do not have sufficient timber 
resources of their own, they import the wood to fill 
the EU’s manufacturing requirements. In this way, 
the European companies have cut costs, but they 
cannot be sure of the origin of the wood being used 
to make their products.
EU imports of products from wood and paper from 
China virtually tripled between 2003 and 2006, 
from 4 million m³ to 11.5 million m³. In contrast, 
the import of wood-based products from Indonesia 
has fallen by 15% from just under 6 million m³ to 
5.1 million m³. A very large share of this wood 
(over 80%) is believed to be illegal.64 
In addition to its role as a re-exporter, China’s rap-
idly growing economy is a major consumer of 
South-East Asian wood in its own right. China’s 
timber demand is projected to rise to 350 million 
cubic metres in 2010, with a shortfall of 150 mil-
lion cubic metres from official imports. The pri-
mary seaport of entry for raw logs is Zhangjiagang, 
an inland port city on the southern bank of the 
Changjiang River, Jiangsu Province, although the 
nearby ports of Nantong, Yangzhou and Taicang 
have also been important. In addition, a large 
amount of timber is imported from South-East Asia 
over land borders with Myanmar, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic and Thailand via the autono-
mous areas in Yunnan, and from Viet Nam though 
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7
the Guangxi autonomous area. In September 2009, 
the former vice chairman of Guangxi was sentenced 
to 18 years in prison for corruption related in part 
to timber brokering.65
The second major importer in the region is Viet 
Nam, where the wood is used to make furniture, 
especially outdoor furniture, for export. The Viet-
namese export furniture industry has boomed 
remarkably in recent years, and is projected to rise 
to US$3 billion in 2010.66 Vietnamese outdoor 
furniture manufacturers have been accused of ille-
gally sourcing their materials on many occasions.67 
In January 2010, a report on the trade between the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam 
re-confirmed many earlier findings. It found that 
Vietnamese companies have a large influence over 
the forestry sector in the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, and often circumvent controls. Vietnam-
ese timber imports more than quadrupled between 
2000 and 2008 and Viet Nam exported three quar-
ters of a billion dollars worth of wood products to 
the EU in 2007.68 
Despite a ban on log and sawn timber exports, 
timber is trafficked from the Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic to both China and Viet Nam. Traf-
fic from the Lao People’s Democratic Republic to 
China passes through Phongsali northeast of Boten 
and enters Pakha crossing, where customs presence 
is limited. It has been estimated that 48% of timber 
imports by Viet Nam are illegal.69 Viet Nam imports 
around 500,000 cubic metres of logs from the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic per year.70 Much of 
this goes to fuel Viet Nam’s own burgeoning wood 
processing industry and outdoor furniture manu-
facturers. Most of this furniture is exported to the 
USA and Europe.
Indonesia remains the country most heavily affected 
by criminal deforestation, particularly the island of 
Papua. Historically, the two main countries directly 
importing Papuan timber, notably merbau, have 
been China and India. Logs transit the Philippines, 
Papua New Guinea, Singapore and Malaysia. The 
route through Papua-Kuantan (Malaysia) via Pon-
tianak has also been identified.
In addition, Kalimantan (the Indonesian portion of 
the island of Borneo) has been a location for illegal 
logging, including within the National Parks. A 
variety of species of timber were smuggled through 
the Malaysian provinces of Sarawak and Sabah. 
From the mid-1990s to 2004, this cross-border 
trade was believed to be high, but appears to have 
been reduced since that time.
Timber trafficked into Malaysia includes sawn 
timber, which is prohibited for export in Indonesia. 
The timber crosses land and sea into cites in Sarawak 
where processing for export to Viet Nam, China, 
Thailand, Europe and the USA takes place. The 
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) 
has estimated in  the past that some 2 million m3 of 
exported timber allegedly sourced in Sabah, Malay-
sia, was actually brought over from Indonesia.71 
Helicopters are also used to transport logs from 
Indonesia into Malaysia. 
Elsewhere in Indonesia, Riau province in Sumatra 
has also been identified as a key location for the 
timber trade, especially in Gaung, Kampar (South), 
Siak Kechil, Bukit Batu (Central), Rupat, Panipa-
han and Duri (North). Timber is transported into 
Malaysia, increasingly in the form of sawn timber. 
Some of the timber is processed in Malaysia, and 
some simply transits Malaysia en route to China, 
India and other destinations. As in other locations, 
this is facilitated by misrepresentation of the cargo, 
and the complicity of corrupt authorities. 
In the past, Indonesian logs were transported first to 
Shanghai and then distributed to other areas. But 
with the growth of containerization, products such 
as merbau sawn timber are sometimes shipped 
directly to locations such as Fuzhou and Beijing. As 
mentioned above, the key port for whole logs is 
Zhangjiagang Port near Shanghai, China’s biggest 
timber port, which is located close to Nanxun, where 
there are many flooring and decking factories. For 
ramin, however, Guangzhou may be used, with ship-
ments sometimes transiting Hong Kong, China. 
The trade in timber from Myanmar has greatly 
decreased, partly due to interventions made by 
China and partly due to the fact that much of 
Kachin State, the primary source, has been denuded. 
From the early 1990s to about 2005, the trade in 
illegal timber was vast, much of it associated with 
areas controlled by “cease-fire groups” on the Myan-
mar side of the border. In fact, access to this eco-
nomic opportunity was one reason these groups 
agreed to stop fighting the government. This timber 
crossed into China to Tengchong, Baoshan and the 
Yunnan provincial capital of Kunming. According 
to a recent report from an NGO focusing on natu-
ral resources and conflict, “…imports of logs and 
sawn wood across the land border from Burma fell 
by more than 70% between 2005 and 2008. How-
ever, 270,000 cubic meters of logs and 170,000 
cubic meters of sawn timber were still imported 
into Kunming customs district in 2008, more than 
90% of which was illegal.”72 There is also some flow 
to India, Bangladesh and Viet Nam.
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The primary method of illegal importation remains 
the use of fraudulent Malaysian place-of-origin cer-
tificates to mask illegal imports from Indonesia. 
One of the most prized hardwoods is merbau, a 
timber found in Malaysia, Indonesia and Papua 
New Guinea, and used in China to produce floor-
ing and furniture. It is illegal to export whole 
merbau logs from Indonesia, so exporting this prod-
uct through an official Indonesian port requires 
fraudulent paperwork. Almost all of the timber 
exported from Papua New Guinea goes to China, 
and independent reports have found the majority of 
logging operations there to involve illegalities.79
Since these products are ostensibly legal, they are 
“trafficked” to China and Europe using the main-
stream methods of international commerce, includ-
ing containerized shipping. The buyers may include 
many of the top European dealers in wood prod-
ucts. For example, an investigation into the merbau 
flooring industry in Europe in 2006 found many of 
the top brands and retailers were implicated, and a 
2008 study found that, in many instances, little had 
changed.80
Who are the trafﬁckers?
Illegal logging gangs operate throughout the source 
countries, with varying degrees of assistance from 
corrupt officials, particularly in the military. In 
Indonesia, for example, in a 2005 crackdown on 
illegal logging, many military figures were im -
plicated,81 and recently the Indonesian military 
missed a deadline to shut down its illegal businesses, 
including logging.82 According to Human Rights 
Watch, “…the military has had a prominent role in 
large timber operations that have displaced com-
munities from their ancestral lands and fuelled ram-
pant illegal logging. Military units providing 
protection services to companies have earned off-
budget cash payments, raising serious corruption 
concerns.”83
European players are difficult to identify, because 
destination markets include most European coun-
tries, and a wide variety of wood products are 
imported, many in the form of furniture, flooring, 
and other finished products. Since much of this 
material is re-exported from China, European 
importers can credibly claim ignorance as to its 
origins. It therefore becomes difficult to classify 
these operators as complicit in organized criminal-
ity, although without their purchases, the size of the 
market for illegal timber would be greatly reduced.
Trafficking to China is often arranged by brokers 
based in Singapore, Taiwan, Province of China and 
Hong Kong, China who have long experience in 
the trade. In South-East Asia, Chinese expatriates 
are important players in arranging cross-border 
deals. In China, the timber industry is controlled by 
Case study – Merbau
Merbau is a dark, tropical hardwood, commercial stands of which are largely restricted to Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Papua New Guinea. It is one of the most valuable hardwoods in the region: in 2005 it was worth US$150–200 per 
cubic metre for logs and up to US$450–600 for sawn wood at the point of export.73 By 2009 prices had risen to around 
US$540 per cubic metre for logs and US$750 for sawn wood. Although commercial exploitation of this timber only 
took oﬀ in the late 1990s, it has been harvested to the extent that it is presently classiﬁed as “threatened.” In response, 
the Indonesian Government banned the export of whole merbau logs in 2001, limiting exports to what the local saw-
mill industry could produce. But by 2005, it was estimated that criminal syndicates were smuggling 300,000 m3 of 
merbau out of West Papua every month,74 worth at least US$45 million-60 million to the sellers.
One key problem is governance. In 2001, a system of autonomy was introduced for the province of West Papua, in-
tended to direct a greater share of the proceeds of logging to local communities. This system was abused by loggers in 
cooperation with military leaders, and by the time the programme was abandoned in 2002, more than 300 projects 
were active across the province.75 Despite the national ban, the governor of West Papua issued a decree allowing the 
export of merbau logs. In 2003, the regional government issued permits for logging more than twice as many hectares 
of land as permitted by the central government, covering almost one third of the entire land area of Papua.76 
The professionalism of the groups involved is revealed by the techniques they use to evade detection: false ﬂagging 
of vessels; the use of barges instead of transport ships as these are less likely to be searched; the use of containerized 
rough-sawn timber instead of round logs; and a variety of fraudulent documentation, including origin certiﬁcates from 
neighbouring Papua New Guinea.
A national clampdown in 2005 involving 186 suspects, including senior oﬃcials, caused the price of merbau to double,77 
but by 2007, only 13 of these suspects had been convicted, and no senior ﬁgures were prosecuted. Of the suspects, 
the Minister of Forests at the time stated: “the evidence to incriminate them is already clear. I suspect that behind the 
rulings there has been something that is in conﬂict with the legal norms.”78 Estimates for 2008 suggest that merbau 
accounted for 14.3% of Indonesia’s overall timber production, and 31.4% of its processed wood exports.
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a number of large trading firms who deal in import 
quotas. To meet tremendous demand, these brokers 
source timber wherever they can. 
In addition, corrupt public officials and business-
men in the source countries remain important in 
perpetrating this crime. Today, exports from Myan-
mar are controlled by local businessmen, who may 
also be involved in other extractive industries, in 
cooperation with rebel commanders. Thai business-
men are also involved in procuring illicit timber 
from the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, often 
by bribing corrupt military officials. Before the 
opening of the Chinese border, the border between 
Thailand and Myanmar was the epicenter of traf-
ficking in South-East Asia. While this trade has 
been drastically reduced, Thai brokers remain 
important players on the regional scene. 
For traffic to Viet Nam from the Lao People’s Dem-
ocratic Republic, actors on both sides of the border 
are important. Vietnamese timber companies actu-
ally do the felling while Lao teams handle the trans-
port to the border. The lumber is passed to both 
Vietnamese wood processors and brokers, who may 
sell internationally.
How big is the ﬂow?
The World Bank has estimated the annual global 
market value of losses from illegal logging alone at 
over US$10 billion, and annual losses in govern-
ment revenues of about US$5 billion.84 An influen-
tial 2004 study into the financial impacts of illegal 
logging on legitimate trade stated “there is credible 
evidence to suggest” that “8%-10% of global wood 
products production and, similarly, of the value of 
global wood products trade” stems from illegal log-
ging. The report based these figures on 2002 global 
roundwood production of 1.7 billion cubic metres, 
worth $256 billion. Registered imports were worth 
US$186 billion.85 
Illegal logging can reach extraordinary proportions. 
Between 2001 and 2004, it was estimated that 98% 
of all the timber leaving Myanmar for China over-
land was illegal.86 Similarly, at the height of Indone-
sia’s illegal logging problem, 80% of the timber 
coming out of the country was illegal, and the gov-
ernment estimated that this trade was costing the 
government US$4 billion annually.87 This is around 
five times the country’s 2004 health budget.88 Indo-
nesia’s rate of deforestation peaked at around 2 mil-
lion hectares a year (equivalent to 300 football fields 
every hour)89 with one source stating this repre-
sented “several hundred thousand truckloads, cor-
responding to a continuous line of trucks from Paris 
to Bangkok.”90 The United Nation Environmental 
Programme declared in 2007 that illegal logging 
was taking place in 37 of Indonesia’s 41 national 
parks.91
In the Indonesian example, the largest mark-up was 
made by the gangs organizing illegal logging. Traf-
fickers stood to double their money exporting logs 
from Papua to China, more than the mark-up made 
by those who a turned these logs into flooring. If 
similar conditions prevail today, the incentives for 
trafficking remain.
CHINESE LUMBER IMPORTS BY SOURCE COUNTRY, FIG. 141: 2001-2008
Source: China Woods Logistics Association
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It has been estimated that 20-40% of global timber 
production comes from illegal sources, and that 
20% of this enters the EU.92 This amounts to 
around US$3 billion worth of illegally-sourced 
timber every year. In 2001, the EU was believed to 
be directly importing US$700 million of illegal 
timber from Indonesia and Malaysia alone.93 A 
report for the American Forest and Paper Associa-
tion in 2004 referred to estimates which suggested 
that up to 80% of tropical log imports into the 
EU15 were illegal.94 According to the WWF (World 
Wide Fund For Nature), writing in July 2008, “On 
average 40% (9.5 million [cubic meters in round 
wood equivalent volume]) of the wood-based prod-
ucts which are imported into the European Union 
from South-East Asia including China, probably 
originate from illegal logging.”95     
A more recent estimate suggests that the quantity of 
illegal timber which was imported into the EU 
from South-East Asia during 2009 amounted to a 
roundwood equivalent volume of almost two mil-
lion cubic metres, with an import value of roughly 
US$0.8 billion. The quantity imported into the EU 
from China had a roundwood equivalent volume of 
2.3 million cubic metres and an import value of 
US$1.8 billion.96 Thus, illegal timber imports from 
China and South-East Asia in 2009 amounted to 
some US$2.6 billion.
Unlike the EU, China’s timber imports, particularly 
of logs, have been growing at a remarkable rate, so 
any estimates tend quickly to become outdated. A 
forthcoming report from the WWF estimates the 
illegal timber content of China’s imports at some-
where between 30% and 45% in 2006.97 In 2009, 
Global Witness, a non-governmental organization, 
estimated that half of all China’s wood imports are 
illegal in 2007, but a large share of the total was 
illegally harvested timber from the Russian Federa-
tion.98   
The import value of China’s timber imports from 
Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Malaysia and Singapore was 
about US$900 million in 2007. According to 
experts, about half that total was probably illegal 
(between 10% and 90%, depending on the origin 
country and the product). Paper and pulp imports 
from Indonesia, almost all of which were likely to 
be illegal, amounted to about US$1 billion. Thus, 
total illicit imports from South-East Asia that year 
would have been on the order of US$1.4 billion.
Since that time, the share of China’s imports of 
timber from countries where a large share of the 
timber is likely to be illegally harvested (such as the 
Russian Federation) has declined, while the share of 
imports from less vulnerable countries (such as 
Canada) have increased. As a result, the share illicit 
today would be closer to one third than one half. 
Illicit timber exported from Myanmar, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Malaysia and Singapore to China amounted to an 
estimated US$170 million, while pulp, paper, and 
woodchips from Indonesia amounted to about 
US$700 million, for a total of around US$870 mil-
lion in 2009.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RESPONSE
Transnational trafficking in endangered species and 
timber are facilitated by the licit trade in some of 
these products. For example, elephant ivory is not, 
in itself, contraband. The legality of any given piece 
of ivory depends entirely on its provenance. In a 
number of countries, legislation allows domestic 
processing, marketing and use of ivory. The same is 
true of many tree species: the legality of the wood is 
dependent entirely on where and how it was har-
vested. A piece of forged or fraudulently acquired 
paperwork is all that is needed to transform a con-
tainer-load of trafficked goods into legitimate com-
merce. If the demand is legal, it is difficult to ensure 
that the supply remains so.
Even when a product is legally available in interna-
tional trade, it is often cheaper to obtain it from 
illicit sources. Once one key player takes advantage 
of this cost savings, market pressure makes it very 
difficult for competitors to avoid doing the same. 
Over time honest players are eliminated from the 
market, unable to compete with those who cut 
corners. To avoid this downward cycle, it is neces-
sary to create disincentives that outweigh the advan-
tages of profiting from natural resource trafficking.
For those products that cannot be completely 
banned, protecting the environment comes down 
to a reliable system of origin certification and inter-
national accounting. Buyers must be able to distin-
guish the illegal from the legal – there must be no 
grey area.104 A regime must be devised that makes it 
cost-ineffective to bring banned merchandise into 
the licit supply stream. International oversight is 
essential to circumvent corruption and short-term 
thinking on behalf of local actors. Once natural 
resource contraband has been effectively ghettoized, 
it will become more expensive to procure and more 
difficult to market. 
With such a system in place, those who licitly deal 
in these commodities will have strong incentives to 
inform on those who gain a competitive advantage 
by skirting the rules, so long as the informants are 
assured that swift and effective action is taken on 
information submitted. Industry competitors are in 
an excellent position to know where the weaknesses 
are in the system and how they might be corrected. 
They may also contribute financially to ensuring 
their industry avoids disrepute. Providing an inter-
national platform for information sharing and col-
lective enforcement could go a long way to enlisting 
the support of these key players.
Greater regulation must go hand in hand with con-
sumer education. For example, demand for endan-
gered wildlife is especially galling because it is often 
combined with health fraud. The recent surge in 
demand for rhino horn, for example, has been tied 
to a rumour that powdered horn can cure cancer. 
This myth seems to have gained currency in Viet 
Nam in particular,105 and may be behind the fact 
that demand for rhino horn skyrocketed to a 15-year 
high in 2009. Rhino horn is largely comprised of 
keratin, like human hair or fingernails, and there is 
no evidence that keratin has any effect on cancer. As 
a result, the trade in rhino horn simultaneously 
speeds the extinction of an animal species and 
exploits the ill people. Public education plays a 
critical role in preventing such inappropriate 
demand.
More research is required to better quantify the 
problem and to identify priorities. There are a 
number of complex factors that make a species vul-
nerable to extinction, aside from market demand. 
Some of the most vulnerable animal species are slow 
to reproduce. Others require large ranges, or are 
adapted to very specific climatic conditions. The 
same is true for timber: trees that took hundreds of 
years to grow can be felled in minutes. They cannot 
be replaced at the rate they are poached. Ironically, 
as the species becomes scarcer, its value increases, 
and with it the incentives to drive it into extinction. 
Tracking this process is required so that scarce 
resources can be directed to the most acute prob-
lems.

COUNTERFEIT 
PRODUCTS
8

Case studies of transnational threats 173
8
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Product counterfeiting is a form of consumer fraud: 
a product is sold, purporting to be something that 
it is not. This is different from the crime of copy-
right violation, which involves the unauthorized 
transfer of licensed material, such as the sharing of 
music or video files electronically.1 Product coun-
terfeiting is typically an organized group activity, 
because the manufacturing of goods takes people 
and time, and the goal is invariably profit. Many 
jurisdictions take the offence quite seriously, for 
reasons described below. As a result, most product 
counterfeiting would be considered organized crime 
under the Convention.
Lesser goods have been passed off as high-quality 
merchandise since the dawn of organized com-
merce, but the practice has taken on new meaning 
and proportions in the latest wave of globalization. 
With the advent of “outsourcing”, companies in 
developed countries are responsible for the research, 
design and marketing of products, while the actual 
manufacturing of the goods takes place in countries 
with a productive, yet cheaper, workforce. These 
manufacturing countries are also generally poorer, 
and so have lower capacity for oversight. This is 
usually not a problem, because the licensing com-
pany provides quality control – shoddy workman-
ship or substandard materials mean loss of contracts 
and possibly legal action. 
But this same lack of regulatory capacity makes 
unauthorized production possible. Products in high 
demand can be manufactured based on the same or 
similar designs, often packaged and branded in 
ways to make them indistinguishable from the orig-
inal. The counterfeit goods can then be sold through 
parallel markets, or even introduced into the licit 
supply chain. Without the overheads of the licit 
products, these counterfeits can be priced extremely 
competitively while remaining vastly more profita-
ble. Due to this competitive edge, in some markets 
in some parts of the world, counterfeit products are 
far more common than the originals.
Product counterfeiting is widespread: products des-
tined for 140 countries were detected in 2008, 
according to the World Customs Organization.2 
The scale of the global problem has not been well 
documented, however. The International Chamber 
of Commerce continues to cite a frequently used 
estimate: “Counterfeiting accounts for between 
5-7% of world trade, worth an estimated US$600 
billion a year.”3 This figure does not appear to have 
an empirical basis, however, and has been criticized 
as excessively high. In 2007, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development tenta-
tively estimated the value of counterfeit and pirated 
goods that are traded internationally at 2% of the 
world trade in goods, or US$176 billion, in 2007.4 
This estimate appears to have a stronger evidential 
base, but was released with substantial caveats due 
to the lack of comprehensive data. 
The production and trafficking of counterfeit goods 
is often portrayed as a matter of intellectual prop-
erty theft, and through this prism it garners little 
sympathy. Many otherwise law-abiding citizens 
think nothing of buying a knock-off version of a 
designer article. Though many are aware that the 
loss of income reduces the incentives for creativity, 
the impact seems too remote and the victims too 
affluent for many people to give the matter a second 
thought. 
In aggregate, however, product counterfeiting poses 
a serious global challenge. The branding of a pro-
duct provides implicit quality assurance and a legal 
line of accountability that consumers have come to 
take for granted. Without a brand to protect, coun-
terfeiters have no incentive to produce anything but 
superficial quality. Where it becomes impossible to 
distinguish the real from the counterfeit, poor qual-
ity products destroy the reputation of the copied 
brand, and the cheaper goods will inevitably domi-
nate. The ultimate threat of counterfeiting has been 
realized in some parts of the developing world: the 
original, high-quality products have been essentially 
priced out of the market.
Unaccountable products are often dangerous pro-
ducts. Knockoff toy producers need not worry about 
choking hazards or paint toxicity. Counterfeit auto 
parts are not subjected to the rigorous safety testing 
borne by their licit counterparts. Due to cheaper 
materials and workmanship, counterfeit batteries 
and cigarette lighters are prone to explode. Coun-
terfeit medicines need not contain any active ingre-
dient at all. Worse, they could contain a substandard 
dose, allowing the target microbes to develop resist-
ance. In this way, the proliferation of counterfeits 
anywhere in the world can have ramifications for 
global health. And counterfeit products have indeed 
proliferated, as detailed in the flow studies below.
Electronic goods are one of the most commonly 
encountered counterfeit products, and detection of 
pharmaceuticals has also been rising. The single 
most commonly counterfeited class of goods, how-
ever, is apparel: clothing, accessories and shoes. The 
safety hazards of knock-off designer handbags are 
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less obvious than dilute penicillin, but all counter-
feits undermine national and global attempts to 
regulate commerce in the common interest.
For example, counterfeit products are often smug-
gled, both to circumvent problematic inspections 
and to evade import taxes. Since they are generally 
retailed irregularly, sales taxes are avoided. Tax eva-
sion also allows counterfeit goods to be priced 
extremely competitively, while at the same time 
affording attractive profits for the dealers. By dis-
placing the sales of legitimate products, they under-
mine the tax base, and thus affect public services 
available for all.
The damage is not just felt in the receiving coun-
tries: the producing countries also suffer. Even as the 
major brands work to improve labour standards and 
workplace safety at their outsourced manufacturing 
sites, counterfeit goods producers take advantage of 
global sweatshops. As licensed manufacturers try to 
improve their environmental impact standards, 
counterfeiters enjoy the cost savings of dirty pro-
duction. In short, anywhere that the international 
community attempts to establish good practice 
standards for industry, counterfeiters undercut 
them.
Thus, much of the impact of product counterfeiting 
is long-term, subtle and diffuse. Deaths, many of 
which occur in developing countries, are often not 
tied back to the counterfeit product, or if they are, 
there is little organized response. As a result, the 
impact of counterfeiting can be frustratingly diffi-
cult to quantify. The most accessible metric is loss 
of revenues, and so counterfeiting is often reduced 
to a revenue issue, despite being much more than 
that.
Much of global outsourcing is contracted to firms in 
Asia, both for manufacturing and, increasingly, for 
services. In pharmaceutical contract manufacturing, 
for example, India and China are among the market 
leaders. It is therefore not surprising that a large 
share of global counterfeit seizures originate in Asia, 
and that this region is the focus of the following 
section. This is not to suggest the problem is limited 
to Asia, and in many cases the goods are only mis-
branded far from the production sites. As reiterated 
throughout this report, these are global problems, 
and solving them will require interventions at the 
level of the problem.
 

176
COUNTERFEIT PRODUCTS
What is the nature of this market?
The massive growth of Chinese manufacturing has 
been one of the key drivers of the twenty-first cen-
tury global economy. Much of this growth is the 
result of outsourcing by overseas companies, look-
ing to take advantage of China’s high productivity 
and low costs. Most of the retail value of these prod-
ucts accrues to the companies doing the outsourc-
ing, while the Chinese manufacturing firms retain a 
relatively small share. This mutually beneficial 
arrangement is only possible because most Chinese 
firms respect the intellectual property rights of the 
outsourcing companies.
Unfortunately, this situation – in which the design-
ers and manufacturers of a product often live on 
different continents – has fostered the growth of 
counterfeiting. Counterfeiting is an attractive alter-
native to licit commerce because costs are reduced 
to manufacturing, transport and distribution. The 
costs involved in research, design and marketing are 
all avoided. Because counterfeiters are essentially 
unaccountable and have no interest in building a 
brand reputation, costs can be additionally reduced 
by cutting corners in the production phase, such as 
employing sweatshop labour, engaging in environ-
mentally unsound manufacturing processes and 
using inferior-grade materials. Profits can be further 
maximised by avoiding taxes: import duties are 
evaded through customs fraud or outright smug-
gling, and sales taxes are avoided though informal 
retailing, which itself often makes use of illegal 
migrants working for little compensation. The end 
result is a product that can look very much like the 
original, but which can be sold for much less while 
generating a larger profit.
Both the scale and the nature of Chinese manufac-
turing – which often involves a large number of 
small firms collaborating to produce a single prod-
uct – leave the country vulnerable to this abuse. The 
situation is similar to that found around Naples, 
where a large number of cottage industries have 
traditionally produced the world’s haute couture 
alongside the world’s best counterfeits. In addition, 
many of China’s largest exports are products where 
branding is either a key signal of product quality (as 
is the case with electronic devices), provides value as 
a status symbol (as is the case with many apparel 
items) or is an end in itself (as is the case with cer-
tain toys).
Mass-scale counterfeiting for export in China seems 
to be mainly a product of the last decade – in 2000, 
China ranked fourth among national sources of 
counterfeits to the EU, responsible for only 8% of 
the cases.6 The problem of counterfeiting is, of 
course, not limited to China, and the Chinese Gov-
ernment has taken extensive measures to address it. 
In 2009, the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine dealt with 
some 200,000 cases of counterfeit or substandard 
products, dispatching nearly two million quality 
inspectors and seizing an estimated US$490 million 
worth of goods.7 The State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce announced seizing US$221 
million in counterfeits in 2008.8 In addition, Chi-
nese Customs annually seize tens of millions of 
dollars worth of counterfeits bound for export. 
Those convicted stand to face stiff sentences: the 
ringleader of a software piracy operation was sen-
tenced to seven years imprisonment in 2009.9 The 
problem is also regarded as serious by the Chinese  Source: Chinese Customs5
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public. A recent poll indicated that Chinese citizens 
regard counterfeiting and substandard goods as the 
greatest taint on the national image, second only to 
corruption.10
According to independent statistics from the World 
Customs Organization, the United States Govern-
ment and the European Commission, most of the 
world’s counterfeit products can be traced back to 
China. In 2008, the World Customs Organization, 
reporting on data collected from 121 countries, 
found that 65% of the total of counterfeit ship-
ments detected departed from mainland China, 
accounting for some 241 million pieces seized glo-
bally. Hong Kong, China was the departure point 
for another 8 million, bringing the figure above two 
thirds of the global total.11
In the financial year 2009, mainland China was the 
source of US$205 million worth of goods seized in 
the United States, which was 79% of the value of all 
counterfeit products seized that year. Hong Kong, 
China was the source of another US$26 million, or 
10%, and Taiwan Province of China contributed 
another 1%. Collectively, then, some 90% of the 
value of the counterfeits seized in the US in 2009 
came from China.12
The European Customs Union does not provide a 
similar valuation figure, but there is good reason to 
believe the problem is even more acute in Europe. 
The number of seizures in the US (some 15,000 in 
2008) was less than one third of the number of cases 
registered at the European border (just under 50,000 
in 2008), and the flow of counterfeits into the EU 
appears to be growing at a much faster rate.
Either due to increasing incidence or increasing 
detection rates, the number of counterfeit seizures 
at the European border has increased tenfold in the 
last 10 years. In 2008, almost 200 million counter-
feit items were detected. Most of the cases (57%) 
involved articles of clothing or accessories, followed 
by jewellery and watches (10%) and electrical 
equipment (7%). While encountered in a smaller 
number of cases, the most numerous items were 
CDs, DVDs and cassettes. France detected the 
greatest number of cases, while the Netherlands 
confiscated the greatest number of articles.13 
Mainland China was the origin of 55% of the coun-
terfeits seized at the European borders, with Taiwan, 
Province of China accounting for another 10% and 
Hong Kong, China for another 1%. In other words, 
two thirds of the counterfeit products seized at the 
European border in 2008 were produced in China 
as a whole.14 China was by far the leading source of 
clothing items, CD/DVDs, electrical equipment 
and toys. But China is also a leading licit supplier 
of many of these same commodities.
Indeed, looking at any particular sector, the number 
of counterfeits seized is generally dwarfed by licit 
imports. For example, in 2008, just under 6 million 
pairs of counterfeit shoes made in China were seized 
entering the EU, which sounds like a lot.16 But that 
 Source: European Commission15
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same year, the EU imported 1.8 billion pairs of 
shoes from China, equal to 73% of total footwear 
imports, more than three pairs of shoes for every EU 
citizen.19 Thus, the counterfeits seized were equal to 
about one third of a per cent of licit imports. Of 
course, seizures are themselves but a fraction of the 
illicit flow but, as discussed further below, there can 
be little doubt that the illicit market for Chinese 
goods in the European Union is much smaller than 
the licit.
How is the trafﬁcking conducted?
China’s decentralized manufacturing model means 
that virtually any product can be produced by end-
less combinations of otherwise unrelated suppliers. 
It also means that outsourced product specifications 
may be widely disseminated. As a result, aggrieved 
rights-holders cannot simply hold a single contrac-
tor responsible. Finding the source of any given 
counterfeit in this labyrinth of parts suppliers, tool 
makers and assemblers can be a daunting task.
The impetus for a counterfeit product can come 
from many sources. Those with a ready overseas 
market for a particular product can find a produc-
tion team willing and able to supply it. Those 
involved in producing a popular licensed product 
can also produce unauthorized over-runs. It is dif-
ficult to discern how much of the counterfeit market 
is due to push factors and how much to pull. 
In Chinese wholesale markets, counterfeit goods are 
graded based on the degree to which they resemble 
the original. Grade A merchandise may be manu-
factured in the factories licensed to produce the 
authentic goods, and are virtually indistinguishable. 
These products carry price tags that qualify them as 
luxury goods in their own right. Lesser grades may 
simply be diverted factory seconds or they may be 
produced in dedicated workshops using lower-grade 
materials. For any popular product, several different 
grades of imitations are often available.
Geographic specialization has also evolved, and 
certain areas of the country are associated with 
counterfeiting particular products. For example, 
according to the China United Intellectual Property 
Protection Centre, groups in Chaosan (Guang-
dong) specialize in electronics, cigarettes, pharma-
ceuticals and CDs. The goods are moved from their 
production sites to destinations along all the regular 
commercial streams, assisted along the way by cor-
ruption and bribery, if necessary. Because the Chi-
nese law bases the penalties for counterfeit 
trafficking on the value of the material seized, traf-
fickers have learned to break up their shipments 
into small consignments. This has allowed even 
repeat offenders to operate profitably for extended 
periods without fear of incarceration. 
Many of these goods do not go far. An increasing 
share appears to be consumed in China. In addi-
tion, cheap Chinese-made consumer goods of all 
kinds are available throughout South-East Asia, 
including counterfeits, and some of the production 
has been moved there. For example, when Chinese 
authorities began to crack down on the production 
of pirated CDs and DVDs, many producers moved 
their equipment into the semi-autonomous “Special 
Regions” in north-eastern Myanmar, especially 
Mong La (which also acts as a conduit for Chinese 
counterfeits).
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Though sold everywhere, the main volume outlets 
for counterfeit CDs and DVDs in South-East Asia 
are Mong La and Tachilek in Myanmar and Phnom 
Penh in Cambodia. Law enforcement in Thailand 
has made it less of a direct destination for such 
goods; Chiang Mai residents (Thai as well as for-
eign) usually travel to Mae Sai/Tachilek to buy fake 
CDs and DVDs. Such goods are also available in 
Mae Sot (Thailand) opposite Myawady (Myanmar) 
and other border crossing points.
It appears that most of the counterfeits trafficked to 
the EU are shipped by sea. Containerized transport, 
often with a confusing series of way stations, is 
common for long distance traffic. Goods may also 
be ferried by speedboat to Hong Kong, China 
before being trafficked on from there. In addition, 
they may transit Xiamen, Quemoy or Matsu on 
their way to Taiwan, Province of China. Those des-
tined for South-East Asia often make use of the land 
border crossing from Guangxi and Yunnan. Web-
based sales and courier delivery have become 
increasingly popular.
As for many other forms of seemingly licit contra-
band, counterfeit goods from East Asia often transit 
free trade zones on their way to Europe, particularly 
Jebel Ali (Dubai) and other free trade areas in the 
United Arab Emirates. This allows the origin of the 
goods to be disguised, and it also allows unbranded 
products to be decorated with the appropriate logos 
close to the destination market. The United Arab 
Emirates is the second biggest source of counterfeit 
goods seized at the borders of the EU, the prove-
nance of more than 15% of all cases recorded in 
2008. Many of these goods may have been based on 
“raw” (unbranded) merchandise from East Asia.
While sea and road transport are responsible for the 
greatest volumes of good imported, there are a larger 
number of smaller consignments sent by air and by 
post. Both postal and road traffic appear to be grow-
ing in popularity.
In Europe, counterfeits enter at all the major sea-
ports. Not surprisingly, the Netherlands, with the 
biggest port in Europe (Rotterdam), detects the 
largest volume of counterfeits entering the EU, fol-
lowed by Germany, with the second (Hamburg) and 
fourth (Bremen) largest ports. In Spain, Valencia is 
a primary entry point for textile goods, and, with 
Algeciras and Barcelona, is the gateway for the vast 
majority of all counterfeit products entering the 
country. While France detected a fraction of the 
volume of these major ports, it did detect the largest 
number of cases, suggesting the country is a favour-
ite of those preferring to ship small amounts by air.
Once through customs control, the merchandise is 
generally transported to a warehouse district for 
storing, repackaging and distribution. One example 
is the Cobo Calleja district near Madrid, which is 
host to a 2 million square meter zone known locally 
as “mercachina.” This zone houses more than 300 
Chinese commercial distribution companies. The 
area was the subject of a recent police crackdown, 
which netted more than 1.5 million items.20
Merchandise that has still not been branded may be 
further processed in the destination countries or 
elsewhere in the EU. Major counterfeit operators 
may set up legitimate businesses, such as clothing 
manufacturing or sales businesses, as fronts for coun-
terfeit operations and sales. Some may be involved 
in licit import and export operations as well.
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The Internet may be used to market the products, 
particularly for products like “lifestyle” drugs, 
watches and perfumes. But the most common con-
duit for counterfeit goods are illegal immigrants, 
working in informal markets. These hucksters often 
bear the brunt of enforcement efforts, but are symp-
toms, rather than causes, of the problem.
Who are the trafﬁckers?
Counterfeiting operations in East Asia vary greatly 
in their size and sophistication. Operations that 
gain their supply from over-runs or use of factory 
seconds make use of the same infrastructure as the 
licensed producers. In general, counterfeit produc-
tion is as decentralized as other aspects of manufac-
turing. For example, in 2007 two brothers were 
charged with producing 160,000 fake branded razor 
blades from their home, using family members for 
labour and selling the counterfeits to a connection 
in Shanghai.21 
Many of the larger operations producing counter-
feits in China today were founded, or at least funded, 
by people from Hong Kong, China and Taiwan, 
Province of China, who had already been active in 
the trade. The lower-end production in Anhui and 
Henan, aimed at the local and border markets, has 
traditionally been financed by businesspeople from 
Guangdong and Zhejian. New operations likely 
spring up whenever demand for a new product 
necessitates new supply chains. Many of those par-
ticipating in creating components of the final coun-
terfeit product may have no notion that they are 
involved in anything illegal. They are simply 
responding to new orders for products or services in 
an extremely complicated open market.
Since mainstream transportation channels are uti-
lized, those who move the cargo internationally 
may also be unaware of the illicit nature of the con-
signment. If the products are only falsely branded 
at a re-routing hub or at destination, they may actu-
ally be entirely legal during transit. Those know-
ingly committing a crime may be confined to the 
destination countries. Expatriate Chinese who are 
resident in Europe appear to play an important role 
in receiving and processing the goods in many 
instances, as do vendors from South Asia.
Some of these goods are directed into licit commer-
cial outlets. In some cases, the retailers may not be 
aware of the nature of what they are selling, but 
most of the time, it appears that there is at least 
willing blindness to the origin of this drastically 
discounted merchandise. A survey from the British 
Home Office found that 44% of the businesses in 
three high-crime areas had been offered counterfeit 
goods in the year prior to the survey.22
Whatever the role of licit retailers, the bulk of the 
trade appears to be conducted through informal 
markets and street sales. From places like Warsaw’s 
once notorious Stadium Market to dozens of 
municipal flea markets across the United Kingdom, 
thousands of small entrepreneurs flog counterfeit 
merchandise. Street sales people are most often 
illegal immigrants, often from Africa or Asia. There 
have been many documented cases of illegal immi-
grants being forced into counterfeit distribution by 
the migrant smugglers. The pattern is similar to 
what is seen in human trafficking for the purposes 
of sexual exploitation from West Africa to Europe. 
The debt incurred by the migrant is so great that 
they cannot resist demands from their sponsor to 
engage in illicit work, and the activity becomes 
tantamount to human trafficking. 
There is also involvement by traditional organized 
crime groups such as the Neapolitan Camorra, 
which has long sold designer knock-offs manufac-
tured by the same craftspeople who produce the 
originals. Today, the Camorra increasingly sells 
products manufactured in Asia, using the same 
marketing channels.
How big is the ﬂow?
The European Union does not attach a financial 
value to the seizures of counterfeit goods it makes. 
The United States does, and puts the figure at 
around US$261 million from 14,841 seizures in 
financial year 2009.23 The types of products seized 
in both the US and the EU are similar. For example, 
57% of the goods seized at the European border in 
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2008 fell under the heading of clothing, shoes and 
accessories; in the US, it was 58%. If average value 
of each item seized in the EU was about the same 
as in the US, the European seizures from all sources 
would be worth roughly US$867 million in 2008. 
The question is: what share of the total flow does 
this seizure total represent? If about half the flow 
were intercepted, this would suggest a market worth 
at least half a billion dollars; this could be consid-
ered a minimum figure. If the share seized were 
10%, the figure would be US$8.7 billion. If only 
1%, it could be as high as US$87 billion; higher 
than this would suggest extraordinarily weak 
enforcement. Of this, some two thirds would come 
from China. Which order of magnitude is correct?
There are several possible ways of getting a sense of 
which interception rate is most likely, all of which 
rely on clarifying the extent of demand. One is to 
compare an illicit flow to what is known about licit 
demand for the same goods. This is the approach 
implied by the International Chamber of Com-
merce in estimating the size of the world counterfeit 
market at between 4% and 7% of global trade.
China exports a huge variety of manufactured 
goods, so it makes sense to focus on just one sector. 
Returning to the footwear example again, in 2008, 
just under six million pairs of counterfeit shoes 
made in China were seized entering the EU.24 If 
every item exported was seized (a 100% intercep-
tion rate), then six million counterfeit shoes were 
exported. The same year, 1.8 billion pairs were 
legally imported.25 If the number of counterfeit 
Chinese shoes imported were as large as the number 
of legal ones imported, the interception rate would 
be only three tenths of one per cent. 
Both a 100% interception rate and a 0.3% inter-
ception rate seem unlikely; the true value is likely 
somewhere in between. If, as the ICC suggests, the 
counterfeit market were around 5% the size of licit 
market, then the interception rate of counterfeit 
footwear from China would be around 7%. This 
seems plausible, but needs further verification.
Another way of getting at the extent of demand is 
to look to consumer surveys. One poll of consumers 
in Spain in 2006 estimated that Spaniards spent 
285 million euros on counterfeit goods in the previ-
ous year.26 This boils down to about six euros per 
citizen per year. A similar study in the United King-
dom in 2007 found expenditures of 261 million 
pounds on watches, 351 pounds on fragrances, and 
some 3 billion pounds on clothing and footwear.27 
This is equal to about 59 pounds (about 66 euros) 
per citizen for the year. 
If all 500 million EU citizens spent between six and 
60 euros each year on counterfeits, and the source 
of these counterfeits was the same as the counter-
feits seized at the borders, then EU citizens would 
spend between about 2 billion and 20 billion Euros 
per year on counterfeit goods imported from China. 
This suggests an interception rate of between 3% 
and 30%. The true interception rate is unlikely to 
be as high as 30%, given that counterfeit clothing 
and footwear consumption in the UK alone is esti-
mated to be worth more than 2 billion euros. Using 
the 7% interception rate posited for footwear above, 
an estimate of US$8.2 billion in 2008 can be 
derived. If the volume varies at the same rate as the 
value, this would involve some 2.5 billion counter-
feit items. These figures suggest the likely order of 
magnitude, but are only as reliable as the assump-
tions on which they rest.
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What is the nature of this market?
There has been much debate around what com-
prises a “counterfeit” medication, and the issue has 
become highly politicized. On the one hand, large 
international pharmaceutical companies invest 
more of their income in research and development 
than in just about any other industry, and need to 
protect this investment in order to continue to do 
so. On the other, smaller manufacturers in develop-
ing countries seek to meet the needs of the poorer 
countries, but some may have difficulties in meet-
ing international quality standards. In some cases, 
cheaper, but lesser quality, medication is better than 
nothing; in other cases, it clearly is not. 
Products labeled as “counterfeit” run the range from 
overt forgeries to pharmaceutically-sound close imi-
tations; from substandard generic medications to 
repackaged expired drugs. The contents may be 
inert or dilute or inappropriate or poisonous. For 
the purposes of this discussion, “counterfeit” means 
any product that does not contain what the packag-
ing indicates. This applies equally to branding as to 
chemical content, freshness and potency. Defined 
in this way, pharmaceutical counterfeiting is a form 
of health fraud that often amounts to mass 
manslaughter. 
A frequently cited estimate, attributed to the World 
Health Organization, is that 10% of the global 
medicine supply is counterfeit, rising to 30% in the 
developing world. Though the basis of this estimate 
is unclear, the figure is alarming, especially given 
the narrow definition of “counterfeit” used by the 
WHO. The bulk of world pharmaceutical sales 
occur in North America and Europe. These areas 
are not immune to counterfeit medicines: in 2008, 
the European Customs Union detected over 3,200 
attempts to import bogus drugs, involving almost 9 
million items, over half of which originated in 
India. Much of this trade involves so-called “life-
style drugs” (particularly Pfizer’s “Viagra”), however, 
often ordered from on-line pharmacies, although 
there have been a number of well publicized detec-
tions of counterfeit essential medicines destined for 
the legitimate supply chain in North America and 
Europe.28 
The rest of the world consumes far fewer pharma-
ceuticals. If Japan is excluded, then Asia, Africa, and 
Australia combined represent less than 10% of the 
global market. Despite the relatively low value of 
drug sales in developing countries, pharmaceutical 
counterfeits are particularly prevalent in South-East 
Asia and Africa. According to the World Health 
Organization, counterfeits comprise less than 1% of 
the market value in most developed countries, 
although this figure may be increasing. In some 
developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, the share is much higher, between 10% 
and 30%.29 As much as 50% to 60% of anti-infec-
tive medications tested in parts of Asia and Africa 
have been found to have active ingredients outside 
of acceptable limits.30 
In other words, this is an opportunistic crime, 
emerging where regulatory capacity is low, not where 
profits would be highest. It is also an extremely cal-
lous one, depriving the poorest of lifesaving medi-
cine, leading to countless deaths, for a relatively 
meager return. Beyond the direct impact on the 
victims, substandard medicines can fuel microbial 
resistance. Each under-medicated patient becomes 
an evolutionary vector though which “superbugs” 
can develop, posing a global threat to public health.
According to the incident database of the Pharma-
ceutical Security Institute, countries in Asia report 
the largest share of counterfeits detected globally, 
Counterfeit versus substandard
The terms “counterfeit drugs” and “substandard drugs” are often 
conﬂated or confused. For public health purposes, the World Health 
Organization deﬁnes a counterfeit drug as one that is “deliberately 
and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to identity and⁄or source,” 
and substandard drugs as “genuine drug products which do not meet 
quality speciﬁcations set for them.” Since counterfeiters seek to maxi-
mize proﬁts, most counterfeits would be considered substandard if 
they were genuine products. Not all substandard drugs represent in-
tentional frauds, however, because manufactures may believe that their 
products contain the active ingredients speciﬁed on the labels.
Normally, for inaccurate labelling to amount to the crime of consumer 
fraud, some degree of intent must be demonstrated, but constructive 
fraud can be imputed where the perpetrator has a duty of care to the 
victim. Given that the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals is an activity 
with life-and-death consequences, a very high standard of care should 
be expected from drug producers. Particularly with regard to the 
amount of active ingredient, a matter where proﬁt incentives favour 
mislabelling, anything other than the strictest adherence to stand-
ard could be regarded as reckless and any deaths that result could be 
deemed manslaughter.
Products that are packaged in a way to misrepresent the manufacturer 
are clearly counterfeit, whatever their chemical content, but so are au-
thentic products where the expiration date has been altered. Drugs 
that do not contain the amount of active ingredient speciﬁed on the 
label fall into a grey area. Those that are completely inert are unlikely 
to be the product of genuine mistakes. Similarly, those that contain 
pharmaceutically inappropriate chemicals or binders, especially those 
intended to mimic the eﬀects of the speciﬁed drug, show the required 
level of intentionality to be considered counterfeits. Drugs containing 
certain contaminants, moulds or excessively high levels of active ingre-
dient are unlikely to be deliberate frauds, but may rise to the level of 
recklessness to be considered a criminal act, especially when repeatedly 
traced back to the same source.
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with Africa responsible for only 2%. But this is 
undoubtedly a product of enforcement capacity, 
because field tests of pharmaceuticals in both regions 
have produced similarly high shares of counterfeits.
For example, one of the most commonly counter-
feited drugs is artesunate, an antimalarial artemisi-
nin derivative developed in China and widely used 
in South-East Asia and Africa. There are at least 16 
manufacturers of artemisinin in Asia and millions 
of tablets are produced each year for local consump-
tion and export.32 According to street venders in 
West Africa, anti-malarials are among their most 
popular products.
In 2003, researchers conducted a randomized study 
of artesunate tablets sold in the Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic. Of the 25 outlets selected where 
artesunate was sold, 22 sold counterfeit artesunate, 
as defined by packaging and chemistry. Four of the 
fakes contained detectable amounts of artemisinin, 
which may encourage malaria resistance to artemisi-
nin derivatives.33 
In 2008, many of these same researchers collected a 
total of 391 samples of genuine and counterfeit 
artesunate in Viet Nam, Cambodia, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Myanmar and along the 
Thai/Myanmar border. Sixteen different fake holo-
grams, a safety feature introduced into the packag-
ing to reduce counterfeiting, were identified. Half 
of the samples were believed to be counterfeit based 
on the packaging, and this was confirmed chemi-
cally. The tablets contained no or small quantities 
of artesunate, as well as other active adulterants. 
Analysis was able to trace some of the samples to 
southern China, close to the border with Viet Nam, 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myan-
mar.35
Based in part on this evidence, INTERPOL coordi-
nated Operation Jupiter III, one in a series of anti-
counterfeiting operations. Chinese authorities 
arrested a suspect in Yunnan Province in 2006, 
alleged to have traded 240,000 blister-packs of 
counterfeit artesunate. Police seized only a tenth of 
this amount, the rest of which had already been sold 
on the Myanmar border.36 
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In 2008, INTERPOL coordinated “Operation 
Storm”, in which nearly 200 raids were carried out, 
in Cambodia, China, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Viet 
Nam, resulting in 27 arrests and the seizure of more 
than 16 million pills with an estimated value of 
US$6.6 million.38 In late 2009, Operation Storm II 
resulted in the seizure of 20 million counterfeit and 
illegal medicines, at least 33 arrests, and the closure 
of some 100 pharmacies and illicit drug outlets in 
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Singapore, Thai-
land and Viet Nam.39
Systematic pharmaceutical quality testing is rare in 
Africa, but there is rich anecdotal evidence indicat-
ing a problem every bit as severe. One of the only 
studies involving random sampling in West Africa 
tested medicines from 581 Nigerian pharmacies 
and found that 48% of anti-infectives contained 
active ingredients outside acceptable limits.40 One 
small scale study of artesunate sold in Ghana found 
that of 17 brands sold, only six passed the Interna-
tional Pharmocopoeia content uniformity test and 
only three met the European Pharmocopoeia con-
tent requirements.41 A 2003 study of counterfeit 
chloroquine, the traditional anti-malarial, in seven 
African countries showed not only the high per-
centage of the sample that failed to meet drug 
standards, but also how widely spread the counter-
feits were, showing up everywhere, from district 
hospitals to local vendors and households.42
There have also been many recent detections by law 
enforcement of counterfeit drugs in Africa. In Tan-
zania in 2009, INTERPOL coordinated Operation 
Mamba, in which 191 locations, including pharma-
cies, warehouses and illicit markets, were inspected. 
Medicines of all types, including anti-malarials, 
were confiscated, and 22 drug retailers were shut 
down. A similar effort was made in Uganda.43 In 
Egypt, INTERPOL also led six combined opera-
tions in April and May 2009 in which 10 containers 
were seized, each holding hundreds of thousands of 
counterfeit medicines bound for the Middle East,44 
likely for trans-shipment. 
While some of these drugs are produced locally, the 
bulk are said to be produced in Asia, in particular 
in India and China. According to the Common-
wealth Business Council Working Group on 
Healthcare, “The vast majority of counterfeit med-
icines are currently thought to be produced in 
China, India and the Russian Federation, although 
significant numbers of illegal factories have also 
been reported in Nigeria, and the Philippines.”45 
According to Dora Akunyili, former Director Gen-
eral of the National Agency for Food and Drug 
Administration and Control (NAFDAC) of Nige-
ria, “Most of the fake drugs in Nigeria come from 
India and China.”46 
These allegations need further corroboration. There 
has been evidence from law enforcement; for exam-
ple, large consignments of counterfeit drugs made 
in India and bound for Africa have been seized in 
Europe.47 Forensic study of the origin of these 
drugs, similar to what has been conducted in South-
East Asia, is forthcoming.48 Until this evidence is 
produced, the origin of these drugs will remain in 
dispute.
China’s licit pharmaceutical export trade has 
boomed alongside the rest of the economy, growing 
eight times larger in less than a decade; from US$3.4 
billion in 1998 to US$24.6 billion in 2007.49 But 
this has been paralleled by a growth in imports, 
which have grown by nearly a factor of 10, from 
US$1.5 billion in 1998 to US$14 billion in 2007.50 
India’s export of pharmaceuticals has also expanded 
rapidly since the start of the twenty-first century, 
growing four times larger since that time.
Some counterfeit medications made in China are 
not exported, though the share of the domestic 
market that is fraudulent or substandard is not 
documented.51 In India, forensic testing has found 
that a very small share of the drugs were deemed 
“spurious”(falsely branded), less than 2% of the 
anti-infectives, for example.52 Most of these instances 
were in the under-developed provinces of Bihar, 
West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, as well as in Gujarat. 
While small in Indian terms, the spurious drugs 
market in India has been estimated at some US$250 
million sales per annum.53
5
20
29
43
47
57
67
0 20 40 60 80 100
S udan
Mozambique
Gabon
Kenya
Mali
Z imbabwe
Ghana
Source: World Health Organization37
PERCENTAGE OF CHLOROQUINE  FIG. 154: 
TABLETS FAILING POTENCY TESTS IN  
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2003
Case studies of transnational threats 187
8
The same study found, however, that as much as 
10% of the drugs tested were substandard.54 Under 
the definition used for this chapter (a “product that 
does not contain what the packaging indicates”), all 
substandard medication would be considered coun-
terfeit. The active ingredient accounts for 90% of 
the cost of most drugs, so even a 10% dilution can 
translate into a significant competitive edge. Diluted 
drugs can be difficult to detect, requiring quantita-
tive chemical analysis. Even when they are detected, 
it is difficult to prove the dilution was intentional, 
and most such offences would be regarded as a trade 
infraction, rather than a criminal matter. Producers 
who lose their licenses in such matters may reincor-
porate under another name.
How is the trafﬁcking conducted?
Production
The production of counterfeit pharmaceuticals can 
be as simple as producing alternative packaging 
materials using a laser printer or as complicated as 
the production of the original product. In general, 
counterfeit production in China appears to be more 
sophisticated than in India. In China, counterfeit 
drug producers are often chemical companies that 
are not licensed to produce pharmaceuticals,55 or 
even licensed companies that produce both legiti-
mate and bogus drugs. In 2008, the Chinese Gov-
ernment shut down 363 fake medicine production 
facilities.56
In India, the manufacturers can be loosely grouped 
into three categories: unlicensed manufacturers who 
operate out of small cottage factories, licensed man-
ufacturers who secretly make fake drugs alongside 
their legitimate products, and importers who bring 
in drugs from China and then fraudulently repack-
age them.
The small manufacturers operate from the outskirts 
of major cities. In the past, their products were 
crude, but the dispersion of printing and packaging 
technology has brought credibility within the reach 
of even the small entrepreneur. Medications may 
contain the right active ingredient in dilute amounts, 
and are distributed through informal channels to 
local retailers. Agra is reportedly a major outlet for 
these drugs.57
Counterfeiters may produce licensed pharmaceuti-
cals by day and knock-offs by night. One case in 
point involved a pharmaceutical company in Gur-
gaon, Haryana. When the Food and Drug Admin-
istration confronted the owner with evidence of the 
counterfeit goods, he disavowed all knowledge of 
the products except for one: a tablet containing a 
new generation antibiotic ciprofloxacin. Upon test-
ing at the state and central drug laboratories, it was 
found that the pill contained no ciprofloxacin at all, 
and the company’s manufacturing license was 
revoked. But the factory continued to operate at 
night, until an evening raid by police uncovered an 
underground cellar in the factory, where exact look-
alikes of several popular, fast-moving, high-cost 
medicines were being manufactured, most of which 
contained no active ingredient.58
The latest trend may be the importation and repack-
aging of difficult to counterfeit drugs, such as bio-
logical formulations. The November 2009 seizure 
of illegally imported human immunoglobulin vials 
from a company in Mumbai is a case in point. As 
the product did contain some immunoglobulin, it 
appears that the vials were imported from a lesser 
producer in China and repackaged under a leading 
brand name. The counterfeits were being offered at 
25% less than the market price.59 Another case 
involved the seizure in Kochi, Kerala, of counterfeit 
name brand immunosuppressants, drugs designed 
to support organ transplantation, worth some 
US$11 million. Further evidence that counterfeit 
pharmaceutical products are being imported ille-
gally from China emerged with three seizures at the 
port of Chennai in May 2009 alone.60
Trafficking
There are a number of ways counterfeit distributors 
in Africa can link up with producers in China or 
India. One case, adjudicated in China, started when 
a Nigerian businessman resident in China placed an 
order with a Chinese medicine exporter for coun-
terfeit anti-malarial medication. The exporter con-
tracted the job to a pharmaceutical company 
employee, providing samples of the drug to be 
copied. This employee subcontracted the printing 
of the boxes and package inserts to a printing com-
pany employee. False shipping documents were 
obtained to indicate the source of the drug was 
Thailand. The drugs were seized en route in Bel-
gium, shipped alongside counterfeit antibiotics, 
exported by a different Chinese counterfeiting 
group. On arrest of this second group, some 43 tons 
of counterfeit drugs were seized.61
As with other ostensibly legitimate cargo, pharma-
ceuticals are often shipped out through regular 
freight companies. The contents may be falsely 
declared to avoid targeted inspections. Many of the 
counterfeit pharmaceutical consignments exported 
from China are containerized, some passing through 
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customs by means of stealth or bribery. Some of the 
products destined for South-East Asia are shipped 
to Hong Kong by speedboat, consolidated, and 
shipped on by container. 
Smaller amounts, such as those associated with 
Internet sales, are dispatched by international cou-
rier services. According to the International Narcot-
ics Control Board, “India has become one of the 
main sources of drugs sold through illegally operat-
ing Internet pharmacies. Orders placed with such 
pharmacies are often dispatched to buyers in other 
countries using courier or postal services. Since 
2002, Indian law enforcement agencies have 
detected and disbanded several groups that were 
operating illegal Internet pharmacies.”62
Law enforcement officials in South-East Asia say 
that the majority of the counterfeit pharmaceuticals 
in their countries come from Fujian, Guangdong 
and Yunnan provinces of China. Some of this traffic 
moves first through Shenzhen and Hong Kong, 
China before arriving in South-East Asia. Some is 
smuggled directly into Viet Nam at border crossings 
in Pinxiang and Nanning (on the Chinese side) to 
Huu Nhgi at Dong Dang in Viet Nam’s Lang Son 
province. The Lao Cai border crossing point is 
more popular when the medicine is coming from 
Kunming (Yunnan province). When coming from 
Quangzhou, the border-crossing point at Mong Cai 
is used. The goods do not necessarily pass through 
official checkpoints at these border crossings. 
Rather, the main roads are used until the goods are 
close to the border. If necessary to avoid inspection, 
the goods can be moved across the border at unof-
ficial crossing points.
Medicine coming from Kunming (but not necessar-
ily originating there) is also smuggled into Myan-
mar, from Daluo (Yunnan province) to Mong La. 
As with other trafficked goods, the Je-Gao Chinese 
enclave in Myanmar connected to Ruili (Yunnan) 
and close to Muse (Myanmar) is a popular crossing 
spot. The Cangyuan Va Autonomous County is 
also close to Saohin-Saohpa (Panghwei) in the 
northern Wa Hills of Myanmar, a rebel controlled 
area. Another route is from China along the Nam-
ting river into the Kokang area of northeastern 
Myanmar near the towns of Nam Teuk and Chin-
sweho. From there, the road leads west to Hsenwi 
(Theinwi) and Lashio in north-eastern Myanmar, 
and on to Mandalay and other urban centres in 
central Myanmar. Goods can proceed through 
Monywa near Mandalay to Tamu/Moreh on the 
Indian border. Counterfeit medicines are also smug-
gled to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and 
through Laos to Cambodia. In Thailand, however, 
the availability of fake medicines is relatively lim-
ited.
Trafficking from India would proceed from the 
source provinces to exporters in Maharashtra, 
Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu.63 The exact distribution 
channels in Africa are not well known. Nigeria 
appears to act as a clearing house for goods imported 
for regional distribution. 
Who are the trafﬁckers?
As discussed above, the counterfeit producers may 
have all the trappings of legitimate businesses and 
use the licit channels of commerce to distribute 
their products. People involved in the licit pharma-
ceutical industry or in other areas of public health 
may be involved. These people are specialists, and 
are unlikely to be involved in other forms of crimi-
nal commerce.
Pharmaceutical counterfeiters may also make use of 
the services of traditional organized crime groups, 
however. For example, in China, if complicit whole-
salers and retail outlets decide to default on their 
debts, it is easier to employ local thugs to collect 
than to risk exposure in the courts. Competition 
between rival firms may, in some instances, be set-
tled with hired muscle. But for the most part, cor-
ruption achieves what stealth or violence would 
accomplish in other markets. For example, com-
plicit officials or their relatives may be awarded 
“stock” in these operations, receiving periodic divi-
dends. 
Wholesalers and distributors may also play an 
important role in introducing counterfeits into the 
supply chain. They may dilute shipments of legiti-
mate pharmaceuticals by replacing part of the stock 
with counterfeits, retaining the balance for resale. 
In India, as well as in destination markets, pharma-
ceuticals are sold and transported like any other 
product. Countries where the oversight of these 
market players is limited are vulnerable to this sort 
of insider tampering. As a result, legitimate export-
ers may unwittingly source counterfeit medication 
for their African and South-East Asian clientele. In 
a pending case in India, one exporter of antibiotics 
and painkillers to Nigeria, Benin and the Congo, 
found that one of its long-term suppliers did not 
have a manufacturing facility at all and was using a 
forged export permit.
In China, some of the larger domestic counterfeit 
drugs operations boast their own truck fleets. Some 
export operations have agents overseas in both tran-
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sit and destination countries. Many of the key 
agents have important political connections, and 
some run their operations from Hong Kong, China 
or overseas. 
In India, states in the north and east are affected by 
counterfeits manufacturing, but exports mostly 
occur from the southerly states. 
How big is the ﬂow?
Quantifying the scale of an activity in rapidly 
changing societies the size of China or India is a 
daunting task; estimating the share of this activity 
that is clandestine is all the more so. Statistics are 
kept by different agencies at different levels of gov-
ernment, and may never be amalgamated at the 
national level. The definitions of sector may vary 
between agencies, and even within agencies over 
time. Some figures may include traditional medi-
cines and supplements, while others may not. Med-
ical devices, including everything from bandages to 
prosthetic limbs and pacemakers, may also be 
included at times. Further, as discussed above, there 
is no consensus on what defines a counterfeit phar-
maceutical, and whether any particular substandard 
operation is considered egregious to merit the title 
“counterfeit” is often a matter of judgment.
In China, the official data on seizures are both dif-
ficult to access and complex. Independent statistics 
are kept by each of a range of entities that might act 
against counterfeiters at local and national levels, 
including the food and drug administrations; the 
administrations for industry and commerce; the 
public security bureaus; and customs officials. The 
State Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reports 
having closed over 9,000 unlicensed pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and “eradicated” 388 counterfeiting 
operations in 2007. The value of the products con-
fiscated in these proceedings varies substantially 
from year to year, from 231.8 million yuan in 2006 
to 169.1 million yuan in 2007 (about US$35 mil-
lion in 2006 and US$25 million in 2007).64 Sei-
zures in China are thought to account for less than 
5% of counterfeit medicine output, which would 
suggest a total market of at least US$500 million 
based on the FDA seizures. But this is only part of 
the picture, since agencies other than FDA seize 
drugs. For export markets, customs seizures are 
particularly relevant. Chinese customs seizures of 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals typically comprise less 
than 1% of the total value of all counterfeit prod-
ucts seized, however – only 11 such seizures, valued 
at 850,000 yuan (about US$125,000), were made 
in 2005.65
Experts estimate that since the mid-1990s, transac-
tions in counterfeit medicines, health-care products 
and medical equipment in China have been grow-
ing at an annual rate of 15%, with the market value 
currently standing at around 20 billion yuan (about 
US$3 billion) per year. The export market and 
domestic market are believed to account for 40% 
and 60% of the total respectively. This would sug-
gest an export value of US$1.2 billion. If correct, 
the counterfeit export trade would be equal to about 
5% of Chinese pharmaceutical exports (estimated 
at US$24.6 billion). If a similar figure were applied 
to India’s exports of US$7.6 billion, the combined 
counterfeit export value would be worth about 
US$1.6 billion.
These export figures need to be placed in perspec-
tive by looking at the import markets in Africa and 
South-East Asia. The poorer countries in South-
East Asia typically consume less than US$10 per 
capita per year on pharmaceuticals.66 With a popu-
lation of some 600 million, this would indicate a 
total market of less than US$6 billion. Per capita 
expenditure in Africa is even less, perhaps US$8 per 
capita,67 representing a total annual expenditure of 
about eight billion dollars. If half the markets in 
each of these regions involved counterfeits, this 
would represent a combined annual market of 
around seven billion dollars. Given that both the 
share counterfeit and the per capita expenditures are 
rather soft figures, the US$1.6 billion market value 
cited above seems reasonable, representing about 
one tenth of all pharmaceutical sales and billions of 
dose units.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RESPONSE
Counterfeiting can and must be combated at the 
source, but in a globalized world, this source is 
increasingly difficult to locate. The technology is 
widely available; for example, medicinal counter-
feiting often involves nothing more than laser-
printing new boxes and repackaging. China and 
India appear prominently because they are large 
countries promoting exports, and while shutting 
down production in either of these countries would 
have global impact, it would also create opportuni-
ties for criminals located elsewhere.
Those who might be interested in buying a cheaper 
version of a popular product are similarly wide-
spread. Little can be done to deter consumers com-
mitted to buying fake goods; there is not much 
support for criminalizing possession, and it would 
be difficult to prove buyers were not duped. Public 
awareness campaigns may help reduce demand, but 
only if members of the public can tell the genuine 
product from a counterfeit. To prevent fraud, the 
line between real products and knock-offs must be 
clearly articulated. Part of the solution is techno-
logical, making use of packaging and other markers 
that are increasingly difficult to imitate. Part is edu-
cational, assuring that consumers are aware of these 
markers and the possible consequences of ignoring 
them.
There is one market where price is likely to con-
tinue to be more important than quality assurance, 
and that is the market for pharmaceuticals in Africa. 
For the poorest consumers, the choice may be 
between questionable medicine and no medicine at 
all. The ultimate solution to this dilemma is ensure 
that they are never forced to make this choice, and 
that life-saving medication is available to all. Until 
this is possible, vigorous law enforcement is essen-
tial to protect the most vulnerable of consumers. 
African agencies need outside support to protect 
their populations, while agencies in source coun-
tries must continue to crack down on this shameful 
enterprise. The producers of legal medicines may be 
reluctant to disclose instances of counterfeiting for 
fear of hurting their market, but they should be 
legally compelled to do so. Manufacturers of medi-
cine should be required to adhere to the same stand-
ards for exported products as for those made for 
local consumption.
So long as the bulk of this trade occurs in the open, 
counterfeit distribution can be targeted geographi-
cally. Flea markets, street hawking sites and fringe 
retailers are ripe for public education efforts, where 
the hazards of buying merchandise of questionable 
origin can be publicized. These sites can also be 
subjected to preventative policing and police stings. 
Efforts should be made to break the link between 
counterfeit sales and migrant smuggling. The main 
barrier faced in enforcement is getting the authori-
ties to take the matter seriously. So long as the risks 
are low and profits high, counterfeiting will remain 
a rational choice for many.
It is imperative that measures be taken to protect 
the licit supply chain. If reputable wholesalers and 
retailers assure that their sources are clean, then the 
buying of counterfeits will remain a marginal activ-
ity. These retailers should be motivated to protect 
their reputations, but those found negligent in 
screening the products they sell should be held 
liable. Those outlets that specialize in discounted 
goods must be scrutinized. On an industrial level, 
purchasing agents must be carefully monitored. 
Policy should not encourage buyers to place price 
over reputability. The public cannot be prevented 
from buying cheap goods, but consumers should at 
least be assured that they get what they paid for.
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MARITIME PIRACY
Unlike most of the other organized crime problems 
discussed in this report, maritime piracy is not a 
trafficking issue. No contraband is moved, no illicit 
market serviced. Rather, it is a violent, acquisitive 
crime.1 It is transnational because a ship is consid-
ered the sovereign territory of the nation whose flag 
she flies.2 It is organized because commandeering a 
ship at sea requires considerable planning and some 
specialized expertise. 
The following chapter focuses on just one piracy 
problem: that found off the coast of Somalia, espe-
cially in the Gulf of Aden. This area has seen the 
largest share of global piracy attacks in recent years, 
and the problem appears to be growing. Somalia is 
not the only area of the world affected by maritime 
piracy, however. The Gulf of Guinea in West Africa 
has long been a high risk area, as are the waters 
along Bangladesh and the South China Sea. But in 
2009, more than half the global piracy attacks were 
ascribed to Somali pirates.
The term “piracy” encompasses two distinct sorts of 
offences: the first is robbery or hijacking, where the 
target of the attack is to steal a maritime vessel or its 
cargo; the second is kidnapping, where the vessel 
and crew are threatened until a ransom is paid. The 
Somali situation is unique in that almost all of the 
piracy involves kidnapping for ransom. 
Until recently, piracy was a phenomenon in decline. 
Twenty-first century piracy was first seen in the 
South China Sea and in the Malacca Straits.3 
Attacks peaked at roughly 350 to 450 reported 
attacks per year during the period 2000-2004, and 
then dropped by almost half in 2005.4 This reduc-
tion was attributed to effective and coordinated 
international action against the pirates. But in 2008-
2009, piracy again skyrocketed, due almost entirely 
to the dramatic increase of piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia. Piracy is once again on the forefront of the 
international community’s attention, as  maritime 
trade is threatened and ransom payments to Somali 
pirates have risen to the millions of dollars. 
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Source: ICC International 
Maritime Bureau, 
Piracy and Armed Roberry 
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What is the nature of this market?
Although there have long been pirates based in 
Somalia, profiting off the commercial maritime 
flows that concentrate in the area, recent events are 
a direct product of the social and political chaos 
that has prevailed in the last two decades. After the 
22-year dictatorship of Siad Barre and 18 years of 
civil war, the central government collapsed in 1991, 
and the country effectively split into three: 
the independent north-eastern state of s 
Somaliland;  
the central semi-autonomous region of  s 
Puntland; and 
the south-western state of Somalia.s 
Today, the Transitional Federal Government of 
Somalia still does not retain full control of the cap-
ital, let alone the rest of its sovereign territory. Over 
three million Somalis depend on food aid, more 
than a two-third increase from 2007. The country 
has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in 
the world. Less than a quarter of Somalia’s children 
go to school, and the country is about to become 
Africa’s least literate. There has been a continuous 
outflow of refugees and migrants to neighboring 
countries, with the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees estimating that as many as 50,000 people, 
predominantly Somalis, crossed the Gulf of Aden to 
Yemen in 2008.5
Modern piracy off the coast of Somalia is said to 
have arisen from efforts of local fishermen, who 
formed vigilante groups to protect their territorial 
waters. After the fall of the Barre regime, foreign 
vessels from Europe, Asia and Africa moved into 
tuna-rich Somali waters en masse. Unauthorized 
fishing may have resulted in the loss of nearly 30% 
of the annual catch. The United Kingdom Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID) has 
estimated that Somalis lost US$100 million to ille-
gal tuna and shrimp fishing in 2003-2004, at a time 
when the country’s GDP was perhaps US$5 bil-
lion.6 There have also been reports of toxic waste 
dumping in Somali waters. Initially, vessels involved 
in illicit fishing or dumping were attacked by these 
vigilante groups, with the end of either extracting 
taxes or deterring future incursions. One way of 
securing reparations was to hold the vessel and its 
illicit cargo until compensation was paid, and over 
time seizing vessels became an end in itself. 
Today, in a situation similar to what has happened 
in the Niger Delta, the political aims of the pirates 
have all but been forgotten. While the rhetoric 
remains, the true end of these attacks is the enrich-
ment of the pirates. Drifting further and further 
from the Somali coasts, the pirates are attacking 
commercial freighters, pleasure craft and other ves-
sels that have nothing to do with Somalia. Rather 
than championing the cause of the Somali people, 
pirates today attack vessels bearing the food aid on 
which so many Somalis depend.
Somalia’s pirates have had to drift further and fur-
ther from the coast in search of prey. In 2004, the 
International Maritime Board warned all vessels to 
avoid sailing within 50 nautical miles of the Somali 
coast. In 2005, it increased this distance to 100 
nautical miles.7 By 2006, some pirate attacks 
extended as far as 350 nautical miles off the coast of 
Somalia, with pirate attacks occurring in the Indian 
Ocean, in the Gulf of Aden and at the mouth of the 
Red Sea.8 Between 2007 and 2008, the main area of 
pirate activity shifted from southern Somalia and 
Mogadishu port to the Gulf of Aden. Since the 
beginning of 2009, there has been an increase in the 
number of attacks reported off the east coast of 
Somalia in the western Indian Ocean, with some 
attacks taking place over 1,000 nautical miles off 
that coast. 
The greatest victim of this piracy is undoubtedly 
the Somalis themselves. On top of the ongoing 
conflict, Somalia is also suffering from four years of 
catastrophic drought, and an estimated 3.2 million 
Somalis, approximately 43% of the population, 
were dependent on food aid in the latter part of 
2008. Some 95% of international aid supplies to 
Somalia is shipped by sea. The World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP) ships approximately 30,000 to 
40,000 metric tons of food aid per month to the 
Horn of Africa region. As a result of the attacks on 
aid-bearing ships, WFP has reported that it has 
become more expensive and dangerous to ship food 
assistance to Mogadishu.9  
Since late 2008, on top of having to pay higher 
insurance premiums, WFP shipments also require 
an escort from European Union or Canadian navies. 
While some Somali pirates have consented not to 
target vessels carrying humanitarian aid and other 
supporting commercial vessels,10 attacks on human-
itarian aid shipments have yet to stop. For example, 
in April 2009, Somali pirates hijacked the MV 
Maersk Alabama and attacked the MV Liberty Sun, 
both US-flagged and -crewed cargo vessels con-
tracted by the WFP to deliver food assistance off the 
south-east coast of Somalia.11 In November 2009, 
the MV Maersk Alabama was attacked again, 
although the crew managed to repel the attack.12
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The increased shipping costs have also had a major 
impact on the economy, since shipping is tradition-
ally a major source of income for the country. The 
region’s fishing industry has also been affected. Tuna 
catches in the Indian Ocean are reported to have 
fallen by 30% in 2008, in part because of fishing 
vessels’ fear of piracy.13  This has had a major impact 
on countries like the Seychelles, who rely on the 
fishing industry for up to 40% of their income.14 
On the other hand, the inflow of ransom money 
has had a beneficial economic effect on some local-
ities. For example, Garoowe, the capital of Punt-
land, appears to be experiencing a construction 
boom, and even the price of marriage dowries is 
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said to have increased.15 This ‘dirty money’ is likely 
to have a negative impact on governance in that 
region, however, as the purchasing power and influ-
ence of the pirates exceeds that of the government. 
Piracy is said to be penetrating all levels of the soci-
ety in Puntland, with a number of ministers being 
suspected of involvement in piracy.16 It is also 
reported to be undermining the traditional leader-
ship influence of many clan elders in Somalia, who 
are actively encouraging local youth not to get 
involved in piracy.17 There have been fears that 
ransom funds could affect the outcome of upcom-
ing elections in Puntland. 
Beyond Somalia, the effects are also wide ranging. 
There are the direct victims: in the first half of 2009 
alone, 485 seafarers were taken hostage off the coast 
of Somalia, with six injured, four killed and one 
missing.18 Ship-owners are victim to piracy not only 
because of the ransom that they have to pay but also 
because of the increase in the cost of shipping. The 
increased incidence of piracy has raised insurance 
premiums for vessels plying these waters from some 
US$20,000 in 2008 to US$150,000 at the end of 
2009.19 
The Gulf of Aden is one of the most important trad-
ing routes in the world. Thousands of ships pass 
through the Gulf en route to or from the Suez Canal 
every year. The US Department of Energy estimated 
that, as of 2006, as many as 3.3 million barrels of oil 
per day were transiting the Bab el Mandab strait 
between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.20 To 
compound the problem, there are few alternatives to 
the Gulf of Aden. The longer route to Europe and 
North America around the Cape of Good Hope 
significantly increases the cost of shipping.
Canal authorities have reported declines in shipping 
traffic and resulting revenue loss recently, due both 
to decreased economic activity and the piracy threat 
in the Gulf of Aden.21 If international shipping 
continues to avoid the Gulf area’s oil and gas export-
ing facilities, the world may see an increase in com-
modity and energy prices from Asia and the Middle 
East. Furthermore, it is feared that if the price of 
shipping, including insurance premiums, continues 
to rise, regional trade for countries like Egypt, 
Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Dijbouti 
and Yemen will decline as well. 
How is the crime conducted?
Somali piracy is unique in many regards, as Somalia 
does not have a natural coastal terrain of the sort 
that is usually favourable to pirates. Pirates in other 
parts of the world typically operate in areas with 
numerous forested inlets and islands, where ships 
could be hidden from aerial and maritime surveil-
lance while they are being renamed and repainted. 
Instead, Somali pirates have developed on-land 
sanctuaries from which they can launch pirate 
attacks and conduct ransom negotiations.22 This, 
no doubt, has affected their choice to focus on hos-
tages rather than cargo.23 What may have been 
considered a deficiency has resulted in a very posi-
tive outcome for the pirates: the amounts they com-
mand for ransoms far exceed what they could have 
gained through robbery.
Traditionally, Somali pirates have operated from 
small, fast skiffs, waiting up to 50 nautical miles off 
the coast for a suitable vessel to attack. But as patrols 
have pushed them further out, they are increasingly 
using bigger fishing trawlers as “mother ships”. 
These larger vessels are usually able to carry several 
skiffs, as well as weapons (typically AK-47s and 
increasingly, rocket-propelled grenades).
The visual horizon at sea is normally about three 
miles. The ability of pirates to locate target vessels 
in vast expanses of sea has led some to conclude that 
pirates are being provided with GPS coordinates by 
informants with access to ship tracking data.24 
Crews of some hijacked vessels have said that the 
pirates appear to know everything about the ship on 
boarding, from the layout of the vessel to its ports 
of call. Calls made by pirates from their satellite 
phones from captured ships indicate an interna-
tional network.
From the time of first sighting, it generally takes the 
pirates some 15 to 30 minutes to board the ship.25 
Once the vessel is targeted, the skiffs attack from a 
number of directions simultaneously, which usually 
allows one of the skiffs to approach the vessel unno-
ticed. Relatively slow ships with low sides, a small 
crew and insufficient surveillance are more vulner-
able to pirate attacks. Pirates do not limit their 
attacks to one kind of ship, although bulk carriers, 
container ships and general cargo ships comprise 
the majority of piracy targets.26
Most ships that are successfully captured by Somali 
pirates in the Gulf of Aden are brought to Eyl, 
Hobyo or Haradheere.27 There are also reports that 
Bargaal and Garaad are used as anchorage sites.28 As 
mentioned above, since the pirates are not con-
cerned about concealing the vessel from public 
sight, negotiations are usually done with the ship 
visibly anchored off the Somali coast.29  
In the first part of 2009, the average time that crews 
were held hostage was approximately two months, 
with  the shortest time being six days and the long-
est six months.30 Negotiations for ransom are usu-
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ally done directly between the pirates on the seized 
vessel and the ship-owners or head companies, 
although sometimes third-party intermediaries in 
Somalia and abroad are also used. The negotiations 
are generally conducted via satellite telephones and 
the captured ship’s communication equipment.
In most instances, ransoms are paid in cash and are 
delivered to the pirates aboard the seized ship. The 
method of payment may be direct transportation of 
the money to the pirates by a representative of the 
ship-owner or even the parachuting of the ransom 
money. In a few cases, ransoms have been paid to a 
trusted third party representative outside Somalia. 
Upon receipt of the money, the pirates release the 
hostages and usually leave separately to avoid track-
ing and capture.31 
Who are the offenders?
Somali pirates are generally young men raised in a 
desperate and disorganized society, willing to risk 
their lives for the slightest chance of something 
better. The groups themselves are small – perhaps 
six to 10 individuals – so despite the existence of a 
number of well-known groups, this would appear 
to be an endeavour with few barriers to entry. So 
long as start-up financing is available, there is likely 
a long list of volunteers willing to sign up. Most use 
small arms such as AK-47s and shoulder-fired rock-
et-propelled grenades, of which there is an abun-
dant supply in their war-torn country. While clearly 
no match for a naval vessel, teenagers with auto-
matic weapons in skiffs can easily overcome most 
commercial ships, since the crews are generally 
unarmed.
Some 1,400 Somalis are estimated to be involved in 
piracy.32 Two main piracy networks in Somalia have 
been recognized: one in the semi-autonomous north-
ern Puntland in the Eyl district and another group 
based in Haradheere in Central Somalia.33 Smaller 
pirate groups have been recognized operating from 
the ports of Bosaso, Qandala, Caluula, Bargaal, 
Hobyo, Mogadishu and Garad.34 Specific groups 
mentioned in reports from the region include:
the Somali Mariness   based in Central Somalia, 
this group appears to have pioneered the use of 
mother ships;
the Kismayu groups   (also own as National  
Volunteer Coastguard) from Kismayu in 
southern Somalia, focused on small boats, close 
to the shore; 
the Marka Groups   operating south of Mogad-
ishu to Kismayo, this small group uses ﬁshing 
boats with long-range ﬁre power; and, 
the Puntland groups   operating from a small  
village near Bossaso, using modiﬁed ﬁshing ves-
sels and seized vessels for continued attacks.35
It also appears that a number of groups are organ-
ized along clan lines, with the sub-clans of Darood 
and Hawiye being particularly prominent. But most 
piracy groups appear to be equal-opportunity 
employers, seeking recruits in the refugee camps 
housing some 40,000 internally displaced Somalis. 
They may recruit skilled fishermen since some 
would-be pirates have little or no knowledge of the 
sea. With the resources they command, pirates can 
draw whole communities into their net.36 For exam-
ple, the ancient town of Eyl is said to have been 
transformed into a logistic support structure for 
piracy.
How big is the offence?
The amount of ransom demanded by the pirate 
groups over the past few years has risen from tens of 
thousands of dollars to hundreds of thousands and 
even millions. In 2008, the average ransom was 
estimated at between US$500,000 to US$2 mil-
lion, and in 2009 it appears to have risen further 
still. According to the Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral to the Security Council on the state of piracy in 
Somalia (2009), the “Eyl Group” alone was holding 
hostage six vessels and their crew and was expected 
to have earned approximately $30 million in ransom 
payments by the end of 2008..37 While some ship-
owners have been understandably reluctant to dis-
close ransom payments, recent ransom payments of 
more than US$5 million have been reported.38
Only a portion of this money goes to the pirates. 
Government officials and the armed groups that 
control different parts of the country - especially in 
Puntland - may also be taking a share, though the 
precise amount is unknown. According to one 
breakdown, the pirates involved in the actual hijack-
ing receive only 30% of the ransom, out of which 
they must cover their expenses. The armed groups 
who control the territory where the pirates are based 
may claim perhaps 10% as a tax, and elders and 
local officials command a similar share. The finan-
cier of the operation may take 20% as interest on 
the funds advanced, with a full sponsor claiming 
perhaps 30%.39
According to a convicted pirate, a single armed 
pirate can earn anywhere from US$6,000 to 
US$10,000 for a $US1 million ransom.40 This is 
approximately equivalent to two to three years’ 
worth of salary for an armed guard at a humanitar-
ian agency and much higher than what a local busi-
ness would pay. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RESPONSE
Somali piracy is another example of a problem 
caused more by prevailing conditions than by the 
impetus of any particular group. If armed robbery 
in any other part of the world routinely yielded tak-
ings in the millions of dollars, or even the equiva-
lent of several years’ salary, this activity would be 
extremely difficult to deter through law enforce-
ment, however harsh. But these rich pickings are 
available in an environment where there are few 
alternative sources of income, where war and famine 
have hardened some to the sufferings of others, and 
where the chances of being brought to justice are 
slim. In this context, becoming a pirate may appear 
to be a rational vocational choice.
Halting this activity will require a change in cir-
cumstances. There have been longstanding interna-
tional efforts to combat hunger, promote 
development and bring peace to Somalia, and these 
remain the core of the issue. There may be scope for 
reducing piracy, however, without waiting until this 
embattled nation is returned to normalcy.
One approach is target hardening. The shipping 
lines themselves have experimented with a wide 
variety of security devices, most of which are non-
lethal, including water cannons and high-intensity 
light and sound projectors. The efficacy of these 
devices remains unclear, but if they could truly repel 
a military attack, they would likely have wider 
application in conventional warfare. This sort of 
technical solution could promote an arms race, with 
cargo vessels taking on increasingly heavy hardware 
to avoid being singled-out, and well-funded pirates 
employing ever more aggressive tactics in response. 
However well-funded, it is unlikely the pirates will 
ever be able to take on a naval warship. Under 
Resolution 1816,41 the Security Council has created 
conditions for third-party governments to conduct 
anti-piracy operations in Somali territorial waters, 
as well as engaging in on-shore operations with 
authorization from the Somali Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG). Currently, naval battleships 
from a wide range of countries patrol the Gulf of 
Aden. This presence seems to have had some impact: 
there were more attempted hijackings in the Gulf in 
2009 than in 2008, but fewer successful ones. 
But the greatest potential lies in promoting action 
against the pirates by Somalis in Somalia. Somali 
Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke 
has argued that, “[Y]ou cannot tackle piracy from 
the sea no matter how many naval ships you put 
into the waters… the best way to actually fight the 
piracy is to tackle these things from the land.”42 It is 
certainly true that the open way the pirates cur-
rently operate is only possible with substantial 
mainland support. The pirates are often at sea for 
months negotiating a ransom, and need supplies 
and services during this time. Once paid, the mili-
tants must debark and return to shore, often laden 
with considerable volumes of cash. They would not 
get far if they could not rely on the protection of 
local potentates. If the groups that are currently 
taxing the piracy trade – including community 
officials, elders and clan leaders, and militants – 
were to decide it were in their best interest to stop 
piracy, it would very likely stop. The governments 
of Puntland and the TFG have pledged their sup-
port, but need assistance in translating this political 
will into local action. Aside from the broader project 
of improving national governance and the rule of 
law in the country, specific measures aimed at 
enhancing law enforcement effectiveness could have 
a beneficial effect.
Another point of vulnerability lies in the pirates’ 
information stream. While some attacks appear to 
be opportunistic, some seem to be aimed at particu-
lar maritime vessels. Locating a particular ship at sea 
without inside information would be extremely dif-
ficult. Better securing this information for vessels 
traversing the danger zone could pay dividends in 
reduced pirate attacks. Similarly, bundles of cur-
rency are of little use if they cannot be converted 
into the goods and services the pirates desire. Meas-
ures to prevent the outflow of this money or the 
inflow of products (particularly arms, maritime 
craft and parts, and vehicles) could also reduce 
incentives for piracy.
ATTEMPTED VERSUS  FIG. 159: 
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IN THE GULF OF ADEN,  
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CYBERCRIME
In less than two decades, the Internet has grown 
from a curiosity to an essential element of modern 
life for millions.1 As with other aspects of globaliza-
tion, its rapid expansion has far exceeded regulatory 
capacity, and this absence of authority has left space 
for many abuses. The problem is compounded by 
the fact that the Internet was fashioned on a mili-
tary system designed to circumvent interference and 
external controls.2 But even those who most loudly 
champion its creative anarchy have come to realize 
that the Internet can only reach its full potential if 
some basic ground rules are established and if anti-
social behaviour is vigorously discouraged. The 
challenge remains how, exactly, to do this.
“Cybercrime” has been used to describe a wide 
range of offences, including offences against com-
puter data and systems (such as “hacking”), com-
puter-related forgery and fraud (such as “phishing”), 
content offences (such as disseminating child por-
nography), and copyright offences (such as the dis-
semination of pirated content).3 It has evolved from 
the mischievous one-upmanship of cyber-vandals to 
a range of profit-making criminal enterprises in a 
remarkably short time. Of course, criminals, like 
everyone else with access, make use of the Internet 
for communication and information gathering, and 
this has facilitated a number of traditional orga-
nized crime activities. But the growing importance 
of the Internet and our collective dependence on it 
has also created a number of new criminal opportu-
nities. This chapter considers two of the most prob-
lematic: the well-established fraud of identity theft 
and the previously unprofitable trade in child por-
nography. The former is an acquisitive crime, an 
updated version of check kiting. The latter is a kind 
of electronic trafficking, transmitting contraband 
across borders through the Internet.
A key question at the outset is whether these two 
activities could or should be classed as organized 
crime. Both are offences that tend to favour lone or 
small groups of perpetrators. Among the great 
advantages cyberspace offers to criminals are ano-
nymity and the ability to allow otherwise unassoci-
ated individuals in different parts of the world to 
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network on a transactional basis (through the use, 
for example, of bulletin boards, typical in both 
offences). The inherent limitations in organizing 
identity theft and child pornography for the profit 
of standing criminal groups are discussed further 
below. Other forms of cybercrime, particularly 
intellectual property violations, may be more attrac-
tive to standing groups, and evidence has been 
increasing that organized cybercrime groups of 
some longevity are operating in areas like software 
piracy and other forms of copyright infringement.4 
And there are a number of reasons why cybercrime 
in general and organized cybercrime in particular 
might increase in the near future. 
First, the technology of cybercrime has become 
more accessible. Software tools can be purchased 
online that allow the user to locate open ports or 
overcome password protection.5 These tools allow a 
much wider range of people to become offenders, 
not just those with a special gift for computing. For 
example, the proprietors of the recently discovered 
“Mariposa” botnet (a network of “enslaved” com-
puters), perhaps the largest in history, were said not 
to have advanced hacking skills.6 Due to mirroring 
techniques and peer-to-peer exchange, it is difficult 
to limit the widespread availability of such devices.7 
While skilled cyberthieves would likely see no 
advantage in working for a standing organization, 
these tools could allow criminal groups to employ 
large numbers of relatively unskilled individuals to 
labour on their behalf.
Second, the profile of Internet users is changing. In 
2005, the number of Internet users in developing 
countries surpassed the number in industrial coun-
tries.8 If these new users were no more likely than 
those in developed countries to be predators, the 
number of predators should continue to expand 
apace. But the number of high-value victims, largely 
located in richer areas, will remain more or less the 
same. As a result, the intensity of the attacks on this 
unchanging victim pool will likely grow. The Inter-
net has made high value victims as accessible as 
local ones for perpetrators in the developing 
world.9
Finally, each new offender can increase the number 
of attacks exponentially through the growing use of 
automation. Many millions of unsolicited bulk 
spam messages can be sent out by automation 
within a short time frame.10 Hacking attacks are 
often also now automated11 with as many as 80 mil-
lion hacking attacks every day12 due to the use of 
software tools that can attack thousands of com-
puter systems in hours.13 Recently, a botnet was 
detected involving 12.7 million infected computers, 
include those of many of the world’s biggest corpo-
rations.14 The capacity to launch millions of attacks 
is relevant for two reasons:
It makes viable criminal strategies that would s 
otherwise be unproﬁtable due to the high 
failure rate. For example, despite widespread 
knowledge of the nature of advance fee fraud 
and phishing schemes, these remain proﬁtable 
because the perpetrators need only succeed 
in locating one or two marks in millions of 
attempts.
It allows cyberthieves to ﬂy under the radar by s 
taking only a small amount of money from a 
large number of victims, decreasing the chances 
of detection.15 
Some analysts have posited losses to cybercrime to 
have been as much as 1 trillion US dollars in 2008,16 
although these sorts of figures are hotly contested. 
Given the breadth of the activity and the number of 
possible victims (over 1.5 billion internet users 
recorded in 233 countries),17 it is difficult to come 
up with comprehensive estimates. 
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What is the nature of this offence?
The imposters who pepper history were unusual 
individuals with the confidence and skills to con-
vince others that they were someone that they were 
not. In the days when most people died in the com-
munity in which they were born, however, the idea 
of widespread identity theft would have been 
absurd. In recent years, human mobility has reached 
such levels that governments and businesses have 
become reliant on technical devices to establish 
identity, such as documents, identification num-
bers, and, increasingly, biometric indicators. The 
Internet has placed even greater emphasis on asso-
ciating people with bits of data, including codes, 
passwords and personal identification numbers. 
This information can be obtained by cybercriminals 
in a variety of ways, and used to steal money or 
incur uncollectable debt through the Internet or 
more conventional channels.
Today, identity-related offences are the most 
common form of consumer fraud.18 The technique 
is modern, but it is not new. With the widespread 
use of checks and credit cards came the misuse of 
these same instruments, by criminals posing as the 
authorized user. These documents can be obtained 
through theft or robbery, and this remains one of 
the most common forms of what could broadly be 
described as “identity theft.” More elaborate forms 
of impersonation were commonly based on per-
sonal data acquired by stealing mail or rummaging 
through refuse.19 This information could be used to 
acquire identity documents, allowing the offender 
to open checking accounts or obtain credit cards, 
which would be used to acquire cash or goods. 
Credit card numbers could be obtained through 
discarded carbons and used to place telephonic 
orders for goods, often delivered to mail drops. 
These paper-based forms of fraud are still far more 
common than their electronic counterparts, but 
they are relatively slow and the potential for large 
profits is limited. Electronic forms of identity theft 
present many advantages, discussed below. 
The misuse of credit card information is often iden-
tified as the most common form of identity-related 
crime.20 Rather than rummaging for carbons, large 
databanks of credit card information with personal 
identification numbers can be downloaded by those 
able to hack their way into protected sites. This 
information can be sold on to those in a position to 
exploit it, and for many cybercriminals, this is the 
end of the process. Their goal is to collect huge 
volumes of protected information and sell it, typi-
cally via dedicated bulletin boards, to criminal 
groups who specialize in “cashing out”.21 These bul-
letin boards offer a wide range of information and 
services for sale, typically in bulk packages.22 
Electronic banking has offered opportunities for 
acquiring the cash more directly. The most recent 
techniques used to acquire identity information by 
Internet-related methods can be broken into three 
large headings: “phishing”, or deceiving Internet 
users into divulging their personal information; 
“malware”, or the use of unintentionally-installed 
software which collects and transmits personal 
information; and “hacking”, or illegally accessing 
computer systems remotely.
Phishing
Some countries use the term “identity fraud” to 
describe this phenomenon, which could be classed 
with offences formerly described as “larceny by 
trick”.23 The technique involves fooling victims into 
disclosing passwords and related information by 
posing as the relevant financial institution or other 
organization with a legitimate interest in this infor-
mation. There are at least two headings under which 
phishing attacks can be further divided:24 email-
based and “pharming”. 
E-mail-based phishing typically occurs in three 
phases. In the first phase, offenders identify legiti-
mate companies that are offering online services 
and communicating electronically with custom-
ers.25 The Anti-Phishing Working Group identified 
259 e-mail information campaigns that had been 
hijacked by phishers in June 2009.26 The most tar-
geted sectors were payment services (49%) and the 
financial sector (32%).27 
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In the second phase, offenders design websites that 
look like the legitimate websites of the identified 
company, known as “spoofing sites.” In order to 
direct users to the spoofing sites, offenders often 
send out e-mails resembling those from the legiti-
mate company.28 These sites request the user to 
provide details such as passwords and other infor-
mation that can be used for identity theft. The 
estimated response rate to e-mail phishing is between 
3% and 11% of those to whom the request is sent.29 
Of these, some sites are so convincing that up to 
5% of those accessing the site have provided the 
requested information.30 
In the third phase, the offenders use the informa-
tion disclosed by the victim to log on to the victim’s 
accounts and commit offences, such as transferring 
money or applying for new accounts. The transfer 
of money from the victim’s account often involves 
financial agents to launder the funds so acquired.31 
In June 2009 Anti-Phishing Working Group 
detected more that 49,000 unique phishing sites.32 
The second technique used to direct the user to the 
spoofed website is manipulation of the Domain 
Name Server (DNS) in a process known as “pharm-
ing.”33 This usually involves installing malware on 
the individual user’s computer or a DNS, which 
routes traffic on the Internet. When a computer or 
DNS is infected, users attempting to access their 
electronic bank accounts or other online informa-
tion are redirected to a spoof site. When they enter 
their personal information to log on, the identity 
thieves record this information.
Malware
Instead of e-mail scams, identity thieves can use 
malicious software to obtain the desired informa-
tion directly from the user’s computer.34 Toolkits 
that enable offenders to design such malware are 
available for US$200 to US$500.35 Once installed, 
there are a number of ways these software devices 
can operate.36 They can directly scan hard drives to 
collect information formatted in ways typical of 
passwords, credit card numbers and social security 
numbers.37 Since many people use the same pass-
words for multiple accounts, detecting one or two 
can be enough to unlock all the users’ accounts. 
They can also be designed to intercept communica-
tions or log keyboard strokes - literally recording 
every entry made by a user - and this information 
can be sifted electronically for passwords and related 
information.
Hacking
The term “hacking” is used to describe the unlawful 
access of a computer system.38 It is one of the oldest 
computer-related crimes,39 and in recent years has 
become a mass phenomenon.40 By targeting com-
puter systems that host large databases, offenders 
can obtain identity-related data on a large scale,41 
and this is an increasingly popular approach.42 In 
the largest case detected in the past in the USA, the 
thieves obtained more than 40,000,000 credit card 
records.43
Apart from direct financial profit, offenders can use 
identity-related information for other purposes, 
including using a victim’s bank account to launder 
money.44 In addition, they can circumvent identifi-
cation and terrorist prevention measures by using 
obtained identities. The Report of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations on Recommenda-
tions for a global counter-terrorism strategy 
highlights the importance of developing tools to 
tackle identity theft in the fight against terrorism.45 
Who are the offenders?
Identity theft is not necessarily a crime that needs 
to be committed with the help of others.46 Single 
offenders with access to the technology can acquire 
and use this information on their own, or sell it on 
to others who can better exploit the data. Both the 
seller and the buyer of identity-related information 
are involved in the offence, but they do not form a 
“group” any more than do the buyers or sellers of 
any other commodity. Where groups exist, they 
tend to be both smaller47 and more loosely struc-
tured48 than those involved in other forms of orga-
nized crime. One of the great advantages of the 
Internet for criminals is that it allows the formation 
of exactly these ad-hoc associations between other-
wise unrelated individuals.49
INSTITUTIONS FEIGNED IN FIG. 162: 
PHISHING ATTACKS
Source: Anti-Phishing Working Group, Phishing Activity Trends 
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Since offenders may act as individuals and the crime 
may be committed from anywhere in the world, it 
is very difficult to profile identity thieves. It is esti-
mated that many of the currently active groups are 
operating from Eastern Europe,50 but this is diffi-
cult to demonstrate statistically. West Africa is also 
implicated: a recent survey of businesses operating 
online found that one quarter had stopped accept-
ing orders from certain countries due to repeated 
fraud. Of these, 62% indicated Nigeria was one 
such country, followed by Ghana (27%) and Malay-
sia (21%).51 National indicators, such as the coding 
language of malware, show too much volatility to 
be true indicators of the origin or residence of the 
criminals. The same is true for the location of serv-
ers used in the crime. For example, in May 2009, 
the country hosting the largest share of detected 
phishing websites was the USA, with 54% of the 
sites detected.52 One reason for the dominance of 
the USA may be the high number of servers located 
in that country. But just two months later, the pro-
file changed, with Sweden hosting the largest share: 
46%, up from 7% in May.53 
In terms of victims, the USA has been reported as 
the leading source of credit card numbers advertised 
on underground economy servers.54 Figures from 
the USA show that most computer crime against 
US citizens is committed by other US citizens. Two 
thirds of the perpetrators of Internet crimes reported 
to the US national Internet Crime Complaint 
Center in 2008 were based in the United States, 
with 11% coming from the United Kingdom, 9% 
from Nigeria, 3% from Canada and 2% from 
China. South Africa, Ghana, Spain, Italy and Roma-
nia each comprised less than 1% of the perpetra-
tors.55 
How big is the problem?
As a new and ill-defined crime area, data on the 
scale of cyber identity theft are very rudimentary, 
with most figures emerging from national assess-
ments. The United States appears to be the source 
of most of the identity information dealt on-line, 
comprising a large share of the value of the global 
market, so it is particularly relevant as a national 
example.
Albert Gonzalez is said to be the single most prolific 
identity thief in United States history. Gonzalez was 
indicted in multiple cases, including the Shadow-
crew case (1.5 million data items stolen),56 the TJX 
Companies case (46 million)57 and the Heartland 
Payment Systems case (130 million – the single 
largest US case ever).58 In addition to being used to 
withdraw cash from ATMs, the stolen information 
was sold to conspirators in Eastern Europe. His net 
profit from these exploits remains unclear, but his 
guilty plea included forfeiture of US$1.6 million, 
one condominium, a luxury car and some personal 
items. It remains possible that Gonzalez has addi-
tional wealth secreted in overseas accounts, but 
considering the extent of his activity, these assets 
seem rather modest. A large Nigerian identity theft 
ring detected in New York resulted in the indict-
ment of 48 people. This network was alleged to 
have made US$12 million in 2008, or about 
US$250,000 apiece.59
Based on a government survey in the USA in 2006, 
it was estimated that within a 12-month period, 
some 10 million people lost on the order of US$15.6 
billion to identity theft. This represented a signifi-
cant downward revision from a previous estimate 
based on a similar methodology. Victims were asked 
how the information was obtained. Over half of the 
victims did not know, and of those who did, the 
majority indicated sources that precluded cyber-
crime. Only 2% said the information was obtained 
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by phishing or hacking into a computer.60 If the 
chances of the victim knowing the source of the 
leak were the same for both cyber victims and other 
victims, then perhaps 5% of the US$15.6 billion 
loss could be attributed to cybercriminals, or 
US$780 million. An update of this survey con-
ducted by a private research organization in 2007 
found a declining trend in the incidence of identity 
theft in the USA.61
Outside the USA, other Anglophone countries have 
found much smaller total losses. In Australia, iden-
tity theft loss estimates vary from less than US$1 
billion to more than US$3 billion per year.62 In the 
United Kingdom, the cost of identity fraud was 
recently said to be 1.2 billion pounds (just under 
US$2 billion).63 Total losses in Canada were pegged 
at about US$2.5 billion in 2002.64 It is unclear 
what share of these losses was computer-related.
Beyond these countries, there are very few data. 
One annual study by a security company with 
global reach concluded that the USA was the source 
of some two thirds of the credit card information 
sold on known underground economy servers in 
2008.65 If the USA represents two thirds of the 
market and US losses are on the order of US$780 
million, global losses would be on the order of 
US$1 billion.66 
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What is the nature of this market?
The virtues of the Internet include its ability to 
transmit great volumes of information at little cost 
anywhere in the world, and its ability to bring 
together people of common interests who would 
otherwise never meet. Unfortunately, the Internet is 
equally efficacious when the subject is vice, and 
pornography has traditionally been a mainstay of 
Internet content. 67 Of this, an indeterminate 
amount is child pornography. It appears that almost 
all child pornography transmitted today is in elec-
tronic form, typically traded though bilateral or 
multilateral exchanges. Behind every image of child 
pornography lies a victim of sexual abuse and, argu-
ably, of human trafficking.
Until recently, the production and acquisition of 
child pornography were highly risky activities.68 
Only a limited number of paedophiles had access to 
the facilities to produce hard copy materials, most 
materials were produced by amateurs,69 and their 
dissemination was limited to social networks that 
were both difficult to establish and fragile.70 Offend-
ers, when arrested, were generally in possession of a 
handful of images.71 These considerations suggested 
that a good deal of the demand for these materials 
would necessarily go unmet, and that the market 
would remain fundamentally unprofitable.
One of the risks associated with the growth of the 
Internet is that the greater accessibility of child 
pornography could lead to greater demand, and 
thus greater profitability in the production and sale 
of these materials. If child pornography were to 
approach the profitability of adult pornography, 
this could attract the attention of organized crime 
groups, transforming what had been a furtive paper 
exchange into a professional operation and leading 
to greater levels of victimization. 
The greater accessibility of these materials may have 
a number of less direct impacts as well. Repressed 
paedophiles may find validation in these depictions 
of their fantasies and a sense of community in the 
groups that exchange child pornography. To gain 
acceptance in these groups and to achieve recogni-
tion among their peers, they may feel compelled to 
produce their own footage. These materials can 
even be used to “groom” victims, to convince them 
that such conduct is normal and accepted. 
The possibility that children are being victimized 
for the sole purpose of making marketable child 
pornography is subject to empirical verification, 
but, to date, has not yet been tested. Despite the 
seizures of many hard drives and even servers con-
taining hundreds of thousands of images, very little 
work has been done examining the content of these 
images to determine what can be said about the 
nature of production – how much is professionally 
produced, and how much is clearly amateur. In fact, 
little research has been done on the global scale or 
growth of the child pornography industry. Such an 
exercise would seemingly be straightforward to do, 
since image comparison can be automated, using, 
for example, the PhotoDNA software from Micro-
soft. Using a capture/recapture estimation tech-
nique, the universe of child pornography could be 
quickly surmised. Looking at different drives seized 
at different points in time, the growth rate of the 
market could be estimated. This could be compli-
mented by a content analysis, looking at issues like 
the language spoken in video clips, indicators of the 
age of the images, or other indicators of when, 
where, and how the current stock of child porno-
graphic images has been produced. Given the 
importance of the issue, it is remarkable that such 
research has not yet been done. Some of the best 
content-oriented studies are discussed below.
Based on limited case studies, it does appear that 
those caught in possession of these materials today 
possess far more images than in the past.72 But it 
remains unclear whether there are significantly 
more images in circulation, or whether each offender 
simply has access to a more complete collection 
than before. One study of dated digital images 
found a strong clustering in recent years, but images 
taken before the advent of the digital camera were 
necessarily excluded.73
How is the crime committed?
A key initial question to ask in understanding the 
child pornography industry would be: is the distri-
bution of child pornography similar to YouTube, 
where most of the content is produced by amateurs 
competing for prestige within their peer group, or 
does it resemble the adult commercial pornography 
industry, which is run like a business? It appears 
that child pornography is available in both com-
mercial and non-commercial domains, but the ratio 
between the two remains unclear.74 It does appear 
that peer-to-peer exchanges, generally not commer-
cial, have become the most popular means of 
exchanging these materials, however.75
There have been studies of site content based on 
public reports to national complaint lines, but these 
studies generally do not capture peer-to-peer 
exchanges, and consequently the materials they 
review may not be representative of all those cur-
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rently being exchanged. The Internet Watch Foun-
dation is an organization in the United Kingdom 
that receives site-content complaints, the vast major-
ity of which are related to child sexual content. In 
2005 and 2006, the division between commercial 
and non-commercial domains was close to even, 
but more recent years show both a sharp shift to 
commercial sites and a diminishing number of 
overall detections.76 This may not be a true trend, 
however, since diminishing detections may be 
related to trend toward the greater use of peer-to-
peer exchange rather than public websites, a trend 
that may be particularly pronounced among non-
commercial actors.
A similar organisation in Canada – Cybertip.ca – 
recently found that a much smaller share of the sites 
reviewed were commercial: only 13%. It found that 
the share of commercial sites varied greatly by the 
host location of the websites. In the Russian Fed-
eration, for example, only 2% of the known web-
sites were commercial, while in the UK, 21% were. 
This ratio may be related to the likelihood of being 
prosecuted in the host jurisdiction. 
In the Cybertip.ca study, the commercial websites 
reviewed were actually more likely to feature mod-
elling-type images and less likely to show sexual 
assault than non-commercial ones. This may be 
partially due to the fact that some of the commer-
cial sites were themed to emphasize the innocence 
of the children. 
Whether commercially motivated or amateur, 
offenders do not seem to have difficulties in sourc-
ing victims, because their targets are generally too 
young to defend themselves. Contrary to what 
might be expected, the victims of child pornogra-
phy are not primarily teenagers just shy of adult-
hood. In the Cybertip.ca study, the majority 
appeared to be under the age of 8, with many of the 
most severe images featuring babies and toddlers. 
Commercial sites were more likely to show these 
very young children than non-commercial sites. 
The Internet Watch Foundation also provides a 
profile of the victims, noting that 69% of the vic-
tims appear to be under the age of 10, with 24% 
being less than 7.77 In one sampling, 39% of those 
persons caught with images of child sexual abuse 
had images of children younger than 6 years old.78 
In the Cybertip.ca sample, girls comprised 90% of 
the victims on commercial websites, compared to 
83% on all websites. While some studies have found 
greater gender balance, this is in keeping with the 
gender ratio found in other large studies.
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY DOMAINS  FIG. 165: 
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Cybertip.ca also found that most commercial web-
sites sell memberships, and although online pay-
ment systems appear to be preferred, the majority 
also offered credit card payment options. Sites tend 
to be themed, and frequently open with a homep-
age featuring a collage of images and text. There are 
generally links to a thumbnail gallery containing 
some 20 to 60 images with further links to a large 
collection of members-only material. Many of these 
sites move frequently to new hosts in different 
countries, illustrating that the location of the host 
computer may have little to do with the origin of 
the material.
Aside from surveys of this sort, there are other rea-
sons to believe that much of the production of child 
pornography is not primarily commercially moti-
vated. As described below, the making of child por-
nography is generally opportunistic; the victimizer 
is very often a person entrusted with the care of the 
child. It appears that, in most cases, the images are 
generated as a result of the abuse, rather than the 
abuse being perpetrated for the purpose of selling 
images. More research is required to come to a firm 
conclusion on this issue, however.
Those with an interest in child pornography locate 
and access the sites in several ways. Much material 
can be gained through networking on usenet groups 
or through bulletin board services. To gain access to 
non-commercial websites with large volumes of 
material, candidates may be required to submit 
images, both to bolster supply and to demonstrate 
bona fides. For example, those wishing to join the 
“Wonderland” club of the late 1990s were required 
to submit 10,000 images to the database, which 
gained them access to some 750,000 additional 
images.79 
Child pornography vendors often set up fictitious 
businesses in order to obtain a merchant account 
for credit card processing.80 To evade detection by 
law enforcement, payment schemes used by com-
mercial child pornography websites are increasingly 
complex.81 The rapid growth of anonymous finan-
cial services has been reported.82 The demand for 
anonymous payments led to the development of 
virtual payment systems and virtual currencies 
enabling anonymous payment.83 Virtual currencies 
may not require identification and validation, thus 
preventing law enforcement agencies from tracing 
money-flows back to offenders. Recently, a number 
of child pornography investigations have succeeded 
in using traces left by payments to identify offend-
ers.84 The use of anonymous payment systems such 
as E-Gold can hinder such investigations.85 
Who are the offenders?
Prior to the Internet’s coming of age, child porno-
graphy was not a business of interest to traditional 
organized crime groups,86 and there is little evi-
dence of their participation today. Based on domain 
analysis, it is very likely that the number of orga-
nized groups involved in child pornography is 
small.87 Those who produce, distribute and con-
sume child pornography are all culpable, but could 
operate independently and in different parts of the 
world. In amateur operations, there is often sub-
stantial overlap: consumers of child pornography 
may produce their own material for trade, and set 
up or participate in online forums for distribution. 
These networks are not financially motivated, how-
ever, and so would not be regarded as organized 
crime groups under the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime. Considerations of 
this sort led the global NGO “End Child Prostitu-
tion, Child Pornography and Trafficking of Chil-
dren for Sexual Purposes” (ECPAT) to conclude:
The majority of child pornography distributed 
internationally is, in fact, exchanged between 
paedophiles and child molesters without any 
commercial motive. Furthermore, while there is 
evidence that organised crime is involved in 
adult pornography, the same is not generally 
true for child pornography.88
Research indicates that up to 97% of those who 
engage in sex crimes against children on the Inter-
net act alone.89 This may also be true for both the 
production and dissemination of pornographic 
materials: it is possible for single offenders to set up 
and maintain commercial child pornography web-
sites without having to act in groups.90 On the 
other hand, the exchange of these materials, whether 
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for financial benefit or not, is a group activity, and 
for some offenders may become an end in itself. 
Whether professional or amateur, the damage done 
to the victims is the same, and those who exchange 
child pornography for non-commercial reason are 
often abusers themselves. Frequently, the child sex 
abusers captured in pornographic images are people 
who are meant to be caring for the children they 
victimize. According to data gathered by the US 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Chil-
dren, in more than one quarter of the cases where 
the relationship was known, the victimizer was the 
parent of the child victim, and in an additional 10% 
of the cases, it was another relative. The perpetrator 
was a stranger in only 4% of the cases. One study 
found that 46% of those arrested for possession of 
child pornography in the US had access to children 
through their job or organized youth activity.91
The majority of those who collect child pornogra-
phy appear to be male, “white and westernized”,92 
although there is a subgenre featuring underage 
Japanese girls aimed at the Asian market. While 
some studies differ,93 quite a few show the majority 
of collectors to be primarily middle-aged. Aside 
from this, the background appears to be fairly 
diverse. Those who produce these materials appear 
to fit a similar profile. In a study of 155 child por-
nography offenders, 85% admitted to having vic-
timized children themselves.94
Because those who produce child pornography are 
often the relatives of the children, the victims tend 
to match the ethnic profile of the victimizers: 96% 
of the victims in the Cybertip.ca sample were white. 
Research in Australia similarly concluded that most 
of the victims were white (86%), with some Asians 
and very few children of aboriginal background.95 
In 2009, the single largest content analysis ever 
produced was conducted on more than 250,000 
images collected by the UK Child Exploitation and 
Online Protection Centre. This research found that 
91% of the victims were white and 81% female, 
with 38% being white, prepubescent females. Some 
6% were Asian females. Black children were con-
spicuous by their ab sence.96
It has been argued that most of the victims come 
from developing countries,97 but it is difficult to 
reconcile the facts above with this conclusion. 
Large-scale production in Africa is excluded due to 
the ethnic profile of the known victims. Amateur 
pornography produced in Mexico, Philippines and 
Brazil has been detected,98 but clearly these sources 
do not predominate. It is frequently asserted that 
90% of the commercial child pornography comes 
from “Eastern Bloc” countries in Europe,100 and 
that, as a location, Eastern Europe appears to be key 
to the organization of the trade.101 This would be 
compatible with the ethnic profile described above. 
A number of cases have been documented in the 
Russian Federation, Ukraine, the Republic of Mol-
dova and Belarus, often involving child modeling 
agencies.102 But given that the producers and the 
consumers seem to be essentially the same people, 
most of these images likely originate in the main 
consumer countries.
The USA holds the largest national share of the 
domains related to child pornography that are 
detected by groups like the Internet Watch Founda-
tion and Cybertip.ca, but the USA also has by far 
the largest number of domains of all sorts.103 The 
Russian Federation generally also figures promi-
nently in these assessments. Of course, as noted 
above, the location of the offenders may be different 
than the location of the domains they use – this is 
one advantage of the transnational nature of the 
Internet for those selling child pornography.
Despite their use of the Internet, child pornogra-
phers and their clients are not necessarily techno-
logically sophisticated. Only 6% of the offenders in 
one sample used encryption technology.104 In 
another sample, 17% used password protection, 
3% evidence-eliminating software only 2% used 
remote storage systems.105 It is possible that more 
sophisticated consumers have evaded detection 
altogether, however.
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How big is the ﬂow?
As noted above, the lack of research on the size and 
growth of the universe of child pornography is 
striking. Known databases have included up to one 
million images, but these figures include videos 
which contain many thousands of still images. The 
largest database that has been cleared of redundan-
cies was collected by the project “Combating Online 
Paedophile Networks in Europe” (COPINE) at 
University College Cork in Ireland, which con-
tained some half a million images, some of which 
might be 30 years older or more. In the late 1990s, 
an average of four new victims were appearing each 
month in images traded by the newsgroups they 
monitored.106 If this trend were to continue, and 
1,000 images were taken of each child, this would 
yield a growth of some 50,000 images per year, or 
about 10% growth annually. 
Some very large estimates have been made of the 
value of the commercial child pornography indus-
try, with very little evidence to back them up. In 
one frequently cited estimate, the on-line commer-
cial child pornography industry is said to be worth 
US$20 billion. Via a number of intermediary 
sources, this figure is variously cited to UNICEF 
and the FBI, both of which have disavowed the 
number.107 As will be discussed below, this amount 
far exceeds credible estimates of the value of the 
adult internet pornography industry, and is about a 
quarter of the value of the global cocaine trade, a far 
more expensive and popular commodity. 
Perhaps leery of providing a more precise estimate, 
a number of sources have referred to child pornog-
raphy as a “multi-billion dollar industry”,108 
although the basis for these calculations remains 
equally unclear. There are at least two ways a more 
accurate estimate could be made.
Industry-based: an estimate of the annual turn-s 
over of the total pornography industry could be 
multiplied by the share of all pornography that 
involves children.
Consumer-based: an estimate of the number of s 
oﬀenders could be multiplied by the amount 
spent by each annually.
Industry-based
Little credible recent research has been done to 
estimate the size of the market for adult porno-
graphic materials. One 1999 scan of web content 
found that just over 1% of 2,500 randomly selected 
servers contained pornography.109 In 1998, the 
online adult pornography industry was estimated to 
generate between US$750 million and US$1 bil-
lion in revenues annually.110 It is likely that the 
demand has expanded since that time,111 as the 
number of Internet users grows, but the number of 
free sites has also expanded. In addition, many of 
the new users are located in developing countries, 
and many of these new users may face restrictions 
in their access to internet pornography. China, for 
example, uses a national filter to prevent access to 
these materials, and treats violations very seriously 
– over 5,000 people were arrested for internet por-
nography offences in 2009.112 As of 2000, online 
pornography also became illegal in India.
The consensus seems to be that the market has 
become more competitive, with a small number of 
commercial providers113 competing with the prolif-
eration of free sites. The volume of pornography-
related web searches is very large, but one industry 
estimate suggests that only 0.3% to 0.4% of those 
visiting the pay sites actually purchase content.114 
Those who do pay tend to be collectors, who sub-
scribe to access huge volumes of material, with fees 
in the tens of dollars securing entry to extended 
consortia of websites.115 Although pornography 
may play a greater role in the lives of paedophiles 
than for the public in general, it is highly unlikely 
that the value of the industry exceeds that of the 
adult trade, due to the much smaller user base. 
These considerations would favour an estimate of 
less than US$1 billion annually.
Consumer-based
There are no generally accepted figures for the prev-
alence of paedophilia, but some insight into the 
number of people who might buy child pornogra-
phy can be gathered from criminal justice data. 
Data associated with law enforcement investiga-
tions have suggested some very large figures for the 
number of offenders and the annual turnover of 
particular networks.116 
“Operation Avalanche” was probably the largest-
ever investigation focusing on commercial child 
pornography. Landslide Inc. was a company offer-
ing credit card and subscriber services for child 
pornography websites. It offered subscriptions to 
more than 5,000 websites globally117 which, at the 
time of shut down, were reported to have between 
75,000118 and 390,000119 customers. The profit, 
said to be generated mostly through child pornog-
raphy-related financial services, was reported to be 
up to US$1.4 million a month.120 This suggests a 
profit of around US$3,500 per site per year.121 
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Some 7,000 British citizens were implicated in 
Operation Avalanche, making possible Operation 
Ore, a controversial crackdown in the United King-
dom in 1999. The litigation surrounding these 
arrests has suggested that a share of those allegedly 
paying for child pornography never downloaded it. 
In fact, some appear to have been victims of iden-
tity theft – their credit card information was bought 
by website owners and charges falsely generated. 
Both Operation Avalanche and Operation Ore 
appear to have resulted in relatively few convictions 
compared to the number of offenders initially 
implicated, and many of the British convictions are 
still under appeal more than a decade later.122
In fact, the number of arrests and convictions for 
possession of child pornography annually are rather 
modest, even in the best resourced countries. Brit-
ish Home Office figures show 116 offences were 
recorded for “abuse of children through prostitu-
tion and pornography” in 2008/9.123 In Canada, 
1,408 people were charged with possession of child 
pornography in 2008.124 This is up considerably 
from the 159 people were charged with possession 
of child pornography in 2003.125 The figure was 
1,407 in 2007, suggesting a rather stable situation 
today.126 The United States Federal law enforce-
ment authorities, which actively pursue online sex 
offences, were referred 2,539 suspects for possession 
of child pornography in 2006, of whom more than 
half were prosecuted.127 Due to the deployment of 
several federal task forces, including those focused 
on child abuse on the Internet,128 this figure was up 
sharply from the 169 detected in 1994. 
If US federal authorities were referred even 1% of 
those in possession of child pornography annually, 
this would indicate a pool of one quarter of a mil-
lion offenders, equal to less than one tenth of one 
per cent of the US population. If a similar share 
were offenders in Europe, including the Russian 
Federation, this would still be less than one million 
consumers in total. There is evidence of consump-
tion of these materials in Asia, but even so, a figure 
of more than two million Internet child pornogra-
phy consumers globally would posit extremely low 
detection rates and can be considered an upper 
limit.
How much do each of these people “consume” 
annually? Many child pornography consumers have 
been found in possession of large numbers of 
images.129 As mentioned above, extreme examples 
include databases of 250,000130 or even 1 million 
images,131 although such figures quickly reach the 
point of absurdity, unless a large share are video 
images. If viewed and acquired at a rate of one per 
minute, selecting 1 million still images would rep-
resent almost four years’ continuous work, labour-
ing 12 hours per day. According to one sampling, 
the average number of images in the possession of 
offenders investigated was 16,698.132 This would 
represent a substantial investment if these images 
were selected and purchased individually, but case 
studies suggest that, as with the adult industry, 
material tends to be acquired en masse, through 
trade or subscription services. Other studies suggest 
far smaller numbers of images per offender: one 
US-based study of 429 arrestees found that more 
than half (52%) had fewer than 100 images, and 
86% had fewer than 1,000 images.133 The study 
distinguished a subset of “organized” collectors 
(27%), who were more likely to have large collec-
tions, video material, non-digital child pornogra-
phy, images of children under 6 years old, better 
computer systems and encrypted files.134 
To consume one billion dollars worth of material, 
each of the two million global consumers would 
have to spend US$500 annually apiece, or about 
US$40 per month. One recent study found an aver-
age commercial site membership was US$53 per 
month,135 so this is within the realm of possibility, 
but posits that all child pornography consumers are 
paying subscribers. It also assumes that subscribers 
receive sufficient new material every month to jus-
tify the monthly fee. 
All this would suggest that 1 billion US dollars 
would be pressing the outer limits of a credible 
estimate for the annual global turnover for child 
pornography. It is far more likely that the figure is 
considerably less, given that a good deal of material 
is shared between peers. And, if the US figures are 
representative, perhaps a quarter of global consum-
ers (the share classed as “organized”) are likely to be 
regular subscribers, for a market value on the order 
of US$250 million.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RESPONSE
Of course, the impact of child pornography cannot 
be reduced to a dollar figure. And while production 
of this material appears to be largely an amateur 
activity, international action should be taken against 
those aspects of the market that do constitute trans-
national organized crime: the networks that distrib-
ute these images. These networks do comprise 
groups of some longevity aimed at the commission 
of a serious offence. The acquisition of new images 
represents a form of “material benefit”, so even net-
works engaged in bartering could be considered 
organized crime groups under the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime. The same is true for identity theft: the actual 
theft may be largely an individual activity, but those 
who organize this market and exploit the data con-
stitute transnational criminal networks. There are at 
least two levels at which the problem can be 
addressed: prevention and justice.
Prevention can be conducted by individual govern-
ments, or even by non-governmental actors. Offend-
ing sites can be rapidly disabled, monitoring groups 
established and tip-lines promoted. These national 
efforts can be global in scope, since the Internet 
knows no boundaries. Public education will con-
tinue to play a key role in preventing online finan-
cial victimization, as well as preparing children to 
deal with and report attempts to exploit them.
Prevention efforts should have some ameliorative 
effect, but perpetrators will continue their attempts 
until a credible threat of incarceration can be gener-
ated. Creating this threat will require both interna-
tional cooperation and national action. 
Unfortunately, there is, at present, no international 
agreement to cooperate on cybercrime, aside from 
the general provisions of the Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime. Establishing such 
an agreement should be seen as a matter of interna-
tional priority.
Within this framework, national law enforcement 
agencies can cooperatively take advantage of the 
anonymity of cyberspace. Undercover work that 
would take months of preparation in the “real 
world” can be conducted by anyone with a terminal 
and a good set of leads. This is unlikely to prevent 
the activity altogether, but may discourage new 
players from entering the market place and reduce 
the incentives for stealing
11
REGIONS UNDER STRESS: 
 WHEN TOC THREATENS 
GOVERNANCE AND STABILITY
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REGIONS UNDER STRESS
When TOC treatens governance and 
stability
The United Nations Security Council has recently 
paid much attention to the threat posed by transna-
tional organized crime. The Secretary-General, 
speaking at the African Union summit in January 
2010, also emphasized the perils of illicit traffick-
ing, particularly drugs. He noted that “Criminal 
networks are very skilled at taking advantage of 
institutional weaknesses on the ground.”1 In Febru-
ary 2010, “The Security Council note(d) with con-
cern the serious threats posed in some cases by drug 
trafficking and transnational organized crime to 
international security in different regions of the 
world.”2 This chapter illustrates what happens when 
transnational criminal activities intersect with a 
region’s governance problems. TOC can present a 
major challenge even where the state is strong, but 
when, for a variety of reasons, the rule of law is 
already weakened, it can pose a genuine threat to 
stability. As this crime further undermines govern-
ance and stability, countries can become locked in a 
vicious circle where social trust is lost and economic 
growth undermined. This challenge is sometimes 
overstated, but, as this chapter illustrates, it is very 
real in some parts of the world. 
The clearest examples are found in countries where 
insurgents draw funds from taxing, or even manag-
ing, organized criminal activities, particularly drug 
trafficking. South-West Asia, South-East Asia, and 
the Andean region are cases in point, and troubled 
areas in these regions have become the world’s lead-
ing sources of illicit drugs. In the absence of the sort 
of outside funding found during the Cold War, 
rebel groups must derive their sustenance from the 
regions they control, and these unstable areas are 
often already enmeshed in drug trafficking. The 
money associated with organized crime can be so 
great that militants may forget about their griev-
ances and focus on satisfying their greed. Even 
where this is not true, drugs pay for bullets and 
provide a lifestyle to combatants that makes them 
less likely to come to the negotiating table.
Drugs trafficking is not the only organized crime 
activity that can keep a rebellion afloat, however. As 
the example of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo illustrates, insurgents can harvest and traffic 
the natural resources present in the areas they con-
trol, generating incomes for warlords that dwarf 
what they could earn in peacetime. Some of the 
world’s poorest countries have been robbed of their 
most valuable resources in this way, and untold 
environmental damage has been done. Africa is 
especially vulnerable to this type of abuse, as dia-
mond-fuelled wars in Angola and Sierra Leone 
demonstrate. The oil-driven conflict in the Niger 
Delta provides a current example.
The map on the next page overlays some of the 
major trafficking flows discussed in this chapter 
with some of the stability challenges experienced 
around the world. It illustrates the interplay between 
conflict, both current and recent, as well as global 
trafficking flows. The presence of United Nations 
Peacekeepers in many of the post-conflict areas 
highlights the importance of the issue for the inter-
national community. 
Organized crime can become even more important 
when rebels gain exclusive control of a portion of a 
country. The pseudo-states thus created have no 
international accountability and, particularly when 
strategically placed, often become trafficking hubs 
and retail centres for all manner of illicit goods and 
services. They also continue to pose a threat to 
national and international security, providing a safe 
haven for international fugitives, including terrorists. 
A large number of UN peace missions are operating 
in regions affected by transnational organized crime, 
including West Africa (UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire, 
UNMIL in Liberia, UNOGBIS in Guinea-Bissau, 
UNIPSIL in Sierra Leone and UNOWA for West 
Africa as a whole), Central Africa (MONUC in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and BONUCA 
in the Central African Republic), East Africa (Soma-
lia), South-West and Central Asia (UNAMA in 
Afghanistan, UNRCCA in Central Asia), and South-
East Europe (UNMIK in Kosovo).
But conflict zones are not the only places where 
transnational organized crime can pose a threat to 
the state. There are a number of areas around the 
world where criminals have become so powerful 
that, rather than seeking to evade the government, 
they begin to directly confront it. In these cases, a 
pattern of symptoms is typically manifest. Investi-
gators, prosecutors, and judges who pursue organ-
ized criminals are threatened and killed. Journalists 
and activists may also be targeted. Corruption is 
detected at the highest levels of government, and 
law enforcement can become paralysed by mistrust. 
Portions of the country may effectively drift beyond 
state control. This is the situation presently con-
fronted in some parts of Central America and West 
Africa, both of which have suffered from a long his-
tory of violence and instability.
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Drug trafficking can also have a catastrophic effect 
on local violence levels. Drug “wars” can rival some 
conflicts in terms of body counts. Of the countries 
with the highest murder rates in the world today, 
many are primary drug source or transit countries. 
Most of these are discussed in the regional profiles 
that follow.
Organized criminals generally do not seek to topple 
the state, but they can provoke a reaction that can 
also threaten long-term peace prospects. A clear 
sign that crime has become a national security threat 
comes when exceptional legal and security measures 
are taken, including calling on the military to help 
re-establish the government’s authority. 
While sometimes necessary to reacquire lost terri-
tory, the long-term use of regular military forces to 
police civilian populations presents risks for the rule 
of law and civil liberties. Military and police offi-
cials may become frustrated with a corrupt or inef-
fective criminal justice system and begin to engage 
in extrajudicial executions. The public may form 
civilian vigilante groups as well. Over time, these 
paramilitary vigilantes can become as big a security 
challenge as the criminals they were formed to 
combat.
In all of these cases, the criminal activity is transna-
tional because the main sources and destinations of 
contraband are typically found in different parts of 
the world. The profits from drug trafficking, for 
example, are drawn from consumers in the wealthi-
est nations. In absolute terms, transnational organ-
ized crime is strongest in the richest countries, but 
its share of total economic activity there is so small 
that it does not rise to become a substantial threat 
to state security. But when this wealth is levelled 
against countries with much smaller economies, 
organized crime is given the resources to overwhelm 
local law enforcement. To cope, these agencies need 
international support for local interventions.
All affected countries must play their part, but these 
are truly transnational problems, and require trans-
national solutions, where all aspects of the market 
chain are assessed and addressed strategically. Too 
often, organized crime is seen only as a national law 
enforcement problem. Because the criminal justice 
system is focused on putting individual criminals in 
prison, efforts against organized crime tend to focus 
on organized groups. But the markets are much 
bigger than the people who presently ply them; 
cocaine has been trafficked from the Andean region 
for over three decades, and while the groups involved 
have changed over time, the flow continues. So too 
do the security challenges it creates. The success of 
the Kimberley Process3 in stopping the flow of blood 
diamonds from West Africa illustrates how strategic 
measures designed to tackle the entire trans national 
market can be far more effective than armed inter-
ventions at the national level.
Of course, sound national law enforcement remains 
essential, and has proven effective in reducing stabil-
ity-threatening organized crime problems to more 
manageable proportions. For example, from the 
1970s to the early 1990s, fuelled by money gained 
in processing and trafficking heroin to the United 
States, Cosa Nostra was able to threaten the stability 
of Italy, a G8 country and the third largest economy 
in Europe. In a situation very similar to that faced in 
Central America today, these transnational criminals 
sought to undermine public will to combat them by 
assassinating a number of high ranking public offi-
cials and engaging in a bombing campaign through-
out the country. Resolute action against the mafia 
brought this onslaught to an end. While Cosa Nostra 
and the other regional Italian mafias still exist, Sicily 
is no longer a transhipment point for heroin, and 
direct attacks against the state are few. 
To experience these sorts of results, affected states 
must be supported in strengthening their domestic 
institutions, but this must be done in the context of 
an international strategy aimed at addressing the 
entire trafficking flow. While Sicily ceased to be a 
major heroin hub, the problem moved on to other 
regions. Over time, the problem may be displaced 
to precisely those areas least capable of coping, 
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REGIONS UNDER STRESS
where organized crime can pose a significant chal-
lenge to the state.
The following pages look in more detail at the ways 
transnational organized crime is posing a challenge 
to stability in areas around the world. In particular, 
a number of case studies are presented in four main 
sections, concerning:
the impact of the transnational cocaine market s 
on the Andean Region, Mesomerica and West 
Africa;
the impact of the transnational heroin market s 
on South-West/Central Asia, South-East  
Europe and South- East Asia;
the impact of minerals smuggling on Central s 
Africa; and
the impact of maritime piracy on the Horn of s 
Africa.
Each of these discussions will look first at the major 
TOC problem confronting the region; though 
many of these regions are subject to multiple con-
traband flows, a single one is usually dominant, 
particularly with regard to its impact on political 
stability. Next, the history, sometimes quite pro-
tracted, of instability in the region is explored. 
Finally, the interaction between these two factors – 
the organized crime problem and political stability 
– is described.
Many other examples could have been included, 
but these are some of the best known instances for 
which there are supporting data. Other areas, 
including Aceh (Indonesia), Sri Lanka, or the Phil-
ippines, have similarly been affected. There is virtu-
ally no region of the world with stability problems 
where organized crime is not an issue. 
Most of these examples involve drug trafficking, for 
the simple reason that drug trafficking generates 
greater revenues than any other form of transna-
tional criminal activity in the world today. In addi-
tion to health and social consequences they bring, 
drugs provide the economic clout for insurgents 
and organized criminals to confront the state. They 
pay for arms and bribes. Competition for these 
profits is typically violent, and the targets for this 
violence can easily shift from rival traffickers to 
officials and other members of the public.
There are a variety of reasons why other forms of 
trafficking are less relevant. Some forms of transna-
tional organized crime that generate high revenues, 
such as human trafficking to Europe, do not con-
centrate this wealth sufficiently to pose a stability 
threat. Firearms trafficking was specifically excluded 
as a topic in this report. Weapons are a necessary 
part of armed violence, of course, but the transfer 
of weapons is usually episodic, rather than part of a 
sustained flow. The weapons themselves are danger-
ous, but the organized criminal activity of traffick-
ing them rarely affects a region’s stability.
ESTIMATED VALUES OF SELECTED TRANSNATIONAL TRAFFICKING FLOWS,FIG. 172:  
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Main transnational organized crime 
threats
Most of the world’s illicit cocaine supply comes 
from the Andean region, primarily from or through 
Colombia. However, Colombia is also the country 
which has made most progress over the last few 
years in curbing the threats to national and interna-
tional security emerging from drug production and 
trafficking. 
The 1980s saw the emergence of the Medellin and 
the Cali “cartels”: large, structured organizations 
that controlled most of the market. Very shortly a 
huge amount of wealth was concentrated in a small 
number of hands. This allowed the cartel members 
to wield tremendous corrupting power and gain 
political influence. The destruction of these cartels 
became an urgent national security issue, and, with 
international cooperation and assistance, they were 
dismantled in the first half of the 1990s.
This did not stop the drug trade, but it did signifi-
cantly reduce its political influence. A large number 
of smaller criminal organizations emerged, some-
times also referred to as ‘cartelitos’. The emergence 
of these groups, in combination with increased 
efforts to curb the transport of raw materials from 
Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, led to 
increased coca cultivation in Colombia in the 
second half of the 1990s. 
Prompted in part by evidence that illegal armed 
groups were taxing the trade, the Government 
intensified its eradication efforts. The area under 
coca cultivation fell from 163,300 ha in 2000 to 
81,800 ha in 2008, mainly due to eradication. 
During the same time, however, yields increased, 
due to the introduction of more efficient farming 
and processing techniques, before declining again 
in recent years. In sum, Colombian cocaine produc-
tion declined by 35% between 2000 and 2008. 
In parallel, traffickers in Peru and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia began to manufacture cocaine. By 
2008, about half of the world’s finished cocaine 
products originated in these two countries, and was 
shipped to the growing markets of South America 
and Europe. Powder cocaine destined for Europe is 
often shipped via Brazil and various West African 
and Southern African countries. Criminal groups in 
Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia are, in 
general, only involved in shipping the cocaine 
within the region to neighboring countries, where 
international syndicates take over the trafficking.
Security/governance situation
Leftist guerilla groups emerged in the mid-1960s in 
Colombia. Several of the left-wing rebel groups 
later joined the political system, leaving the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and 
the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) as the 
two main guerilla forces.6
Right-wing paramilitaries emerged in the 1980s, 
initially to protect the interests of the large farmers 
and other business owners. By 1997, the paramili-
COCA BUSH CULTIVATION IN THE ANDEAN REGION, FIG. 173: 1990-2008
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tary groups amalgamated under the umbrella of the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).7 The 
‘services’ of the paramilitary groups were, however, 
also sought by various organized crime groups to 
protect their smuggling activities. Eventually, the 
AUC itself emerged as a key organizer of cocaine 
trafficking. 
The country’s overall security situation deteriorated 
around 2000, as the FARC, the ELN and the AUC 
started to control ever larger parts of the Colombian 
territory, partly financed through drug money. With 
the strong decline in coca cultivation over the 2000-
2008 period, and the regaining of the territory by 
the Government, the security situation improved 
again. Starting in 2003, many members of the AUC 
were demobilized through an amnesty process. But, 
as described below, the threat has not passed, and 
the country continues the struggle against illegal 
armed groups. 
The main security threats for Peru have been the 
activities of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), 
a Maoist group which started its operations in the 
Ayacucho region of Peru, close to the coca cultiva-
tion centres of Apurimac-Ene. Its activities were 
later concentrated in the Huallaga valley, Peru’s 
largest coca producing area (Alto Huallaga). The 
leader of the Shining Path was arrested in 1992 and 
the rebel group started to disintegrate. Links with 
drug trafficking groups, however, enabled the Shin-
ing Path to survive. In line with growing coca culti-
vation in recent years, sporadic attacks against army 
patrols increased again after 2006.8 
Linkages between TOC and stability 
threats
The progress made in Colombia over the last few 
years in reducing the threats emerging from the 
narco-business has been impressive, as shown above. 
Nonetheless, the overall situation remains fragile. 
Without the continuation of efforts, Colombia 
could fall back to where it was a few years ago. 
As the cocaine economy expanded, the number of 
homicides rose in Colombia from around 5,000 per 
year in the late 1970s to some 30,000 in the early 
1990s.9 But when the large cartels were dismantled 
in the early 1990s, violence began to decline again. 
The smaller groups assumed a lower profile and 
avoided open confrontations with the authorities. 
Large amounts of cocaine continued to flow out of 
the country, but homicides declined from around 
28,000 in 1993 to 23,000 in 1998. 
This trend was briefly reversed in the late 1990s, as 
both the insurgents and the paramilitaries increased 
their role in the drug business. The left-wing groups 
have primarily taxed coca cultivation in the areas 
under their control, with the FARC engaging in 
some manufacture and local trafficking to neigh-
bouring Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 
Ecuador. The paramilitary groups, on the other 
hand, increasingly focused on providing services to 
trafficking groups, and even trafficking themselves. 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the 
AUC reportedly made some 70% of its total income 
from drug related activities, mostly related to the 
cocaine business. The international reach of the 
AUC tended to be much larger than that of the 
FARC, extending to Mexico and in some cases to 
the USA. 
When the Colombian Government began to regain 
territory lost to the militants, the homicide rate 
began to decline again. Important areas controlled 
by the FARC, including some of the country’s coca 
producing areas, were recovered. The number of 
persons enlisted in the insurgent groups in Colom-
bia (excluding the AUC) declined from 33,800 
persons in 2002 to 13,200 in 2007. From 2003, the 
Government also began to dismantle the 32,000-
strong AUC. As a result, the number of homicides 
in Colombia fell by some 45% between 2002 and 
2008 to 16,000 persons, the lowest number over 
the last two decades.
Similar trends to those seen in Colombia over the 
last few years can also be observed in Peru. In line 
with a massive decline of coca cultivation in the 
1990s, terrorist incidents, mostly related to the 
activities of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) 
operating out of the main coca cultivation areas of 
the country, declined drastically.
While revenues from the cocaine business declined, 
overall economic development improved. In Peru, 
GDP grew by 4% per year over the 1990-2000 
period, that is, more than the overall economic 
growth in Latin America and the Caribbean over 
the same period (3.3% per year). Similarly, the 
Colombian economy grew, on average, by 4.4% per 
year over the 2000-2008 period, which was above 
the average for the Latin America and Caribbean 
region (3.6%). In parallel, corruption declined in 
Colombia. In 1999, Transparency International 
rated Colombia the country most affected by cor-
ruption in South America. By 2009, it had the 
second best rating, second only to Chile.11 
Despite these remarkable achievements, the danger 
has not passed, and the armed groups have not been 
eliminated. The Shining Path in Peru is still active 
and has been launching sporadic attacks, particu-
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larly after 2006. In Colombia, there were illegal 
armed groups in 79% of the municipalities where 
coca was cultivated in 2008, while in non-coca 
growing areas the proportion was significantly lower 
(27%).12 There are also indications that some of the 
former members of the dismantled AUC have re-
organized themselves to become full-fledged 
cocaine-trafficking organizations. Out of the 31,700 
persons that were enlisted in the various AUC 
groups in 2003, around 4,800 persons may have 
become members in the new paramilitary/traffick-
ing organizations.13 There have even been claims 
that elements in the FARC and the AUC are col-
laborating in producing cocaine.
As the situation in Colombia improves, the situa-
tion in the 0neighboring Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela appears to be in decline. The single larg-
est cocaine seizure in 2008 was 4.1 tons of cocaine 
seized from a commercial vessel coming from the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and 2.5 tons were 
also seized on a fishing boat coming from that 
country.14 According to the new Maritime Analysis 
Operation Centre (MAOC-N), more than half 
(51%) of all intercepted shipments in the Atlantic 
(67 maritime events over the 2006-08 period) 
started their journey in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela. Direct shipments from Colombia, in 
contrast, accounted for just 5%.15 the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela’s murder rate has risen in 
recent years, and is now among the highest in the 
world. Its standing in the Transparency Interna-
tional rankings has also dropped. At the same time, 
all available information suggests that profits made 
by Venezuelan organized crime groups are still sub-
stantially lower than those made by Colombian 
organized crime groups.
Trafficking to markets in both North America and 
Europe may have generated Colombian drug traf-
fickers some US$6.6 billion in sales (US$6 billion 
in gross profits) in 2008.16 This is more than twice 
as much as the US$2.7 billion of gross profits gen-
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erated by Afghan opiate traders in 2008. The gross 
profits made by the Colombian groups were, how-
ever, equivalent to only 2.5% of Colombia’s GDP 
in 2008, while the equivalent ratio in Afghanistan 
was 26%.17
Colombia has long struggled with this intractable 
blend of organized crime and insurgency, and while 
it has received international assistance, much of this 
has been aimed at drug interdiction within the 
country itself. Significant progress has been made 
by Colombia in recent years, but much more could 
be done on addressing the entire trafficking chain 
through better coordinated international efforts. 
The problems linked to the transnational cocaine 
market have implications for a number of countries, 
including Colombia, Peru, the Bolivarian Republic 
of  Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, other countries of 
Central America, most countries of the Caribbean, 
Mexico, the USA as well as countries in West Africa 
and Europe. All concerned countries’ problems have 
been aggravated by factors outside their control, 
and the resulting instability can likewise have an 
impact on areas outside its jurisdiction. To address 
a problem that affects South America, Central 
America, North America, Europe, Africa, and the 
rest of the world, a global strategic plan to combat 
the cocaine trade is needed.
AREA UNDER COCA CULTIVATION AND TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN PERU,FIG. 176:  
1986-2005
Source: DEVIDA, Cocaine production Monitoring in the Andean region,  
Lima, July 2004; UNODC cultivation data
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Main transnational organized  
crime threats
There are many transnational organized crime threats 
affecting West Africa, including the trafficking of 
cocaine, natural resources (including oil), cigarettes, 
counterfeit medication, women, small arms, toxic 
waste, and migrant workers. Of these, two forms of 
contraband currently pose a real threat to the stabil-
ity of states in the region: cocaine and natural 
resources. The other organized crime problems are 
serious for other reasons, but they do not concen-
trate enough money into a small enough number of 
hands to pose a real challenge to the state.
Large-scale cocaine trafficking through the region 
was first detected in 2004, symptomatic of a shift in 
the centre of gravity of the global market from the 
USA to Europe. West African traffickers had long 
been active in small-scale import and marketing of 
cocaine in Europe, as they have been in many other 
parts of the world. But around this time individuals 
based in West Africa began to provide logistic assist-
ance to Colombian traffickers in organizing their 
maritime shipments to Europe from at least two 
hubs: one centred on Guinea-Bissau and Guinea in 
the north, and one centred on the Bight of Benin in 
the south, both involving Nigerian nationals. 
Mother ships from South America could unload 
cargoes to smaller craft from the coast, and the 
cocaine could be stored, repackaged, and redirected 
to European buyers from this vantage. In exchange 
for their services, it is believed that the West Afri-
cans were paid in kind: they were allowed to retain 
up to one third of the shipment to traffic on their 
own behalf, which they did mainly via commercial 
air couriers.
By 2008, the situation began to change. Height-
ened international awareness of the threat made 
trafficking via West Africa more difficult. In addi-
tion, a series of events shifted the political terrain in 
the northern hub. In August 2008, the head of the 
navy of Guinea-Bissau fled the country under alle-
gations that he was orchestrating a coup d’état. In 
December 2008, the man who had ruled Guinea 
for 24 years died, and a military cabal took control, 
later arresting two of the dictator’s sons and several 
prominent officials for their involvement in drug 
trafficking. In March 2009, the head of the army of 
Guinea-Bissau was murdered, and, shortly after-
ward, in an apparent reprisal attack, so was the 
president. Finally, a series of very large seizures of 
cocaine disappeared while in police custody. The 
owners of these shipments, Colombian traffickers, 
may have concluded that their West African part-
ners had decided to keep 100%, rather than one 
third, of the consignment, and terminated relations 
on this basis. Whatever the cause, both maritime 
seizures and airport seizures on flights originating in 
West Africa virtually disappeared at the end of 
2008. Some trans-Atlantic traffic may have shifted 
to private aircraft, however, as the recent crash of a 
Boeing 727 jet in central Mali suggests. Some may 
be trafficked by means as yet undiscovered. The 
cocaine trade through West Africa continues, but 
apparently at a reduced rate of perhaps 25 tons per 
year, with a retail market value of US$6.8 billion at 
destination in 2008. However, there is anecdotal 
information from law enforcement circles that 
cocaine trafficking via West Africa may have started 
to increase again in late 2009 and in 2010 as traf-
fickers are trying out new routes, including ship-
ments via the Sahara for transit destinations in 
northern Africa and final destinations in Europe.
West Africa has also been affected by trafficking of 
natural resources. One of the best documented cases 
involved the trafficking of diamonds from Sierra 
Leone, often via Liberia, with the funds supporting 
the rebel Revolutionary United Front and the crimi-
nal regime of Charles Taylor. While this trade has 
largely been tamed due to the end of the war and the 
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implementation of the Kimberley Process, an older 
trafficking flow endures: the illegal “bunkering” of 
oil from the Niger Delta in Nigeria. 
Oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1956 and has 
played an important role in domestic politics since 
that time. During the Nigerian Civil War (1967-
1970), the rebel Igbo Biafrans devised simplified 
ways of refining the high quality crude of the Delta, 
allowing local marketing of stolen oil. Today, oil 
bunkering is inextricably entangled in the militant 
struggle in the Niger Delta. A series of organized 
armed groups have demanded the Government and 
the international oil companies give a larger share of 
the wealth of their land to the local people and to 
compensate them for damage done to waterways 
and farm land. These militants fund themselves 
through a variety of criminal activities, including 
kidnapping of oil company employees, but their 
mainstay has long been the trade in stolen oil.
The stability/governance situation
West Africa is one of the the poorest and least stable 
regions on earth. All but three of the 16 countries 
in this region are on the United Nations list of the 
“least developed countries”, including the five coun-
tries with the very lowest levels of human develop-
ment. Since independence, West Africa has 
experienced at least 58 coups and attempted coups, 
some very recent, such as the 18 February 2010 
coup in Niger. There remain many active rebel 
groups in the region. 
At present, of the 15 nations of the Economic Com-
munity of West African States (ECOWAS), about 
half are experiencing some form of instability. Long-
standing insurgencies are found in Côte d’Ivoire, 
Senegal, Mali, Niger and, arguably, Nigeria. Both 
Sierra Leone and Liberia are continuing to recover 
from brutal civil wars. Mauritania and Guinea 
recently experienced coups d’état, and the president 
of Guinea-Bissau was murdered by his own troops. 
According to one recent rating of the 25 countries 
with the highest risks of instability globally, nine 
were in West Africa: Niger, Mali, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire 
and Benin.18
The United Nations maintains a number of politi-
cal and peace missions in the region, including the 
United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), 
the United Nations Peace-building Support Office 
in Guinea Bissau (UNOGBIS), the United Nations 
Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone, 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Libe-
ria (UNMIL).
Linkages between TOC and stability 
threats
The greatest danger posed by cocaine is its extreme 
value compared to that of local economies. This 
allows traffickers to penetrate to the very highest 
levels of government and the military. Law enforce-
ment officials can be offered more than they could 
SHARE OF COCAINE COURIERS ORIGINATING IN WEST AFRICA DETECTED FIG. 179: 
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earn in a lifetime simply to look the other way. This 
extreme leverage has allowed traffickers to operate 
with very little resistance from the state, and there-
fore little need to resort to violence. There appears 
to have been some violence in elite circles as rivals 
compete for access to these profits, however.
For example, in Guinea-Bissau, several journalists 
and activists have had to flee the country or go into 
hiding after they received death threats for reporting 
on military involvement in drug trafficking. Both 
the then head of the army and the head of the navy 
appear to have been involved in making these 
threats.19 From 2007 onwards, high level officials 
have made similar accusations, including the Inte-
rior Minister and the head of the Judicial Police, but 
none has been able to challenge the military. Drugs 
have been detected arriving on military air strips, 
military officers have been arrested in possession of 
hundreds of kilograms of cocaine, and there have 
been several armed stand-offs between police and 
military forces concerning drug shipments. Drugs 
seized by the police are confiscated by the military 
and then disappear. Accused soldiers, as well as for-
eign traffickers, are simply released from custody. In 
July 2008, both the Attorney General and the Min-
ister of Justice said they had received death threats 
related to investigations into a cocaine seizure.20 
The killing of the president and the army chief of 
staff in March 2009 appears to have been motivated 
more by personal rivalry between the two men than 
by trafficking, although the latter was said to have 
accused the former of involvement prior to the 
2008 elections.The nature of the alleged coup plot 
by the head of the navy is even less clear. But given 
the evidence of corruption and the relative sizes of 
the contraband and the economy, virtually every 
political conflict has criminal undertones.
Guinea-Bissau is not unique in this respect. In 
Guinea, the presidential guard, commanded by one 
of the president’s sons, appears to have been involved 
in drug trafficking, alongside a number of high 
ranking public security officials. Another of his sons 
has also been accused of involvement. In Sierra 
Leone, the Minister of Transportation resigned after 
his brother was implicated in the country’s largest 
cocaine seizure. Given their close ties to national 
officials, it is perhaps not surprising that there is 
little evidence of insurgents dealing in the drug. 
There have been allegations that rebels in the north 
of Mali and Niger have been involved in trans-Sa-
haran trafficking, but little evidence is currently 
available on this flow.
 
In contrast, oil bunkering in Nigeria has been very 
much a rebel activity from the start, although the 
political objectives of the thieves have always been 
vague. The Niger Delta rebels argue that their por-
tion of the country has been left undeveloped and 
subjected to environmental abuses, even as Nigeria’s 
most valuable resource is extracted from the Delta. 
But as time has passed, it has become difficult to 
distinguish those with political motivations from 
those with financial ones. The integrity of the oil 
trade is particularly important to regional stability 
because Nigeria accounts for over half the popula-
tion of the region and over 60% of the regional 
GDP. Oil comprises 95% of Nigeria’s foreign 
exchange earnings and up to 80% of budgetary 
revenues.21 In turn, Nigeria is a key trading partner 
for the other countries of the region, so a large share 
of the region’s population is dependent on the oil 
sector. Thousands have died in the armed struggle, 
which itself has absorbed a large amount of national 
security resources.
From August to October 2009, Nigerian President 
Umaru Yar’Adua offered a pardon and cash pay-
ments to rebels who laid down their arms, and 
many of the most prominent leaders took him up 
on this offer. The major militant umbrella group, 
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (MEND) declared a ceasefire at the same 
time. But in February 2010, MEND retracted this 
ceasefire, calling the amnesty process a “sham” and 
warning the oil companies to prepare for “all-out 
onslaught”.22 The conflict and the smuggling con-
tinue.
The countries of West Africa need help in strength-
ening their capacity to resist transnational organ-
ized crime. Recent efforts against the cocaine trade, 
with the support of the international community, 
have shown promising results. But, rich or poor, 
there isn’t a region in the world that can be entirely 
shielded against transnational organized crime. 
West Africa remains particularly exposed, and the 
region will continue to face serious potential threats 
to governance and stability so long as transnational 
contraband markets are not addressed.
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Main transnational organized  
crime threat
A great deal of international attention has been 
placed on the drug-related violence in Mexico, with 
some even arguing that the country is in danger of 
being severely destabilized. Less attention has been 
placed on Central America, where the murder rates 
are four to five times higher than in Mexico, and 
where both the economy and the state are far less 
robust and resilient. While the drug violence has 
been intense in places like Ciudad Juarez, Mexico’s 
overall murder rate remains moderate compared to 
many other countries afflicted by the drug trade. 
On the other hand, the Mexican cocaine traffickers 
appear to be evolving into multi-crime groups, with 
the ability to shift investment to other areas if the 
cocaine trade declines.
Unlike Mexico, the Central American countries 
have high levels of violence unrelated to the drug 
trade – a legacy of longstanding social divisions and 
decades of civil war. The highest murder rates in 
these countries are seen not in the largest cities, but 
in provinces with a special role in the drug trade, 
often ports or border crossing points. For example, 
the rural Petén province in Guatemala, particularly 
affected by the drug trade, has the highest murder 
rate in the country. The death count has risen over 
time, as a growing share of cocaine trafficking is 
conducted through this region. 
The territory of Mexico has long been used by traf-
fickers as a conduit for cocaine destined for the 
USA, but as noted above, the groups in Mexico 
have progressively wrested control of this flow from 
their Colombian suppliers over time. Today, some 
180 tons of cocaine, bringing about US$6 billion to 
the regional cartels, transits Central America and 
Mexico annually. A sudden drop in consumption in 
the United States after 2006,  almost certainly 
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related to loss of supply, has rendered competition 
for the remaining market even more intense. It may 
also be prompting trafficking organizations to 
diversify their operations.
The wealth associated with cocaine trafficking has 
created large and powerful organized crime groups. 
These groups command manpower and weaponry 
sufficient to challenge the state when threatened, 
including access to military arms and explosives. 
They also have the funds to sow widespread and 
high-level corruption.
In Mexico, the cocaine trade is now dominated by 
a number of “cartels” who compete to control 
border crossings and transportation routes. The 
leadership, turf, and structure of these groups has 
shifted over time as conflict both within and 
between the cartels, as well as enforcement efforts, 
force realignments. As of early 2010, the dominant 
cartels were the following:
The Sinaloa Federations  , led by billionaire, 
and Mexico’s most wanted man, Joaquin “El 
Chapo” Guzman;
The Gulf Cartels  , once the most powerful 
criminal organization in Mexico, now greatly 
weakened by the defection of Los Zetas;
Los Zetass  , founded when a group of special 
forces soldiers defected to the Gulf Cartel and 
now operating as a traﬃcking organization in 
its own right;
The Juarez Cartels  , also known as the Carrillo 
Fuentes Organization, which is struggling to 
maintain control over its plaza (smuggling turf ) 
in Ciudad Juarez, the city most aﬀected by car-
tel violence;
The Tijuana Cartels  , also known as the Arellano 
Felix Organization, which is similarly struggling 
to maintain control over the Tijuana plaza.
The Beltran Leyva Organizations  , a breakaway 
from the Sinaloa cartel, now weakened by the 
police killing of its leader, Arturo Beltran Leyva, 
on 19 December 2009.
La Familia Michoacanas  , a Zetas breakaway 
based in Michoacan but expanding, renowned 
for its penchant for beheadings, quasi-religious 
ideology, and domination of methamphetamine 
production.
Perhaps due to the recent slump in the cocaine 
trade, these groups are progressively engaging in a 
number of other organized crime activities, includ-
ing migrant smuggling, kidnapping, and extortion 
(including “taxing” businesses) – all crimes that 
were prevalent in Mexico before cartel involvement. 
La Familia, which espouses a bizarre ideology com-
bining aspects of evangelical Christianity with revo-
lutionary populism, provides the most extreme 
example, “taxing” businesses in the areas they con-
trol and engaging in very public displays of violence 
to soften resistance.
Though the total flow has declined, the share of 
northbound cocaine passing through Central Amer-
ica (particularly Guatemala and Honduras) appears 
to have increased. The groups involved in this region 
are less well defined. For most forms of crime in the 
region, the blame often falls on two street gang 
confederations founded by deportees from the USA: 
Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and Calle 18 (M18). 
But there is little evidence that these groups, com-
prised of street youths intensely focused on neigh-
borhood issues, are widely engaged in large-scale 
transnational drug trafficking. Most are based in 
inland cities, far from the maritime routes along 
which most cocaine flows before arriving in Mexico. 
They are certainly culpable in street sales in the 
areas they control, but their capacity to engage in 
bulk transnational smuggling is questionable. Some 
may be recruited as hit men by the Mexican organ-
izations, but as they frequently tattoo their faces as 
a sign of their commitment to the gang, they are 
ill-suited for any operation involving possible con-
tact with the public or the authorities. The maras 
have engaged in demonstrative violence in the past, 
including the random killing of civilians, but there 
is little to indicate they have any kind of political 
agenda, aside from avoiding police interference with 
their affairs.
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The repeated arrests of high level officials in the 
police and the military, in contrast, suggest that the 
main traffickers in Central America are far more 
sophisticated than street gangsters, and are tied to 
some members of the ruling elites, rather than the 
underclass. There is also growing evidence of Mexi-
can cartel penetration into Central America, par-
ticularly regarding Los Zetas in Guatemala and the 
Sinaloa Federation in Honduras.
The stability/governance situation
The Northern Triangle of Central America is still 
reeling from the brutal civil wars in Guatemala 
(1960-1996) and El Salvador (1980-1992). The 
region suffers from having one of the most unequal 
distributions of income in the world, comparable 
only to southern Africa or the Andean region. Small 
elites working with strong militaries have long 
dominated countries in this region, exporting agri-
cultural commodities, as well as engaging in other 
labor-intensive enterprises. All countries in this 
region score poorly in governance indicators, par-
ticularly with regard to the rule of law, and the 
threat of renewed instability and conflict remains. 
Guatemala has long had a problem with vigilante 
justice, a response to a lack of police presence in 
much of the country. Honduras experienced a coup 
d’état in 2009, when the serving president attempted 
to attain public support for an extended term of 
office.
As a result of this legacy of violence, instability, and 
inequality, the Northern Triangle of Central Amer-
ica has the highest murder rate of any region in the 
world, and very high rates of other forms of violent 
crime. It has also experienced political violence, and 
at times the distinction between criminal and polit-
ical violence can be difficult to discern. Street gangs 
appear to be a symptom, rather than a driving cause, 
of this underlying violence.
Mexico is very different from her southern neigh-
bors, having a much larger and diversified economy, 
a stronger government, and milder social divisions. 
Nonetheless, insecurity in some parts of the country 
has become intense, and drug-related corruption 
has had an impact on national institutions.
Linkages between TOC and stability 
threats
Organized crime threatens stability, to varying 
degrees, in both Mexico and the northern triangle 
of Central America. In some areas, the civilian 
police have been both corrupted and outgunned, 
and the military has been brought in to recapture 
territory lost to criminal groups. These groups have 
gone on the offensive, murdering a number of 
prominent law enforcement officials who dared to 
oppose them. For example, in December 2009, the 
head of the Honduran anti-drug agency was mur-
dered, as was Mexico’s federal police chief in 2008. 
Organized criminals also target rank-and-file police 
officers for retaliatory killings. In June 2009, 12 
federal police agents were tortured, killed, and their 
bodies dumped when the Mexican police arrested a 
high ranking member of La Familia Michoacana. 
Civilians have also been targeted for demonstrative 
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attacks, such as 2008 Independence Day grenade 
attacks in Morelia.
In all of these countries, corruption at the highest 
levels, on occasion including the national heads of 
police and drug enforcement agencies, has been 
detected. For example, in Guatemala in August 
2009, President Colom fired the director general of 
the national police, his deputy, his operations head, 
and his investigations head after a large amount of 
cocaine and cash went missing. This was far from 
the first such purging in Guatemala in recent years. 
In 2005, the head of the drug enforcement agency, 
his deputy, and another top drugs official were 
arrested for drug trafficking after being lured to the 
USA on pretence of training. The drug enforce-
ment branch they commanded was itself a rework-
ing of a previous agency, which had been disbanded 
following arrests of members for similar diversions. 
The agency has been reworked yet again in 2009.
Similarly, in August 2008, the Mexican Govern-
ment launched “Operation Cleanup”, aimed at 
purging the top ranks of the police of drug cartel 
corruption. The operation resulted in the jailing of 
both the interim commissioner of the Federal Police 
and the acting head of the counternarcotics divi-
sion, among others. The same month, El Salvador’s 
chief of police resigned when two top aides were 
accused of drug links. The corruption extends out-
side the police, and has implicated other criminal 
justice officials, legislators, and members of state 
and local government. 
But this situation is complicated: accusations of 
drug complicity can be used to take out opponents, 
and some of those assassinated by the traffickers 
may have been erstwhile collaborators. The fact that 
high level corruption continues to be detected and 
the officials removed shows the struggle is very 
much alive and that progress is being made.
The complexity of the situation is perhaps best 
illustrated by a drug scandal that began on 19 Feb-
ruary 2007, when three Salvadoran representatives 
to the Central American parliament (Parlacen) in 
Guatemala were killed after inexplicably departing 
from their motorcade. Their murderers were quickly 
identified as the head of Guatemala’s criminal inves-
tigations division and three of his men. One of 
these arrestees claimed they had been hired to hijack 
the car, which was allegedly carrying cocaine worth 
US$5 million. The arrestees were never able to 
elaborate, however, as they were all shot dead while 
in custody in a high-security prison on 25 February. 
This incident led the serving Interior Minister to 
tender his resignation. Since then, two key investi-
gators have been murdered, and the United Nations 
International Commission against Impunity in 
Guatemala (CICIG) has accused the Attorney Gen-
eral of interfering in the investigation of one of 
these cases.
Aside from its corrosive effect on law enforcement 
integrity, the cocaine trade has also propelled the 
murder rate in the northern triangle of Central 
America to the highest in the world. Figure 180 
demonstrates the clear linkages between drug traf-
ficking and violence. Contrary to what would be 
expected, in none of these countries is the highest 
murder rate found in the largest cities: rather, it is 
found in provinces that have strategic value to drug 
traffickers. For example, Guatemala’s Petén prov-
ince is rural and largely indigenous, two variables 
that negatively correlate with violence elsewhere in 
the country. But it is also a major drug trafficking 
zone, where jungle landing strips provide easy access 
to the Mexican border. Consequently, it has the 
highest murder rates in the country. Other prov-
inces have the misfortune of containing key traf-
ficking ports, such as the provinces of Atlántida in 
Honduras, Sonsonate in El Salvador, Escuintla in 
Guatemala and Michoacán in Mexico.
Honduras has the unfortunate distinction of having 
the fastest growing murder rate in the region, which 
may be associated with its increased use of the 
country as landing site for cocaine-laden aircraft 
from Colombia and the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela. It also hosts the province with the single 
highest murder rate in the region: Atlántida, where 
one out of every 1000 people was murdered last 
year. The capital of Atlántida is La Ceiba, a well-
known cocaine trafficking port, and the site of clan-
destine landing strips.25 As mentioned above, in 
December 2009, General Aristides Gonzalez, direc-
tor general of the national office for combating 
drug trafficking, was murdered. The General had 
gone on a campaign against the unauthorised air-
ports found across the country, some of which are 
said to be linked to the Sinaloa cartel. Just before his 
murder, he had seized a major strip and threatened 
to take action against all property owners on whose 
land the strips were found. 
Some have argued that the violence in Mexico is 
tied to the Government’s efforts to stop the drug 
trade, not the drug trade itself. While it is true that 
enforcement can create instability in drug markets 
that can lead to violence, enforcement in countries 
like Guatemala is much weaker, and the murder 
rate is at least four times higher. In addition, most 
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of the deaths in the “cartel wars” are of cartel mem-
bers themselves, fighting over trafficking routes. 
These groups have shown their willingness to diver-
sify into other areas of crime, and recent losses in 
cocaine revenues seems only to have intensified the 
violence. A policy of appeasement is impractical: 
these people, and corrupt officials who support 
them, cannot be allowed to remain in place. The 
treatment is painful, but the alternative is to lose the 
patient itself.
This may sound like an exaggeration, but many 
who have worked closely with law enforcement in 
the region concur. In December 2008, the head of 
UN CICIG said, “If the Guatemalan authorities are 
unable to stop the infiltration of Mexican drug 
cartels, in two years they could take over Guatemala 
City.”26 President Colom has issued a series of “state 
of prevention” orders in response to the violence in 
which constitutional liberties are restricted for a 
period of time in certain parts of the country, and 
there have been a series of attacks against labor 
union leaders, environmentalists, and human rights 
defenders.27 While Guatemala appears to be the 
most affected, its problems are not unique, and the 
stability of all countries in this region requires that 
transnational organized crime be controlled.
To do this, the states need support in strengthening 
local law enforcement and governance. But even 
more important, they need the assistance of the 
international community in addressing the transna-
tional flows affecting their countries. The drug wars 
they face are fuelled by a cocaine trade that runs the 
length of the region. Mexico’s killers are armed 
largely by weapons trafficked from the north, but 
also from the south. Dealing with these threats will 
require both national institution building and a 
global strategy to address the relevant trafficking 
flows.
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Afghanistan has dominated the worldwide opium 
market for more than a decade and 2009 was no 
exception as overall opium production in the coun-
try now stands at 6,900 metric tons, or some 90% 
of global supply. The impact extends beyond 
Afghanistan itself, affecting neighbors with stability 
issues of their own. An estimated 375 tons of Afghan 
heroin are trafficked worldwide via routes flowing 
into and through the neighboring countries of Paki-
stan (150 tons), the Islamic Republic of Iran (105 
tons), and the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (95 tons).28 Most of 
the drugs are bound for the lucrative markets in 
Europe and the Russian Federation, but drug use in 
the region is rising. 
The heroin trade is controlled by well-established 
trafficking networks of various sizes in cooperation 
with corrupt officials with a range of international 
connections.29 Some of the larger traffickers and 
corrupt officials may launder their money interna-
tionally, particularly in the nearby financial hub of 
Dubai. Despite robust efforts by Dubai authorities,30 
the Emirate’s proximity to Afghanistan, the pres-
ence of an important South Asian diaspora and 
large informal financial systems leave Dubai par-
ticularly vulnerable to exploitation by criminal 
gangs and, possibly, terrorist groups. 
In Afghanistan, where 80 to 90% of the economy 
is still informal, the hawala system of money trans-
fer remains prevalent: money is paid to a network’s 
representatives in one country, and this broker 
authorizes the same amount to be paid out in 
another. All this occurs outside the formal banking 
system, and this allows criminal funds to be trans-
ferred without risk of encountering official con-
trols.31 Narcotics make up a significant portion of 
this informal economy.32 Research by UNODC in 
2006 suggested that 60% of fund transfers in 
Afghanistan were drug related, while an estimated 
80 to 90% of the hawala dealers in Kandahar and 
Hilmand provinces were involved in drug money 
transfers.33 An estimated US$5 to US$6 billion 
were transferred to and from Afghanistan in 2004 
and 2005, through hundreds of hawala markets 
around the country.34
The smuggling of the chemical precursors needed 
to make heroin from opium is also a big business. 
Around 13,000 tons of chemical precursors, includ-
ing the crucial acetic anhydride, are needed each 
year to produce heroin from Afghan opium. There 
is no licit use for these chemicals in Afghanistan, so 
they have to be diverted from legal shipments from 
a wide range of sources around the world. In the 
span of a decade, the price of acetic anhydride in 
Afghanistan has shot up from US$24 per litre in 
1998 to US$300-350 per litre in 2008, either due 
to more effective interdiction or increased demand. 
The concentration of processing in Afghanistan 
should make it easier to interdict chemicals like 
acetic anhydride, but current seizures comprise less 
than 1% of what is believed to be imported into the 
country.35
Although opium is Afghanistan’s most notorious 
crop, the hashish trade has also grown in recent 
years, and total production today may rival that of 
Europe’s traditional supplier, Morocco. All of 
Afghanistan’s neighbors are reporting increases in 
cannabis seizures,36 and cannabis production has 
been reported in 20 of Afghanistan’s 33 provinces.37 
With entrenched smuggling networks, widespread 
insecurity and a drug-based economy, Afghanistan 
is ideally placed to become a major player in the 
global hashish market. In 2008, a single seizure in 
Kandahar province netted an astonishing 236.8 
tons of hashish with a regional wholesale value of 
US$400 million.38 In terms of sheer volume, this 
was the largest drug seizure in history. 
Stability/governance situation
Afghanistan has suffered from more than thirty 
years of conflict beginning with the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan (1979), a war which would last ten 
years, cost more than a million Afghan lives, and 
destroy most of the country’s economy and infra-
structure. Civil strife and warlordism followed the 
Soviet withdrawal (1988), so that many welcomed 
the arrival of the Taliban in 1996. They ruled over 
most of the country until the events of September 
11, 2001 and the international coalition’s interven-
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tion in Afghanistan. Eight years afterward, conflict 
remains a central part of life in the country.
Afghanistan is one of the least developed countries 
in the world in terms of most human development 
indicators. Governance is weak. The writ of the 
central Government is weak and overtly challenged, 
or indeed supplanted, in many parts of the country 
by anti-government elements. The Afghanistan 
NGO Safety Office (ANSO) estimates that insur-
gents control or exert effective influence over nearly 
half of Afghanistan. As the de-facto government in 
some areas, the Taliban’s system of taxation and 
“shadow” tribunals also provides the only form of 
criminal justice and security. As unrest spreads to 
once stable areas, international agencies are being 
forced to scale back aid delivery.
Governance in the provinces is dependent on the 
leadership and integrity of the individual governors 
and on the local security situation. Corruption is 
endemic – both at a low level (among border guards 
and police), as well as among senior officials.39 A 
recent UNODC survey estimated that Afghans 
paid upwards of US$2.5 billion in bribes and related 
payments in 2009. Corruption is also rife along 
trafficking routes all the way from Afghanistan to 
the destination markets of Europe and the Russian 
Federation. 
In terms of casualties, 2009 was the deadliest year 
yet for coalition forces fighting the insurgency, with 
520 troop deaths, up from 295 in 2008. In August 
2009, NATO forces in Afghanistan lost 77 troops, 
setting a new monthly record. Civilian casualties 
rose by 14% in 2009 compared with 2008 and were 
the highest they have been since 2001. Nearly 70 
percent of the more than 2,400 civilian deaths were 
reportedly caused by insurgent attacks. Although 
the number of suicide bombings stayed nearly the 
same (141), the average number of attacks rose by 
30 per cent (from 741 per month in 2008 to 960 
per month in 2009) according to the United Nations 
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA).
Insurgent-led insecurity is no longer confined to 
southern and western Afghanistan, as even the once 
relatively calm northern areas bordering Tajikistan 
have seen anti-government elements resurfacing. 
This is particularly true in Kunduz province where 
the Taliban have steadily staged a resurgence and 
now appear to threaten a vital NATO supply line. 
Violence spilled over the border into Tajikistan in 
2009, with a number of clashes reported between 
Tajik security forces and Al-Qaida linked groups. A 
number of related incidents have also been reported 
in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, perhaps indicating a 
regional destabilization strategy on the part of mili-
tants. 
The Pakistan-Afghanistan border is currently one of 
the most critical regions in terms of insurgency and 
terrorism. From bases in Pakistan’s tribal areas, mil-
itants launch incursions across the border into 
Afghanistan but also increasingly into adjacent 
Pakistani districts/provinces. Once unheard of in 
Pakistan, suicide bombings now occur with grim 
monotony: there were 87 suicide attacks in 2009, 
up nearly 40% from the previous year (and only 6 
in 2006). Violence by Al-Qaida-linked Pakistani 
groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 
previously confined to the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA), has continued to spread to the 
settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province 
(which sustained 60% of all suicide attacks in the 
country in 2009), coming to within 100 kilo meters 
of Islamabad last winter. 
Linkages between TOC and stability 
threats
There is a symbiotic relationship between drug traf-
fickers and the insurgency in Afghanistan, and both 
groups have an interest in prolonging the instability. 
It is no coincidence that in 2009, 99% of all opium 
produced in Afghanistan came from seven provinces 
in the south and west, where government control 
was weakest.40 Drug traffickers focus on regions 
controlled by the Taliban and other anti-government 
forces. The insurgent groups profit from taxing 
illicit trade and some receive donations from crimi-
nals and warlords. Opium is even used as a currency 
to purchase weapons, vehicles, and manpower.
Taliban insurgents earn at least US$125 million 
annually from the opium economy through taxa-
tion of cultivation, production, and trafficking.41 
This figure does not include income from other 
drug-related activities in which they might be 
engaged. This figure is small compared to the over-
all value of the drugs trafficked, but its impact on 
the security of Afghanistan is direct and immediate. 
There have even been reports of joint operations 
between drug traffickers and insurgent groups, 
transferring opium or heroin to major dealers on 
the Afghanistan/Pakistan border and sharing the 
profit.42
There is also some evidence to suggest that insur-
gent groups provide protection for heroin process-
ing facilities within Afghanistan.43 The opiate trade 
and insurgent activity overlap to such an extent that 
some law enforcement actions are both counter-
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narcotics and counter-insurgency simultaneously. 
This was apparent in 2009, when Afghan-led mili-
tary operations in Hilmand province netted mil-
lions of dollars worth of poppy, precursor chemicals, 
weapons, and ammunition.44 Although opium 
poppy is the highest-value drug on regional mar-
kets, cannabis also likely contributes to insurgent 
funding.45 
Borders, particularly with Pakistan, still require 
substantial strengthening, and the rise in volumes of 
goods traded across these borders provides opportu-
nities for both traffickers and insurgents. The 
Afghan Trade Transit Agreement (ATTA), designed 
to promote free trade between Pakistan and Afghan-
istan, is being abused by groups illicitly trafficking 
all kinds of goods, including precursor chemicals. 
The total estimated value of opiate trafficking in 
Pakistan is around US$1 billion per year. Drugs 
trafficked into Pakistan that pass through its Feder-
ally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), travel 
through territory that is under the influence of the 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and other Al-Qaida 
linked groups. Taliban-style taxation systems have 
been reported in these regions as well.46 In southern 
Tajikistan, the porous border with Afghanistan is 
crossed by traffickers but also militants linked to the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other Al-
Qaida linked groups.47 The estimated value of opi-
ates trafficked through Central Asia is around 
US$350-400 million and increases as opiates travel 
northward towards the Russian Federation. 
On Afghanistan’s western front, the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran has suffered greatly from the influx of 
Afghan opium. It has the highest level of opium 
consumption in the world. Drug trafficking is con-
sidered such a major security threat that the Gov-
ernment has spent over US$600 million to dig 
ditches, build barriers and install barbed wire to 
stop well-armed drug convoys from entering the 
country. More than 3,500 Iranian border guards 
have been killed in the past three decades by drug 
traffickers.
In addition to funding insurgency, the drug trade is 
fueling corruption. Afghanistan seized less than 
three tons of heroin in 2008 while about 375 tons 
were estimated to be trafficked out of the country, 
a seizure rate of less than 1%. This appears to reflect 
high levels of corruption among border guards and 
police, as well as collusion with transportation com-
panies. In addition, few drug traffickers are ever 
brought to justice, and some of those that have been 
convicted have been pardoned, suggesting higher 
level corruption as well. At the same time, being a 
member of the judiciary has become a dangerous 
profession. For example, Chief Judge Sher Gul was 
murdered by insurgents in Khost province in August 
2008 while Judge Alim Hanif, who headed the 
Central Narcotics Tribunal Appeals Court in Kabul, 
was murdered in September 2008. 
Widespread corruption, violence, and impunity 
have undermined the confidence of the Afghan 
people in their government, further strengthening 
the hand of the insurgents. Indeed, a portion of the 
Afghan Taliban are non-ideological, more “oppor-
tunistic” fighters motivated by a mixture of political 
discontent and financial need. As the insurgents 
and criminals grow stronger, they are better able to 
sow more violence and corruption, and recruit 
among the disenfranchised.
There was little indication that this vicious circle 
would be broken soon, but there is hope that recent 
political developments will alter the course of events. 
At present, various insurgent groups now control 
large swathes of the Afghan countryside, preventing 
aid from reaching some of the most vulnerable 
communities. At the same time, insurgents are able 
to carry out brazen terror attacks in major popula-
tion centers, such as recent operations in Kabul. 
Instead of focusing on the development needs of 
the Afghans, international aid is tied up in the 
eighth year of fighting the insurgency. Given the 
transcontinental dimensions of the Afghan heroin 
trade and the difficulties in combating drug traf-
ficking in the context of an active conflict, interna-
tionally coordinated action against the global heroin 
market is vital.
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in Italy were Albanians. This percentage dropped to 
22% in 2000-2003 and 13% after 2003. And Italy 
is the one country where Albanian victims are most 
prevalent: of some 10,000 human trafficking vic-
tims detected in Europe and reported to UNODC 
over the period 2005 to 2006, only 56 (about half 
a percent) were Albanian.53 A similar situation can 
be seen with victims from the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. Today’s 
human trafficking victims come from a much wider 
variety of locations, many of them much further 
afield.
The trade in counterfeit cigarettes was once a main-
stay of the belligerent parties, even a key source of 
funding to certain national governments, and it 
remains an important issue. But as far as stability in 
the region is concerned, the biggest crime problem 
facing South-East Europe is domestic: fraud and 
corruption involving some government officials and 
their network of private sector partners. This cor-
ruption is fuelled by complicity in the heroin trade 
and other trafficking activities. The region has 
moved on from the chaos of wartime to a period of 
transition, where opportunities in a rapidly growing 
87
21
31
43
51
89
103
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
NUMBER OF ALBANIAN  FIG. 188: 
HEROIN TRAFFICKING  
SUSPECTS IDENTIFIED IN  
GERMANY,52 2000-2006
40
22
13
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1996-1999 2000-2003 2004-2007
p
er
 c
en
t
Source: Bundeskriminalamt
SHARE OF HUMAN TRAF-FIG. 189: 
FICKING VICTIMS DETECTED 
IN ITALY WHO WERE  
ALBANIAN, 1996-2007
Source: Anti-mafia Bureau and Project WEST
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE BALKANS, FIG. 190: 2007-2009
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF, April 200954
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
A
lb
an
ia
B
os
ni
a 
&
H
er
ze
go
vi
na
B
ul
ga
ria
C
ro
at
ia
F
Y
R
O
M
M
ol
do
va
M
on
te
ne
gr
o
R
om
an
ia
S
er
bi
a
2007
2008
2009
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 g
ro
w
th
 (
%
)
254
REGIONS UNDER STRESS
Cosa Nostra and heroin traﬃcking
From the mid-1970s until the early 1990s, Cosa Nostra threatened the 
national security of a G-8 country from within as no other criminal group 
has done in the western world. The cause of this confrontation was heroin, 
and the threat was only resolved through dedicated and decisive law en-
forcement action.
Rooted in Sicily and in the Italian communities abroad, Cosa Nostra 
reigned as the paramount Italian organized crime group for decades, syn-
onymous in the public imagination with “the maﬁa.” It existed long before 
its rise to prominence, expanding to ﬁll a governance vacuum during the 
process of Italian uniﬁcation. Without formal structures to mediate trans-
actions and resolve disputes, informal structures emerged, including those 
that would evolve into today’s “maﬁa.”i
During its early years, Cosa Nostra assumed a low proﬁle, opting, for ex-
ample, not to carry out abductions in Sicily because of the attention these 
received in the media. Until 1980, there was serious debate as to whether 
the organization really existed.ii This all changed when the Cosa Nostra 
“families” became involved in the international heroin trade.
In the mid-1970s, Cosa Nostra took over heroin traﬃcking from groups 
operating out of Marseilles. Opium was transported directly from Asia to 
Sicily, where it was reﬁned into heroin and traﬃcked into US markets.iii 
In the USA, the heroin was distributed countrywide through a network 
of pizzerias. From 1975 to 1984, this ‘pizza connection’ supplied about 
one third of the entire US market and 80% of the heroin consumed in the 
country’s north-east.iv  
With the introduction of transnational heroin traﬃcking, a provincial rack-
et was transformed into an international business with massive proﬁts, and 
into a threat to the stability of the country. There are at least four ways Cosa 
Nostra posed a threat to state stability in Italy:
By dramatically increasing the murder rate;s 
By mobilizing votes for sympathetic politicians;s 
By assassinating public oﬃcials who opposed them; ands 
By perpetrating quasi-terrorist attacks outside Sicily.s 
With regard to murder, the control of drug routes was the central cause 
of a maﬁa war, which ran between 1981 and 1983. Much to the ire of the 
other families, just a few – in particular the Bontade and Inzerillo families 
– were well positioned to control the 
primary traﬃcking nodes. The ﬁght 
over this key territory left some 1,000 
people dead, giving Palermo a murder 
rate three times the national average 
in 1982. The end result was the domi-
nance of one family – the Corleonesi 
– in the Sicilian heroin trade.v  
The rise in violence produced political 
backlash, which the maﬁa combated 
with its inﬂuence and drug money. 
Cosa Nostra was able to direct tens 
of thousands of votes and used this 
power to gain a margin of impunity. 
Pointing at the close relationship be-
tween some public representatives and 
the families, Judge Giovanni Falcone 
commented in 1987 that: “…this 
convergence of interests with the ma-
ﬁa is one of the most important causes 
of the growth of Cosa Nostra…and 
of the diﬃculties encountered in addressing its criminal manifestations.”vi 
A number of those who could not be inﬂuenced were killed. From 1960 
to 1974, at least eight public oﬃcials were murdered. During the peak of 
the heroin trade, between 1975 and 1985, Cosa Nostra killed at least 20. 
Among these were the president of the Sicilian Region, the head of the 
Communist Party in Sicily, the Palermo chief prosecutor, the local police 
chief and the Prefect of Palermo. 
Investigation into the heroin traﬃcking led to the prosecution of all major 
members of Cosa Nostra in the “Maxi-Trial,” involving about 500 people 
in Palermo and around 30 in New York. In January 1992, most of the 
indicted were sentenced to life imprisonment.
Between the time the ﬁrst Maxi-Trial convictions were announced (1987) 
and August 1992, the violence against the authorities escalated. Five mag-
istrates and many oﬃcers and activists were murdered by Cosa Nostra. 
Among these were the judges Falcone and Borsellino, the masterminds be-
hind the Maxi-Trial, who were assassinated in two separate bomb attacks. 
These murders prompted the stationing of 7,000 troops in Sicily. 
After the arrest of Salvatore Riina, head of the Corleonesi family, in 1993, 
the bombing campaign grew increasingly random. In May, a bomb in 
Rome failed to kill a prominent news anchor, known for his anti-maﬁa 
campaigns. That same month, the Uﬃzi Museum in Florence was bombed, 
killing ﬁve people. In July, a bomb in Milan killed ﬁve people. In the same 
month, two bombs exploded simultaneously in Rome, targeting two ma-
jor churches. Don Puglisi, an anti-maﬁa priest, was killed in Palermo in 
September. In January 1994, Cosa Nostra attempted to kill hundreds of 
people during a football match in Rome, but the bomb they planted at the 
Olympic Stadium failed to explode. 
After 1994, the attacks stopped, and most of the major maﬁa chiefs have 
now been arrested. This progress was made possible because of the par-
ticipation of Sicilian civil society, supported by the national authorities. 
Nowadays, the other Italian maﬁa groups, ‘Ndrangheta and Camorra, ap-
pear to be more prominent than Cosa Nostra. 
This does not mean the Sicilian maﬁa activity has stopped, however. Cosa 
Nostra still plays a role in the US drug market in at least 19 cities. Matteo 
Messina Denaro, believed to be the paramount reigning boss, remains at 
large.vii But Sicily itself is not a drug transit zone anymore and the homicide 
CHRONOLOGY OF MAFIA-RELATED EVENTS IN SICILY
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economy and the possibility of European integra-
tion may prove more attractive than criminal rack-
ets. Of course, renewed political conflict could 
change all this, as could the sudden downturn in 
the economy.
The stability/governance situation
Many of the states in South-East Europe are recent 
creations, and new institutions are still consolidat-
ing. The simultaneous stresses of the transition from 
communism to free markets and the conflicts asso-
ciated with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia 
placed tremendous pressure on the region. It is still 
recovering from this difficult period. 
Unrest between rival ethnic groups in the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began in 1990, just 
as communism was collapsing across Eastern 
Europe. Slovenia was able to secede in a relatively 
short 10-Day War, and the former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia was allowed independence with-
out challenge. But the struggles in Bosnia and 
Croatia were much more protracted, extending 
until 1995 and involving serious war crimes. These 
wars were followed by a conflict in Kosovo until 
1999, and within the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia in 2001.
These conflicts have yet to be entirely resolved. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains under interna-
tional supervision, and tensions between the Fed-
eration and the Republika Srpska have run high. 
Kosovo (Serbia) still hosts a large international 
peacekeeping force and states are divided on the 
question of its final status. The global financial 
crisis, which has had an especially negative impact 
on institutions investing in the Balkans, threatens 
the progress that has been made.
Linkages between TOC and stability 
threats
Organized crime has played a direct role in enabling 
conflict in the region and continues to play a role in 
perpetuating the residual instability. Under com-
munism, organized criminal figures linked to the 
various national secret services smuggled consumer 
goods and performed other needed services that the 
state could not directly perform. These skills would 
prove invaluable during the conflict period, when 
evading sanctions was essential for all the antago-
nists. They were also useful in navigating the priva-
tization process, where entrepreneurial instinct and 
informal pressure played a key role.
During the Yugoslav wars, all sides depended on 
smugglers. For the rump Yugoslavia, oil was essen-
rate in Palermo (0.6 per 100,000 inhabitants) today is one 
of the lowest in Europe.viii 
The history of Cosa Nostra shows what can happen when 
an under-governed region meets a lucrative transnational 
traﬃcking ﬂow, but it also demonstrates how, with po-
litical will, public support, international cooperation, and 
suﬃcient resources, even the most powerful gangsters can 
be brought to heel.
The heroin trade that ignited a long period of violence in 
Italy is still strong and going through other regions, some-
times with consequences worse than those suﬀered in Italy. 
Addressing criminal groups can be of great beneﬁt to indi-
vidual states, but to deal with a problem of international 
dimensions, collaborative eﬀorts to treat the entire traﬃck-
ing ﬂow are needed.
i Paolo Borsellino, Lezione sulla Maﬁa, lecture in Bassano del 
Grappa, 1989; Antonio Gramsci, Alcuni Temi sulla Questione 
Meridionale, 1935.
ii Giovanni Falcone, Marcelle Padovani, Cose di Cosa Nostra, 
Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 1991.
iii Ibid., Saverio Lodato, Trent’Anni di Maﬁa, Saggi, Bibliote-
ca Universale Rizzoli 2006; John Dickie, Cosa Nostra – A 
history of the Sicilian Maﬁa, Coronet Books, 2004. 
iv Giovanni Falcone, Marcelle Padovani ‘Cose di Cosa Nostra’ 
Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, Time Magazine  “Busting a 
pizza connection” 23 April 1984. John Dickie, Cosa Nostra – 
A history of the Sicilian Maﬁa, Coronet Books, 2004. 
v Pino Arlacchi, Addio Cosa Nostra - la vita di Tommaso Bu-
scetta, Rizzoli, 1994; John Dickie, Cosa Nostra – A history of 
the Sicilian Maﬁa, Coronet Books, 2004; Giovanni Falcone, 
Marcelle Padovani, Cose di Cosa Nostra, Biblioteca Universa-
le Rizzoli, 1991.
vi Final sentence of the Maxi-Trial ﬁrst instance, 17 July 1987.
vii Magazine S,  Ho visto Messina Denaro, August 2009.
viii BRA, Crime Statistics 2008; HEUNI, Criminal Justice 
Systems in Europe and North America, Finland, 2001.
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tial; for other parties, weapons and other materiel. 
Many traffickers sold to both sides in the conflict. 
Some factions relied on trafficking as a source of 
funding. Smuggling cigarettes to the region and 
into Western Europe was one important money 
spinner, and heroin was another. Criminal activities 
extended beyond the region into the extensive 
Balkan diaspora in Western Europe and throughout 
the world.
Even more directly, organized criminals were often 
among the antagonists, deployed in volunteer bri-
gades or paramilitaries or even as commissioned 
officers of the warring factions. These groups were 
responsible for some of the worst atrocities of the 
war. One of the key objectives was to “cleanse” dis-
puted areas of rival ethnicities, and for this, author-
ized criminals were often more effective than a 
military approach. “Rape camps” were organized, 
making use of female prisoners of war,55 and traf-
ficking in women for the purposes of sexual exploi-
tation continued to be an issue even after the 
peacekeepers arrived.56 In these ways, organized 
crime became an instrument of war. War and priva-
tization took place simultaneously, and organized 
criminals were well placed to take advantage of this 
process.57
Once the war in Yugoslavia began to cool, another 
front opened up. In 1997, the economy and gov-
ernment of Albania collapsed when a series of 
nationwide pyramid schemes ran insolvent. Around 
this time, fighting began between ethnic Albanian 
Kosovars and the forces of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and this continued through to 1999. 
The Kosovo Liberation Army received weapons 
looted from the armories of Albania and support 
from the Albanian diaspora community. It also 
drew funds from heroin trafficking, making use of 
diaspora networks in Italy, Switzerland, and else-
where in Europe. In 2001, ethnic Albanians in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia rebelled, a 
move that some have said was motivated more by 
criminal interests than political ones.
During the conflict, Albanian traffickers enjoyed a 
great advantage in the heroin market, due to chaos 
in their home areas and large diaspora populations 
in several key destinations, including Italy, the sec-
ond-largest heroin market in Europe. They were 
also highly motivated, since they were engaged in a 
civil war. When the war ended and a moratorium 
was imposed on speedboat traffic between the two 
countries, these traffickers lost their privileged posi-
tion. Their declining participation in West Euro-
pean heroin markets can be seen in declining arrest 
and seizure figures, as noted above. It can also be 
seen in the decline of their traditional allies in Italy, 
the criminal group Sacra Corona Unita.
Without these organized criminal activities and the 
funds they provided, the wars could have been 
much shorter, and the parties quicker to come to 
the negotiating table. Having penetrated govern-
ment and business, criminal elites applied the tech-
niques of organized crime, such as assassination, in 
politics and commerce in the immediate post-con-
flict period. The most spectacular example of this 
was the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister 
Zoran Đinđić in 2003 by organized crime figures 
who had managed to infiltrate the security services. 
This led to a major crackdown in Serbia and sent a 
message through the region that tolerance of organ-
ized crime was not sustainable.
The situation in South-East Europe has moved on 
considerably since that time, due in part to inten-
sive attention by the European Union. Much work 
has been done on building institutions and sup-
porting regional governments in making progress 
toward the goal of European integration. But insta-
bility remains a threat in some areas. 
Much of the remaining tension in the region is tied 
to the interests of rival strong men seeking to pro-
tect their fiefdoms, including the right to control 
criminal rackets. Of these, heroin trafficking routes 
are among the most lucrative. So long as powerful 
people remain involved in illicit activities, they will 
retain an interest in keeping the region off balance. 
They will also maintain the funds and the man-
power to promote instability if it suits their inter-
ests.
In addition to supporting peace and stability in the 
region, international cooperation on Balkan organ-
ized crime remains a priority because of the global 
dimensions of this activity. In particular, the huge 
flow of heroin that continues to go through the 
region is a matter of serious concern, and, more 
recently, Balkan criminals seem to be expanding 
their role in the European cocaine trade. The coun-
tries of South-East Europe do not have the means 
to stop these multi-billion dollar drug flows on 
their own.
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Main transnational organized 
crime threats
Afghanistan has not always been the world’s largest 
heroin producer. The title once belonged to Myan-
mar, which, from the 1980s until the 1990s, was 
the primary supplier to North America.58 It remains 
an important producer for the region, including 
Thailand and China. Opium production has been 
largely concentrated in the Shan State, the area of 
the country also most affected by insurgency.
Indeed, Myanmar’s declining role in global heroin 
markets is directly tied to the defeat of a key insur-
gent group. The Mong Tai Army, a separatist rebel 
group headed by the drug warlord, Khun Sa, was 
defeated in 1996.59 It controlled more than 70% of 
the heroin trade in the Golden Triangle at that 
time.60 The implementation of a number of peace 
agreements with the various ethnic rebel groups 
operating across the Shan State, some alternative 
development efforts in combination with Chinese 
pressure put on several of the ethnic groups in the 
eastern parts of Myanmar, led to massive declines in 
opium production. 
As a result of these efforts, over the 1996-2006 
period, the area under poppy cultivation fell from 
163,000 ha to 21,500 ha, a decline of 87%. The 
Kokang region, bordering China, became opium 
poppy free in 2001. The Wa region, also bordering 
China, was once the largest opium producing area of 
Myanmar, but it became poppy free in 2006. The 
other main opium production region, the North 
Shan State, which also borders China, reduced the 
area under poppy cultivation by 99% between 2003 
and 2006. By 2008, Myanmar accounted for only 
5% of the world’s total opium production, down 
from 30% in 1998. Since 2006, cultivation has again 
increased, however, reaching 31,700 ha in 2009, but 
this is still much lower than 10 or 20 years ago. 
The South Shan State, bordering Thailand, is cur-
rently the largest opium producing area, followed 
by the East Shan. These two areas accounted in 
2009 for around 90% of Myanmar’s total area under 
poppy cultivation. 
Since the late 1990s, partly in parallel to the mas-
sive declines in heroin production, methampheta-
mine production increased in the country, 
particularly in the regions where opium production 
declined. The territory controlled by the United Wa 
State Army (UWSA), the largest militant group, has 
been identified by both US and Thai sources as a 
major producer of methamphetamine, as well as 
territories controlled by the Shan State Army-South 
(SSA-S) and territories controlled by various groups 
inside the ethnic Chinese Kokang autonomous 
region.61 The number of arrests made for synthetic 
drug trafficking in Myanmar has already started to 
approach those made for heroin. The authorities in 
Myanmar dismantled 16 synthetic drug laborato-
ries and 24 heroin laboratories over the 2006-08 
period.62 These drugs are mainly destined for China 
and Thailand, though increasingly also affect other 
countries in South-East Asia (the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Cambodia and Viet Nam) as 
well as India.
OPIUM PRODUCTION IN MYANMAR, FIG. 191: 1990-2009
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Stability threat
Myanmar is categorized as one of the Least Devel-
oped Countries and is the second poorest country 
in Asia.63 It is also consistently rated as one of the 
countries most affected by corruption in the world, 
coming in third from the bottom in the Transpar-
ency International rankings in 2009. The country 
has been governed by the military since 1962, and 
at times more than 40 regional ethnic militias were 
engaged in armed conflict with the central authori-
ties. This fighting drove some 140,000 ethnic 
minority refugees to camps in Thailand and dis-
placed an even larger number within Myanmar.64 In 
1989 and subsequent years, a series of ceasefire 
agreements were concluded, mostly in exchange for 
some kind of local autonomy. A number of the 
ethnic groups, however, have continued their armed 
struggle or are in a position to take up the armed 
struggle at any moment. 
There were at least 16 different armed groups con-
trolling parts of the Shan State and the Kayah State 
in 2009.65 The strongest seems to be the United Wa 
State Army (UWSA), controlling the Wa region, as 
well as some border regions in South Shan and East 
Shan. Another important group is the Shan State 
National Army (SSNA), controlling several parts in 
North Shan and northern parts of the South Shan. 
South Shan is the most contested province, and it is 
also the province with the highest levels of cultiva-
tion. Most of the smaller groups see opium as a key 
source for generating income to maintain their mil-
itary power. Next to the SSNA, parts of the South 
Shan State are controlled by the Shan State Army 
(SSA), by the Shan State Nationalities People’s Lib-
eration Army (SNPLA), by the Shan State South 
company (SSS), by the Pa-O National Organiza-
tion (PNO), the Shan State Kayan New Land Party 
(KNLP) and the Kayan National Guard (KNG). 
Groups controlling the Kayah State include the 
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the 
Karenni State Nationalities Peoples’ Liberation 
Front (KNPLF). The Special Region 4 (S.R.4) is 
controlled by the National Democratic Alliance 
Army (NDAA). 
Links between TOC and stability threats
Being isolated from other sources of income, many 
of the insurgent groups turned to taxing of drug 
production as a major source of revenue. In addi-
tion, they were also reported to tax timber, gems, 
and other black-market goods passing through the 
territories which they control. The survival of many 
of these groups seems to depend on the illicit drug 
business. 
The 330 tons of opium produced in Myanmar in 
2009 generated around US$100 million in gross 
income for the farmers.66 It is not possible to calcu-
late the income earned by the drug traffickers, 
because there are no accurate data on heroin prices 
in the border regions. A very rough estimate would 
place heroin sales at around US$360 million in 
2009, with a range of perhaps US$140 to US$500 
million. Gross profits (income less amounts paid to 
farmers) would then be around US$260 million.67 
On this basis heroin sales would be equivalent to 
around 1.3% of the licit GDP of Myanmar.68 This 
is much less than in Afghanistan. So while drug 
sales allow rebel forces to remain mobilized, the 
country as a whole is not dependent on them.
Should the rebel forces need to become active again, 
they could very rapidly increase their drug income. 
Farmers in the region have the know-how to imme-
diately expand production if needed. One factor 
constraining yields in 2009 was the poor weather. If 
weather conditions had been the same as in 2008, 
the 2009 yield would have been 40% higher. The 
rebel groups could also become more actively 
involved in international trafficking if there were 
financial needs to do so, as Khun Sa’s Mong Tai 
army had done. Short-term incomes in excess of 
one billion dollars would not be out of the ques-
tion. But accessing this income requires interna-
tional trafficking to foreign consumption markets, 
many of them located half a world away. 
Reducing the potential for violence in South-East 
Asia will require addressing the transnational heroin 
trade, ATS production and regional trafficking, as 
well as all the other illicit activities that fuel armed 
groups in the region.
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Main transnational organized  
crime threat
Unlike the other areas reviewed with insurgency 
problems, the problem in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC) is not drugs, but the illicit 
extraction and smuggling of minerals. The DRC 
has tremendous mineral wealth, yet the Congolese 
are among the poorest people on earth, and they 
have grown poorer even as the value of their national 
assets has grown. One of the reasons for this appar-
ent paradox is organized crime: the looting and 
smuggling of gold and other minerals by armed 
groups who have assumed control of parts of the 
country. And despite decades of peace efforts, the 
insurgent groups who benefit from these minerals 
do not appear eager to come to the negotiating 
table. Until the mineral trafficking is addressed, the 
prospects for peace will be seriously undermined.
Insurgent groups in the eastern part of the country 
are arming themselves with money gained from 
illegal mining and mineral trafficking. The problem 
is an international one, with countries in the region 
serving as transit zones and wealthier nations as 
destinations for the contraband. Rwanda is particu-
larly affected – one of the key armed groups operat-
ing in the DRC is the ethnic Hutu Forces 
Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) 
– and the country is a key transit zone for trafficked 
minerals.69 But the traffic also affects Burundi, 
Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. 
Prime destination markets include Belgium, the 
United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates and 
Thailand.
While coltan used to be the biggest source of income 
for armed groups in the eastern DRC, gold and cas-
siterite (tin ore) have now replaced it. Gold prices 
have increased steadily over the last decade, and 
demand has been stable at just below 4,000 tons per 
year.70 
Demand for tin increased in the mid-2000s, peak-
ing at more than 363,000 tons per year in 2007, 
and prices increased accordingly.71 However, as a 
result of the global economic downturn in 2008, 
both demand for, and the price of, cassiterite have 
decreased. It is too early to tell whether this will 
significantly impact on the groups profiting from 
the trade.
While it is clear that armed groups are benefiting 
from supplying these markets, it is unclear how 
PRICE OF GOLD AND TIN, FIG. 194: 
2003-2009
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data
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traders in Canada, China, India and the Russian 
Federation increased their share.80
The stability/governance situation
The DRC is a country the size of Western Europe, 
sharing land borders with nine countries. Most 
Congolese today live within 100 kilometres of an 
international border and often have closer links 
with neighbouring countries than the central gov-
ernment.81 The distance from Kinshasa to the Kivus 
is more than 1,500 kilometres, practically inacces-
sible given the lack of paved roads. The country has 
experienced serious governance problems since 
independence, including the 32-year dictatorship of 
Mobutu Sese Seko, during which infrastructure was 
allowed to decay. 
In 1994, ethnic Hutu militias in Rwanda attacked 
the country’s Tutsi population, killing an estimated 
half a million people in about 100 days. When 
order was again restored, a large number of Hutus 
fled the country in fear of reprisals. Among them 
were militants, who continued to attack Rwanda. 
Some of these would evolve into today’s Forces 
Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). 
In 1996, the Rwandan and Ugandan militaries 
invaded the DRC, in order to defeat the Hutu and 
overthrow Mobutu Sese Seko. DRC politicians, 
who had wanted to depose Mobutu for some time, 
joined the offensive. 
In 1997, Laurent Kabila deposed Mobutu with the 
assistance of the Rwandan and Ugandan armies. In 
1998, Kabila broke with his allies, who refused to 
leave the country, so both backed new militia 
groups. Although the conflict formally ended in 
2003,82 the eastern part of the country – particu-
larly North and South Kivu – is still experiencing 
armed conflict. While there are several underlying 
issues,83 profits from illegal minerals are funding 
armed groups and thus perpetuating insecurity.
Following a “serious escalation of fighting”84 in 
North Kivu in the second half of 2008, the political 
situation changed dramatically in early 2009. The 
long-time leader of the armed group Congrès 
National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), Lau-
rent Nkunda, was arrested in Rwanda in January. 
Soon thereafter, several thousand combatants from 
CNDP, PARECO (Patriotes Résistants Congolais) 
and smaller armed groups were incorporated into 
the national army (the Forces Armées de la Répub-
lique Démocratique du Congo – FARDC).85 
In spite of the political progress, the Forces 
Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) 
remains active, and millions of dollars continue to 
flow into its coffers.86 Although the CNDP is now 
ostensibly a part of FARDC, the movement and its 
revenue-generating capacities remain distinct.87 For 
example, at Bisie mine in Walikale, North Kivu, 
which produces some 70% of the province’s cassi-
terite, a former CNDP officer was assigned to col-
lecting taxes on behalf of the government, and he 
continues controlling part of the mine’s produc-
tion.88
CASSITERITE FROM NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU, MAIN IMPORTERS BY  FIG. 197: 
COUNTRY OF REGISTRATION, 2007
Source: Global Witness, “Faced with a gun, what can you do?”  
War and the militarisation of mining in eastern Congo, July 2009, p. 60. 
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Linkages between TOC and stability 
threats
The United Nations has established clear links 
between illicit mineral exploitation and trafficking 
and armed conflict in the eastern DRC through the 
work of its Group of Experts. The Group’s reports89 
have detailed how income gained from this trade 
has enabled various armed groups to build up their 
military capacities and challenge the Government’s 
territorial control, particularly in North and South 
Kivu.
The Forces Démocratiques de Libération du 
Rwanda (FDLR), a predominantly Rwandan Hutu 
group, is the group that has benefited most from 
illicit minerals. Its control of gold and cassiterite 
mines, particularly in South Kivu, continues to 
generate large revenues. It is involved in trafficking 
minerals by road to Rwanda, and has close ties to a 
number of traders and trading houses. For example, 
the top five cassiterite comptoirs in South Kivu in 
2007 (according to Government export statistics) 
had direct financial links to negociants who work 
with the FDLR.90 
In 2009, the newly-integrated FARDC, with assist-
ance from the Rwandan Defence Force, launched 
an offensive aimed at weakening the FDLR’s mili-
tary capabilities. It targeted key FDLR bases and 
strategic locations. The offensive failed, however, 
and FDLR is still deeply entrenched in South Kivu, 
particularly in key mining areas.91 
The Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple 
(CNDP) has often chosen more indirect methods 
of profiteering from the natural resources. This 
group controls a key border crossing with Rwanda,92 
imposes various forms of “taxation” on the produc-
tion and trafficking of minerals, and exerts pressure 
on mineral traders and buying houses for cuts of 
their profits. Some parts of North Kivu are, in fact, 
under parallel civilian administrations, with CNDP-
appointees working in administrative offices of 
some local government entities. For example, in 
Masisi, CNDP officials are collecting a number of 
local taxes.93
PARECO and various community-based armed 
groups (known as “Mai Mai”) also benefit finan-
cially from the trade in illicit minerals, but usually 
in an opportunistic way. This also reflects the fact 
that these groups tend to lack a well-defined eco-
nomic and political agenda.94
Finally, elements of the Congolese military forces 
are also deeply entrenched in and benefiting from 
the trade. The UN Group of Experts argued that 
“the Group believes that it is not in the interest of 
certain FARDC commanders to end the conflict in 
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo as long 
as their units are able to deploy to, and profit from, 
mining areas.”95 
In other words, the trafficking of minerals is key to 
conflict in the DRC. Addressing this conflict will 
require addressing the transnational organized crime 
that fuels it. If, through internationally coordinated 
efforts, this flow were to be stemmed, many of the 
combatants would lose their ability, and perhaps 
their will, to fight. Efforts similar to those used in 
the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds could 
make a major difference in the security of the 
DRC.
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Main transnational organized  
crime threat
Somalia is a single state comprised of three autono-
mous zones: Somaliland, Puntland, and the residual 
Somalia, which has been contested by rival armed 
groups for nearly two decades. In this context, it is 
difficult to speak of threats to the state, but any-
thing that serves to aggravate and spread instability 
must be addressed. The recent growth of maritime 
piracy, bringing millions of dollars in ransom money 
to armed criminals, poses this threat.
Piracy has been around as long as people have 
depended on seaways for transport and trade. Inci-
dents of piracy in Somalia, the country with the 
longest coastline on the African continent, have 
increased rapidly in recent years, as has the coun-
try’s share of global piracy incidents. In the early 
2000s, Somali pirates were responsible for around 
5% of global attacks. In 2009, out of 406 reported 
incidents, more than half (217) were attributed to 
Somali pirates.
The pirates claim to be defending the coastline of 
Somalia from illicit fishing and toxic waste dump-
ing, but their actions belie their words. As the 
number of pirate attacks in the region has increased, 
commercial fleets have been advised to steer farther 
and farther from the Somali coast. This has com-
pelled the pirates to travel farther in search of vic-
tims, and they now attack craft having absolutely 
no relation to their domestic waters. Playing the 
role of the national defender has won the pirates 
some public legitimacy; important because they are 
dependent on community support on shore. This 
line is becoming increasingly implausible, but the 
practice has become so widespread that it may not 
matter any more.
Pirates are now operating more than 1,000 nautical 
miles (1,852 kilometers) from the shore, which 
means they are capable of targeting ships off the 
coasts of Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Seychelles and Madagascar, as well as in the Indian 
ocean.96 As the principal waterways become better 
policed, the location of piracy incidents has shifted 
away from the Gulf of Aden and towards the south-
eastern coast of Somalia. In 2008, less than 20% of 
the attacks took place outside the Gulf; in 2009, 
more than 40% did.
The main method for targeting vessels is for the 
pirates to wait in skiffs, usually some 50 nautical 
miles off the coast, on the lookout for a suitable 
vessel to attack. This method is used both in the 
Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean. However, 
there are also reports of pirates being equipped with 
GPS and tracking ships through the use of on board 
navigation information systems. They are also 
believed to have built up a large network of coastal 
and port informants.97
Once a vessel has been targeted for attack, several 
small skiffs are released from pirate “mother ships”,98 
prepared to attack the vessel simultaneously from 
different directions. This method of attacking 
moving vessels is currently very common for Somali 
piracy; it is used much less frequently by other 
pirates.99 Assault rifles and/or rocket-propelled gre-
nades are now used in most attacks by Somali 
pirates.100 At least some of the pirates involved usu-
ally manage to board the vessel and capture the 
(generally unarmed) crew.101 Bulk carriers, con-
tainer ships and general cargo ships comprise the 
majority of piracy victims.102 This is likely due to 
their relatively large size and slow speed. 
The hijacked vessel is then brought to one of the 
main bases of operation, Eyl, Hobyo or Haradheere,103 
and negotiations for ransom can commence. The 
pirates have set up safe locations onshore from 
where they can conduct ransom negotiations.104 
Companies that pay ransoms are understandably 
reluctant to reveal the amount, and the pirates 
themselves are not a reliable source, but the figures 
mentioned are frequently in the millions of dollars. 
In January 2010, a record ransom of either US$5.5 
or 9 million was paid.105 With 47 successful hijack-
ings in 2009, the annual profit generated by piracy 
could amount to tens of millions of dollars, in a 
country with a GDP of some 2.5 billion dollars.106 
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There is anecdotal evidence that as many as 1,400 
Somali men are now actively engaged in piracy.107 
Two main piracy networks have been identified: 
one in the semi-autonomous northern Puntland 
and another in the south-central Mudug region.108 
The most prominent pirate groups today seem to 
have their roots in Somali coastal fishing communi-
ties, especially in north-eastern and central Somalia, 
and their organization tend to reflects Somali clan-
based social structures.109 
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The stability/governance situation
After the 22-year dictatorship of Siad Barre and 18 
years of civil war, the Government collapsed in 
1991. Numerous attempts at establishing a central 
authority since then have failed. Somalia still does 
not have an effective national government which 
controls the entire country. Indeed, it has three 
administrations with differing objectives: 1) the 
Transitional Federal Government, which aims to be 
the national government; 2) Government of Soma-
liland, which aims to be the government of an inde-
pendent Somaliland; and 3) Government of 
Puntland, which aims to be the government of the 
semi-autonomous region of Puntland.
While the election of President Sheikh Sharif Sheik 
Ahmed in January 2009 brought some optimism, as 
his ascent to power was brought about by a union 
between the former enemies of the Transitional 
Federal Government and the Islamic Courts Union; 
unfortunately, this union was short-lived. Somalia 
once again descended into a state of anarchy, and 
the insurgent groups Al Shabaab and the Hizbul 
Islam coalition attempted to take Mogadishu.110 
Since early May, in addition to the intermittent 
attacks on Government forces, there have been tar-
geted killings by insurgent groups, such as the June 
assassination of Omar Hashi Aden, the serving 
Minister of National Security.111
The President and his government have sought 
engagement with armed opposition groups, includ-
ing the Hizbul Islam coalition. There have also been 
consultations with influential clan elders and Islamic 
clerics in efforts to broaden domestic support for 
the stabilization of the country. However, these 
engagements have proved to be challenging, in large 
part due to inflexibility among hard line insur-
gents.112 
Of the three entities that constitute Somalia, Soma-
liland has the best established central government, 
whereas the putative national Government in 
Mogadishu is the weakest. Even the Somaliland 
Government struggles to deliver basic public serv-
ices. Four fundamental shortcomings affect all three 
governments, namely inadequate governance sys-
tems, human resources, public service delivery and 
physical infrastructure.113
In Puntland, which is a base for pirates, the political 
situation was recently described as “generally 
calm,114 in spite of occasional violent incidents, 
abductions and assassinations.115 Two Members of 
Parliament were also assassinated in separate inci-
dents in January 2010.116 
It has been argued that the common strand linking 
all Somali insurgents is a perception that the inter-
national community has been indifferent to the 
country’s sovereignty and the interests of ordinary 
Somalis. For example, some see the Transitional 
Federal Government as a foreign imposition. The 
American missile strike that killed the leader of one 
of the main insurgency groups, Al-Shabaab, in 
2008, provoked intense anger across the country, 
even among those who do not support the 
group.117 
It is clear that Somalia has severe problems estab-
lishing even the most basic governmental structures, 
let alone tackling piracy. Moreover, resources to 
improve the situation are scarce and unpredictable: 
the Transitional Federal Government forecast a total 
expenditure of US$110 million on anti-piracy 
measures in 2010, 80% of which depends on for-
eign assistance.118 
Linkages between TOC and stability 
threats
Somali piracy is clearly linked to the general lawless-
ness in the country. The instability is enabling 
piracy to flourish, as pirates have little to fear from 
a state that lacks capacity to prevent, expose and 
prosecute the crime. Pirates can generally operate 
with impunity,119 and may even enjoy an air of 
respectability within their communities.
Other cases presented in this chapter illustrate how 
the development of organized crime activities in a 
context of instability and weak governance can 
impact the situation that created it. One commen-
tator argues that “the failure of governance has…
resulted in a climate of insecurity in Somalia, which 
led to the development of a criminal economy. The 
reign of terror which has plagued Somalia on land 
created the environment for the extension of vio-
lence to the sea, and the profit from piracy in turn 
again sustains the insurgency in the country as a 
whole.”120 
While Somalia may indeed become trapped in a 
“vicious circle”, it is currently not clear to what 
extent piracy is driving instability. The links between 
pirates and insurgents are not clear-cut. Neither of 
the two main insurgent groups, Al-Shabaab and the 
Hizbul Islam coalition,121 are known to be directly 
involved in piracy, but it has been reported that Al-
Shabaab (AS) does have some links to pirates. 
Pirates have apparently approached AS for combat 
training, and AS is learning about maritime opera-
tions from the pirates. It also appears that AS is 
capable of taxing piracy. For example, when the 
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group captured the southern port of Kismayo, it 
was reported that pirates operating out of the port 
had to pay “protection money” in order to be left 
alone.122 
The “operational synergies” that may exist between 
some of the pirates and AS seem to be limited to the 
pirates of Haradheere (north of Mogadishu), who 
are from the same clans as many of AS. Due to clan 
rivalry, the pirates north of Haradheere are likely to 
have limited connections with AS.123 In addition to 
indirectly funding insurgency, there is concern 
about the growing influence of the pirates on what 
government exists. 124 Politicians who wish to remain 
in power may be loathe to challenge the pirates, 
given their wealth and, often, popular support. In 
Puntland, piracy is said to be penetrating all levels 
of society. The pirates’ annual income dwarfs the 
Government’s budget,125 and a number of Puntland 
ministers are suspected of involvement in piracy.126
In short, in addition to addressing the security con-
cerns around a very important maritime trade route, 
efforts to address piracy should also contribute to 
the efforts to restore order to Somalia. Wealthy 
organized criminals are yet one more powerful 
group with an interest in instability. And any wealth 
entering the country at this stage is likely to find its 
way into the hands of the militant groups who con-
trol so much of the territory of the country.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RESPONSE
This chapter has illustrated the ways that transna-
tional organized crime is both a symptom and a 
cause of instability in a diverse range of regions 
around the world. Both organized crime and insur-
gency undermine the rule of law. Together, they 
pose an even greater challenge to stability. Left 
unaddressed, criminal riches can buy the arms and 
the influence to affect the course of political events, 
particularly in the poorer areas of the world. And 
the direction of this influence is almost always 
toward further conflict, as the downward cycle feeds 
upon itself.
This insidious link can provide a point of insertion 
for intervention, however. Contraband flows can 
have devastating local effects, but their dynamics 
are almost always international. Interventions can 
be targeted in areas less problematic than war zones. 
Strategies aimed addressing these flows could play a 
pivotal role in addressing civil conflict, by removing 
the profit motive that keeps many antagonists 
armed and in the field. Put simply, reducing crime 
can help foster peace.
For example, the two most problematic illicit drugs 
– cocaine and heroin – leave a swathe of destruction 
in many regions affected by the trade. If the flow of 
these drugs were significantly reduced, this could 
pay dividends in reducing violence and, in some 
cases, conflicts around the world.
The problem is that most efforts against drugs are 
national, or, at best, bilateral, when the scale of the 
trafficking is global. Without a strategy scaled to fit 
the size of the problem, successful national efforts 
run the risk of simply displacing contraband flows. 
When opposed, the drug markets in cocaine and 
heroin have consistently adapted, finding new cul-
tivation areas, new transit zones, and new consumer 
markets. In many cases, they have settled in the 
areas of least resistance, which are precisely the areas 
least equipped to deal with the challenge. And it is 
here that organized crime can escalate to the level of 
being a threat to stability.
The world does have a framework for dealing with 
these drugs internationally, in the form of the three 
drug Conventions (of 1961, 1971, and 1988), the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, and the Convention against Cor-
ruption, which provide a platform upon which 
cooperation can occur. A great deal of successful 
collaboration has occurred under this aegis, but 
more could be done. Too often, work under the 
Conventions has been limited to law enforcement, 
while transnational organized crime cannot be 
reduced to a criminal justice issue. The Conven-
tions provide a bedrock, but they do not constitute 
a global strategy, and they do not frame drug traf-
ficking as a matter of international security. 
To deal comprehensively with these intractable and 
interlinked issues, there can be no substitute for 
coordinated international action. One area where 
immediate progress can be made is to fully integrate 
crime prevention into United Nations peace opera-
tions. The Security Council recently invited “the 
Secretary-General to consider these threats as a 
factor in conflict prevention strategies, conflict 
analysis, integrated missions’ assessment and plan-
ning and to consider including in his reports, as 
appropriate, analysis on the role played by these 
threats in situations on its agenda.”127 The United 
Nations is best suited to provide the leadership 
needed to address these global issues at the level 
required. But doing so will necessitate moving 
beyond the disciplinary silos that distinguish organ-
ized crime from other security threats. It will mean 
acting as one United Nations, making use of the full 
range of military, development and crime preven-
tion tools available.
CONCLUSION
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This report has been framed as a threat assessment, 
so it is fair to ask: which transnational organized 
crime flow poses the greatest global threat?
Throughout the report, when feasible, an estimated 
dollar value has been ascribed to each flow, in order 
to facilitate comparison. Of course, this is just one 
metric, and others may be more significant, as dis-
cussed below. But higher value flows can pose a 
higher risk because they place more money in the 
hands of criminals, who may use it to put bullets in 
guns or to bribe officials. This kind of comparison 
is especially useful when looking at areas where 
organized crime could pose a threat to the state.
The value estimates presented in this report must be 
regarded as extremely tentative. Since the data are 
incomplete everywhere, different estimation meth-
ods have been employed with each flow, and this 
affects their comparability. Many are based on sei-
zures, which reflect an unknown level of enforce-
ment success. In general, they should be seen more 
as indicators of the order of magnitude of the prob-
lem than figures of any precision.
Still, the differences between flows discussed in this 
report are striking. Drugs remain the highest value 
illicit commodities trafficked internationally, by 
quite a wide margin. The flows coming closest are 
actually those best integrated into licit markets – 
counterfeit goods and illicit timber – as well as 
those involving illicit human movement. Firearms, 
for reasons described above, make up some of the 
lowest value flows. The estimated total value of the 
flows considered in this report is about US$125 
billion per year, of which about 85% is generated by 
drug markets.
In addition to absolute value, a number of factors 
can affect the threat posed by a particular flow. 
Flows that direct a large amount of money to a 
small number of individuals or groups are more 
dangerous than those where the proceeds are more 
widely disbursed. Migrant smuggling from Mexico 
to the US results in billions of dollars changing 
hands, as much as local profits from cocaine, but so 
many hands are involved that the threat is much 
less. The identities of the traffickers is also clearly 
relevant, as is the location where the value accrues. 
Those who manufacture counterfeits in East Asia 
generate huge revenues collectively, but none of 
these people has any interest in taking on the state. 
The same amount of money in the hands of mili-
tants in Central Africa would be considerably more 
problematic.
The nature of the enterprise is also relevant. Human 
trafficking, for example, involves a lot of overheads. 
In the case of women trafficked to Europe for the 
purposes of sexual exploitation, it involves the hous-
ing and upkeep of some 140,000 workers, plus the 
costs of security and marketing. Turnover may be 
large, but profits, many of which accrue to small 
trafficking groups, are likely to be relatively small. 
In comparison, almost all the money gained through 
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identity theft is profit, with operating costs reduced 
to the price of an Internet connection.
Weighing all these considerations, drugs appear to 
generate the most dangerous flow of profits, fol-
lowed by environmental resources. Individual traf-
fickers may make tens of millions, if not hundreds 
of millions, of dollars in a relative small number of 
transactions. Production areas are often affected by 
insurgency, and transit countries often suffer both 
from either high rates of murder, high levels of cor-
ruption, or both. With core demand generated by a 
consumer base of addicts, drugs also represent a 
long-term source of income for organized crime 
groups. But drug flows also illustrate that it does 
not take a lot of money to cause a lot of damage. 
Traffickers and insurgents in Afghanistan, for exam-
ple, command only a small share of the value of the 
global heroin market, but cause far more violence 
than traffickers in Europe, where most of the value 
of the market resides. Similarly, those who fight 
over extractive industries in Africa may be compet-
ing for relatively small amounts of money, but in 
the context, these profits are worth killing for.
Although important, the impact of destabilizing 
money flows is just one aspect of the threat posed 
by organized crime. The direct impact of drugs, 
which have resulted in addiction, disease and death 
for millions, is equally severe. The violation of 
human rights when a woman is trafficked for sexual 
exploitation, or when a child is violated for pornog-
raphy, can never be adequately quantified. Firearms 
trafficking may not generate the largest incomes, 
but can even more directly challenge peace and 
stability. The market for tiger parts may be worth 
only a few million dollars per year, but the poachers 
pursuing this market could still drive these animals 
to extinction. 
Another way of looking at the threat is to look at 
the trend. Only four of the 16 TOC problems dis-
cussed in this report are clearly increasing, but this 
may be because only the largest and best established 
flows were included. Some organized crime prob-
lems have been around for decades, and may already 
be declining due to interventions and other factors. 
Others are rapidly emerging, and it may be possible 
to take action before the problem spirals out of 
control. For example, there has been a recent surge 
in demand for rhino horn associated with growth of 
the market in the east; a demand that could cause 
irreversible damage in a short period of time if not 
addressed.
In addition, the trend in the volume of contraband 
moved and the trend in threat may point in differ-
ent directions. For example, the cocaine flow to the 
United States has been in long-term decline, with a 
sudden drop off since 2006. At the same time, vio-
lence associated with this flow has dramatically 
increased. Changes in routing can also strongly 
affect the threat posed by a trafficking flow, such as 
when cocaine to Europe began to be diverted 
through West Africa. 
In the end, it appears that drugs remain the back-
bone of transnational organized crime, command-
ing the largest share of revenues, and fuelling 
violence, corruption, conflict and addiction. But 
this report has examined only a few markets in 
natural resources, and it is possible that some could 
be comparable both in scale and in impact, at least 
in the source countries. More research is needed on 
these extractive markets and their relationship with 
TOC and conflict.
Given this complexity, can any meaningful lessons 
be drawn from the findings of this report about 
TOC as a whole? At least three major points come 
to the fore:
Because most traﬃcking ﬂows are driven 1. 
more by the market than by the groups 
involved in them, eﬀorts that target these 
groups – the traditional law enforcement re-
sponse – are unlikely to be successful on their 
own.
Because TOC markets are global in scale, 2. 
global strategies are required to address them, 
and anything else is likely to produce un-
wanted side eﬀects, often in the most vulner-
able countries.
Because globalized commerce has made it dif-3. 
ﬁcult to distinguish the licit from the illicit, 
enhanced regulation and accountability in 
licit commerce could undermine demand for 
illicit goods and services.
Responding to TOC markets re-
quires more than law enforcement
The preceding chapters have illustrated what was 
suggested at the outset of this report: most of what 
we call “transnational organized crime” today is 
rooted in market forces, not the plotting of profes-
sional criminal groups. For example, a large number 
of people know that firearms legally acquired in the 
United States can be sold for much more in Mexico. 
No mastermind is needed to coordinate the hun-
dreds of straw purchasers required to satisfy demand. 
Similarly, people in rural areas of South-East Asia 
understand that the wildlife that surrounds them 
has value. So long as the buyers remain in certain 
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well-known collection points, no one has to con-
tract these traditional hunters to do the job. Sophis-
ticated structures are not needed to dispatch 
teetering boatloads of migrants into the Atlantic or 
the Mediterranean, or to post stolen credit card 
information on underground bulletin boards. Piracy 
in Somalia has become a vocation, almost a move-
ment. Individual pirate groups may become more 
or less important, but for as long as the opportunity 
exists and barriers to entry are low, there will be 
many young men willing to risk their lives for a shot 
at escaping conflict and hunger.
This is not to say that organized criminal groups are 
irrelevant to global TOC problems. Triad-type 
groups mediate relations between traffickers and 
officials in many markets in Asia. The Camorra 
remains important in receiving and distributing 
counterfeit goods in Europe, as well as in a number 
of other rackets. The Mexican cartels are becoming 
multi-crime enterprises, likely to endure even if 
cocaine demand were to dry up. These and many 
less well-known groups play an important role in 
promoting contraband provision and sales of illicit 
services. Much like insurgents, many take advan-
tage of their geographic control and network of 
corrupt officials to facilitate the business of crime. 
In doing so, they can acquire tremendous power, 
and become a problem in their own right. But in 
the end, they are participants in the market, not the 
source of it.
The implications of this central finding are several. 
While arresting and incarcerating individual perpe-
trators is important for its general deterrent effect, 
doing so is not sufficient to counteract illicit trade. 
So long as there is standing demand, and there 
remain areas where illicit goods can be sourced and 
trafficked, the market will adapt to any loss of per-
sonnel. Since the problem of TOC cannot be 
resolved purely through arrests and seizures, it 
cannot be reduced to a criminal justice issue. The 
solutions will require a much broader range of tools 
than those currently in the hands of law enforce-
ment officials.
Global strategies are needed for 
global problems
Of the 16 crime problems examined in this report, 
13 are intercontinental. What happens in these 
markets is a product of supply on one end of the 
world and demand on another, as well as conditions 
in a string of transit countries. Interventions at any 
point in this chain will have implications for every 
link. From a global perspective, national or even 
regional efforts made in isolation can be worse than 
ineffective; they can be counterproductive, as the 
problem is pushed from regions that pose resistance 
to those that do not, or cannot. 
Treating transnational organized crime markets will 
require two parallel sets of measures. First, there is 
a need to strengthen global resistance to TOC by 
building both the national and international capac-
ity to track and respond to the problem. This is 
something like strengthening the immune system, 
and represents a long-term collective project. 
Second, there is a need to create global strategies to 
collectively address TOC problems that have 
become so acute that they require special interven-
tion. This is more like a response to a particular 
infection, and would involve international strategic 
planning. In either case, the intervention must 
occur systemically, involving the whole organism. 
Both supply side and demand side measures must 
be coordinated, and the problem must be approached 
at a global level.
Regulating the licit can curtail  
the illicit
Traditional approaches tend to focus on influencing 
the behaviour of people whose behaviour is very 
difficult to influence. Many of those involved in 
TOC markets have very little to lose. Some are 
desperately poor, and contribute to global crime 
because there are few alternative options available. 
Some are marginal members of affluent societies, 
who participate in TOC as part of a broader coun-
terculture. Of course, there are organized criminals 
who are both privileged and greedy, but they gener-
ally rely on the work of countless others who are not 
so well-off. 
It is difficult to deter the desperate and the marginal 
with the threat of incarceration. These are often 
people for whom the immediate rewards of partici-
pation in TOC seem far more significant than the 
distant possibility of arrest. Coca and opium poppy 
farmers, street gang members, drug-addicted sex 
workers, straw purchasers, bush meat poachers, 
trafficking victims turned traffickers, the illegal 
migrants who vend counterfeit goods and the small 
manufacturers who produce them: most of the 
people who make illicit markets possible either do 
not appreciate that what they are doing is wrong, or 
they no longer care. Many are focused on making it 
through the day, and for some, imprisonment is not 
the least attractive alternative.
But there is another group of people whose behav-
iour is very important to maintaining these mar-
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kets, a group with quite a bit to lose if they are 
found to be operating outside the law: those who 
operate on the licit side of these same markets.
Lack of clarity about the origin of certain goods 
allows otherwise honest buyers, including commer-
cial firms, to purchase illicit merchandise. This 
results in much larger demand than there would 
normally be for contraband goods. When products 
are sold openly, the average buyer assumes they can 
be bought in good conscience. Professional buying 
agents may be under pressure to find the cheapest 
source available, and globalized commerce has made 
it impossible to individually screen each vendor. 
Regulating these markets globally would eliminate 
the good faith buyer pool, substantially reducing 
demand for contraband. All suppliers to the licit 
market internationally must be carefully monitored 
to ensure nothing illegal gets passed off as legitimate 
goods.
For example, trafficked timber and minerals enter 
the legitimate supply chain and are used by compa-
nies that can claim ignorance as to the ultimate 
origin of these commodities. Counterfeit goods and 
medicines are often produced by the same firms 
that make the licensed products and may be sold 
from legitimate wholesale and retail outlets. Simi-
larly, the trade in illicit ivory is only lucrative because 
there is a parallel licit supply, and ivory can be sold 
and used openly. Ivory would lose much of its mar-
ketability if buying it were unequivocally an illegal 
act, or if ownership of these status goods had to be 
concealed. In some cases, consumers are duped; in 
others, there is willing blindness. If the source of 
these products were clearly documented interna-
tionally, they would not be confronted with this 
dilemma.
The same may even be true of services. Whatever 
decision a national government makes on the legal-
ity of foreign workers or the sex trade, this decision 
must be enforced. The line between the legal and 
the illegal must be clear and consistently enforced. 
There must be no grey area, because this grey area 
conceals the workings of transnational organized 
crime.
Illicit drugs remain one of the few items discussed 
in this report that are illicit on their face, but even 
these are reliant on poorly regulated international 
commerce in chemical precursors. When only legit-
imate users of acetic anhydride can access it, for 
example, heroin production will be considerably 
more difficult.
A number of the most significant flows discussed in 
this report are by-products of licit commerce that 
has globalized at a rate in excess of our collective 
ability to regulate them. Supply chains are not sub-
ject to comprehensive audit because no one can 
keep track of the myriad products being shuffled 
back and forth across national borders. What goes 
on domestically remains obscured, and trade secrets 
have come to be regarded as matters of national 
security. It is in this murk and muddle that transna-
tional trafficking germinates. 
Putting an end to the parallel trade in illicit goods 
is part of the larger project of bringing transparency 
and accountability to global commercial flows, but 
considerable progress could be made by focusing on 
a few of the most problematic commodities. The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative pro-
vides an example in the oil and mineral field. A 
similar effort could be mounted for environmental 
resources, and global accountability programmes 
launched for arms, pharmaceuticals, and even cer-
tain sectors of manufactured goods and chemicals.
More accurate accounting of containerized ship-
ping could also help reduce the volumes of contra-
band transported internationally. Most global 
commercial flows proceed by sea, but at present, 
transnational shipping is a chaotic affair, with inter-
national waters a largely lawless zone. Progress has 
been made in assuring bulk carriers are licensed and 
monitored. So too should be their cargoes, if com-
mercial accountability is to become a reality.
Of course, this logic does not apply to those forms 
of organized crime that are predatory, rather than 
market-based, such as identity theft and piracy. 
Arrest and seizures are not much more likely to 
curtail these activities than they are to eliminate 
contraband markets, however. Internet access is 
growing in the developing world, where law enforce-
ment capacity is limited, and there is currently no 
viable criminal justice system in Somalia. Here, the 
solutions are more likely to be technological, aimed 
at making it more difficult to acquire money in 
these ways. In the end, each flow is unique, and the 
interventions required to address it cannot be pre-
scribed without detailed consideration of the par-
ticularities, but the potential for taming the illicit 
by regulating the licit should be explored in each 
instance.
Coming to terms with TOC
This report represents the first attempt by UNODC 
to survey the broad terrain of transnational organ-
ized crime. It comes nearly 10 years after the meet-
ing in Palermo that gave birth to the Convention. 
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Progress has been slow in coming to terms with this 
multi-faceted and complex topic. It is hoped this 
threat assessment will help promote the interna-
tional cooperation required to take on these global 
problems.
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